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Abstract
Voluntary business regulation at the transnational level is becoming a significant 
feature o f global environmental governance. The thesis considers the origins o f the 
Equator Principles, a voluntary code o f conduct created by commercial banks to 
manage environmental and social risks associated with project financing in 
developing countries. Based on the operational policies o f the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the framework has thus far been adopted by over 60 commercial 
banks since its launch in June 2003, representing over 85 percent o f the global project 
finance market.
The thesis argues that the rise o f private environmental governance in the commercial 
project finance market is closely linked to the emergence and diffusion o f 
environment and social norms in the international system. It traces the normative 
origins o f the Equator Principles to the theory and practice o f environmental project 
review first institutionalized at the World Bank in the early 1970s, then later 
expanded and applied to the IFC’s private sector projects as well. The thesis argues 
that the rise o f a corporate accountability movement in the financial sector was the 
principal reason why commercial banks decided to collaborate and create a common 
industry standard based on environmental and social norms institutionalized in 
multilateral institutions.
It makes three main contributions to our understanding o f private environmental 
governance formation. First, the power o f transnational advocacy groups to influence 
corporate behavior is determined by the legitimacy of the norms they promote as well 
as political opportunities presented by market structures. Secondly, international 
organizations are increasingly facilitating and legitimizing voluntary business 
regulation as the most effective institutional form o f governance for integrating 
public interest concerns into transnational markets. And third, voluntary business 
regulation, such as the Equator Principles, is positioning private actors and forms o f 
authority at the center o f transnational rule-making processes, producing systems o f 
rules that both challenge and reinforce international law, regimes and institutions.
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7. Introduction: The Greening o f Global Project Finance
Introduction
Capital is crossing national boundaries like never before. The increasingly permissive 
environment for global capital has enabled a dramatic growth in the scale and pace of 
financial market transactions, resulting in unprecedented profits for transnational 
investors. While recent events have also illustrated the risk that banks are exposed to 
in this integrated market environment, their revenue potential has increased 
remarkably during the past two decades. Alongside the deregulation o f banking in 
OECD countries, financial globalization has produced a new tier o f global banks that 
are increasingly influencing the distribution o f long-term capital across countries and 
industry sectors. Whether providing financing in support of commercial logging in 
Indonesia, oil and gas production in Central Asia or telecommunications 
infrastructure in Nigeria, the growth o f commercial financing directly to development 
projects have made global banks central to the national economic development 
aspirations o f many countries.
While such projects often stimulate economic growth by expanding exports, they may 
also generate significant adverse impacts on the environment and local communities. 
As a result, transnational corporations (TNCs) operating in developing countries (and 
the commercial banks that finance their expansion) are increasingly facing public 
demands for greater corporate accountability and transparency, as host country laws 
and regulations are often deemed inadequate or poorly enforced. In the 1990s, the 
commercial project finance industry became the source o f much criticism from 
environmental activists because o f the ecological and social harms associated with 
large, capital-intensive projects, such as power plants, open-pit mines, pipelines, and 
ports. It manifested itself in public campaigns against several commercial banks with 
a long-standing presence in the project finance market being accused o f encouraging 
deforestation in Indonesia, undermining the human rights o f indigenous people in 
Ecuador, or fueling corruption in Chad.
In June 2003, ten large commercial banks announced their joint intention to 
voluntarily apply the World Bank’s environmental and social standards and project 
review procedures to their project financing worldwide. By adopting the Equator 
Principles, they publicly declared a commitment to screen all project proposals for 
adverse environmental and social impacts. Under the framework, they must require 
borrowers o f funds for large projects to commission environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs), conduct consultations with project-affected communities, and 
develop an environmental action plan that identifies mitigation measures and 
benchmarks. In turn, compliance with the action plan would be integrated into the 
loan agreement between the commercial bank and the borrower, and a violation o f  it 
could in principle be used by the commercial bank as a legal justification to withhold 
loan disbursements.
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Hailed as a milestone in the evolution o f responsible lending practices, the Equator 
Principles have become the most well-known and far-reaching voluntary initiative in 
the financial sector.1 It emerged out o f policy discussions between leading 
commercial banks, in consultation with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
the private sector lending arm o f the World Bank Group. To date, more than 60 
financial institutions - including Barclays, HSBC, Citigroup and ABN Amro - have 
publicly declared a commitment to apply the framework to their project financing, 
representing over four-fifths o f the global project finance market. This remarkable 
support for the policy framework within the commercial banking industry stands in 
sharp contrast to the situation less than a decade ago, when commercial lenders 
commonly argued that applying the World Bank’s standards to their project finance 
investments was not within their commercial mandates to maximize shareholder 
value. More broadly, this attitude reflected the long-standing view that a private 
financial institution could not and should not restrict the decision-making autonomy 
o f borrowers on matters not directly relevant to the financial risk o f  the project loan.
Against this backdrop, the primary objective o f this thesis is to explain why the 
Equator Principles emerged and subsequently gained widespread approval among 
commercial banks operating in the global project finance market. More specifically, 
why would commercial banks voluntarily subject their project financing activities to 
a set o f public standards at a time when their financial power in the global economy 
was unprecedented and growing? On the back o f extraordinary profits, it seems 
counterintuitive that they would publicly announce their commitment to apply a due 
diligence framework that curtails their decision-making autonomy when making 
financing decisions about large projects, and requires borrowers to undertake impact 
mitigation measures that may add both time and cost to project preparation. In an 
increasingly competitive marketplace, financial institutions that apply such practices 
could very well lose business in cases where potential borrowers do not see the 
commercial value in abiding by them and have access to alternative sources o f project 
financing with no such strings attached.
The emergence of the Equator Principles reflects a broader trend in global 
governance towards the greater inclusion and influence o f private actors in 
transnational rule-making. The recent decade has seen a proliferation o f new forms o f 
private governance that organize TNCs around sets o f voluntary commitments to 
responsible corporate conduct. In many cases, they aim to capture the efficiency gains 
that stem from harmonizing business norms and practices across national 
jurisdictions. These initiatives often take the form o f voluntary codes o f conduct, 
industry standards and guidelines that define norms for corporate behavior in relation 
to a wide variety o f public interest concerns, such as human and civil rights, 
environmental issues, corruption, and labor.2 For example, the Coalition for
1 The document that describes the Equator Principles, as well as press releases from all the financial 
institutions that have adopted them, can be found at www.equator-principles.com. (See Appendix 1)
2 For brief overviews, see Bendell (2004), pp.25-28, Lipchutz and Fogel (2002), pp. 125-129, Newell
(2001), pp.91-95, and Utting (2005), pp.2-3.
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Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) emerged out o f discussions 
between companies, environmentalists and churches, calling on the private sector to 
reduce pollution, conserve non-renewable resources, and use sustainable energy as 
evaluation criteria for selecting Board members. Similar voluntary regulation is 
facilitated by the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 
the International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC), and the U.S Climate Action 
Partnership (USCAP).
Therefore, the Equator Principles is a useful case study for studying broader 
institutional transformations in global environmental politics, particularly the growth 
o f private rule-making processes at the transnational level. The next section will 
briefly present the theoretical approach that will be employed.
1.1 The Equator Principles and International Norms
In advancing our understanding o f why private governance emerges, it will argue that 
an analysis o f the timing, content, and institutional design o f institutional 
arrangements hold many clues as to why private actors are able and willing to 
collectively organize themselves behind a common framework.3 In explaining the 
timing o f the Equator Principles, the analysis finds that the growing interest in 
environmental and social lending policies among commercial banks was intimately 
tied to the emergence o f a broader corporate accountability movement in Western 
Europe and North America in the late 1990s.4 This broader movement was 
comprised o f a loosely connected network o f  non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), which included environmental and human rights activists, and religious and 
consumer groups, and converged around a perceived need to set and enforce 
standards for responsible business practice and hold TNCs accountable for their 
impacts on the environment and local communities.5
In the financial sector, this movement consisted primarily o f ‘transnational advocacy 
groups’, or NGOs organized in transnational networks that mobilize domestic
3 In this context, ‘governance’ can be defined as ‘the creation and implementation of rule systems that 
facilitate the coordination and cooperation of social actors and determine the distribution o f costs and 
benefits o f collective action.’ (Koenig-Archibugi 2006, p.3)
4 For a discussion o f TNCs and public accountability, see Koenig-Archibugi (2004). For an overview 
of the emergence o f a ‘corporate accountability movement’ in the United States and Europe in 
response to globalisation, see Bendell (2004). For further examples o f environmental NGO campaigns 
against the corporate sector, see DeWinter (2003), Keay (2002) and Wapner (2002), pp. 43-46. For 
examples o f campaigns against private financial institutions, see Emel (2002).
5 DeWinter (2003), p. 141. In general terms, an NGO is taken here as being an organization that is both 
‘non-profit’ and ‘non-governmental’ (Bendell 2004, pp.12-13) But in more specific terms, the 
ECOSOC statute o f the U.N states an NGO cannot 1) be a profit-making body; 2) should support the 
aims and work of the U.N., 3) should repudiate violence; 4) should be a representative body with an 
identifiable headquarters, and officers, democratically accountable to a policy-making conference; 5) 
should respect the norm o f ‘non-interference in the internal affairs o f states’, barring it from being a 
political party, and 6) cannot be established by an inter-government agreement, (adapted from Willets 
2005, pp. 436-37)
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pressure against TNCs that operate in developing countries.6 Their growing influence 
manifested itself in a series o f public campaigns against leading commercial banks 
involved in controversial development projects that were associated with widespread 
environmental damages.7 In response to this development, commercial banks, and 
TNCs more generally, felt pressured to justify their pursuit o f profit by demonstrating 
how their corporate activities benefited a wide variety o f public policy objectives.8 As 
such, commercial banks were initially forced to engage with environmental NGOs 
through the media and defend their practices. During this process, many admitted 
negligence or ignorance and introduced corporate environmental policies in an 
attempt to prevent future controversies and protect their reputation in the retail 
banking market.
In terms o f its content Jthe Equator Principles are directly based on the environmental 
and social review procedures o f the IFC, as well as the World Bank’s environmental 
standards. As the foremost public financier o f private infrastructure in developing 
countries, the IFC was influential in developing standards for commercial project 
financing, and aiding commercial banks reach an agreement. From the commercial 
banks’ point of view, choosing to based the Equator Principles on the IFC’s standards 
was driven by two objectives; to reduce the likelihood o f public confrontations in the 
media with advocacy groups over the adverse impacts o f large projects in developing 
countries, and to facilitate the harmonization o f standards among both public and 
private financial institutions in order to increase efficiencies and prevent a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in environmental and social risk management practices. Achieving both o f 
these objectives depended on negotiating a delicate balance between making public 
commitments to ethical financing while maintaining market competitiveness by 
keeping the cost o f capital down.
Yet, the reputational damages caused by media controversies over particular projects 
meant commercial banks felt compelled to reassure the public that adverse 
environmental and social impacts would be identified and mitigated in order to 
restore the public legitimacy o f commercial project financing. More specifically, it 
was no longer publicly acceptable for commercial banks to consider project financing 
purely as a financial transaction without recognizing and managing the broader 
development impacts o f projects. In this respect, policy development was primarily 
driven by a need to meet broader standards o f appropriateness defined by changing 
public expectations o f corporate behavior, while ensuring that the cost o f 
implementing the standards in their internal financing operations would not be 
prohibitive.
6 Keck and Sikkink (1998)
7 See Missbach (2004) for a NGO perspective on the lack of environmental and social governance in 
commercial project financing.
8 This dynamic between advocacy groups and TNCs is common across industries, see Jenkins (2001) 
and Newell (2001). In recent years, socially responsible investment funds (SRI funds) have 
increasingly put pressure on industry to align their practices with international environmental and 
social norms. (Graham and Woods 2006) This can be manifested in two ways; screening of 
investments against a defined set o f ethical criteria, and stakeholder advocacy, in which SRI funds 
used their voting rights as shareholders to improve corporate regulatory policy, (see ISIS 2002)
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Whereas the timing and content o f the framework suggests that both transnational 
advocacy groups and international organizations significantly influenced private 
governance formation, the institutional design o f the Equator Principles reflected the 
corporate power that commercial banks exercised in transnational rule-making 
processes. Specifically, whereas the Equator Principles do affirm the legitimacy of 
well-recognized international norms that are often the cornerstone o f transnational 
advocacy campaigns, the framework does not create any rights or liabilities to 
anyone. In turn, this means the standards and procedures developed by the World 
Bank and the IFC as mandatory requirements that could be enforced through various 
accountability mechanisms in their public financing operations, are in fact entirely 
voluntary for the commercial banks that have adopted the Equator Principles. 
Furthermore, the commercial banks did not to adopt the IFC’s disclosure policies that 
identify how and when project-level information is shared. Nor did they sign on to its 
exclusion list that identifies certain economic activities ineligible for financing. 
During the drafting process, this decision was not and could not be successfully 
challenged by any actor, including the IFC itself. Therefore, the freedom to pick and 
choose which standards and procedures to adopt, and how to integrate them into 
commercial project lending practices, represents an important source o f power for 
commercial banks.
More broadly, the thesis argues that the emergence and diffusion o f international 
norms stand at the center o f this development, as they determine the social context 
within which banks define their interests and choose particular courses o f action.9 As 
norms refer to standards o f behavior that define for actors what constitutes legitimate 
forms o f behavior, understanding how they emerge, diffuse and become prominent 
within given issue areas may reveal the social constraints and opportunities that shape 
the rational choices o f actors.10 In this context, the causal and normative beliefs that 
actors hold, or that govern a particular issue area, determine whether consensual 
knowledge o f the policy problem emerges, what meanings are attributed to different 
behavioral choices, and ultimately, how actors pursue their interests.11 Understanding 
environmental and social standards and review procedures as sets o f norms implies 
that they should not simply be viewed as informational devices that guide decision­
making, and in aggregate, increase the efficiency and effectiveness o f social relations. 
Instead, they are deeply contested precisely because they assign rights and 
responsibilities to different actors, and create distinctions between legitimate and 
illegitimate lending practices. As a result, their value is not only for markets to 
decide, but are also determined by the evolution o f public expectations about what 
constitutes legitimate corporate behavior.
9 For a thorough review of norms literature, and a theoretical framework for analyzing and 
understanding international norm dynamics, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)
10 For definitions o f norms, see for example Axelrod (1986), p. 1096-1097, Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998), pp.891-893, and Klotz(1995), pp. 13-16.
11 Haas (1990), p.2. In this context, interests are not perceived as the opposite o f ideals or values, but 
rather, ‘interests cannot be articulated without values’ and ‘the interests to be realized by collaborative 
action are an expression o f the actors’ values.’
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W hereas there is a general consensus across rational and constructivist approaches 
that norms matter in international relations, there is great disagreement about why 
actors follow them. As Nadelmann (1990) notes:
‘It is difficult and often impossible to determine whether those who conform to a particular 
norm do so because they believe the norm is just and should be followed, or because 
adherence to the norm coincides with their principal interests, or because they fear the 
consequences that flow from defying the norm, or simply because conforming to the norm 
has become a habit or custom.’ 12
The analysis attributes the emergence and widespread endorsement o f the Equator 
Principles to a diffusion o f norms, or standards that differentiate between legitimate 
and illegitimate forms o f behavior for particular actors. As they give meaning to 
certain acts and forms o f behavior, norms are central to understanding why some 
forms o f corporate conduct are at one time acceptable, while later derided as 
irresponsible and illegitimate. The emergence o f the Equator Principles reflects how 
the substantive and procedural norms that have come to define responsible project 
lending in multilateral financing have by virtue o f their legitimacy and actions of 
norm entrepreneurs over time diffused across public to the private financial 
institutions. Understanding the economic, social and political developments that 
precipitated and perpetuated the expanding legitimacy o f these norms and their 
integration into the profit narratives o f commercial banks is therefore a critical 
objective.
In this context, the dramatic transformation in the policy positions o f commercial 
banks cannot be disassociated from the long-term resilience and widening legitimacy 
of the World Bank’s environmental standards for project financing. Since the early 
1970s, the concept o f environmental review has been considered the institutional 
mechanism o f  choice for ensuring that project lending promotes sustainable 
development. First introduced at the World Bank by President McNamara in 1971, it 
rests on the assumption that the environmental and social costs o f projects can be 
adequately mitigated by reviewing project proposals prepared by banking staff in 
collaboration with borrowers. In 1987, following a period o f intense conflict between 
environmental NGOs and several allied governments, and the World Bank’s senior 
management defending its banking staff, environmental review became formalized, 
mandatory, systematic and fully funded, and subsequently, gradually adopted by 
other multilateral development banks as well.13 And with the Equator Principles, a 
significant share o f the commercial banking industry has pledged to adhere to the 
same substantive and procedural norms aimed at protecting the environment and 
extending certain rights to project-affected communities.
12 Nadelmann (1990), p.480.
13 In 1996, the EBRD adopted its Environmental Policy, and two years later, the IFC formally adopted 
the World Bank’s framework, thereby extending the practice of environmental and social review to 
private sector projects. Subsequently, export credit agencies (ECAs) pledged their commitment to 
these norms in 2001 under the auspices of the OECD’s Common Approaches on Environment and 
Officially Supported Export Credit.
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By placing an analytical focus on norms, the thesis provides a framework for 
understanding time-specific institutional developments, such as the emergence o f the 
Equator Principles, within broader long-term transformations in the global political 
economy. Three parallel processes are o f  significance here. First, TNCs are 
increasingly defining their role in society in the context of the gradually emerging 
‘corporate social responsibility’ paradigm, often in response to an increasingly 
vociferous corporate accountability movement that is demanding regulatory 
constraints on transnational business.14 Secondly, international organizations are 
increasingly establishing institutional relationships with the private sector in order to 
induce private actors to voluntarily integrate a wide variety o f public policy 
objectives into their business practices. In this context, state-based authority is 
increasingly being used to promote and legitimize voluntary business regulation at 
the transnational level. And third, forms o f voluntary governance that depend on 
market-based mechanisms for their effectiveness are increasingly being challenged 
by a transnational movement for corporate accountability, which promotes well- 
recognized norms in areas such as environment, human rights and labor in an attempt 
to improve the public regulation o f transnational business.
The transnational perspective on norms breaks with the common tendency to place 
states, state power and state interests at the center o f institutionalization processes at 
the global level. Yet, it is still instructive to review alternative explanations o f 
governance formation. The next section outlines the main approach taken in the 
thesis, and subsequently considers how the most common theoretical perspectives on 
international relations would explain the growth o f private governance in world 
politics, and evaluates their usefulness in relation to this study.
1.2 Explaining the Emergence of Private Governance
With globalization, the rise o f non-state actors and private governance at the 
transnational level has become an important feature o f world politics.15 Change- 
inducing decision-making, it is argued, increasingly takes place ‘transnationally’, by 
a variety o f public and private actors operating at different scales across 
interdependent issue areas, guided by competing and conflicting interests and 
motivations.16 In the field o f environment in particular, much attention has been given
14 See for example Bendell (2004, pp.12-16), DeWinter (2003), Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Newell
(2001) on the role o f civil society in confronting transnational business, and Jenkins (2001), Sethi
(2002) and Utting (2005) on corporate institutional responses to such pressures.
15 This thesis identifies with the definition of globalization used by Gilpin (2001), using it as shorthand 
for the integration o f  the world economy. In more detail, the definition by Scholte (2005) o f economic 
globalization covers the intended use of the term in full. He refers to three overlapping processes. First, 
increased cross-border movements between countries of people, goods, money, investment and ideas. 
Secondly, the growth in open-border transactions, in which the mobility o f companies, trade, money, 
and finance is global rather than simply international. And third, increased trans-border transactions, 
whereby ‘social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities’. (Scholte 2005, 
p.605)
6 Transnational relations is defined here as ‘regular interactions across national boundaries when at 
least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf o f a national government or an inter­
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to the proliferation of transnational networks and partnerships between and among 
civil society groups, inter-governmental organizations, business associations and 
TNCs existing largely independently of the formal treaties, conventions and 
agreements that are typically associated with inter-state relations. This trend is best 
captured by the phrase ‘governance without government’, which refers to the role that 
social institutions, rather than organizations or material entities, play in solving 
collective-action problems that pervade social relations under conditions of 
interdependence. 7 Examples may include voluntary codes o f conduct, industry 
standards and guidelines that define norms and standards for corporate behavior in 
relation to a wide variety o f public interest concerns, such as human and civil rights, 
environmental issues, corruption, and labor.18
As most o f these new forms o f private governance are not rooted in a formal or legal 
authority with sanctioning power, there is much uncertainty as to how and why they 
emerge. In the study o f global environmental politics in particular, but also 
international relations more broadly, the growing role and influence o f private 
governance is becoming an important aspect o f the evolution o f international 
organization and institutions.19 In this context, TNCs are the most important private 
actors, as the central organizing entities o f global business and the main agents o f the 
transformation o f the world economy, and to a certain extent, the state itself.20 In 
many areas o f environmental governance, TNCs no longer hold subordinate positions 
to states in the drafting o f standards, but exert authority by virtue o f their financial 
resources and technical knowledge. With their growing influence, the profit motive 
has become increasingly accepted as a legitimate, and in some cases, vital aspect o f 
environmental governance, leading to institutional arrangements centered on 
addressing the environmental and social cost o f business within the parameters set by 
the commercial interests o f private enterprise.
governmental organization.’ (Risse 1995, p.3). This was the central thesis in the literature on 
‘transnational relations’ that emerged in the 1970s (Keohane and Nye 1974; Kaiser 1971), and has in 
recent years been central to discussions regarding the elevated authority and influence o f non-state 
actors in the context o f ‘governance’ (Arts and Verschuren 1999; Cutler et.al 1999; Haufler 2000; Hall 
and Biersteker 2002; Hewson and Sinclair 1999; Rosenau and Cziempel 1992)
17 Young (1994), p.16. The central point o f emerging literature on ‘governance’ is that the absence of 
world government does not mean that governance is impossible beyond the level o f individual states. 
(Koenig-Archibugi 2006, p. 4)
18 For brief overviews, see Jenkins (2001), Lipchutz and Fogel (2002), pp. 125-129, Sethi (2002) and 
Utting (2005), pp.2-3.
19 As per Falkner (2003), private governance ‘emerges at the global level where the interactions among 
private actors, or between private actors on the one hand and civil society and state actors on the other, 
give rise to institutional arrangements that structure and direct actors’ behavior in an issue-specific 
area.’ (p.72)
20 See Michelat (1994) on how TNCs are shaping government policy. In general terms, a TNC, or 
company, is one that is ‘based in one country that has affiliates in at least one foreign country, which 
may be branches o f a parent company, separately incorporated subsidiaries or associates, with large 
minority shareholdings. (Willets 2005, p.362) Drawing on Gilpin (2001), they expand overseas 
primarily through foreign direct investment (FDI), whose purpose is to achieve partial or complete 
control over marketing, production, or other facilities in another economy; such investments may be in 
services, manufacturing or commodities, (p.278)
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By exploring the empirical case o f  the Equator Principles, the thesis aims to advance 
our understanding o f how and why systems o f private governance are increasingly 
emerging at the global level, and what they tell us about the changing nature of power 
and authority in the international system ?21 In relation to this particular case, the 
thesis finds that external pressures for accountability and transparency played an 
important role in inducing the commercial banking industry to develop a common 
industry framework for managing environmental and social issues in project 
investments. But more importantly, the pre-existence o f a set o f norms and rules in 
the multilateral system that defined why and how financial institutions could lend 
profitably and responsibly essentially constituted cooperation among commercial 
banks, by not only defining the problem they were facing, but providing the solutions 
for it.
Given the significance o f public sector norms and the dual role o f multilateral 
development banks and environmental NGOs in establishing and diffusing the norm, 
it is too simplistic to characterize the emergence o f the Equator Principles as example 
o f the ‘privatization’ o f global governance.22 Instead, the case reveals how 
globalization has enabled and induced different categories o f public and private 
transnational actors to collaborate in new, innovative ways to facilitate the integration 
o f environmental and social concerns into transnational business. In particular, new 
forms o f relationships between states, international organizations, NGOs and TNCs 
are giving rise to a new form o f transnational rule-making that is de-territorialized, 
decentralized and often constituted by a combination o f public and private norms, 
producing rules that can conform to the commercial imperatives o f transnational 
business while giving recognition to long-standing environmental and social norms in 
the international system.
The analysis is focused on advancing our understanding o f private governance 
formation in issue areas with ‘high value content and informational uncertainty’, 
commonly attributed to environmental protection and labor standards, and human 
rights.23 While perhaps a marginal aspect o f the totality o f world politics, these 
institutional processes are nevertheless redefining the purpose, content and design of 
a sub-set o f global business regulation, potentially reshaping our understanding o f the 
relationship between private sector development, environmental degradation and 
poverty. In these issue areas, transnational politics are characterized by conflicts 
between actors over the relevance and applicability o f so-called prohibition norms, or 
norms that circumscribe the conditions under which actors can participate in and 
authorize activities.24 Applied to transnational business, it entails the setting of 
standards that bar certain types o f economic and financial practices for mostly moral 
and ethical reasons that have in the past been deemed both profitable and legitimate.
21 For a broader discussion o f political institutions, see March and Olsen (1989), pp.1-21. Applied 
specifically to the study o f international relations, see Ruggie (1998), pp.45-62.
22 See Clapp (2005) for this argument.
23 Keck and Sikkink (1998), p.2.
24 As per Nadelmann (1990), ‘prohibition norms’ are absolute restrictions on certain types o f activities, 
such as the condemnation o f killing whales, elephants or other endangered species, (p.479)
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Moreover, these restrictions often serve to give laws and norms institutionalized in 
Western democracies extra-territorial jurisdiction, by forcing private transnational 
actors to comply with them when they are doing business in developing countries, 
regardless o f whether it is required by national laws and regulations.
In most cases, private governance concerning environmental and social issues emerge 
from deliberative processes involving both public and private actors in which 
different sources o f legal, technical and moral authority are combined to integrate 
well-recognized international norms with existing transnational business practices.
A theory purporting to understand why private actors are increasingly engaging in 
institutionalized cooperation over environmental and social matters needs to be able 
to explain these broader transformations that are reshaping the process, social purpose 
and impact o f rule-making in world politics. What is clear is that compared to the 
most common manifestations of international cooperation, such as multilateral 
diplomacy, treaties and agreements, private governance does not easily fit with the 
prevailing assumptions about institutionalization in international relations, because o f 
its decentralized institutional design, the absence o f formal enforcement powers and 
the diversity o f actors involved. In particular, the marginalization o f states and 
nationally-bound actors within these rule-making processes seems to undermine the 
commonly held view that states are the primary actors in global governance.
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives
Notwithstanding the limitations o f state-centric approaches, it is still instructive to 
briefly survey the most common theoretical perspectives on governance formation, 
and consider how they may explain these developments. In the study o f international 
relations, governance formation has been traditionally studied within one o f three 
analytical concepts; power, interests and knowledge. In a power-based theory, 
governance formation manifests the power and authority o f dominant states, and is a 
function o f their material resources and capabilities. For realists, the chief proponents 
o f this view, the basic assumption that governs their understanding o f governance is 
that the nature of relations between actors, whether cooperation or conflict, depends 
upon the structure o f the international political system.25 In this context, governance 
is supplied by powerful states in their effort to ensure stability and order in world 
politics. In turn, they assume that dominant states provide the conditions for 
processes o f institutionalization to emerge and evolve, and also possess the capability 
to bring them to an end.26
In contrast, interest-based theories point us to the positive and negative incentives 
that actors (notably states) face in cooperating with each other, and the institutional
25 For example, Carr (2001), Gilpin (1971), and Krasner (1995).
26 See for example Gilpin (1971) and Lipson (1984). As Haufler (1999) has noted, the literature 
attributing regime emergence and persistence to hegemonic power integrated hegemonic stability 
theory to the study of international institutions, and embedded it within a liberal concern for 
institutional cooperation.
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conditions that encourage cooperation. For neo-liberal institutionalists, governance 
formation is a product o f rational bargaining processes between actors in which the 
outcome is the most efficient solution to solving coordination problems or increasing 
the efficiency o f interactions. In this context, governance is not necessarily an 
expression o f state power, but triggered by the emergence o f favorable institutional 
conditions which cause a demand for governance by inducing self-interest driven 
actors to favor cooperation over unilateral behavior.27
In contrast to the rational ontology o f these perspectives, constructivist approaches 
assume the identities and interests o f actors are not fixed, but are constituted by 
norms that define standards o f behavior an particular ideas about the material world.
28 In turn, international institutions are seen as social constructions that attribute 
meaning and social purpose to different forms o f behavior. By virtue o f their 
constitutive role, institutions have significant distributional consequences by 
attributing legitimacy to different actors, forms o f  behavior and interests, at the 
detriment o f others. In this view, power is inherently socialized, and is produced and 
exercised in social relations which define ‘who are the actors and what are the 
capacities and practices they are socially empower to undertake.’ As power is 
embedded in social structures, institutional development and the emergence o f 
institutionalized behavior among actors is tied to the diffusion o f norms and rules. 
Thus, rather than reflecting shifts in material capabilities or incentives, this 
perspective attributes governance formation to a shift in norms. As a result, 
understanding why and how norms emerge and diffuse in the international system 
becomes an important imperative to understanding processes o f  international 
institutionalization.
Based on the characteristics o f transnational governance, conventional state-based 
approaches to understanding processes o f institutionalization in world politics do not 
adequately account for how and why non-state actors engage in transnational rule- 
making processes.30 As non-state actors are not vested with the same legal and formal 
authority as states, their sources o f power are inherently different and more diffuse, 
yet may in some circumstances be equal or even superior to them. For example, norm 
entrepreneurs, such as environmental and labor groups, may exert social pressure on 
both governments and TNCs by advocating certain normative beliefs and moral
27 For example, global economic integration has increased interactions between states and 
interdependencies between them. To illuminate the distinction between institutionalist and structural 
realist accounts of international relations, using the analogy o f a poker game, Kehoane and Nye (1989) 
argue that ‘at the process level, analysts are interested in how the players play the hands they have 
been dealt. At the structural level, they are interested in how the cards and chips were distributed as the 
game started.’ (p.21)
28 For brief overviews of constructivism in international relations, see for example Wendt (1995), 
Checkel (2001) and Finnemore (1996).
29 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 10.
30 For the purpose o f analysis, Josselin and Wallace (2001) offer a useful definition o f non-state actors, 
namely actors which are ‘at least in principle autonomous from the structure and machinery o f the 
state, and of the governmental and intergovernmental bodies below and above the formally-sovereign 
state: transnational, rather than transgovemmental.’ (pp.3-4)
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claims that de-legitimize existing state or corporate practices.31 Business may use 
their financial resources, technical expertise and market power to exert influence over 
governments and engage in both international and transnational rule-making 
processes.32 And both sets o f actors are frequently involved in the creation and 
implementation o f private forms o f voluntary regulation at the transnational level.
As private governance is more informal, fragmented and voluntary-based than 
conventional international agreements, treaties and conventions, an approach which 
regards institutions as formal structures is ill-suited to understand how and why they 
emerge, and what determines their institutional design and social purpose. In 
addition, apart from being unable to capture the influential role o f non-state actors in 
private governance, state-centric approaches also tend to bypass what seem to be the 
most interesting questions. For example, whereas establishing the significance o f 
private governance requires an assessment o f how states impact, or are impacted by, 
institutional processes at the transnational level, the arguably more interesting 
question is how and why non-state actors are able to legitimately project authority in 
ways that are commonly assumed to be limited to states. As such, this requires a 
theoretical perspective that does not take state power, interests or inter-state relations 
as a starting point. Similarly, a contrarian’s view that elevates the role and influence 
o f non-state actors over states can be equally inappropriate, and be vulnerable to the 
same kinds o f  criticisms.
Before discussing this theoretical approach more in detail, the next section will 
explain why the framework will be influential in the global project finance market, 
and more broadly, in shaping environmental and social governance in global finance.
1.4 Why the Equator Principles Matter
The analysis suggests that an in-depth study o f the Equator Principles can provide 
many clues as to why private governance emerges and gives rise to institutionalized 
behavior in the private sector. The adoption o f the Equator Principles is not legally 
binding, and compliance with them is not formally monitored or enforced. By 
implication, they could be easily dismissed as yet another code o f  conduct that does 
not impact core business practices in any significant way. Yet, notwithstanding their 
voluntary nature, corporate codes o f conduct have the effect o f forcing TNCs to 
consider the environmental and social impacts of their business practices and publicly 
justify their actions (and inactions) to broader constituencies, including shareholders, 
consumers and civil society more broadly.33 As such, private governance gives birth 
to new forms o f dialogue and authority, mobilizing intellectual energy towards 
reconciling commercial interests with a wide variety o f public concerns. In addition,
31 On the role o f norm entrepeneurs in institutional processes at the global level, see for example 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), pp.896-902, Keck and Sikkink (1998), Nadelmann (1990), and 
Wapner (1995).
32 See Levy and Newell (2005), pp. 1-21, and Strange (1996).
33 Newell (2001a), p.89.
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one o f the virtues o f international law is the extent to which non-binding norms and 
principles, so-called ‘soft law’, can be given formal expression and hardened into 
binding rules that give rise to specific duties and obligations.34 Therefore, in cases 
where voluntary guidelines are recognized by public bodies as ‘best practice’, there is 
a distinct possibility that they become legally binding in the future, which is what 
justifies a closer examination o f them.35
Beyond this aspect, the framework has several specific characteristics that suggest it 
may significantly influence corporate practices and broader governance structures.
First, the mere fact that a vast majority o f leading commercial banks that provide 
project loans in developing countries have adopted the Equator Principles suggests 
that the framework may significantly influence the market. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, 
the original ten commercial banks have since been joined by more than forty financial 
institutions, representing over 85 percent o f the global project finance market in 
financing volume. As project finance is commonly provided in loan syndications, the 
reach o f the framework goes beyond the number o f signatories. When debt financing 
is pooled together in syndications, a leading bank arranges the debt financing and 
conducts risk assessments on behalf o f all the banks. In this context, if the arranging 
bank applies the Equator Principles, all the debt financing provided through the 
syndication is compliant with the framework. In this way, the influence o f the 
framework is not limited to those banks that have adopted it, but also includes those 
that participate in syndications arranged by Equator banks.
According to one study, the total debt amount for Equator Principle debt financing in 
developing countries in the first half o f 2006 was roughly £14 billion, or more than 
90 percent o f the market.36 Furthermore, only three percent o f projects in developing 
countries were arranged and financed by non-Equator banks. According to some legal 
experts, this impressive market penetration means the framework may significantly 
inform the future development o f lender liability in developing countries by setting a 
global benchmark for what constitutes acceptable and responsible financing 
practices.37 This notion is backed by anecdotal evidence that some TNCs in 
environmentally-sensitive industries are expecting that compliance with the Equator 
Principles may in the future be a condition for accessing long-term capital.38 As a 
result, a new industry o f consulting, training and legal advisory services is emerging 
to meet the demands from commercial banks and TNCs for support in interpreting 
and implementing the framework.
34 See Boisson de Chazournes (2000), Clapp (2005) and Hurrell (1993). As Drahos and Braithwaite 
(2000) note, ‘today’s voluntary code secretariat provides a contractual environment and a framework 
that can become tomorrow’s treaty when the right kind of disaster supplies the catalyst, (p.274)
35 Clapp (2005).
36 ‘IJ first half review: Equator Principles financing’, Infrastructure Journal, August 17, 2006.
37 Boisson de Chazournes (2000) and FBD (2005).
38 FBD (2005), pp. 118-121 and Lazarus (2004).
Christopher Wright 21
Figure 1.1 Adoption of the E quator Principles
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Second, by being based on the IFC’s environmental and social standards, the Equator 
Principles give affirmation to well-recognized norms and rules in the international 
system, such as human rights, protection o f sensitive ecosystems and public access to 
information and decision-making. In theoretical terms, the framework not only 
advances and legitimizes need to protect the environment and the rights o f local 
communities, it also reaffirms the validity o f particular norms, or standards o f 
behavior, that prescribe for lenders how they should act on these values. As such, 
they have raised public expectations about investment practices, and the moral 
responsibilities that investors have. As a result, the framework has significantly 
empowered the IFC in the global project finance market, by effectively making its 
own environmental and social policy framework the recognized industry standard.
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Third, by placing an inter-governmental body o f  rules and standards at the center o f 
the framework, the Equator banks all but ensured that it would enjoy international 
support among states. The World Bank’s environmental and social standards 
significantly inform the practices o f national environmental agencies and the lending 
policies of other international, regional and bilateral financial institutions. In addition, 
as the IFC’s Board o f Directors formally approves changes and additions to its 
operational policies and procedures, the Equator Principles effectively enjoy a 
multilateral endorsement. By extension, this makes it much more likely that they be 
recognized by governments as an acceptable standard for responsible project 
financing, rather than a competing framework that undermines or challenges state 
governance. In turn, given this conformity, the Equator Principles are much more 
likely to be integrated into international agreements, policies and procedures than a 
framework built entirely upon standards devised in the private sector.
And fourth, while most voluntary codes o f conduct provide only limited guidance as 
to how individual companies should implement norms, rules and principles in 
particular business contexts, the Equator Principles define specific standards for a 
very narrow area o f the financial sector, project financing. This high level o f 
specificity is likely to increase its influence on corporate conduct for several reasons. 
First, precise prescriptions relieves commercial banks o f interpreting how the 
framework should be translated into practice, reducing the likelihood that ambiguity 
and uncertainties cause commercial banks to implement the framework in divergent 
ways, and thereby impeding harmonization. Secondly, specificity raises public 
expectations and makes it easier for external observers and competitors to 
demonstrate instances o f non-compliance. And third, given that specificity both 
removes uncertainties and increases accountability, it may reduce the problem of 
free-riding by helping to ensure that only those commercial banks prepared to act on 
their commitments decide to adopt the framework. As such, it is more likely to induce 
high levels o f compliance, and by extension, succeed in harmonizing environmental 
and social risk management practices across commercial banks with those o f the 
World Bank and the IFC.
The next section will outline the methodological approach and research design that 
will be employed in the thesis.
1.5 Methodology
As many new forms o f  transnational rule-making are not rooted in a formal or legal 
authority with sanctioning power, there is much uncertainty as to how and why they 
emerge. The aim o f this research is two-fold; to provide an-depth analysis o f the 
Equator Principles as a means to advance our understanding o f how and why private 
actors are increasingly cooperating to create rules for governing corporate 
environmental and social practices in transnational markets, and related, to test the 
explanatory power o f  existing theoretical perspectives on governance formation in 
international relations against an atypical case. In doing so, the research is focused on
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generating insights into six aspects of private governance formation; why norms 
emerge, timing, main initiators, sources of influence, governance structure, and why 
norms are adopted. In turn, the findings generated by this thesis can contribute to 
refining existing theories o f governance formation so as to better explain the 
emergence o f transnational rule-making.
Case Study
Drawing on George and Bennett (2007), the research is based on a ‘within-case 
analysis o f a single case’. The case study approach can be defined as a ‘detailed 
examination o f an aspect o f a historical episode to develop or test historical 
explanations that may be generalizable to other events.’ 3 For example, within the 
study o f politics, case studies often observe particular nation-states at a single point in 
time or over some period o f time, in order to make inferences about certain features 
o f nation-states more generally.40 It is typically characterized as an exercise in 
process-tracing, in which the researcher attempts to identify links between possible 
causes and observed outcomes. The research method relies on qualitative methods, 
such as interviews, participatory observations, and field studies, and tends to focus on 
the properties o f a single phenomenon or event.41
Given that a case study approach entails the study o f an instance o f a class o f events, 
it is necessary to narrowly define which classes o f events the case is drawn from and 
assumed to be comparable to. Table 1.1 presents a useful typology for distinguishing 
different forms o f  global governance mechanisms. In this typology, Pattberg (2004) 
categorizes global governance mechanisms based on three different purposes and 
actor constellations. Based on this typology, the Equator Principles can be 
categorized as either a hybrid or private rule-making mechanism, depending on what 
level o f public involvement is necessary to qualify for the ‘hybrid’ level, (identified 
in Table 1.1 in bold print). By extension, the findings generated by this study o f the 
Equator Principles is presented as an example of, and therefore assumed to be 
comparable to, transnational rule-making processes involving either a combination of 
public and private actors, or private actors only. Whereas hybrid rule-making 
processes involve the active participation o f at least one state or international 
organization in the rule-making process, actor constellations o f private forms are 
limited to non-state actors only.
The impetus for this research is based on the observation that transnational rules are 
increasingly emerging from within the private sector to govern the environmental and 
social impacts o f transnational corporate practices. As such, private actors engaged in 
such rule-making can no longer be considered merely intervening variables in the
39 George and Bennett (2007), p.5.
40 For definitional issues related to the case study approach, see Gerring (2007), pp. 19-26.
41 For an overview of the case study approach, see Gerring (2007), pp.1-15, Hamel et.al (1993) and 
Stark and Torrance (2005).
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international system, but possess the capability and interest in establishing their own 
transnational system o f rules.42 Furthermore, rule-making is for this purpose assumed
Table 1.1 Examples of Global Governance Mechanisms
Actor Constellation 
Purpose
Public Hybrid Private
Provision o f G oods 
and Services
UNEP Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI)
Privatization of 
water services
Im plem entation GEF Global Network on 
Energy (GNESD)
Cement Sustain­
ability Initiative
R ule-M aking Johannesburg
Summit
W orld  C om m ission 
on D am s (W CD )
M arin e  S tew ardsh ip  
C ouncil (M SC )
Sou rce: Pattberg (2 0 0 4 ), p. 12.
to resemble standard-setting, or the making o f voluntary, expertise-based structural, 
procedural or substantive regulation for corporate practices. 3 The key distinction 
between public rule-making and hybrid or private forms, is that the former is 
typically backed by state power and often embedded in structures o f public 
regulation, while the latter are commonly voluntary and depend on non-state forms o f 
enforcement. The definition o f  rule-making does not only include processes that 
involve the creation o f new rules that conflict or differ with existing rules. Rule- 
making that is based on applying existing rules to new institutional contexts, for 
example drawing on international environment law to formulate obligations for TNCs 
operating in environmentally-sensitive industries, are also included in this definition.
This methodological approach for understanding how and why the Equator Principles 
emerged was chosen because o f  its advantages over alternative approaches. First, 
while sampling a greater number o f cases may be better able to reveal the 
distinguishing characteristics o f  each, the advantage o f focusing on one case rests on 
the opportunity to conduct an in-depth analysis.44 In this respect, it is particularly 
useful for identifying and measuring the significance o f attributes and characteristics 
that are commonly aggregated in studies with more cases. Secondly, case studies lend 
themselves to samples that are new, reveal themselves for the first time, or are
42 Pattberg (2004).
43 Kerwer (2 0 02), p .298.
44 As Hamel et.al (1 9 9 3 ) dem onstrate, it is the depth o f  the description o f  the object o f  study that 
determ ines and drives the case study’s explanatory power, (p .4 8 -5 0 )
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identified as unusual cases. A method that is based on original data o f one case 
enables the heuristic identification o f new variables and hypothesis in ways that 
statistical methods drawing on existing databases are less able to. And third, by 
limiting the study to a single case, rather than many, the approach lends itself to 
identifying and evaluating the range o f intervening variables that can cause particular 
outcomes. By extension, it is conducive to testing competing theoretical explanations 
and identifying the preconditions for different theoretical perspectives to have 
explanatory power by considering whether independent variables emphasized in 
particular theories matter in explaining the outcomes o f a particular case.
Apart from describing the empirical developments that led to the launch o f the 
Equator Principles, the thesis aims to test the explanatory power o f the main 
theoretical perspectives on governance formation in international relations. Given that 
theories in international relations have been developed to explain state-based 
governance and not rules created by and for private actors, assessing their 
explanatory power against this particular case also provides an opportunity to test 
their scope and relevance to studying new forms o f  global governance. By exploring 
their validity in reference to a single case, the research findings can inform future 
studies o f other similar cases and facilitate theory refinement and development.
Case Selection
The thesis is a heuristic case study o f the Equator Principles that seeks to answer 
broader questions about how and why private and hybrid transnational rule-making 
processes emerge, and what they tell us about the nature o f institutional change in 
world politics. Given the limited empirical data available about recent private and 
hybrid transnational rule-making processes and the limited knowledge about their 
emergence, the selection of the Equator Principles as the subject o f a single-case 
study was driven by two criteria. First, its unique characteristics, notably the 
specificity o f the rules, the interactions between public and private actors, and the 
high level o f uptake in the market, make it an intriguing case for testing the validity 
of existing theories o f governance formation. In turn, the case will be used to identify 
relevant variables that influence the emergence o f similar transnational rule-making 
processes, and suggest how existing theories can be refined to better explain 
outcomes. And secondly, in addition to being an ‘outlier’ case among global 
governance mechanisms, the framework has become recognized as the most 
influential and ground-breaking case within the financial sector, despite not having 
been subject to an in-depth academic analysis. Therefore, beyond its theoretical 
contributions, the aim of the thesis is to provide historical data for future studies of 
the Equator Principles.
The influence o f  the Equator Principles in the financial sector manifests itself in 
several ways. First, following the adoption of the framework, numerous commercial 
banks have invested in environmental risk management training for project finance 
staff, reorganized credit risk processes and in some cases, used the Equator Principles
Christopher Wright 26
to inform the integration o f  environmental and social considerations into other forms 
of corporate finance. Secondly, in terms o f process, a core group o f commercial 
banks have organized working groups to discuss policy matters related to the Equator 
Principles, that regularly consult with the IFC and transnational advocacy groups. 
Issues that have thus far been discussed include enhancing reporting requirements, 
establishing a secretariat, and encouraging more commercial banks in developing 
countries to adopt the framework. Third, at the project-level, environmental advocacy 
group have used the framework as leverage for demanding that commercial banks 
reject financing certain projects on the basis o f their adverse environmental and social 
impacts, and numerous commercial banks have publicly stated that they have rejected 
particular projects because they did not comply with the Equator Principles. Fourth, 
the framework has become the focal point for civil society engagement with the 
financial sector and has provided a new social purpose and meaning to interactions 
between commercial banks and environmental advocacy groups. And finally, the IFC 
has used the Equator Principles to demonstrate its technical expertise in 
environmental and social risk management, and show shareholders how it is helping 
to integrate environmental and social practices into financial markets. More broadly, 
the IFC has drawn on its experience with facilitating the emergence o f the framework 
to increase its engagement with corporate responsibility initiatives through 
partnerships with international organizations and business networks, including the 
U.N Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
Data Requirements and Collection
In order to establish why the Equator Principles emerged and why commercial banks 
decided to adopt it, the thesis is based on information gathered from individuals 
directly involved in the negotiations o f the framework, and privy to the decision­
making processes within adopting banks. To collect data, the research depended 
heavily on interviews with key decision-makers, cross-examining them on the 
specifics o f particular events, including the causal relationships they believed existed 
between different phenomena. In turn, information was analyzed using the method o f 
‘process-tracing’ which draws on multiple types of evidence for the verification o f a 
single inference.45 It often involves presenting and analyzing long causal chains, and 
considering whether the sequence o f events and variables conform to what various 
theories predict, and if variance is detected, use the empirical material to suggest hoe 
they could be refined to increase their explanatory power relative to particular cases.
The main objective was to interview project finance executives from all o f the ten 
commercial banks that endorsed the Equator Principles at the launch in 2003, along 
with IFC staff that were closely involved in the policy discussions. By asking 
different interviewees the same sets o f questions, it would in principle be possible to 
reconstruct the events and discussions that preceded the framework, and map the 
different rationales and expectations that negotiating parties had. By way o f
45 See Gerring (2007), pp.172-185 for a broader definition of process-tracing, examples o f how it has 
been used, and its strengths and weaknesses. Also, see George and Bennett (2005), pp. 205-232.
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interviews, the research could also identify the circumstances that led project finance 
professionals to attribute positive values to these norms, after long having dismissed 
them as irrelevant or prohibitive to their social purpose as commercially-driven 
organizations.
In this context, the structuring o f interviews, the selection o f interviewees, and the 
manipulation o f interview data, becomes a central determinant o f research quality. As 
noted by Barbour and Schostak (2005), the unavoidable dilemma facing interviewers 
is what status to attribute information given by others. In truth, interviewees may 
have a wide variety o f reasons for providing false information, particularly in 
answering sensitive questions about their interests and motivations, which may place 
their respective employers in a bad light. Indeed, given the central role that corporate 
communication plays in the formulation of corporate environmental strategies, 
interviewers in this field necessarily need to approach the interviews with a certain 
amount o f skepticism, without prejudging the interviewees.46
To address the problem o f information accuracy, a concerted effort was made to only 
interview project finance executives that had been party to the policy deliberations 
preceding the launch o f the Equator Principles, rather than public relations staff 
charged with promoting the framework in the aftermath. In turn, by gathering 
multiple sources o f evidence, irregularities could be identified and discarded. 
Furthermore, the quality o f interview data was also enhanced by promising 
interviewees that data would be considered strictly confidentiality.47 By making this 
declaration prior to the interview, the expectation was that they would be more 
inclined to answer questions truthfully and admit knowledge gaps. But some element 
o f subjectivity is o f course inevitable, and the quality o f the research then falls back 
on the knowledge base and the analytical judgement o f the researcher.
In addition to interviews, the research draws on content analysis o f corporate reports, 
media clippings and personal observations. In considering corporate reports and news 
items, biases were understood and considered when incorporating them into this 
research. In terms o f  personal observations, the researcher benefited from attending 
numerous meetings and conferences as an NGO employee, an academic researcher, 
and a freelance journalist48 For example, in February 2005, the author attended a 
multi-stakeholder dialogue between members of Banktrack and a selection o f Equator
46 As an example, in a survey of the German financial sector on corporate environmentalism, the most 
important benefit of developing an internal environmental policy cited by German financial institutions 
was the positive effect it had on the motivation of employees. However, closer scrutiny revealed that 
only one financial institution in the survey actually reported having asked its employees about this 
directly. BMU (2002).
47 Thus, in later empirical chapters, names of interviewees are replaced by codes. In turn, examiners 
will be provided a separate interview sheet that associates these codes with particular individuals. (See 
Appendix 2)
48 From June 2003 to June 2005, the author was an external consultant for the International Financial 
Flows and the Environment (IFFE) Project at the World Resources Institute (WRI). Since January 
2006, the author has been a freelance journalist, writing for The Ecosystem Marketplace and Ethical 
Corporation Magazine.
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banks, held at the offices o f Credit Suisse near Zurich. Such experiences did not 
themselves directly inform the research, but broadened the knowledge base o f the 
author and thereby improved the quality o f analytical and methodological 
judgements.
Process
Based on anecdotal information sampled through personal observations and informal 
conversations with individuals close to the subject matter, a preliminary questionnaire 
with in-built hypothesis was produced. Then, during the course o f the interviews, the 
questionnaire was amended several times, reflecting new information and knowledge 
gathered interviews, and document analysis conducted alongside. The sample 
questions were shared with interviewees prior to the interview. However, in the vast 
number o f interviews, the depth o f conversation went beyond what the questions 
would suggest, and the length o f the interviews also often exceeded the time 
commitment that was asked for.
In sequencing the interviews, a deliberate choice was made to approach the least 
important and informed decision-makers first, in order to identify the key decision­
makers and be best prepared for the most important interviews. Following the 
completion o f preliminary analysis, almost exclusively based on policy literature and 
media reports, the author conducted the first round o f interviews with IFC staff that 
were either first-hand observers o f the policy discussions, or directly involved as 
technical advisors. At this stage, he also interviewed several staff o f transnational 
advocacy groups that had campaigned against commercial banks. What followed was 
an extended period o f research and writing, before a second round o f interviews with 
commercial banks o f secondary significance. These interviews honed in on the 
central research questions, while recognizing that interviewees may only have 
cursory information about some parts o f the policy discussions. Yet, following this 
round o f interviews, the analysis sharpened and a phase o f document analysis and 
writing followed. In the last round o f  interviews, the most significant decision-makers 
were formally approached, and in-depth interviews with these individuals followed.
In a final stage, earlier drafts were revisited and updated to produce the final draft o f 
the thesis.
Limitations o f  the Research Design
Notwithstanding the arguments in favor o f using a case study approach to understand 
how and why the Equator Principles emerged, the research method has limitations 
that influence the quality o f findings.49 First, a case study approach, and single-case 
research designs even more so, invariably raises questions about the extent to which 
findings can be generalized. Given that findings are drawn from a few or a single
49 See Gerring (2007), p.5-8, for an outline o f the standard positivist critique. See also Hamel et.al 
(1993), p.23.
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case, they can necessarily only be extrapolated to cases that have similar 
characteristics. As a result, while an in-depth analysis o f a small number o f cases 
based on large amounts o f original data can in principle generate more insights than a 
cross-comparison that draws more heavily on secondary data, the findings may not be 
generalizable to a large population o f cases given the unrepresentativeness o f the 
single case. As such, it is not guaranteed that findings about the significance o f 
particular dependent variables or the interactions between variables generated by a 
single case study can be generalized to other cases.
Secondly, a single-case study approach runs the risk o f failing to unearth sufficient 
evidence to assess the validity o f competing theoretical explanations. Given the 
limited scope of investigation, the researcher may assume that the range o f 
independent variables thought to be significant in explaining the dependent variable 
are present in the single case, even in cases where they are not. For example, it is 
unclear whether public, private, and hybrid transnational rule-making processes have 
more in common than different forms o f mechanisms with the same actor 
constellations. Yet, when assumptions about the scope o f cases determine case 
selection, they may influence inferences about causal mechanisms and thereby suffer 
from systematic error. In turn, researcher may draw erroneous conclusions and 
extrapolate these to other cases.
And third, a case study approach, even if it involves several cases, is often criticized 
because the objects o f research are not sufficiently distanced from the subjects 
researching them. Given that the case study approach depends largely on qualitative 
data collected through interviews and ethnographic studies, and researchers 
deliberately mix the descriptive and the analytical aspects o f the research, critics have 
questioned whether findings are sufficiently objective to be generalized. This can be 
particular problematic in cases where the researcher chooses a case study on the 
basis of his/her prior familiarity with the issue area.
In terms o f data collection, the method and process had several limitations that should 
influence how the findings are interpreted and used in future research. First, as one of 
the primary aims was to document the series o f meetings and workshops that 
preceded the launch o f the Equator Principles, the research was primarily based on 
interviews with banking executives that were heavily involved in the negotiations and 
in the aftermath, have a large stake in its success and reputation. Meanwhile, banks 
that had not adopted the framework and were under heavy criticism for not doing so 
were less likely to agree to an interview, given the sensitive nature o f the questions. 
As a result, data gathered from interviews would be biased in favor o f the framework, 
and the research is unable to adequately reveal motivations that banks may have for 
not adopting the framework. Yet, while interviews with consultants, environmental 
activists and lawyers that engaged with a broad array o f banks somewhat made up for 
this shortfall, it is nevertheless a limitation that should be recognized when 
considering the main findings.
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Secondly, as the thesis aims to make a set o f theoretical claims about why private 
actors adopt norms, it is important to recognize what the material and social costs of 
non-compliance are, as an aspect o f understanding how private actors define their 
interests. Given the voluntary nature o f the framework, and the lack o f independently 
verified information on actual compliance, it is somewhat difficult to assess whether 
adopting the framework also leads to changes in corporate behavior. While the 
investments in resources and staff, the reform o f credit risk processes, and the 
emergence o f consulting industry around the Equator Principles suggests that the 
framework has led to material changes within adopting banks and in the way project 
risks are managed, data on compliance across financial institutions is currently not 
available. As a result, the study o f norm adoption is necessarily limited to 
understanding why commercial banks would publicly commit to applying the Equator 
Principles to their project finance operations, and is less able to make claims about 
what they actually intend to do so.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The thesis will seek to place the emergence o f the Equator Principles within broader 
structural and normative changes in the global political economy and global 
environmental governance. It will attempt to provide an integrated analysis o f the 
social, political and economic developments that induced commercial banks to favor 
a common industry standard for the project finance market, and thereby led to the 
emergence o f the Equator Principles.
Following this introduction, chapter two will provide a comprehensive overview o f 
the existing literature on international norms in the study o f international relations. In 
doing so, it will highlight how rational-materialist perspectives exogenize norms to 
identities and interests, and therefore subordinate the independent significance o f 
norms in governance formation. While both power and interest-based approaches 
recognize the role o f the norms in governance, neither assumes behavior is entirely 
rule-governed. In contrast, alternative cognitive approaches, notably constructivism, 
focus on how norms not only inform the behavioral decisions o f actors, but also 
constitute their identities and interests. In conclusion, it will identify examples from 
the growing body o f research on international norms that illustrate how behavioral 
variations have been persuasively attributed to social institutions, rather than material 
capabilities or incentives.
Chapter three outlines the theoretical framework that will shape the analysis o f the 
emergence of the Equator Principles. Drawing on the preceding literature review, this 
chapter first considers how the three dominant theoretical perspectives in 
international relations -  realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism -  
expect governance to emerge in world politics. By comparing these perspectives 
across six aspects o f governance formation, it provides a framework for testing the 
explanatory power o f each in relation this case. Subsequently, by drawing on existing 
research in the field o f international norms, the chapter proposes a theoretical model
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in which norm entrepreneurs, notably transnational advocacy groups, advocate 
particular norms and principles in the corporate sector. In explaining successes, it 
argues that norms that have been legitimized by states in the international system are 
more likely to diffuse further in the corporate sector than those that are not.
Chapter four introduces the project finance market and the concept o f ‘risk’, which is 
the conceptual lens through which project finance executives understand their 
professional roles and responsibilities. This is important, as biases grounded in their 
professional training and commercial orientation influence how they interpret 
environmental and social impacts generated by a particular project, and make 
judgements about how to manage them. The chapter identifies project finance as a 
financial structure ultimately aimed at reducing projects risks to a level that is 
financially acceptable. In this context, adverse environmental and social impacts, 
such as water pollution or the disruption o f local livelihoods, are primarily 
understood as potential risk to the ability o f the borrower to service debt. Yet, the 
integration of environmental and social norms into project risk management both 
reinforced this conceptual view, whilst also expanded it in important ways.
Chapter five discusses the question o f norm emergence, and traces the origins o f the 
Equator Principles to the World Bank, and more specifically, to the introduction of 
environmental review o f projects in the early 1970s. Furthermore, it highlights how 
the continuous contestation o f  operational policies and their application to particular 
projects was instrumental to the evolution o f these norms, and ultimately, their 
widespread legitimacy in the international system. Overall, it identifies how the 
contentious relationship between the World Bank, and later the IFC, and transnational 
advocacy groups reflected differences in their understandings o f what constitutes the 
origins of underdevelopment and environmental degradation, and what should be the 
social purpose o f development finance in addressing this. In the end, the analysis 
finds that the environmental and social review procedures o f  the World Bank reflect 
these differences, by legitimizing and promoting large-scale infrastructure lending 
while recognizing the need to protect the environment and the rights o f local 
communities.
Following this analysis o f the emergence and institutionalization o f environmental 
and social norms in multilateral financing, chapter six addresses the question as to 
how these norms diffused into the private sector. In identifying one o f the two 
principal drivers of norm diffusion, the analysis discusses the significance of 
transnational networks o f advocacy groups and local community activists and their 
role in gradually increasing the public scrutiny o f commercial project financing in the 
1990s. By campaigning against both multilateral and commercial lenders involved in 
controversial projects, they helped to de-legitimize the notion that the latter were not 
equally responsible for ensuring that projects they financed did not generate 
significant adverse environmental and social impacts. As such, they helped narrow 
the gap between public expectations o f multilateral and commercial lenders by 
holding them both to the same level o f standards. In turn, this resulted in the de-
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legitimization o f project financing practices that did not adhere to particular 
environmental and social norms.
In turn, chapter seven provides an in-depth study of the drafting process o f the 
Equator Principles, identifying how and why commercial banks decided to 
collaborate on creating a common industry standard, and why they settled on the 
IFC’s policy framework as a blueprint. It identifies the IFC’s critical role as a 
convener and facilitator o f cooperation, allowing commercial banks to overcome 
collective action problems. However, with regards to determining institutional 
content and design, the commercial imperatives o f the banks themselves, and the 
structure o f the project finance market, proved more decisive than the IFC’s 
influence.
And finally, chapter eight identifies the main conclusion that can be drawn from the 
case study, and discusses how they can advance our understanding o f the emergence 
o f private governance in international relations. It revisits the comparison o f 
theoretical perspectives on governance formation outlined in chapter three, and 
argues that while realism can best account for why norms get institutionalized in the 
multilateral system, constructivists are best able to explain their diffusion, and neo­
liberal institutions their adoption by private actors. It concludes that a collective 
concern for reputational risk prompted commercial banks to negotiate and launch the 
Equator Principles and thereby effectively adopt the IFC’s policy framework. In 
doing so, they enjoyed significant discretion in designing a framework that 
conformed to their commercial objectives in the marketplace.
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2. Perspectives on Governance Formation
Introduction
The introductory chapter suggested that emergence o f the Equator Principles can be 
usefully investigated using an analytical focus on norms. Specifically, an analysis of 
how norms emerge and diffuse within particular institutional contexts, and why and 
under what conditions they are adopted by actors, can shed light on why private 
governance emerges in areas o f significant public interest, such as human rights and 
environmental protection. By employing this analytical angle, the thesis refutes the 
notion that the emergence o f the framework should be narrowly viewed as a function 
o f state power and hegemony, or in purely functionalist terms, as a response to a 
demand among private actors for standards that help coordinate investment practices. 
Instead, both the emergence o f and the perceived need among private actors for a 
common approach and their choice o f particular standards should be seen in the 
context o f norms emerging and diffusing across policy spaces, which created the 
impetus for cooperation between private actors and determined the institutional 
design and content o f the framework. As such, norms not only informed behavioral 
choices, but also defined the problem that cooperation ultimately sought to address 
and solve.
It is common for literature on private governance to dismiss existing scholarship on 
international institutions because o f its state-centric and rational biases. However, 
given the central roles that states and state-based institutions play in global processes 
o f institutionalization, lending significance to international norms requires an 
appreciation for how these have attained legitimate status in world politics. In turn, a 
central contention put forward here is that private governance is deeply embedded in 
well-recognized international norms that gained legitimacy because o f their inclusion 
into international constitutive law, notably the U.N Charter and the articles o f 
agreement and mission statements o f various multilateral institutions. Therefore, in 
cases where governance, whether public or private, induces behavioral convergence 
around such norms, an analysis o f governance emergence necessarily needs to focus 
on processes o f institutionalization at the global level, and how these impact the 
emergence and diffusion o f norms across institutional contexts.
This chapter reviews the literature on norms in international relations, surveying the 
dominant theoretical perspectives on the study o f international institutions in 
international relations. In this context, the thesis uses regime analysis as a departure 
point for understanding how neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists explain the 
emergence o f governance within issue areas, and the significance they attribute to 
norms in this process. While the regime concept is not particularly useful for studying 
private forms o f cooperation, the literature on international regimes does provide 
insights into how dominant perspectives in international relations understand the 
emergence o f governance at the global level.
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Subsequently, the broader cognitive view is introduced, and used to provide a 
constrasting perspective to the rational-materialist theories o f institutional change. 
Broadly, this literature argues that in order to explain the emergence o f governance, it 
is necessary to understand how technical standards and procedures acquire particular 
normative meanings, how and why these meanings may shift over time and diffuse 
across institutional contexts, and ultimately, acquire legitimacy among actors so as to 
inform behavioral choices. In turn, understanding why some norms gain prominence 
while others do not, and to what extent these inform the identities, interests and 
behavioral choices o f actors, emerges as a critical objective.
The chapter will be structured as follows. The first section will seek to conceptualize 
the concept o f ‘norms’ by reviewing how they are defined and understood in 
constructivist approaches to international relations. This will include an overview of 
their main properties and functions, and how they give rise to institutionalized 
patterns o f behavior. The second section reviews the theoretical literature on 
international regime formation, and the third offers a cognitive critique o f this. And 
finally, the fourth section will survey recent literature that demonstrates the 
significance o f norms in constituting shifts in institutional behavior among states in a 
wide variety o f policy areas, including security, economics, development aid and 
human rights.
2.1 Defining International Norms
The literature on international norms employs a variety o f broadly similar definitions. 
In Finnemore (1996), norms are defined as ‘shared expectations about appropriate 
behavior held by a community o f actors.’ 50 In their discussion o f international norm 
dynamics and political change, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) define norms as 
‘standards o f behavior for actors within a given identity.’51 In another oft-cited 
definition, Jepperson et.al (1996) refer to norms as ‘collective expectations about 
proper behavior for a given identity.’ 52 Common to all o f these definitions is the 
sense that norms induce convergence among actors, thereby mobilizing interests and 
behavior around particular notions o f appropriateness. It is behavioral convergence 
that manifests the power o f a particular norm, and represents the true test o f 
successful norm diffusion and adoption.
In this regard, norms should be differentiated from rules, which are much more 
targeted and precise. Whereas norms loosely define the boundaries o f 
appropriateness without directly clarifying for actors what norm compliance may 
entail in particular circumstances, rules provide explicit guidance in language for 
particular actors, such as ‘private property -  no trespassing.’ Relative to international
50 Finnemore (1996), p.22.
51 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p.891.
52 Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996), p.54.
53 This distinction between norms and rules is made by Kratochwil (1989), p.73. See also Dessler 
(1989), pp.454-458.
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cooperation, norms tell us why states collaborate, which is ultimately based on an 
agreement on the character and value o f the subject singled out for regulation, 
whereas rules tell us what the collaboration is about. That is why rules o f privacy 
differ between cultures, based on how the commonly-held understanding o f the ‘the 
right to privacy’ norm is understood and interpreted. Therefore, complying with rules 
can be said to be a discrete choice, and actors can exempt themselves from rule 
compliance by arguing that prohibitions do not apply to them. In contrast, actors may 
adhere to norms without knowing they are doing so, by virtue o f engaging in certain 
forms o f behavior that respect certain norms. In this context, they are more 
unconsciously bound to norms than rules, as the former identify for actors their 
identities and interests as members o f a social community.
As an element o f prescribing behavior, norms operate as ‘collective social facts’ 
embedded in shared understandings that define bonds between actors belonging to a 
social group.54 As such, norms, in contrast to some specific rules, are collectively 
held, by prescribing appropriate acts for actors that share particular identities or 
belong to particular social communities. This perspective presupposes that states (or 
other actors) have a normative identity, and do not simply embody interests and make 
behavioral choices like functional bodies.55 Therefore, norm compliance defines 
group membership, as an actor conveys a sense o f belonging by making appropriate 
and legitimate behavioral choices. As Kratochwil (1989) notes, ‘by directing actors to 
act in specified ways, rules and norms link individual autonomy to sociality.’56 More 
broadly, they define, reinforce and strengthen bonds between actors, as behavioral 
convergence sustains group cohesion and reinforces their shared, collective identities.
By implication, norms are intimately tied to governance, as they are a powerful 
source o f behavioral convergence, or more specifically, the harmonization o f 
practices. Norms may induce and explain convergence in expectations among a group 
o f actors in cases whether they seemingly lack a clear long-term motivation to do 
so.57 According to Bernstein (2001), three functions are commonly attributed to 
norms in the constructivist literature on global governance. First and foremost, norms 
have an important constitutive function, as they define the identities and interests of 
actors, including their perspectives o f the natural world and the knowledge and ideas 
that inform them. By extension, norms do not simply provide solutions to predefined 
problems, as rational institutionalists would hold. Instead, they give meaning and 
legitimacy to particular identities and courses o f action, thereby defining for actors 
what constitutes a problem and which behavioral responses are deemed appropriate to 
mitigate or prevent it.58 In fact, if  an actor violates constitutive norms, other actors 
with similar identities are unable to understand or comprehend the action, as it falls 
outside o f what is perceived as meaningful social action.59
54 Katzenstein (1996), p. 17.
55 Finnemore (1996), pp.5-7.
56 Kratochwil (1989), p.70.
57 Kratochwil 1989, p.58
58 Finnemore (1996), pp.22-28.
59 Dessler (1989), p.455.
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Secondly, norms regulate social behavior by setting standards o f appropriate conduct. 
As outlined by Kratochwil (1989), norms define the scope o f  prohibitions, which 
rules out certain methods o f individual goal-seeking that are in principle available to 
actors.60 They do so by restraining actors from even contemplating certain behavioral 
choices, as they perceive them as antithetical to their identities. Moreover, within the 
range o f permissible objectives and strategies, norms create ‘separation-schemes’ 
which minimize interference and channel conflict. This quality, stressed by neo­
liberal institutionalists, means norms contribute to regulating conflict between actors 
that compete over scarce resources, by inducing behavioral shifts that help actors 
realize joint gains.61
And third, as Bernstein (2001) notes, norms perform a deontic function, by 
‘expressing values that create rights and responsibilities and thereby empower actors 
by providing reasons and justifications for particular actions.’62 This means norms 
can be prohibitive, by circumscribing the conditions under which actors can 
participate in and authorize certain activities, as well as enabling, by providing actors 
with a moral license to undertake certain actions.63 In either case, norms can have 
significant distributional consequences that ultimately empower certain actors over 
others 64 In this context, the discussion in Kratochwil (1989) on the normative origins 
and impacts o f ‘rights’ becomes very relevant. As rights embody claims about why 
the demands o f certain actors should be socially protected, they impose obligations 
and duties on other actors, even if  these actors are not specified.65 Accordingly, they 
confer entitlements to ‘right holders’, whilst barring others from making particular 
arguments and engaging in certain practices that infringe on those rights.
In summary, as norms help mobilize actors around particular goals and strategies, and 
may indirectly induce redistributions o f power and wealth, they are directly relevant 
to some o f the moist poignant research questions in the study o f international 
relations. In particular, norms can be useful focal points for analyzing abrupt shifts in 
collective behavior among a set o f actors that are unexpected and counterintuitive. 
Before considering the important questions about how and why particular norms 
emerge and diffuse in the international system, the chapter will review the literature 
on international regimes as a proxy for understanding how the mainstream traditions 
in international relations consider international norms in explanations o f governance 
formation. Subsequently, it will draw on this discussion and identify how norms have
60 Kratochwil (1989), p.70.
61 See Axelrod (1986) for an illustration of this example. This limited view on the significance of 
norms is captured in the following statement; ‘When coordinated behavior takes place without the 
intervention of a central authority to police the behavior, we tend to attribute the coordinated behavior 
and the resulting regulation of conflict to the existence o f norms.’ (p. 1096)
62 Bernstein (2001), p.5.
63 The former are referred to by Nadelmann (1990) as ‘prohibition norms’, and may include 
condemnations o f killing whales, elephants or other endangered species, or human rights violations 
and (p.479)
64 Katzenstein, (1996), p.27.
65 Kratochwil (1989), p.155. Accordingly, he distinguishes between positive rights, or ‘non-actions’ 
that give others rights, such as no trespassing, and negative rights, or those upon which all others 
depend.
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been used to understand the recent political mobilization o f  private actors in global 
environmental politics, and the emergence o f new forms o f transnational governance.
2.2 Regime Analysis and the Study of International Norms
The concept o f ‘international regimes’ originated within the institutionalist tradition 
in social theory, and provided a theoretical tool for considering how shared norms, 
values and principles can provide the basis for cooperative and coordinated behavior 
in the international system.66 Regime analysis was the first comprehensive attempt 
within the mainstream traditions o f international relations to explore the role o f 
international institutions in shaping political change in the international system. In the 
most oft-cited definition, international regimes are defined as institutional 
arrangements that ‘encompass principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area.’ 67 The 
regime literature that proliferated in the 1980s provides a useful insight into how neo­
realists, neo-liberal institutionalists and sociological institutionalists explain the 
emergence, diffusion and adoption o f international norms.68 As norms are 
conceptualized as important building blocks o f international regimes by identifying 
standards o f appropriate behavior for regime members, the research on the formation, 
maintenance and decline of international regimes sheds light on how different 
perspectives conceptualize the relationship between actors, norms and governance.
In the study o f how and why international regimes emerge, scholars typically outline 
three generic approaches, each resting on different understandings o f  international 
norm dynamics centered on either power, interests or knowledge, (see Table 2 .1 )69 
As discussed by Hasenclever et.al (1997), within both power- and interest-based 
approaches, behavior is largely explained in instrumental terms, as a function of 
either hegemony or interactions, respectively. In this context, norms are understood 
as exogenous variables that enhance material power or form part o f the decision 
environment in which actors make rational choices. In both cases, actors are depicted 
as self-interest actors, continuously analyzing the material costs and benefits o f 
different courses o f action, and choosing those that conform to the interests of 
dominant states, or maximize their own utility. More generally, their perspective on 
the emergence and diffusion o f international norms is strongly influenced by the
66 Vogler (2003), p.26.
67 Krasner (1983), pp. 1-2. In this widely used definition, principles are ‘beliefs o f fact, causation and 
rectitude’, norms are ‘standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations’, and rules are 
‘specific prescriptions and proscriptions for action.’
68 For Oran Young’s discussion and critique o f the consensus definition, see Young (1986), pp. 105- 
108. Because of the ambiguity surrounding the Krasner’s definition, Strange (1983, p.342) famously 
labeled the ‘international regime’ concept ‘woolly’, whereas both Finnemore (1996, p. 16) and 
Kratochwil (1984, p.685) have argued the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
that represent the building blocks of international regimes need to be conceptually developed further to 
avoid being too vague for constructive scholarship.
69 For example,Young (1986) differentiates between three behavioral models, realism, which depicts 
states as ‘status-maximizers’, neo-liberal institutionalism, which depicts states as ‘utility-maximizers’, 
and a Rawlsian perspective, in which state behavior is constituted by rules, (pp. 118-120)
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assumption that the international system is based on a state o f anarchy between 
competitive states, an institutional context characterized by uncertainty and risk.
The theoretical perspectives embedded in regime analysis were shaped by economic 
and political developments in the international system. As a result o f the proliferation 
o f international regimes since World War II, the actions and interests o f states were 
increasingly embedded in a complex array o f institutions and rules. While the most 
prominent international regimes arose in the areas o f economic and security relations, 
institutionalized international cooperation and coordination emerged in many areas, 
including communications, transportation and the environment.70
Table 2.1 Three Theoretical Perspectives on International Institutions
Neo-Realism Neo-Liberalism Cognitivism
Central variable power interests knowledge
“In stitutio nali s m” weak medium strong
Meta-theoretical
orientation
rationalistic rationalistic sociological
Norm dynamics 
determined by
hegemony rational
competition
discursive
practices
Loosely adapted from Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997), p.6
For example, domestic trade, economic and financial policy was increasingly 
embedded in a variety o f overlapping and mutually reinforcing international regimes, 
notably the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the financial 
stability and development aid regimes o f the Bretton Woods institutions, which 
gradually facilitated the liberalization and integration o f the global economy. In turn, 
within many issue areas, state practices were increasingly rule-governed, drawing 
their purpose from multilateral organizations, agreements, and treaties, and giving 
rise to new kinds o f responsibilities and obligations.
The use o f regime analysis has been particularly popular in studying the creation and 
persistence o f international institutions in the international political economy. As an 
example o f how Krasner’s definition is applied to a particular case study, Cohen
(1983) posited that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in 
response to a fundamental principle that emerged out o f the inter-war experience, 
namely that all nations should have assured access to supplementary balance-of-
70 See for example chapters by Robert Jervis, John Ruggie, Oran Young and Ben Cohen in Krasner
(1983).
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payments deficit financing.71 Furthermore, this principle was combined with the norm 
that granted members access to IMF resources based on pledges to avoid certain 
distortionary policies. In turn, the IMF charter, its Articles o f Agreements, contains 
specific rules for actions in relation to enforcing its prerogative o f policy 
conditionality. And finally, the application o f these principles, norms and rules are 
organized in a set o f administrative decision-making procedures, including formal 
voting, which determines the amount o f available financing to member states, and the 
set o f conditions that form part o f the loan. Moreover, as Haas (1990) notes, the 
creation o f the IMF effectively led to an internationally-recognized monetary issue 
area, in which previously separate monetary management issues related to inflation, 
exchange rates, and growth were brought together in negotiations.
The next three sections will identify the different perspectives on international 
regimes that are commonly found in international relations literature.
Regimes Reflect State Power
In a power-based theory, international norm dynamics are intimately tied to broader 
shifts in material power between states within issue areas, which lead to the 
promotion o f particular norms to the detriment o f others.72 As norms are simply 
viewed as building blocks o f international regimes, they are seen as instruments 
through which powerful states exert influence in the international system, and 
therefore embedded in broader explanations about the sources o f state power. As 
such, norms emerge in a given issue areas because dominant actors decide to change 
their strategies and place their power behind new norms, or because interactions 
between powerful states cause a shift in the balance o f power between them which 
allow them to project their power in ways that they have not been able to do before. 
Moreover, norm diffusion among actors or across issue areas is then a function o f the 
exercise o f that power, and the institutionalization of norms into systems o f rules the 
govern relations between actors. This means that the emergence and diffusion o f 
norms is mediated principally by states, and more specifically, powerful states, as 
part o f a process o f ‘hegemonic socialization’.73
An illustration o f how neo-realists understand the creation and persistence of 
international regimes further elucidates how norms are understood in a rational 
perspective where power is the central variable. Given the overarching emphasis on 
power, neo-realists attribute much less independent significance to institutions than 
neo-liberal institutionalists in explaining the creation and persistence o f international 
regimes.74 For neo-realists who are generally pessimistic about the prospects o f
71 Cohen (1983), p.323.
72 For a lengthier discussion o f this perspective, see Hasenclever et.al (1997), pp.83-135.
73 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p.896.
74 In fact, since realists most often do not accord international norms even limited autonomy and 
simply view them as manifestations or products of interests, many scholars conceptualize neo-realism 
as a theoretical alternative to regime theory in understanding international institutions, rather than one 
of several perspectives. For example, Keohane (1998) juxtaposes ‘rational’ and ‘reflectivist’
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international cooperation, the basic assumption that governs their understanding o f 
international economic regimes is that the nature o f international economic relations 
depends upon the structure o f the international political system.75 As a result, 
international institutions are not given much significance independently o f powerful 
states, which means realism does not have an independent theory o f international 
norm dynamics. Given this perspective, a central area o f investigation in the regimes 
literature was to the extent international regimes merely reflected broader 
distributions o f power in international relations, and in particular, the interests of 
hegemonic powers. In this context, states are inherently ‘status-maximizers’, seeking 
to climb the hierarchical ladder o f power in the international system by exercising 
influence over other states in order to acquire more power.76 As power is the most 
important variable, dominant states are assumed to provide the conditions for 
processes o f institutionalization to emerge and evolve, and are assumed to possess the 
capability and power to bring them to an end.77 By extension, neo-realists understand 
international regime formation as a function o f the overall distribution o f power 
among states in the international system
Regimes Regulate Inter-State Conflict
Given that the explanatory power o f realism depends on a near correlation between 
power o f states and the emergence and purpose o f international institutions, 
observations in the late 1970s that international economic cooperation had persisted 
under conditions o f waning hegemonic dominance posed a real challenge. After the 
signs o f U.S hegemonic decline in the global economy, a research program raised the 
question as to how international economic regimes established in large part by U.S 
political might in the post-1945 period were surviving without their chief architect 
maintaining a hegemonic position in the global economy. As Kratochwil (1989) 
noted, realism was slightly ‘embarrassed’ by this development, as it suggested that 
power-based theories o f international institutionalization alone could not fully 
account for the persistence of international regimes.78 In fact, this was perceived as 
evidence that existing constellations o f power alone do not determine the nature o f 
international cooperation.79 Thus, they recognized that adherence to particular norms 
among states was not entirely dependent on the threat o f force, and that international
approaches to studying international institutions, with the former resembling neo-liberal 
institutionalism, whereas Klotz (1995) distinguishes between neo-realism and neo-realist 
institutionalists, with the latter accepting that international regimes may attain limited autonomy.
(pp.20-21)
75 See for example Gilpin (1971) and Krasner (1995).
76 The distinction between states as ‘status-maximizing’ agents in realism and ‘utility-maximizing’ in 
neo-liberal institutionalism, is from Young (1986), p.l 18.
77 As Haufler (1999) has noted, the literature attributing regime emergence and persistence to 
hegemonic power integrated hegemonic stability theory to the study o f international institutions, and 
embedded it within a liberal concern for institutional cooperation.
78 Similarly, Keohane (1982) argued hegemonic theories of international regimes fail to explain the lag 
between changes in power structures and changes in international regimes, (p.326)
79 One common alternative explanation offered by neo-liberal institutionalists was that fluctuations in 
demand for international regimes, rather than shifts in the balance of power between states, induce 
international regimes to emerge and decline. (Keohane 1982, p.326)
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norms could in fact develop their own limited autonomy if  institutionalized in 
international organizations and regimes. In turn, the acceptance that an active 
hegemonic power was not necessarily a precondition for an international regime to 
emerge triggered a new research program that sought to identify the wide range o f 
institutional conditions that facilitate and encourage international cooperation.
In contrast to neo-realists, neo-liberal institutionalists viewed norms as sources o f 
regulation which served as focal points for sets o f actors and facilitated the 
harmonization o f interests and behavior among them .80 Therefore, while neo-realists 
study norms within the context o f the evolving balance o f power between states in the 
international system, neo-liberal institutionalists emphasize how norms can contribute 
to favorable conditions for international cooperation.81 Or as Keohane and Nye 
(1989) argue, using the analogy o f a poker game, whereas neo-realists emphasize the 
structures that determine the distribution o f chips in explaining outcomes, neo-liberal 
institutionalists focus on the process that determines how different players make 
strategic betting choices through interactions. Rather than being an instrument o f 
power, norms form part o f a broader opportunity structure that determines the range 
of choices available to actors, and the costs and benefits associated with different 
types o f behavior. In this context, actors strategically invoke or advocate norms that 
reinforce their fixed interests, or alternatively, norms may inform the decisions that 
actors make to maximize their own welfare. In these cases, norms are understood as 
tools or mechanisms that individual actors can deploy at will, or road maps that guide 
behavior and regulate conflict.
In the microeconomic logic that governs neo-liberal institutionalist understandings of 
the relationship between agents and structures, the focus shifts from the supply o f 
international regimes, as provided by hegemons, to the demand for international 
regimes among states in a given issue area. In this context, norms are not instruments 
o f state power, but informational devices that help actors identify their common 
interests and achieve collective benefits.82 Rather than constituting identities and 
interest, they simply help remind actors o f their common, often hidden, material 
interests, and provide a framework for bargaining and negotiating cooperation.83 As 
such, norms emerge because there is a demand among actors for better coordination 
and cooperation in a given issue area. The diffusion o f such norms is then a function 
o f their inherent efficiency in meeting the evolving interests o f actors. In this context, 
utility, rather than power, is the overarching variable that explains how and why 
norms emerge and diffuse among a group o f actors. If successful, norms play a role in 
consensus-building, by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for actors 
to pursue certain courses o f action. In doing so, norms do not express power in and of
80 Reflecting this perspective, Axelrod (1986) says ‘norms provide a powerful mechanism for 
regulating conflict in groups’ in cases where a central authority is lacking, (p. 1095).
81 For a lengthier discussion o f this perspective, see Hasenclever et.al (1997), pp.23-82.
82 For a broader neo-liberal institutionalist definition and perspective o f ‘international institutions’, see 
Keohane (1998), pp.389-389.
83 Young (1994), p.26
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themselves, but rather facilitate cooperation and the convergence o f interests among 
actors and help them realize joint gains.84
A brief outline o f the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective on international regimes 
illustrates how actors interact with norms in a purely utilitarian framework. Whereas 
neo-realists identified power as the central variable for understanding the creation and 
persistence o f regimes, neo-liberal institutionalists argued that the collective interests 
o f states and the efficiency o f formal institutional structures determined the fate o f 
international institutions. 5 For neo-liberal institutionalists, the puzzle that the 
emergence o f international regimes presented is why inherently self-interested actors 
choose to cooperate in an international system o f anarchy.86 In this context, regimes 
do not emerge spontaneously, but are outcomes o f ‘political entrepreneurs’ that see a 
clear benefit in organizing collaboration.87 As such, they focused on identifying the 
conditions under which states cooperate and coordinate behavior in policy areas 
otherwise characterized by discord, and the factors that explain the persistence o f 
such collective action. In turn, these positivist assumptions mean interactions between 
states can be examined through employing game-theoretical models, such as the 
game o f the Prisoner’s D ilem m a.8
In this context, hegemonic rule was not the overarching explanatory variable, but 
identified as one o f many factors that made cooperation much more likely.89 
Therefore, neo-liberal institutionalists found it necessary to identify institutional 
conditions specific to the issue area in question, and the opportunities and obstacles 
for cooperation embedded within them. 0 Given the predicted decline o f U.S 
hegemony in the 1980s, a popular line o f inquiry centered on identifying the 
conditions that encouraged self-interested states to cooperate with each other in the 
absence o f a hegemonic power.91 For Keohane and Nye (1989), an important 
explanatory factor was the post-war expansion o f free trade and investment, which 
was underpinning evolving relationships o f ‘complex interdependence’ between 
states in the international system.92 In turn, regime formation and persistence was
84 Keohane (1984).
85 To illuminate the distinction between institutionalist and structural realist accounts of international 
relations, using the analogy of a poker game, Keohane and Nye (1989) argue that ‘at the process level, 
analysts are interested in how the players play the hands they have been dealt. At the structural level, 
they are interested in how the cards and chips were distributed as the game started.’ (p.21)
86 Hurrell (1993).
87 Keohane (1982), p.339.
88 For a description of this game, and an application of it to economic and security matters, see Lipson
(1984)
89 Some scholars, such as Keohane (1984), suggest that a hegemon is critical, whereas others, such as 
Young (1986), demonstrate that a dominant actor is not necessary to facilitate cooperation between 
competing states.
90 For a useful discussion of rational institutionalist perspectives on compliance with international 
regimes, see Ziim (2005), pp.20-22.
91 In the context o f the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, cooperation was assumed to be more likely under 
conditions o f ‘ongoing reciprocal exchange’, which occur in cases where interactions are infinite or 
linked to a wide variety o f other games with the same players. (Lipson 1984)
92 Keohane and Nye (1989).
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attributed to the growing economic integration o f domestic economies, which 
deepened interactions between states and increased the relative gains o f cooperation, 
and conversely, the relative cost o f defecting from international agreements.93
For neo-liberal institutionalists, regimes are viewed as vehicles that provide a 
framework within which actors can realize joint gains through cooperation.
So rather than merely reflecting instrumental acts or single agreements between 
states, international regimes manifest a convergence among states around particular 
norms, rules and principles, which provide the basis for sustained institutionalized 
cooperation between them.94 This view is most succinctly spelled out in Keohane
(1984), in which the emergence o f regimes reflects the existence o f ’political market 
failure’ in which actors demand international institutions to solve collective 
problems.95 Thus, in the absence o f supranational authority, regimes as systems o f 
norms and rules were perceived as important and effective sources o f governance that 
facilitated cooperation between self-interest driven states. In turn, actors are willing 
to accept constraints on their behavior if it maximizes their benefits.
This perspective assumes that international regimes have fixed optimal outcomes, in 
which the volume and distribution o f benefits across actors is maximized. Once 
established, they define common rules o f behavior that incentivize cooperation over 
non-cooperation, thereby solving collective action problems caused by unaligned 
incentives and interests between individual actors. Their persistence depends on the 
extent to which instructive rules and sanctioning mechanisms effectively discourage 
non-compliance. This could result from changes in the distribution o f capabilities 
among participants, where gainers may reassess the benefits o f cooperation in the 
face o f  new power dynamics. So not only do utilitarian arguments assume that actors 
are inherently non-cooperative and driven by conflicting material self-interests, they 
also presuppose that action is always intentional, and that the costs and benefits o f 
rule-compliance are pre-established rather than continuously interpreted and 
resolved. 6
In this context, the content and structure o f international economic regimes was seen 
as a product o f broader bargaining processes between self-interest driven states over 
global trade and investment rules. Furthermore, bargaining outcomes did not simply 
reflect the distribution o f power among states, nor did it require the active
93 Keohane and Nye (1989). But given these constraints, realists do recognize that cooperation is more 
likely on economic matters than over matters o f security, because of the greater possibility of 
institutionalizing stable expectations. (Lipson 1984)
94 In this context, regimes differ from single agreements or acts o f cooperation, in that they go beyond 
the formal letter o f international law by institutionalizing compliant behavior over the long-term based 
on a set o f collectively held norms and principles (Vogler 2000). Their relationship may also be 
decpited as hierarchial, in which (higher order) regimes facilitate the making o f substantive 
agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures for 
negotiation. (Keohane 1982, p.337) As Hurrell (1993) notes, engaging in cooperation presumes the 
existence of a basic moral community among states, resting on a basic compatibility of major values 
and common conceptualization of basic concepts, such as order, justice, state, law, contract etc.
95 Keohane (1984), p.85.
96 Kratochwil (1989).
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participation o f a hegemonic power, as realists would contend. Instead, they also 
depended on the extent to which underlying institutional conditions induced states to 
favor cooperation over unilateral behavior. 7 By extension, the central objective was 
to understand what kinds o f institutional conditions were likely to give rise to 
cooperation between inherently self-interested states, and induce them to comply with 
institutional arrangements. Given this motivation, studies o f international regimes 
tended to focus on the formal structures o f cooperation within international 
institutions, such as agreements, treaties and conventions, and how these allowed
QO
states to act collectively and manage conflicts amongst themselves. For example, 
Mitchell (1994) argued that whether a regime elicits compliance depends not entirely 
on hegemonic power or the economic interests o f regime members, but instead, on 
the agreed upon compliance system, and in particular, levels o f transparency, the 
inclusion o f potent and credible sanctions, the reduction o f compliance costs and a 
focus on preventing violations rather than deterrence."
In relation to the environment, some regime analysis has tended to be less rigid, as 
scholars have loosened the state-centric, rational-material assumptions that dominate 
regime analysis to give recognition to the significance o f the growing ecological 
interdependence between states and the influence it affords non-state actors in 
environmental policy-making processes. While a utilitarian logic still dominates the 
literature on international environmental regimes, research has to a large extent 
accepted the post-realist consensus that international institutions have real 
implications for states and the formation o f interests, and investigated the origins o f 
institutionalized cooperation by looking beyond the role o f converging interests or 
favorable distributions o f power among states.100 In particular, the instrumental role 
o f scientific communities in identifying the origins o f environmental problems and 
placing them on the international agenda has been o f particular interest to some 
scholars o f international environmental regimes.101 The argument is that in place o f 
domestic interest groups, transnational scientific alliances could influence state 
identities and interests by creating and diffusing new categories o f knowledge and 
information that induce a convergence in policy among states, thereby laying the 
foundation for institutionalized cooperation between them. By attributing significance 
to transnational scientific or technical networks, non-state actors are given an 
influential role in the formation o f international environmental regimes, and norms 
rather than fixed material preferences determine both the purpose and content o f 
governance.
97 Keohane (1984), p.76. For an example of an interest-based institutional bargaining model developed 
to understand international regime formation, see Young (1989).
98 See for example Keohane (1984). For a review and critique o f Keohane (1984) and the contractual 
theory o f international regimes, see Hasenclever et al (1993), pp.27-44.
99 These observations were made with reference to two international oil pollution control regimes, the 
first governing tanker discharges, and the second governing equipment to prevent oil spills, such as 
segregated ballast tanks. (See Mitchell 1994)
100 Vogler (2000).
101 Haas (1992).
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Yet, despite the emphasis on norms, rules and principles as defining characteristics of 
international regimes, the emergence of regime theory served to extend the use o f 
positivist methodologies to study the emergence and impact o f international norms 
and institutions. When confronted with the persistence o f international cooperation in 
the face o f hegemonic decline, regime theory did not re-examine the basic ontological 
and epistemological assumptions o f realist and liberal theory. Instead, the challenge 
o f regime analysis has largely been to explain the emergence and persistence of 
international cooperation given rigid rational-materialist assumptions.102 In particular, 
as Vogler (2000) notes, the adherence to a utilitarian logic centered on rational- 
materialist explanations o f political change has led to the integration o f regime 
analysis into the main positivist theoretical traditions o f international relations theory, 
largely leaving the sociological dimensions aside. In fact, the interest in international 
institutions as potential sources o f political change was limited to understanding how 
they may complement existing rational explanations.103 Therefore, neither realists 
nor neo-liberal institutionalists used regime analysis to develop a theory of 
international norm dynamics that is independent o f either the material power or 
interests o f actors.
The next section will review the alternative cognitive perspective for understanding 
institutional change in world politics that questions the ontological and 
epistemological basis o f conventional rational approaches. By departing from the 
notion that actors have fixed identities and interests, this perspective attributes a 
much greater significance to norms in the international system, and therefore places 
norm shifts at the center o f governance formation within given issue areas.
2.3 Cognitive Perspectives on International Norms
The central contribution that cognitive approaches bring to the study o f international 
relations is that social institutions do not only affect behavioral choices, but also 
constitute the identities and interests o f actors.104 In international relations theory, 
cognitive perspectives that focus on the role o f ideas, norms and forms o f knowledge 
have been most prominent in constructivist literature on state behavior. In their view, 
constitutive norms should be recognized as a crucial element in explaining stability 
and change in the study o f  international relations and institutions, alongside political 
and economic advantage.105 Norms encode appropriate actions for actors with
102 Briefly, these are ‘that states are inherently self-interested actors competing in a world o f anarchy, 
that cooperation need not depend on altruism, and that it can develop from the calculations of 
instrumentally rational actors.’ (Hurrell 1993, p.56)
103 As Katzenstein (1996) notes in the context o f discussing the extent to which national identity 
influences the security policy of states, ‘cultural explanations may be acceptable [to realists] as a last 
resort, but only if all other styles of analysis have failed.’ (p. 17) As an example of this, Goldstein and 
Keohane (1993) argue that examining the role of ideas in foreign policy-making might be able to shed 
light on the ‘empirical anomalies’ o f rationalist approaches.
104 For an overview of this perspective on regimes, see Hasenclever et.al, pp.136-210.
105 Klotz (1995), p. 17. As Nadelmann (1990) notes, while international regimes tend to reflect the 
economic and political interests o f the dominant members of international society, moral and
Christopher Wright 46
particular institutional identities, who in turn comply with norms to fulfill their 
institutionally-defined obligations and duties. As norms organize and structure the 
cognition o f actors, they give rise to routinized and habitualized forms o f behavior. 
And crucially, such rule-guided behavior does not depend on the threat o f external 
sanctions, as actors have internalized the duties and obligations that define their 
institutional identity. As such, the behavior o f actors is communitarian, rather than 
instrumental, as the identities and capabilities o f actors cannot be understood in 
isolation o f their membership and position within a social community.106
While the prevailing epistemological position o f regime analysis became almost 
entirely positivistic in orientation, the concept originated within the institutionalist 
tradition in social theory. In contrast to power- and interest-driven perspectives, 
constructivist approaches assume that the identities and interests o f actors are not 
fixed, but are constituted by social structures, defined by ‘shared understandings, 
expectations or knowledge.’ 107 This alternative cognitive perspective, also labeled 
‘reflectivist’ (Keohane 1998), ‘interpretivist’ (Klotz 1995), and a model o f ‘social 
learning and policy diffusion’ (Underdal 1998), emphasizes how the production and 
reproduction o f knowledge does not only constrain and enable behavior, but also 
constitutes identities and interests.108 In turn, the sharing o f knowledge can facilitate 
a convergence in modes o f  thinking, and produce a common understanding o f what 
constitutes a problem o f common concern, in effect defining the issue area.109
As such, constructivists are interested in the foundational origins o f identity and 
interest formation. This means not taking for granted how the decision environment is 
organized, but recognizing that the delineation o f issue areas and linkages between 
public policy problems is socially constructed, and constitute actors and agency.110 A 
central assumption is that interests are redefined as the dynamic between knowledge 
and goals evolves in deliberations between actors.111 In this view o f governance, 
human behavior is predominately rule-governed, and can only be understood against 
the background o f ideas and norms that give inter-subjective meanings to different 
behavioral choices. As Kratochwil (1989) notes, an actor must refer to rules in order 
to make a choice, and the observer must understand the normative structure
emotional factors also play a crucial role in the creation and evolution o f international regimes, 
including religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments, faith in universalism, compassion, conscience, 
paternalism, fear, prejudice, and the compulsion to proselytize, (p.480)
106 March and Olsen (1989), p. 161.
107 Wendt (1995), p.73.
108 For sociological critiques o f the conventional regime approach, see Checkel (2001), Kratochwil 
(1989), pp. 45-60, Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), Klotz (1995), pp.13-39, Risse (2000), pp.1-14, and 
Schimmelfennig (2000), pp. 111-112.
109 See Haas (1990) for a discussion on how knowledge creation and diffusion is central to the 
development of issue areas, and the formation o f individual and collective interests in the context of 
international regimes.
110 Haas (1990). As an example, whether greenhouse gas emissions cause global warming have 
objective answers, but the degree of certainty that warrants mitigative actions and the nature of those 
actions are for actors to decide, and depends on their intepretation of the problem. (Bodansky 1990,
p.621)
111 See Chayes and Chayes (1993).
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119underlying the action in order to interpret and appraise that choice. As such, norms 
are central to the deliberative processes o f assessment, justification and criticism, as 
they identify and establish for actors what has normative value and moral purpose.
Employing this approach means depicting regimes as inherently social structures that 
inform the evolution o f state identities and interests, with no meaning or existence 
apart from the ongoing behavior of actors. 1,3 Moreover, material capabilities, so 
central to neo-realist approaches to understanding institutional change, explain 
nothing by themselves, as their effect presupposes shared knowledge that is not 
reducible to capabilities.114 By extension, the analytical focus o f constructivists is as 
much on informal institutions, such as norms o f behavior, conventions, and self- 
imposed codes o f conduct, as the formal institutions that rationalists commonly 
emphasize, such as codified rules, laws and constitutions.115 In turn, meanings are not 
fixed in material structures, but mediated through social interactions and embedded in 
social practices. In this context, interaction does not follow rational negotiations 
between actors with fixed preferences, but is characterized by persuasive and 
argumentative acts aimed at adjusting interests toward particular ideas and norms.116 
By extension, as Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) argue, the significance o f 
international institutions goes beyond what the utility calculations o f rational actors 
would address, as they manifest shared understandings that inform members about 
the boundaries o f appropriate conduct in certain situations.
Before reviewing constructivist research on the emergence and diffusion 
international norms, it is instructive to briefly review an alternative cognitive 
approach that places hegemonic forces coalescing around an agenda o f capital 
accumulation at the center o f analysis. This perspective, while post-positivist, 
associates institutional change with historical structures centered on accommodating 
capital and encouraging capital accumulation, thereby providing an interesting take 
on the relationship between the state, transnational business and civil society, so 
central to the emergence o f private governance.
Critical Cognitive Approaches: The Neo-Gramscians
In contrast to constructivists, critical perspectives on international regimes argue they 
consistently favor certain norms and principles that facilitate and perpetuate the 
dominance o f particular states and actor constellations over others. As such,
1,2 See Kratochwil (1989), pp. 69-94.
113 Young (1983).
114 Wendt (1995), p.73.
1,5 This distinction is made by North (1990).
116 As Risse (2000) argues, if  identities and interests are fixed, there is no room for argumentation. In 
place o f a rational ontology, he suggests that actors engaged in the international public sphere 
constantly have to explain and justify their behavior, and in case where actors are uncertain about their 
own identities, interests and views of the world, communicative processes centered on argumentation 
and persuasion become very important, (p.21-23)
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international regimes do not only reflect material power structures, but also produce 
and reproduce hegemonic discourses that constitute the identities, interests and 
behavior of actors. These contentions are embedded in the Neo-Gramscian 
framework for understanding international political economy, in which Gramsci’s 
theory o f hegemony is drawn on to advance a historicist method o f studying 
international relations. In this context, a long duree perspective is employed to 
illuminate how particular historical structures are produced by collective human 
action and come to characterize the social material world during particular periods o f 
history.117 According to Cox (1987), these historical structures define a collective 
consciousness, which present themselves to subjects as objective reality. Yet, in 
actuality, they are a historically specific subjective understanding o f the social world. 
Within them, ideas, material capabilities and institutions reciprocally interact and 
collectively form a complex reality, and operate within three spheres o f activity; 
social relations o f production, forms o f state, and world orders. 118
The historicist perspective manifests itself in the contention that the past shapes 
current and future historical structures, which provides for the possibility that 
different time periods are shaped by different historical structures, and that within 
given time periods, different historical structures confront each other in concrete 
social situations in a struggle over hegemony. As such, these structures are not given, 
but continuously produced and reproduced by human agency and interaction, and a 
dialectic between normative and material dimensions. This gives ‘precedence to 
practice’ in explaining the nature and content o f broader structural change, and 
identifies hegemony as a product o f process, rather than material capabilities. In turn, 
the notion o f truth is historically specific and inter-subjectively produced by social 
relations, conventions and discursive practices.
The most significant argument that Neo-Gramscians contribute to the study of 
international institutions is that the modem incarnation o f the state has always been 
associated with the growth of integrated capital markets.119 Likewise, inter­
governmental institutional arrangements have evolved over time to accommodate 
capital, as it depends on the creation and maintenance o f regimes o f capitalist 
accumulations.120 These arguments are embedded in Gramscian perspectives on the 
relationships between the state and civil society, or the state and business, which sees 
them not as antagonistic, but reciprocal and mutually reinforcing, nested in a deeper 
shift towards new institutional forms. By extension, neo-liberal ism is transforming
117 For good overviews o f the theoretical assumptions o f this perspective, see Amin and Palan (2001), 
Bieler and Morton (2001) and Gill and Law (2001). For its application to understanding international 
economic and environmental regimes, see Levy and Newell (2005), and Paterson et.al (2003).
118 In this context, ideas are understood as ‘inter-subjective meanings, or shared notions o f social 
reality, material capabilities are ‘more tangible resources’, whereas institutions are ‘amalgams o f the 
previous two elements.’ (Bieler and Morton 2001, p.22)
1,9 Gill and Law (2001).
120 These regimes often take the form o f ‘regimes o f accumulation’, directly or indirectly governing 
‘the mode o f life, composition of the labour force, its political organization, the technical, 
organizational and human aspects o f the labour process and legal regulations at work.’ (Gill and Law 
2001, p.95)
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the state into corporation-like actors, by being driven by competition and adopting 
corporate techniques and practices, and corporations into states, evident in CEOs 
perfecting political and diplomatic skills,12
By extension, business influence on world politics not only manifests itself in 
lobbying and bargaining with individual states, and the consequences o f capital 
allocations, but also as part o f a transnational hegemony that exerts institutional and 
ideological influence on social relations in world politics. Since the normative and 
material dimensions o f social change mutually reinforce each other, ‘world 
hegemony is a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure, it 
cannot simply be one o f these things, it must be all three.’123 This understanding of 
world order corresponds to Gramsci’s concept o f ‘civil society’, defined as a realm 
within which social structures o f accumulation are consolidating while continuously 
being challenged.
So rather than depicting hegemony in the international system as a function o f state 
economic or military power, or as a consequence o f private structural power, Neo- 
Gramscians point to the networks generated by elite interactions between business, 
state officials, bureaucrats, and members o f international organizations, that force a 
broad consensus around neo-liberal ideas and forms o f governance.124 As Cox 
(2001) notes, hegemony at the international level is not merely an order among states, 
but closely associated with the dominant mode o f production, post-Fordist capitalism, 
which penetrates into all countries and subordinates other modes o f production. As 
such, the global economy is integrated into the international system, not as a sub­
structure driven by the power and interests o f states, but as the central arena o f 
hegemonic power and socio-economic reproduction o f structural relations o f 
inequality.
In this view, the post-Second World War international regimes depicted by realists as 
products o f U.S hegemonic leadership, and by liberals as reflections o f sustained 
legitimacy o f liberal ideas and values in the international system, are interpreted quite 
differently. Rather than focus on the power capabilities or strategic interests o f the 
U.S, or the incentives among states for international economic cooperation, critical 
perspectives see this period as the consolidation o f economic, social and political 
forces around a configuration o f power based on market capitalism. According to Gill 
and Law (1993), these regimes encompassed a wide range o f actors that shared class 
interests and were united behind the perpetuation o f neo-liberal norms, including 
financial firms on Wall Street, elements o f the state apparatus, centrist political 
parties and organized labor in the major capitalist nations. Their leading element was 
the international expansion o f capital-intensive, mass-consumption accumulation, and
121 Amin and Palan (2001) and Cerny (1995).
122 For example, see Sell (2000) and Williams (2001) on organized business lobbying o f multilateral 
trade negotiations at the WTO.
123 Cox (2001), p.62
124 See Bieler and Morton 2001, p. 29, for examples of how transnational hegemony is manifested in 
current international economic regimes.
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broadening global investment opportunities for exports and FDI in manufacturing and 
natural resource extraction, particularly oil.
While this perspective has gained a growing following, particularly among scholars 
researching the relationship between global environmental politics and the broader 
institutional structures o f global capitalism, it has yet to significantly engage with the 
literature on social movements and account for how these are able to induce both 
states and private actors to pursue policies that seem to conflict with a pure capital 
accumulation agenda. The next section will review how constructivists typically 
understand the emergence and diffusion o f norms in the international system, and the 
role they attribute actors and strategic agency in this process.
2.4 Norms and State Behavior: A Survey of Literature
During the last two decades, literature on international norms conducted outside the 
confines o f regime theory has flourished. Rather than assuming that the influence of 
norms in international relations is limited to formal structures created and adopted by 
states, these perspectives identified broader social structures and normative changes 
as constitutive o f the international system itself. In a wide variety o f policy areas, 
including those that have traditionally been the exclusive domain o f power- or 
interest-based approaches, scholars identified how state behavior could be traced to 
the emergence and diffusion o f particular norms, either domestic or international. 
Moreover, these norms were central to explaining the character o f relations between 
states, and the broader evolution o f international organization and cooperation.
Perhaps the first real challenge to the rational-materialist assumptions o f neo-realism 
was the English School, which placed shared norms and values at the center of 
explanations o f stability and order in international relations. While broadly accepting 
the overarching assumptions o f neo-realism that world politics is anarchical, this 
alternative view rejected the notion that it was populated by ego-centric, self-interest 
driven states left to defend themselves in the absence o f supranational rules and 
norms. Instead, they perceived relations between states to be predominately norm- 
governed, sustained by common institutions, norms and practices, in particular 
international law and diplomacy. In turn, instead o f an international system o f 
anarchy, there exists an international society o f states, in which relations between 
states are competitive, yet take place within a common normative framework that 
places certain social constraints on state conduct.125 According to Bull (1979), the 
principles, norms, rules and values that constitute the international society govern 
both which states are considered a member and how those states behave.
By extension, the English School identified social structures as central to identity and 
interest formation, and by extension, as the basic foundation for the generation o f
125 For the seminal publication on the concept o f ‘international society’, see Bull (1977). For a brief 
comparison o f the neo-realist and English School understanding o f international relations, see Brown 
(2007).
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alliances, and more generally, for cooperative interactions between states. According 
to this view, many international regimes that identify certain state practices as 
immoral and unacceptable can be traced to the ideational consensus that represents 
the foundation o f international society.126 Subsequently, problematizing identities and 
interests became a common theme in the constructivist literature in international 
relations, as a means to understand sustained patterns o f behavior o f particular states, 
or groups o f states with a shared cultural or normative heritage. For example, in his 
analysis o f the Cuban missile crisis, Kratochwil (1989) argues that it was not the 
competitive buildup o f military capabilities persay that precipitated the infamous 
Cold War standoff, but rather how both the United States and the Soviet Union 
interpreted each other’s military ambitions.127 In this context, the distribution o f 
military capabilities was not a sufficiently accurate predictor o f  why the conflict 
occurred or what the outcome would be. Instead, what mattered was the meaning that 
both parties attributed to particular policies pursued by the other side, and in turn, 
how these meanings were reaffirmed or contested in the context o f interactions 
between them .128
Constructivist approaches to regime analysis have convincingly argued that regimes 
have a compliance pull o f their own. Specifically, what binds members together and 
produces a sense o f obligation are not simply the functional benefits that they provide 
states, or the extent to which they reflect broader relationships o f power between 
them .129 Rather, as Ruggie (1983) argues, norms embedded in international regimes 
produce a consensus among states around what constitutes legitimate social purposes 
towards which state power is expected to be employed at the domestic level. In his 
oft-cited example, he argues states complied with the international economic regime 
that emerged after the Second World War because it sought to integrate domestic 
welfare demands into an international neo-liberal world order.130 This balance 
between international and domestic objectives, captured in the phrase ‘embedded 
liberalism’, gave recognition to the desire among states to manage the domestic costs 
o f a liberal international economy. The widespread acceptance o f this concept gave 
the international economic regime a ‘legitimate social purpose’ that meant neither 
overwhelming power or the existence o f clear, short-term benefits was necessary to 
induce states to comply with norms.
By recognizing that norms can give rise to stable behavioral patterns over time, 
Ruggie (1983)-illuminated how institutional continuity and change in the 
international political economy had been driven by the persistent or changing 
legitimacy of particular norms related to international trade and capital.13 This
126 Nadelmann (1990), p.483.
127 Kratochwil (1989), pp.49-52.
128 In a similar example, Wendt (1995) notes that ‘500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to 
the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends o f the United 
States and the north Koreans are not, and amity and enmity is a function of shared understandings.’ 
(P-73)
129 Hurrell (1993).
130 Ruggie (1983).
131 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).
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perspective attributes governance formation to a shift in norms, which reconstitutes 
the identities and interests o f actors, and by extension, the duties they feel obligated 
to fulfill. As a result, understanding why and how norms emerge and diffuse in the 
international system become important imperatives for explaining why governance 
emerges in particular issue areas. In particular, whereas state power and interests may 
determine form, such as the institutional design o f the regime, it is the rise and fall o f 
norms that explains the content, notably the regime’s social purpose. By extension, 
constructivists argue that disassociating norm dynamics from power and interests in 
the rational-material sense helps explain why fluctuations in power among states may 
not influence the social purpose o f international regimes, and conversely, why 
institutional continuity and change may result despite the absence o f shifts in the 
balance o f power.
Apart from problematizing behavioral decisions beyond the utilitarian logic, norm 
research has also taken issue with the homogenization o f state identities that is 
prevalent in realist analysis. Katzenstein (1996) features a selection o f case studies 
that refer to norms, identities and social realities to explain state interests and 
behavior in security politics, including weapons acquisition patterns, positions on 
humanitarian interventions, and the choice o f military postures in relations with other 
states. A common assumption that runs counter to rational approaches is that the 
social purpose o f individual states is not fixed, but is greatly informed by domestic 
political and cultural traditions that (re)constitute their identities. In turn, state 
behavior is not conceptualized as a means to an end, but instead, an end in itself as it 
serves to affirm state identity. In a similar vein, Finnemore (1996) considers the 
reasons why states adopted the Geneva Conventions, a set o f four treaties concerning 
the treatment o f non-combatants and prisoners-of-war in military conflict. She argues 
that states did not adopt them principally because they expected it to bring strategic 
advantages to themselves in times o f war, but as an end in itself, as ‘affirmations of 
value about the kind o f world people wanted and the kind o f behavior that was 
acceptable.’ 132
With regards to explaining the emergence and diffusion o f norms, constructivists 
often point to the instrumental actions o f particular ‘moral agents’. In the areas o f 
environmental protection, labor and human rights, a burgeoning literature has 
documented how advocacy groups have become influential political forces in world 
politics, pressuring states, international organizations and TNCs to integrate public 
interest concerns into their activities. In the literature, these non-state actors are 
identified as ‘norm entrepreneurs’, collectively manifesting a ‘global civil society’ 
that is becoming a growing source o f global governance.13 Their activities and policy 
positions are primarily motivated by an ideational commitment, and that have defined 
political strategies based on raising awareness o f particular issues and framing their
132 Finnemore (1996), p.129.
133 For a discussion o f the term ‘global civil society’ and its role in global governance, see Mathews
(1997), Newell (2001a), and Wapner (2000).
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moral causes in persuasive ways.134 As part o f making moral demands, norm 
entrepreneurs question the utility o f certain activities that are considered entirely 
legitimate, and often protected either by law or political prudence.135 By doing so, 
they not only advocate particular remedies to widely recognized problems, but 
actually define the problems themselves, including who bears responsibility. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), as this involves challenging existing 
norms, they may have to explicitly act in ways that are deemed ‘inappropriate’ by 
existing normative standards, such as engaging in organized civil disobedience. By 
doing so, incompliant behavior may over time become accepted if  it leads to 
outcomes deemed by other actors to be favorable and preferable.
In turn, by promoting shared values, norm entrepreneurs mobilize ‘social energy’ to 
trigger broader social transformations in favor o f human equality and social justice. If 
they overcome initial resistance and denial of accusations o f wrong-doing, they may 
be successful in institutionalizing new norms in inter-state structures. For example, 
the norm may become embedded in domestic regulations, either as ‘soft’ or ‘hard 
law’, and inform the creation o f new policies among states and international 
organizations in issue-specific areas. As noted by Risse and Sikkink (1998), at this 
stage states consistently argue in favor o f the norm, regardless o f whether the 
audience is generally hostile or favorable to it. And in cases where they have not been 
integrated internationally, international organizations may develop new organs, 
subunits, and administrative practices that are designed to improve some new 
measure o f organizational performance.136 In turn, as these policies become 
precedents that inform the development o f subsequent domestic legislation or 
international agreements, the norm contributes to narrowing the policy space for 
alternative understandings and increases the pressure on states that remain defiant in 
their opposition to the norm.
And finally, apart from conceptualizing the purpose and impact o f social movements, 
norm research has been used to problematize the role o f international organizations in 
world politics by demonstrating how they are instrumental in not only diffusing 
domestic norms across countries, but also producing shared understandings of 
international problems and conceptualizing institutional responses to them. In this 
context, they are neither instruments o f power, as neo-realists argue, nor simply 
functional responses to state problems, as neo-liberal institutionalists contend. As 
Haas (1990) notes, while states may create international organizations to solve 
particular coordination problems, the exact definition and understandings o f those 
problems shift as part o f being embedded within the organizational and professional 
culture of the international organization. In turn, the coordination function of 
international organizations also acts like a knowledge filter, in which domestic policy
134 For a theoretical discussion of ‘framing’, see Payne (2001) and Stone (1989). For examples of its 
application to understanding the influence of transnational advocacy groups, see Keck and Sikkink
(1998) and Nadelmann (1990), and Price (1998).
135 As an example, see Price (1998) for the role of such ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in changing attitudes 
among states towards land mines.
136 Haas (1990), p.86.
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preferences are amended to harmonize with existing policy agendas, and in 
accordance with the professional and technical biases o f the international 
organization.
As such, international organizations engage as semi-autonomous actors in world 
politics, interpreting mandates and state policy preferences in unanticipated ways, 
commonly shaped by their internal organizational and professional culture and the 
rational-legal character o f decision-making.137 Given these biases, they should not be 
conceived as passive and objective actors simply serving their principals as 
international problem-solvers, but instead, as conveyors o f forms o f knowledge and 
categories o f action that shape common understandings o f development in very 
particular ways.138 Moreover, this means the authority o f international organizations 
does not only stem from their association with dominant states, but also their 
discursive power as knowledge producers and brokers, and by extension, influential 
forces in the emergence and diffusion o f norms. For example, St.Clair (2006) 
provides a critical assessment o f the World Bank’s self-proclaimed transformation 
into a ‘Knowledge Bank’ and argues it is not promoting knowledge as an educational 
institution would, but instead advocating a significant bias in favor o f development 
economics as the theoretical and normative foundation for understanding and 
discussing human aspirations for welfare. This perspective is advanced through 
formulating conference agendas, providing capacity-building and professional 
training courses, and most o f all, generating enormous amounts o f policy-oriented 
academic research that ‘frames’ the development problematique in very specific
139ways.
By representing member states, whilst also peddling policy agendas that reflect their 
organizational and professional biases, international organizations provide collective 
legitimization o f particular policy preferences, and by doing so, signal approval and 
disapproval o f the claims, policies and behavior o f  states.14 As an example, Barnett 
and Finnemore (2004) survey the evolution and influence o f the IMF as an 
international bureaucracy, and argue that many o f the roles and functions taken on by 
the international organization cannot simply be explained by broadening demands 
among states for international coordination and policy advice. Rather, the staff o f the 
IMF itself have been leading many new initiatives and broadening the scale, scope 
and depth o f technical advice on monetary policy matters given to member countries, 
greatly expanded its ability to regulate economic life and in many ways constituting 
those systems in need o f  regulation.141 As an example, they discuss the IM F’s move 
from a limited focus on balance-of-payments lending to ever more sweeping 
structural interventions in members’ economies and societies in an attempt to control 
activities that might contribute to stabilization. This move, they argue, was not purely
137 Barnett and Finnemore (2004), p.10-12. For a similar discussion how the internal features of the 
World Bank and IMF effect their respective behavior, see Woods (2006.
138 See St.Clair (2006), Woods (2006) and Stone and Wright (2006), pp. 9-17,
139 On the ‘framing’ role of the World Bank, see Bo&s and McNeill (2004).
140 This argument was originally presented by Claude (1966) in reference to the political function of 
the United Nations.
141 See Barnett and Finnemore (2004), pp.45-72.
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‘technical and value-neutral’, but aimed to ‘reconstitute these economies to conform 
to the market-dominated models that have become known as the Washington 
Consensus.’ 142
The cases o f the World Bank and the IMF demonstrate how the legitimizing effects 
o f expert knowledge created and diffused by international organizations empowers 
certain actors over others, thereby having real distributional consequences. While 
such views are most common in the context o f multilateral financial institutions and 
international economic regimes, they can also be useful in studying norm diffusion in 
other policy areas. As an example, Finnemore (1996) attributes the proliferation of 
state-science bureaucracies in countries to the work o f the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), rather than an 
administrative need the emerged and diffused among member-states. She finds that 
many states that developed these bureaucracies to manage domestic scientific 
research actually had no substantial domestic scientific communities. Therefore, this 
development has to be understood in reference to a desire among governments to 
signal a commitment to advancing modem science, as part o f reinforcing their 
identities as members o f a socially constructed international community o f  which 
UNESCO is an anchor organization.143
Thus, symbolic acts play a role in international relations, as states may pursue courses 
o f action that conform to well-recognized moral principles even in cases where this 
entails confronting a dominant state or absorbing material costs. As an example,
Klotz (1995) observes that the emergence and widespread support for trade sanctions 
against South Africa was a product of the growing legitimacy o f the norm o f racial 
inequality, which reconstituted the identity and social purpose o f states, and prompted 
them to support policies that in many cases conflicted with their immediate short­
term economic interests as major investors and trading partners. Similarly, numerous 
case studies in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1998) illustrate how the quest for 
international legitimacy, respect and affirmation explains why states declare a 
commitment to human rights norms. In both cases, widespread legitimacy o f 
particular norms empowered weak states and non-state actors, allowing them to 
confront and circumvent the initial opposition o f dominant states.144
In these observations, collective behavioral changes that manifest governance within 
an issue area are attributed to norm shifts, which are conceptualized as outcomes of 
normative struggles among various networks o f power and knowledge.145 In this 
context, behavioral changes are not primarily due to shifts in material power or 
resources, but changes to the meanings that actors attribute to different courses o f 
action.146 Thus, actors follow new courses o f actions not because they stand to gain in
142 Barnett and Finnemore (2004), p.47.
143 Finnemore, (1996), p.12
144 Klotz 1995, p.24. On the sources o f power of transnational advocacy groups, eee also Keck and 
sikkink (1998) and O ’Brien et.al (2002).
145 Litfin (1994).
146 Elaborating on this point, Risse (2000) argues that rational bargaining models that seek to explain 
processes of institutionalization should more forcefully recognize that human interactions are
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power or wealth, but because doing so corresponds to their identity as members o f a 
particular social group. In turn, the characteristics and properties o f  norms themselves 
hold many answers as to why governance emerges, and the selection o f norms around 
which actors cooperate. In particular, an approach that assumes behavior is norm- 
guided can be useful is shedding light on the diffusion o f environmental and social 
management standards in transnational markets, as these are neither backed by a legal 
authority nor significantly influenced by states. Instead, the transnational policy realm 
is dominated by transnational actors, whether they be businesses, voluntary 
organizations or even international organization operating semi-autonomously from 
their principal states, with recognized technical expertise that is assumed to be 
equally (if  not more) valuable to solving policy problems across national jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The debates between neo-realists and neo-liberals in the 1980s over the creation, 
persistence and effectiveness o f international regimes triggered the first investigation 
into the exogenous effects o f international institutions on state behavior. As Hurrell 
(1993) notes, these debates were shaped by the acceptance o f three rigid assumptions 
about international relations; that states are inherently self-interested actors 
competing in a world o f anarchy, that cooperation need not depend on altruism, and 
that it can develop from the calculations o f instrumentally rational actors. 147 For neo­
realists, the rise and fall o f international institutions is intimately connected to the 
power and interests o f states, whereas for neo-liberal institutionalists, they could not 
be understood within a purely utilitarian logic o f political change that elevated agents 
over structures. The debate between them and sociological institutionalists provided a 
useful starting point for understanding the significance that mainstream theoretical 
perspectives in international relations attribute to norms in explaining institutional 
change.
While the state-centric nature o f regime analysis suggests that it may not be 
particularly useful for understanding how and why private governance emerges at the 
global level, the central role o f state-based authority in processes o f 
institutionalization suggests that inter-state regimes and institutions do matter. This 
contention has been validated in the growing literature on international norms and 
state behavior, which has highlighted the role that powerful states and international 
organizations play in the emergence and diffusion o f norms in the international 
system, alongside more traditional norm entrepreneurs. In turn, as many forms of 
private governance draw on we 11-recognized norms in the international system and 
incorporate references to international environmental law, it is instructive to consider 
private governance as an outgrowth o f existing international regimes, organizations 
and institutions, rather than a separate system o f rules that are either supplementing or
characterized by communicative acts, such as persuasion and argumentation, rather than rational 
exchanges o f material concessions in which the interests o f the parties remain fixed throughout, 
(pp. 14-34)
147 Hurrell (1993), p.56.
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rivaling those created by states.
Building on this literature review, the next chapter will discuss in more detail how the 
three dominant theoretical perspectives on governance formation would explain the 
emergence o f private governance. By comparing the perspectives across six aspects 
o f private governance formation, the chapter will provide a framework for organizing 
the empirical case study and the summary o f findings in the concluding chapter. In 
addition, the next chapter will provide a hypothesis for how norms emerge and 
diffuse in transnational markets by drawing extant norm research in international 
relations.
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3. Theoretical Framework: Norms and Private Governance
Introduction
This chapter will argue that understanding the emergence o f private governance in 
transnational markets is best achieved by placing the growing legitimacy of 
environmental and social norms in the private sector at the center o f the analysis. 
Specifically, given that private governance relies on the voluntary acceptance and 
adherence to particular procedural and substantive norms, compliance is less a 
consequence o f formal enforcement than a desire among private actors to adhere to 
evolving norms that dictate what constitutes legitimate and acceptable behavior. As 
such, social sanctions, such as being excluded from a social group or losing ones 
reputation, are much more significant in explaining compliance than the threat o f 
legal sanctions. By implication, an analysis o f institutionalized behavior in the 
transnational policy realm, where formal state authority is dimished, directs our 
attention to how certain norms initiate and sustain behavioral patterns among actors.
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on governance formation and established 
that norms matter in understanding state behavior. While all three generic approaches 
to understanding institutional change -  power, interests and knowledge -  attribute 
significance to norms, only cognitive approaches endogenize them in the identities 
and interests o f actors. Furthermore, neo-realists, and to a lesser extent neo-liberal 
institutionalists, downplay the role that non-state actors can play in influencing 
international norm dynamics and broader institutional change. By extension, the 
challenge for this chapter is to take the key insights from the previous chapter and 
consider how and why they apply to the case study at hand. Specifically, an important 
objective is to present a framework that explains the emergence o f private governance 
within the broader existing system o f international norms and rules. Implicit in this is 
an assumption that private governance may have significant associations with 
existing international regimes and organizations, and that these ties are most often 
discursive and evident in the diffusion o f norms from and between states to non-state 
actors.
This chapter will consider competing theoretical explanations and outline a 
framework for understanding private governance formation that centers on 
understanding how and why environmental and social norms emerge and diffuse in 
transnational markets. The first section will define the institutional context produced 
by the globalization o f world politics that took place in the 1990s, and identify its 
implications for understanding governance formation. The second section will build 
on the previous chapter and outline three contending hypothesis for explaining 
private governance formation built on realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and 
constructivism, and more specifically, identify the explanations that each o f these 
would have for the emergence o f the Equator Principles. And finally, the third section 
will make the case for a synthesis approach to propose an analytical model for
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studying private governance formation that combines insights from the three 
theoretical perspectives.
3.1 Setting the Context: From ‘International’ to ‘Transnational’ Governance
Given the need to understand norm emergence and diffusion in transnational policy 
processes, it is necessary to move beyond the confines o f regime analysis, which fails 
to fully recognize the direct roles that non-state actors can play in world politics. 
Whereas states are the principal units o f analysis in the study o f multilateral 
environmental agreements, TNCs stand at the center o f the vast array o f  intra­
industry codes o f conduct, guidelines, labeling and certification schemes that have 
emerged in the last decade. The growing role o f private actors epitomizes the 
increasingly liberal orientation o f global environmental politics, towards institutional 
responses that rely on ‘market-friendly’ norms and principles that allow them to be 
integrated into existing neo-liberal economic regimes.148 In many cases, private 
governance manifests itself in standards and guidelines for environmental 
management practices in a given industry in the form o f eco-labeling schemes or 
codes o f conduct.149 While voluntary, the growing diffusion o f  these schemes and 
their growing influence on the practices o f states and international organizations 
suggests that these initiatives could potentially transform the institutional 
relationships between public and private actors.
This section will argue that the conventional focus on formal rules created and 
implemented by states, for states, fails to recognize the increasingly complex set o f 
institutional arrangements that govern the transnational policy arena, in which 
decision-making is guided by states and a variety o f non-state actors with competing 
and conflicting interests and motivations.150 Figure 3.1 depicts the differences 
between an ‘international’ and a ‘transnational’ perspective on governance, in which 
the latter provides a more comprehensive account o f the interactions between public 
and private actors that characterize world politics today. In the ‘international’ 
perspective, governance is assumed to be whatever international organizations do, 
and their formal attributes, such as their charters, voting procedures, and committee
148 The rise of environmental management as an overarching policy paradigm is significant in this 
regard. (Williams 2001) This conception arises from positivist understandings of environmental 
problems, and an optimistic belief in technocratic solutions to environmental problems. See also 
Bernstein (2001), Clapp (2005), Falkner (2003), and Graham and Woods (2006).
149 See Cutler et.al (1999) and Pattberg (2004) for overviews of different institutional types o f private 
governance.
150 Cemy (1995) argues the structural transformation is o f such magnitude that it has ‘transformed the 
way that the basic rules of the game work in politics and international relations.’ (p.596)
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Figure 3.1 Two Perspectives on World Politics
‘International*
HIGH POLITICS
LOW POLITICS
‘Transnational*
Source ; W illetts (2005). p.37*?.
structures, account for their behavior.151 In this perspective, characteristic o f regime 
analysis, the influence o f non-state actors is largely confined to lobbying 
governments at the domestic level and providing scientific input into international 
negotiations.152 In contrast, a transnational perspective recognizes the full range o f 
interactions between states and non-state actors, and more broadly, the growing 
integration o f domestic, international and transnational policy spaces. These 
interactions take place in an international public sphere that is broadly open and
151 Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), p.758.
152 As per Strange (1991), this perspective is deeply rooted in the assumption that the power to create 
and disrupt international order rests exclusively with states, which naturally relegates non -state actors 
to merely informing rule-making, or being forced to obey rules created by states.
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inclusive, rather the closed nature o f many multilateral and bilateral policy-making 
processes.153
As part o f outlining an analytical framework for understanding how norms emerge, 
diffuse and become institutionalized in transnational policy spaces, it is instructive to 
survey the institutional features o f transnationalism that shape international norm 
dynamics. First, the growth o f transnational relations among actors reflects the 
culmination o f broader structural changes in the international system, in which 
private actors and interests increasingly shape the configuration o f the international 
political economy.154 Secondly, as a result o f the political mobilization o f private 
actors in policy areas traditionally driven by the state, institutional design in global 
governance is becoming increasingly diverse, ranging from conventional inter­
governmental agreements backed by state-based authority to non-binding rules and 
certification schemes created and implemented by different kinds o f non-state 
actors.155 Third, and related, by not being directly associated with states or state- 
based institutions, the purpose and scope o f governance is increasingly de­
territorialized, away from rules defined by and for national jurisdictions, to 
frameworks that can be applied and implemented transnationally.156 And fourth, as 
both a precursor to and a product o f the transnationalization o f governance, authority 
is increasingly diffused or delegated to transnational non-state actors, placing them in 
a position to directly determine the institutional design and content o f governance that 
penetrates into domestic policy spaces.157
In general terms, these institutional conditions have proved politically favorable for 
transnational actors, including international organizations, relative to those whose 
interests and influence are limited to particular states. In shaping institutional 
development, transnational actors are not always beholden to state interests and 
actions, but can play a direct and independent role in deciding the purpose, 
institutional design and implementation o f new forms o f transnational governance.
For example, as demonstrated in numerous case studies in Cutler, Haufler and Porter 
(1999), Hall and Biersteker (2002), and Levy and Newell (2005), non-state actors are 
capable o f acquiring and projecting authority in the international system that is 
perceived by those subjected to it as both legitimate and credible. In particular,
153 Risse (2000), p.22.
154 Strange (1996) defines authority in political economy as ‘the power to alter or modify the behavior 
of others by using incentives and disincentives to affect the choices and range o f options.’ (p. 133)
155 See Koenig-Archibugi (2006), pp. 12-19. For examples of new forms o f transnational governance, 
see selected chapters in Hall and Biersteker (2002), Cutler et.al (1999), Higgott et.al (2000), and 
Josselin and Wallace (2001).
156 However, as Scholte (2005) notes, apart from supranational governance beyond states, the growing 
interdependence between states has also induced the emergence of sub-state governance, in which 
local authorities in different states interact and formulate policy independently o f their respective 
national governments.
157 In recognition of this, literature identifying and examining new forms of private governance 
typically rejects the assumption prevalent in the regime literature that states and state-based institutions 
hold a monopoly on legitimate and authoritative power in world politics. For a broader philosophical 
discussion about the nature o f legitimate authority and its relationship with power in the context of 
non-state actors, see Hall and Biersteker (2002), pp.3-22.
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private actors are increasingly cooperating on overtly political matters that go beyond 
the coordination o f market behavior commonly associated with cartels, to form self- 
regulatory private regimes. By doing so, private actors can no longer be considered 
merely intervening variables in the international system, but possess the capability 
and interest in establishing a parallel transnational system o f rules.159
As an example, the most influential standard-setting framework for environmental 
management is the ISO 14000 standard series of the International Standards 
Association (ISO). The standard is intended to provide guidance for adopting firms to 
integrate environmental considerations into their business operations by establishing 
environmental management systems and other operational guidelines.160 The 
international standard for Environmental Management Systems (EMS), ISO 14001, 
was based on the British Standards BS 7750, and also driven by the voluntary charter 
for business drafted by the ICC.161 While dominated by industry, the ISO standards 
are formally negotiated between national industry bodies o f member governments, 
collectively supported by a large network o f some 180 technical committees, 550 
subcommittees, and 2,000 working groups.162 The process o f standard-setting is 
decentralized, with different national standards bodies taking the lead in different
i c ' l
technical areas, in close consultation with national and international stakeholders.
Alongside the rise o f private actors, the information and communications technology 
revolution has allowed advocacy groups in different countries to form transnational 
networks that have become an increasingly powerful force against transnational 
business and the neo-liberal policies o f the Bretton Woods institutions.164 Rather than 
simply acting through states and international organizations as domestic or 
transnational advocacy groups, these networks have become central to the diffusion 
of knowledge and information about environmental and social problems, and become 
directly involved in articulating and implementing policy responses to them. As an 
example, the World Wildlife Fund played a crucial role in the creation o f the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), a standard-setting and certification scheme devised by 
logging companies, forest managers, international NGOs, and a wider range o f local 
community groups and trade unions.165
158 See Drahos and Braithwaite (2000) and Falkner (2003). As per Cutler et.al (1999), private regimes 
are ‘integrated complexes of formal and informal institutions that are sources of governance for an 
economic issue area as a whole.’ (p. 13)
159 Pattberg (2004).
160 According to one proponent, the purpose of the ISO 14000 series is to ‘move organizations from a 
compliance-based orientation to the level o f integrated environmental management.’ (Feldman 1999, 
p.5)
161 Feldman (1999).
162 Clapp (2005), Falkner (2003), pp. 76-77, and Mattli and Biihte (2003).
163 Haufler (2000).
164 See selected chapters in O’Brien et.al (2000), as well as Keck and Sikkink (1998), Kobrin (1998), 
Nadelmann (1990), Price (1998) and Wapner (1995).
165 Pattberg (2004). The first two types of standards are certified by independent certification bodies. 
Since the establishment of the FSC secretariat in 1994, over 78 million hectares o f forest in more than 
82 countries have been certified according to FSC standards while several thousand products are 
produced using FSC certified wood and carrying the FSC trademark.
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In broad terms, the new transnational politics in the international political economy o f 
the environment has produced a policy realm that is largely independent o f domestic 
political structures, and is underpinned by a deepening institutional relationship 
between international organizations, TNCs and transnational advocacy groups.166 In 
turn, decentralized consultations between them are leading to the creation o f new 
systems o f rules in which traditional inter-state bargaining is no longer the locus of
1 f \ 7global decision-making. In turn, this emerging realm o f social relations is 
dominated by transnational actors whose identities are tied to ideas and norms that 
are not nationally-defined or bounded, but derive from a universal vision o f world 
politics. By implication, the social purpose o f interactions is frequently the 
harmonization and coordination o f state and non-state practices across national 
jurisdictions, in areas such as environmental policy and management, financial 
accounting and risk reporting.
3.2 Hypothesizing Private Governance Formation
Before outlining the analytical framework that will be used to explain the emergence 
o f the Equator Principles, it is instructive to review how the three main theoretical 
perspectives on governance formation in international relations would explain the 
emergence o f private governance. Table 3.1 identifies six dimensions o f governance 
formation -  why norms emerge, timing, main initiators, their sources o f influence, 
governance structure, and why norms are adopted - for which the three before 
mentioned theoretical perspectives have competing explanations. First, the question 
as to why norms emerge concerns what factors determine the influence o f a particular 
norm on actors’ behavior. Secondly, timing concerns the reasons why norms begin to 
inform corporate behavior in a particular market at a particular time, as a precondition 
for governance. Third, main initiators refer to the actors that are each theoretical 
perspective assumes will take the lead in creating private forms o f governance.
Fourth, sources o f influence refers to on what basis the main initiators have attained 
their dominant role and exert power in the governance process. Fifth, governance 
structure concerns what the level o f formalization and the kind o f institutional design 
that the respective theories would predict a private governance initiative to have. And 
finally, why norms are adopted concerns the explanations the different theories have 
for why private actors adopt norms.
Overall, the analysis will develop three general hypothesis about how the dominant 
perspectives in international relations on institutional change may explain the 
emergence o f private governance generally, and the Equator Principles in particular. 
While these perspectives have commonly been deployed to explain the emergence of 
international regimes negotiated by and for states, it is nevertheless instructive to 
consider their explanatory power relative to transnational governance o f this kind. In
166 BSrzel and Risse (2002) and Ruggie (2004), p.504.
167 Pattberg (2004).
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turn, the concluding chapter will return to these hypothesis and consider the 
explanatory power o f each in relation to this case.
Table 3.1 Three Perspectives on Private Governance Formation
Realism Neo-Liberal 
Institutionalism
Constructivism
W hy norm s emerge Hegemony Efficiency Legitimacy
Timing Shift in balance of 
power between states
Change in institutional 
conditions and interest 
structure
Rise and fall of 
international norms
M ain initiators States (and 
interna tional 
organizations)
States, international 
organizations and 
transnational actors
Norm entrepeneure 
(both states and non­
state actors)
Sources of influence Economic resources Economic resources / 
technical expertise
Knowledge / 
legitimate moral 
claims
Governance
structure
(International,
state-based
Transnational,
market-based
Global,
society-based
W hy norms are  
adopted
Response to coercion Convergence in 
interests and response 
to incentives
Effect of perauasion
Realism and Private Governance Formation
Early literature on the role o f non-state actors in world politics frequently lamented 
the fact that the core assumptions o f realist perspectives on institutional change do 
not readily lend themselves to exploring private governance as an institutional 
phenomenon separate from states. The state-centric dimension o f realism, in which 
states and state power are elevated over non-state actors and forms o f authority, has 
been seen as a significant limitation in studying emerging forms o f global 
governance. Yet, the inclusion and testing o f a realist hypothesis o f institutional 
change in this thesis is based on a contention that the validity of theory should be 
empirically tested rather than simply assumed.
Within realism, states, and hegemonic states in particular, hold primary significance 
in the analysis o f institutional change. As Haufler (1999) notes, the early literature on 
regime analysis more or less integrated hegemonic stability theory to the study o f 
international institutions, embedding it within a liberal concern for institutional
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1 Aftcooperation. In this regard, explanations o f broader long-term structural stability 
and change in the international economic system are associated with the rise and fall 
o f hegemonic states.169
W hy norm s em erge: Realists argue that state-based institutions remain resilient even 
in an age o f globalization where the mobility and financial strength o f transnational 
private actors have grown considerably. Whether a particular norm exhibits a high 
level o f conformity with existing international institutions (and by extension the 
interests o f powerful states) is the primary factor in determining its legitimacy in 
world politics and its influence on behavior and broader institutional change. By 
implication, realists would predict that only those norms that conform to the interests 
o f powerful states would emerge and diffuse in transnational markets, because they 
are backed by state power. As a result, they would expect that rules predominately 
negotiated and implemented by non-state actors nevertheless do not directly confront 
or undermine state power and state-based institutions. Instead, private governance 
would be expected to extend the power o f states by legitimating and promoting the 
interests o f powerful states, and diffusing norms embedded in domestic policies and 
state-based regimes. Given this prediction, a realist hypothesis would be invalidated 
if norms that conflict with and undermine the interests o f  powerful states are 
institutionalized in transnational markets.
Tim ing: A realist perspective would explain the emergence o f  institutionalized 
cooperation between private actors within a broader context o f inter-state relations 
and competition, (see Box 3.1) The timing of a process that leads to a specific private 
governance outcome is closely linked to the consequences o f state behavior and the 
exercise o f state power. Thus, to understand why norms and rules emerge and induce 
behavioral convergence among market participants, realists would find it necessary to 
consider the national and international structures and institutions within which market 
transactions take place, and within which private actors are forced to operate and 
make decisions. In particular, they would predict that governance reflects changes in 
the balance o f power between states, which places state power behind a new set o f 
norms. More broadly, realists would predict a direct link between the emergence of 
private governance and shifts in the wider inter-state competition over trade and 
finance in the global political economy.
168 While predominately applied to international economic regimes, hegemonic stability theory has 
been loosely attributed to other issue areas as well. For example, Little (2005) argued that states 
observed the humanitarian principle that prohibited the international slave trade not because of its 
inherent moral or ethical properties, but because it was expected that Great Britain intended to enforce 
the regime and had the capacity to do so.
169 For example, Kindleberger (1973), a lead proponent of this view, suggested that the existence of 
mutually beneficial economic exchange between states at the international level has historically 
depended on the presence o f a dominant economic and political power that has the capacity and 
willingness to supply and support the necessary infrastructure, including stability and order. As an 
example, Carr (2001) argued that international free trade in the 19th century did not organically 
emerge, but came into existence and was maintained by British economic and military power. 
Similarly, Gilpin (2001) states that the creation of a multilateral system o f trade and economic 
relations after World War II reflected the material and security interests o f the emerging hegemonic 
power, the United States.
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M ain initiators: Realists assume states are the primary actors in international 
relations by virtue o f possessing a monopoly of force within their given territory. 
They explain the behavior o f non-state actors and institutional cooperation between 
them within the broader struggles for power and influence among states in the 
international system. The significance o f non-state actors is subordinated to that of 
states because o f the legal authority that the latter enjoy within their territorial 
jurisdiction and in relations with other states. Moreover, international organizations 
are considered to be mechanisms through which states act, rather than autonomous 
agents in international affairs. As states, independently or collectively, determine the 
rise and fall o f particular institutions, they ultimately provide the institutional context 
for non-state actors to act and engage with each other. Therefore, in terms o f 
explaining the emergence o f private governance, realists would predict that powerful 
states, either directly or through international organizations, would drive any 
initiative in order to ensure that its purpose, structure and influence would correspond 
to their interests. They would expect the membership o f any initiative to include 
states and/or international organizations, as non-state actors are not viewed to be 
capable o f  creating institutions that rival or challenge those o f states.
Box 3.1 Realism and P rivate  G overnance Form ation
Hypothesis
General: Private governance is supply-driven, conceptualized as a set of 
norms expressive o f hegemonic state power and coercively imposed on 
private actors.
Specific: The Equator Principles reflect the strategic interests and values 
o f dominant economic powers by encouraging the imposition of 
particular terms and conditions on project finance loans given to 
developing countries.
Source o f influence: As power is the main factor in determining the outcomes o f 
negotiation processes that lead to governance, states are the primary actors in the 
international political economy by virtue o f their sovereign powers and economic 
resources and capabilities. States can exercise power structurally, in the sense o f 
creating and enforcing the structures within which market actors are forced to 
operate, or relationally, by directly using their legal authority and economic power to 
punish those that violate law through national or international courts or using other 
coercive measures. Within negotiations between private actors, state power manifests 
itself in the creation and enforcement o f international institutions that constrain and 
enable international business. Whereas realists may admit that growing economic
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interdependence has increased the influence o f transnational private actors, the scope 
o f corporate power and interests is still assumed to be restricted by rules and 
regulations defined and enforced by states and international organizations. In fact, the 
growing financial and economic interdependence between states, reflected in the 
transnationalization o f markets and corporations, as a manifestation o f state power 
and not a reflection o f its decline.
G overnance s truc tu re ; Given these assumptions about norm evolution and state 
power, the overarching purpose o f various regimes, even o f those created and 
implemented by non-state actors, would be to institutionalize norms that encourage 
stability and order in a particular domain in the international system that would 
ultimately be beneficial to powerful states and their survival. As realists assume only 
the exercise or threat o f state power can guarantee compliance, they would predict 
that state authority is present in the governance structure. The validity o f this 
argument would be strengthened by evidence that states or international organizations 
hold privileged negotiating positions and are directly involved in both setting rules 
and overseeing their implementation. But state power could also be exercised 
structurally, in the sense that negotiations conducted amongst non-state actors could 
be nested within broader structures o f inter-governmental relations, such as the U.N 
or the OECD. In either case, the explanatory power o f a realist perspective would 
depend on the presence o f state authority in the governance structure o f private 
regimes, in some form.
W hy norm s are  adopted: As realists believe non-state actors are forced to operate 
within the constraints created and upheld by state-based institutions, norm-following 
behavior is ultimately assumed to be a function of state authority. As markets follow, 
rather than lead states, private actors continuously adapt their behavior to the 
changing nature o f market structures, which themselves are products o f state power 
and competition between states. In this regard, realists would explain private 
governance as a response to state power and the coercive pressures generated by 
state-based institutions. A failure to align their market behavior with the interests of 
powerful states may not necessarily result in direct punishment, but would place them 
in a disadvantaged position within market structures created and maintained by states. 
As a function o f coercion rather than consent, adoption is then a defensive act, meant 
to ensure commercial survival by adjusting behavior according to the rules set by 
powerful states.
Applied to the Equator Principles, a realist hypothesis would be boosted by evidence 
o f significant state representation in the negotiations, either in the form o f direct 
participation or through international organizations. Moreover, the soundness o f  a 
realist interpretation seemingly rests on evidence that commercial banks, despite their 
increased mobility and financial strength in an age o f financial globalization, are 
nevertheless forced to devise rules for themselves that conform to those created and 
enforced by powerful states. Thus, realists would predict that private governance does 
not institutionalize norms and rules that rival those embedded in state structures, but 
serves to reinforce them. In this regard, they would expect the Equator Principles to
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promote the diffusion o f norms that emerged from inter-state cooperation to govern 
investments in a way favorable to states. As such, the framework could be 
characterized as an extension o f state power in global finance that structures financial 
transactions in ways favorable to powerful states and the stability o f capital markets.
Neo-liberal Institutionalism
The rise o f private actors and authority in world politics, and the growing significance 
o f transnational relations between non-state actors across national boundaries, has 
been the root o f a reconsideration o f many realist assumptions within the study o f 
international relations. Neo-liberal institutionalists argue that realists overemphasize 
the significance and impact o f state power in world politics, and related, 
underemphasize the extent to which states are inclined to engage in cooperation. The 
transnationalization o f  politics and markets has deepened interactions between states 
and increased the necessity o f multilateral cooperation to solve problems that affect 
individual states, manifested in areas such as the environment, migration, trade and 
finance. Integration has increased the benefits o f peace, and thereby produced 
favorable conditions for transnational institutions to emerge and diffuse.
W hy norm s em erge: For neo-liberal institutionalists, norms emerge because o f a 
demand among actors for problem-solving or better coordination, (see Box 3.2) The 
process whereby governance emerges depends to some extent on the compatibility of 
interests among actors, and their relative success in bargaining processes. 70 Such a 
perspective would hypothesize that the content o f governance, manifested in the 
standards around which actors coalesce and the structure that governs 
implementation, reflects an efficient response to a collective problem. As neo-liberal 
institutionalists conceptualize governance as problem-solving rather than outcomes o f 
battles for power between conflicting parties, norms emerge and become 
institutionalized through a process akin to Darwinian natural selection; norms that 
gain widespread acceptance do so because they have proven to be more efficient and 
effective at solving collective action problems than other norms.171 Just like 
successful companies in a market are credited with superior business models to those 
that are less successful, so are dominant norms assumed to have superior qualities 
compared to those that are less influential in informing behavioral choices. In this
170 Reflecting such a utilitarian perspective, Axelrod (1986) proposes to use game-theoretic methods to 
study norm dynamics, in which actors select norms on the basis of their utlity. While conceding that 
actors do not always make choices about the future by way of rational calculations, he still subscribes 
to a utilitarian logic in which norm selection is based on the principle that ‘what works well for a 
player is more likely to be used again.’ (Axelrod 1986) p .1097). For an outline of his evolutionary 
approach to studying norm dynamics, see pp. 1096-98.
171 Three principle mechanisms determine the rise and fall o f norms in a utilitarian perspective. First, 
the more effective players, or those that are most successful in attaining their goals, are more likely to 
survive and reproduce, by virtue o f making more efficient choices. Secondly, a similar process of 
natural selection takes place with regards to norms, in which those that are frequently ‘selected ‘ by 
players gain prominence in favor o f those that are most often bypassed. And third, by way o f perfect 
information, players that suffer from making poor choices may start to imitate the norm selections of 
the players that have gained from making better choices. (Florini 2003)
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context, norms function primarily as informational devices that reduce uncertainty 
and solve conflicts between actors, by for example establishing rules o f conduct that 
increase the efficiency o f  transactions.
Tim ing: In this view, the emergence of private governance is a product o f the 
rational choices that private actors make in pursuit o f their own self-interests. The 
timing o f governance formation is attributed to changes in institutional conditions
Box 3.2 Neo-liberal Institutionalism  and P rivate G overnance Form ation
Hypothesis
General: Private governance is demand-driven, and emerges as a 
consequence o f changes to institutional conditions and interest structures 
in which the benefits actors derive from cooperation outweigh the costs.
Specific: The emergence o f the Equator Principles manifests how 
changing institutional conditions meant commercial banks could better 
realize their fixed, rational interests in the project finance market by 
engaging in cooperation and harmonizing environmental and social risk 
management practices.
which create a new demand for order among actors in a particular policy domain. 
Neo-liberal institutionalists therefore place much more significance than realists in 
the evolution o f state interests, and how it impacts the qualitative character of 
relations between states, and in particular, the opportunities for cooperation. For 
example, they would contend that in an era o f growing interdependencies between 
states, transnational governance has become much more possible and desirable. They 
would therefore predict that private governance emerges when institutional 
conditions, notably market changes that alter the distribution o f costs and benefits of 
different forms o f behavior, make cooperation more desirable for private actors.
M ain initiators: Similar to realists, neo-liberal institutionalists also believe that 
states are primary actors in international relations and hold a privileged position 
relative to non-state actors by virtue o f having a monopoly o f force within their 
territorial jurisdiction. However, they contend that global economic and political 
integration has created opportunities for many non-state actors to develop and 
strengthen relations with other states and non-state actors through transnational 
activities. These transnational linkages, alongside deepening relations between sub­
national actors, including bureaucracies and municipalities, means state power in an 
era o f global integration is more diffuse and open to contestation. Thus, in particular 
policy areas, governance formation does not entirely depend on the exercise o f state
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power, as non-state actors may be able to take on ‘state-like’ functions by drawing on 
their resources and expertise.
Sources o f influence: Instead o f simply assuming that the emergence o f governance 
is an expression o f state power and coercion, neo-liberal institutionalists are more 
inclined to consider it a reflection o f interests, in particular shared interests. Thus, 
interest, rather than power, is the ontological starting point for neo-liberal 
institutionalists to understand governance formation. Actors promote their fixed 
interests in rational bargaining processes, and a governance outcome, for example a 
joint acceptance o f particular standards, reflects the fact that actors have individually 
considered cooperation to be preferable to defection in achieving their aims. In turn, 
the influence o f individual actors is reflected in the leverage they have in 
negotiations, their relative bargaining positions, and the strategies they choose to 
pursue. The basis for bargaining power is thus a combination o f economic resources 
and technical expertise, as well as strategic competence and skill. In this context, 
states hold a privileged position, but neo-liberal institutionalists argue non-state 
actors, including scientific organizations and TNCs, can exert influence by virtue o f 
scientific knowledge and technological expertise that other actors depend on for 
understanding problems and solving them.
G overnance structu re : The choice o f governance structure would follow a similar 
logic. A neo-liberal institutionalist perspective would hold that a governance structure 
reflects the interests o f private actors, and optimizes the efficiency o f governance by 
ensuring that the benefits o f cooperation outweigh the costs. In a transnational 
market, this perspective would predict that a market-based structure, which affords 
maximum flexibility and discretion to private actors while ensuring that 
harmonization in practices takes place, is the optimal outcome. As markets are 
believed to lead to a more efficient distribution o f costs and benefits than that which 
would result from a publicly created and enforced system, neo-liberal institutionalists 
would predict that private governance is market based, and driven by voluntary 
compliance. In fact, the growing role and influence o f private actors in transnational 
governance would be interpreted as an efficient response to the kinds o f problems and 
inefficiencies caused by parallel processes o f growing global integration combined 
with the persistence o f nation-based politics and regulation.
W hy norm s are  adopted: Neo-liberal institutionalists would explain private 
governance using a micro-economic logic in which the decision to adopt is based on 
rationally weighing the relative costs and benefits o f different strategies for achieving 
fixed objectives. Actors differ in their market strength and position, as well as the 
institutional environment within which they operate, which explains patterns o f 
adoption. Adoption would therefore be a discrete choice o f action that would be 
measured against a decision to not adopt. It is therefore possible to ascertain that 
those private actors that adopt a particular voluntary framework do so because they 
expect to derive more benefits from doing so than failing to do so. The outcome o f 
such a rational calculation both reflects the constraints and opportunities produced by 
the institutional environment, as well as the actors’ own interests and capabilities.
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Applied to the Equator Principles, neo-liberal institutionalists would view the 
framework as an outcome o f rational bargaining processes between commercial 
banks faced with a collective incentive to better manage the environmental and social 
impacts o f project finance investments. Similar to realists, they primarily understand 
the actions and interests o f private actors to be a function o f international and national 
structures o f governance created and maintained by states. Yet, relative to global 
finance, they would stress that growing economic and financial interdependence 
between states has created new transnational policy spaces and markets in which 
national boundaries are less significant in determining the structure and content of 
governance. This has not only increased the commercial opportunities and autonomy 
o f transnational investors, but made the capabilities and resources o f transnational 
actors more influential. The Equator Principles, as a voluntary framework negotiated 
by transnational investors, would be an expression o f the economic and financial 
interdependence between states, and the growing influence o f  investors as 
intermediaries between national markets.
Constructivism
While both realist and neo-liberal institutionalist perspectives emphasize material 
factors, such as resources and capabilities, in explaining governance formation, 
cognitivist perspectives attribute governance formation to a shift in norms. In 
international relations theory, cognitive perspectives are most commonly associated 
with constructivism, a theoretical orientation that departs from a rational-material 
ontology based on an assumption that ideas, meanings and understandings in the 
social world are socially constructed. In this regard, behavioral changes occur 
because norms reconstitute the identities and interests o f actors and by extension, the 
duties they feel obligated to fulfill. Norms are understood as neither informational 
devices exogenous to interests, nor expressions o f state power. They are viewed as 
central to identity and interest formation, and more broadly, governance. As a result, 
the study o f norm emergence and diffusion must be disassociated from material 
power and interests in order to explain why fluctuations in power among states may 
not influence the social purpose o f international regimes, and conversely, why 
institutional continuity and change may result despite the absence o f shifts in the 
balance o f power. In this regard, the interests o f actors are not fixed around rational 
self-interest, but conceived to be more fluid and produced and reproduced through 
social interactions.
W hy norm s em erge: For constructivists, governance is socially constructed through 
social interactions between many actors, rather than being a consequence o f the 
actions o f one class o f actors, whether they be states or TNCs. In turn, a shift in 
norms is a precondition for institutional change. A constructivist explanation for why 
norms emerge would emphasize the role o f discursive practices in social interactions 
between actors, rather than the legal characteristics and material capabilities o f 
individual actors. Norms become influential because actors consider them legitimate,
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and define their interests around them. An important determinant o f whether a new 
norm is legitimate is the extent to which it conforms to existing norm structures. This 
means norms may redefine how actors understand problems, allocate blame, and 
evaluate solutions. In turn, the emergence o f governance in an issue therefore reflects 
how particular norms come to define what constitutes appropriate behavior as a result 
o f persuasion and argumentation, and give meaning and social purpose to collective 
action. As norms constitute the identities and interests o f actors, norm emergence can 
be associated with a deeper transformation of the social purpose o f agency. Once 
institutionalized in governance frameworks, norms attain a force o f their own as they 
are embedded into the identities and interests o f actors and frame policy discussions 
in ways that reinforce the legitimacy o f the norm.
Timing: Constructivists argue that understanding the timing o f governance formation 
necessitates an inquiry into how and why some norms gain prominence and 
legitimacy among a group o f actors at a given time, while others do not. (see Box 3.3) 
In global governance, norms emerge and diffuse because o f  norm entrepreneurs who 
actively promote them in social interactions. By implication, constructivists would 
expect private governance to coincide with the behavior o f norm entrepreneurs, and 
by extension, the rise o f particular norms, which made certain corporate practices 
illegitimate and gave meaning to cooperation between private actors. Norms are 
produced and reproduced by social interactions between actors that are wedded to 
conflicting ideologies and moral claims, and clash over how particular problems 
should be understood and who is responsible for solving them. When a norm gains 
prominence over others, it changes the appropriateness o f certain types o f corporate 
behavior and thereby creates interests around achieving particular normative 
outcomes. In this context, the decision o f private actors to cooperate with each other 
and commit to following certain norms should not be understood as an instrumental 
reaction to either power or incentives, but a reflection o f a deeper convergence in 
identities and interests across private actors.
M ain initiators: While most constructivists agree that the state is the central 
organizing entity in international relations and thereby exerts considerable discursive 
influence, they do not always share the view that states are primary actors simply by 
virtue o f having a monopoly o f force within a given territory. Instead o f arguing that 
the influence o f  individual actors is a function o f their legal and material properties, 
constructivists point to their legitimacy in social interactions, the moral authority o f 
their normative claims, and the ability to argue and persuade. More broadly, actors 
are not viewed as either power- or interest maximizers. Instead, they are 
conceptualized as norm entrepreneurs, embedded in social structures while promoting 
particular ideas, understandings and standards o f conduct that may alter those same 
structures.
As constructivists do not assume that possessing a legal right to sovereign rule is the 
only source o f power, they would contend that governance can be traced back to 
norm entrepreneurs that frame policy problems and promote particular solutions. 
Norm entrepreneurs can be states as well as non-state actors. This means that while
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the discursive influence o f state-based institutions in defining problems, allocating 
responsibilities among actors and shaping policy discourses is in most cases 
formidable, states’ actions do not alone decide the rise and fall o f international norms, 
and in turn, the emergence o f institutions. In particular, champions o f  norms that 
conform to well-recognized principles constitutive o f international law, such as 
respect for human rights, non-violence and non-discrimination, are often more 
influential than those that challenge these. For example, a human rights organization 
may therefore be more influential in negotiations than a state that routinely violates 
human rights, by virtue o f its legitimacy and moral standing among a particular group 
o f actors.
Sources o f influence: For constructivists, power structures and the distribution of
Box 3.3 C onstructivism  and P rivate  G overnance Form ation
Hypothesis
General: Private governance is norm-driven, and reflects how the 
identities and interest o f private actors have become redefined by new 
norms, which in turn triggers behavioral changes that conform to those 
norms.
Specific: The emergence o f the Equator Principles reflects the diffusion 
o f particular international norms in commercial project finance, which 
reconstituted the identities and interests o f commercial banks through a 
process o f socialization.
power among actors is socially constructed and a function o f inter-subjective 
understandings o f problems and solutions, which provide legitimacy to actors with 
certain identities and interests over others. In contrast to the rational-materialist 
ontology o f both realist and neo-liberal institutionalist perspectives, constructivists 
assume behavioral changes, and governance formation more generally, reflect 
processes o f  socialization whereby the identities and interests of actors are 
reconstituted around particular norms.172 Influence in global governance is much 
more a consequence o f discursive practices, in particular acts o f persuasion, the 
legitimacy o f moral claims and the extent to which norms promoted by actors 
conform to existing norm structures. By implication, influence is not limited to states, 
or even financially powerful TNCs, as non-state actors with legitimate moral standing 
can overturn the power o f those that have superior material resources. Over time, the 
repetition and routinization o f certain types o f behavior reinforces them, thereby 
maintaining the foundation for continued institutionalized cooperation.173
172 See Meyer (2002), pp.532-542 and Schimmelfennig (2000), pp.l 11-112.
173 Rosenau and Cziempel (1992).
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G overnance structu re : Constructivists would expect a governance structure for 
harmonizing market practices to be more inclusive and multi-level than what is 
commonly predicted in the literature on international regimes. It is based on a 
society-based understanding o f international relations in which a multitude o f  public 
and private actors influence the form and content o f governance by participating in 
public discourse. Therefore, they would predict an inclusive governance structure in 
which roles and responsibilities are divided across public and private actors as part o f 
ensuring its legitimacy. Moreover, neither power nor positive incentives are seen as 
requirements for a particular framework to induce compliance. It is legitimacy- 
seeking behavior, rather than fear o f coercion or response to positive incentives, that 
drive institutional change. Therefore, legitimacy o f the process and the outcome of 
governance -  input and output legitimacy -  is the main determinant o f compliance. 
This means constructivists would not necessarily expect private governance to be 
formalized and backed by state power, as the legitimacy o f voluntary principles 
ensures compliance.
Explaining norm  adoption: In terms o f explaining why private actors adopt a 
particular norm, constructivists would argue that it is not a function o f state coercion 
or new incentives that make private actors prefer cooperation over unilateral actions. 
Instead, the roots o f behavioral changes are much deeper, caused by processes of 
socialization which reconstitute the identities and interests o f actors around particular 
norms.174 Once such a transformation has occurred, norm compliance becomes a 
natural act embedded in the consciousness o f actors as ‘the right thing to do’. This 
means the compliance pull o f norms is inherently a social mechanism, where norm- 
following behavior is not motivated by rational calculations o f the costs and benefits 
associated with compliance, but pursued because it is meaningful and considered 
legitimate, or proper in the normative sense.175 When norms have attained that level 
o f legitimacy, breaching them would require actors to make a deliberate choice to act 
in ways they know is illegitimate and inappropriate. By implication, governance 
formation is then a reflection o f collective norm-following, as norms define actors’ 
identities, their view o f the world as well as their own moral and social purpose 
relative to other actors.
Applied to the Equator Principles, constructivists would focus on the growing 
compliance pull o f environmental and social norms among commercial banks, 
reflected in a transformation o f their identities as lenders. They would view the 
framework as evidence o f the emergence and diffusion o f particular norms in the 
global project finance market which redefined what constitutes responsible lending 
practices, and by extension, redefine the identities and interests o f lenders. The 
analysis would then hone in on social interactions between actors, and why actors 
promoting particular norms succeeded in persuading others o f their moral superiority 
over others. Constructivists would predict that successful norm entrepreneurs were
174 See Meyer (2002), pp.532-542 and Schimmelfennig (2000), pp.l 11-112.
175 Dessler (1999), p.454-458 and Ziim (2005). As per Hurd (1999), legitimacy refers to ‘the normative 
belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.’ (p.381).
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both superior in arguing their moral claims and framed them according to existing 
norm structures. In this regard, the Equator Principles reflect how norm entrepreneurs 
were able to shift the parameters for what constituted responsible business conduct, 
and thereby make a concern for environmental and social impacts o f project loans 
central to the identities and interests o f commercial banks as responsible ‘corporate 
citizens’.
The next section will make the case for a theoretical framework which incorporates 
elements o f each o f the perspectives reviewed above. In turn, this will provide a 
context for outlining an analytical approach to understanding the emergence o f 
private governance in transnational markets.
3.3 Understanding Private Governance Formation: A Synthesis Approach
As suggested by Hasenclever et.al (2000), rather than consider which o f the stylistic 
representations o f regime formation applies to this case, it is more constructive to 
assess the validity o f their core assumptions relative to various phases and aspects of 
a particular regime, thereby integrating them into a synthesis framework. A basic 
premise o f this approach is that the three perspectives, while different in their 
epistemology and core assumptions, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For 
example, a focus on international norm dynamics does not necessarily conflict with a 
state-centric view o f international relations. As Ruggie (1983) demonstrates, 
hegemonic power significantly influences the rise and fall o f international norms, and 
more generally, states often serve as norm entrepreneurs in the international system. 
Likewise, constructivists often accept that social institutions are often influenced by 
the rational calculations o f actors, and that norm entrepreneurs make strategic choices 
about how they build and diffuse their ideas. Finally, neo-liberal institutionalists often 
recognize that the social dimension o f  agency, including trust, expectations and 
legitimacy, often explain behavioral choices o f actors.
An emerging tendency in the literature dealing with norm emergence, diffusion and 
adoption is that a dichotomous conception o f theory that favors either an 
instrumentalist or sociological perspective is neither accurate nor particularly 
constructive. To bridge the fault line, several scholars have sought to explore a 
synthesis o f the two dominant positions o f the third debate - rationalism and 
constructivism - by seeking to understand which logic o f social action dominates the 
various stages o f norm evolution.176 For example, as Checkel (2001) notes, ‘softened’ 
rationalists accept that norms do constrain behavioral choices, and that sociological 
imperatives such as prestige, reputation and esteem are sometimes significant factors 
in explaining why actors make certain decisions and follow particular courses o f
176 For attempts at this, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), which place human agency in the form of 
‘norm entrepeneurs’ and strategic calculations at the center o f norm emergence, as well as Risse 
(2000) and Risse et.al (1999), which outline an analytical framework that includes both rational 
bargaining and argumentative processes. See also Checkel (2001) for a comparison of rationalist and 
constructivist methodologies.
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action.177 Likewise, as illustrated in the previous chapter, constructivist approaches to 
understanding international norm dynamics commonly explain the actions o f norm 
entrepreneurs in near instrumental terms, as ideationally committed and motivated 
actors strategically weighing the costs and benefits o f different advocacy strategies 
and carefully selecting targets.178
At the heart o f this matter is the relationship between social structures and agents. As 
Risse and Ropp (1999) note, research on the effects o f ideas need to specify the 
causal mechanisms through which ideas affect actors’ identities, interests and 
behavior. Yet, given that actors identities and interests are constituted by and conform 
to dominant norms, cognitive approaches do tend to have a structural bias. Therefore, 
while such a ‘logic o f appropriateness’ helps explain how institutions constitute 
agency and why stable behavioral patterns persist over time, it is less able to identify 
how such rule-guided behavior may be altered. As Sending (2002) notes, the 
regulative properties o f rules place severe constraints on individual interpretation, 
whereas the constitutive properties o f rules define the identity o f actors and the social 
community they belong to .1 9 Accordingly, this perspective assumes that actors are 
‘more or less ‘hermeneutically-programmed’ by the institutions in which they are 
located’, as they are not given much room to interpret compliance with rules in 
divergent ways.
This structural bias in constructivism poses problems for understanding the 
emergence o f new forms o f behavioral patterns among a group o f actors, as this 
entails explaining why actors break with prevailing norms and align their behavior 
with new norms that redefine what are considered appropriate and legitimate actions. 
To explain norm shifts, constructivists commonly draw on an ontology o f  mutual 
constitution resembling Gidden’s structuration theory, in which social structures such 
as market exchange, classes, or political processes do not exist or evolve by 
themselves, but are embedded in social interactions between actors.180 Therefore, 
social structures should be viewed as systems o f human knowledge that are produced 
and reproduced by social interactions, and can be altered if actors amend their
177 Most rational regime theorists that depart from an orthodox contractarian view of international 
cooperation fall into this category. For example, Axelrod (1986), whilst advancing a game-theoretic 
model for explaining norm evolution, argues that the power o f membership makes defection as a 
strategy less attractive because ‘it would tend to lower one’s self esteem.’ (p.l 105) Similarly, Keohane 
(1988) recognizes that rationalistic theories o f interational institutions need to be historically 
contextualized in order to recognize that specific institutions are embedded in practices that cannot be 
fully explained through rationalistic analysis, (p.393)
178 For example, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), in describing the role of norm entrepreneurs, argue 
that the utilities o f actors can be both ‘material’ and ‘social’, and claim norm entrepreneurs ‘engage in 
‘strategic social construction’ by making detailed means-end calculations to maximize their utilities’ in 
order to ‘change the utility function of other players’. By implication, they argue the first half o f the 
process fits with a rational game-theoretic framework, whereas the latter half does not, as it involves 
reconstituting identities and interests, (p.910) Similar combinations o f rational and constructivist 
ontologies are used in the ‘spiral model’ outlined by Risse et.al (1999)
179 Sending (2002), p.452.
180 See Giddens (1984).
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conduct, either consciously by abrupt deviance, or unconsciously through incremental 
adjustments.
This duality o f structure provides an explanation for how norms constitute identities 
and interests, yet persist only if actors reaffirm their legitimacy through their 
behavioral choices. As Wendt (1995) argues, in most cases social structures contain 
some ‘slack’ that allow actors too diverge from institutional directives and thereby 
contribute to altering them. In this context, actors are not slavishly programmed to 
follow norms, but are inclined to break with entrenched institutions in certain 
circumstances by pursuing forms o f behavior that conflict with their institutionally- 
defined identities and interests. In explaining how a particular normative context may 
be replaced by another, constructivist approaches often resort to action-oriented 
explanations that emphasize actors and their individual ideational and instrumental 
motivations.181 For example, whilst arguing that social structures constitute the 
identities and interests o f actors, Wendt (1995) also notes that ‘what happens in the 
future depends on what actors do with the structures they have made in the past.’ 
(emphasis ad d ed )182 As Sending (2002) argues, this assumes that actors ‘are always 
in a position to evaluate, reflect upon and choose regarding what rules to follow and 
how to act.’ (original emphasis)
Yet, the notion that actors can affirm and undermine norms by making certain 
behavioral choices does not mean their behavior should be examined purely within an 
instrumental logic. Because it is collective action, not discrete rational acts, that 
ultimately cause a transformation in normative contexts. Thus, the rise and fall of 
norms is not for individual actors to decide, but is instead a consequence o f collective 
action. As such, the way in which individual actors perceive the costs and benefits of 
different choices, and how these perceptions may change, is deeply shaped by their 
interactions with other actors. In fact, it is through interactions between actors that 
different courses o f  action gain meaning and social purpose, and become recognized 
as either preferable or counter-productive.
To account for the importance o f strategic behavior for understanding the emergence 
o f international norms, the perspective outlined here will resemble what Hurrell 
(1993) refers to as ‘weak cognitivism’, or an attempt to fill a gap in interest-based 
theorizing by recognizing that the demand for international institutions among actors 
depend on actors’ perceptions o f international problems, which is in part produced by 
causal and normative beliefs.183 There are two reasons for choosing an approach that
181 For example, in discussing a ‘logic of arguing’ as a mode of social interaction, Risse (2002) notes 
that the interplay between agents and structure in the real world usually combines several modes of 
social interaction. Furthermore, as both rational choice and social constructivism encompass both rule- 
guided behavior and deliberative behavior, the debate is really about ‘how far one can push on logic of 
action to account for observable practices and which logic dominates a given situation.’ (p.3)
182 Wendt (1995), p.80, fn.28.
183 Hurrell (1993), pp. 139-154. As such, the focus on international norms in explaining behavioral 
changes is predominately designed to supplement, rather than replace, existing rational theories of 
institutional change and behavior. This perspective conforms more or less to what Checkel (2001) 
brands ‘the modernist branch o f constructivism’, in which ‘scholars combine an ontological stance
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does not entirely depart from instrumental logic. First, norm entrepreneurs that 
deliberately and strategically invoke well-recognized norms to push particular 
political agendas are central to the emergence o f private governance in transnational 
markets, particularly with regards to explaining the proliferation o f business activities 
relative to environmental protection, poverty reduction and human rights. And 
secondly, when private actors are the targets o f norm entrepreneurs, they make 
decisions about social pressures primarily in their capacity as market participants, 
weighing the costs and benefits o f different behavioral changes. As such, the 
characteristics o f  markets, including the level o f integration and concentration and 
how products and services are produced and sold, has a bearing on how private actors 
understand, interpret and respond to calls for greater responsibility and 
accountability.
On the other hand, norms matter. In imperfect market conditions, norms can 
influence how private actors respond to uncertainty. While they are driven by profit- 
motives, private actors frequently make value judgements about profit-margins, risk 
and opportunity, all o f which are based on ideas and understandings about their roles 
and responsibilities relative to shareholders and society as a whole. Such decisions 
are predominately informed by the professional norms that govern market 
transactions, embedded in language, methodologies, and decision processes. But with 
respect to environmental and social impacts o f business practices, behavior is also, 
and increasingly so, informed by norms institutionalized in international law, 
agreements and institutions. In private environmental governance, environmental and 
social norms, such as the precautionary principle and respect for human rights, 
become interwoven with the professional norms that elevate commercial 
justifications above all other moral or ethical claims. This means that with regards to 
prohibition norms, such as a ban on child labor or bribery, they often conflict with the 
professional norms that govern transnational business. In turn, a successful diffusion 
o f the norm would manifest itself when particular business activities are no longer 
deemed legitimate or appropriate, and the adoption o f new norms acquires a 
commercial justification.
More broadly, with regards to the debate between rationalist and constructivist 
accounts o f international institutions, exploring possible synergies between the two 
perspectives is the most fruitful approach to advancing our understanding o f how and 
why new forms o f private governance are emerging at the transnational level. This is 
predicated on the assumption that it is useful to explore the wide middle-ground that 
exists between instrumental approaches based on purely rational-materialist logic o f 
agency, and deeper constructivist perspectives that assumes identity and interest 
transformation is a precondition for any substantive behavioral change. This means 
combining the research questions that dominate the two approaches. On the one hand, 
the primary challenge for a normative theory o f interest formation is to identify under 
which social and material circumstances actors violate dominant norms in favor o f
critical o f methodological individualism with a loosely causal epistemology’, in which ‘norms matter 
in a constitutive, interest-shaping way not captured by rationalist arguments.’ (p.554)
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complying with other conflicting norms.184 As it is assumed that behavior conforms 
to existing social structures, it is necessary to understand how social interactions 
cause actors to shift their allegiances between norms, or related, why particular norms 
succeed others as dominant within a given issue area. On the other hand, the primary 
challenge for a rational theory o f social choice is to identify the material incentives 
that prompt shifts in behavior, often related to changes to the underlying institutional 
conditions. In the context o f private actors, this would entail analyzing how norms 
inform market decisions, and how they influence the choice o f  and justification for 
different business activities. Combining these research questions means identifying 
both the normative and material circumstances that give rise to new forms of 
institutionalized behavior among actors engaged in a given issue area.
3.4 Norm Emergence and Diffusion in Markets: An Analytical Framework
Based on the preceding discussion o f rationalist and constructivist approaches to 
studying governance formation, this section will present an analytical framework that 
purports to demonstrate how environmental and social norms may emerge and diffuse 
in markets so as to lead to substantive behavioral changes. Pursuant o f the issues 
discussed in the previous section, the framework hypothesizes in which phases o f the 
norm emergence, diffusion and adoption process, different logics o f social action -  
instrumentalist or constructivist - explain the behavior o f actors. And secondly, it 
needs to establish the relationship between public and private actors, and their 
relevant roles and sources o f influence, and how this is significant to causing or 
enabling the emergence o f private governance. In turn, the end result would be an 
analytical model that incorporates a theoretical explanation o f private governance 
formation within the broader, existing literature on institutional change in world 
politics.
In comparison to the existent frameworks that seek to explain the emergence and 
diffusion o f international norms, the analytical framework put forth to explain norm 
emergence and diffusion in transnational markets is more complex. First, whereas 
both Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Risse and Sikkink (1999) employ a wide 
definition o f ‘norm entrepreneur’ that in principle may encompass domestic, 
international and transnational actors, the analytical focus o f the norm emergence 
stage in both cases is predominately on domestic politics, and interactions between 
‘domestic movements’ and national governments.185 In the proposed model for 
private actors, the stage within which norms emerge and diffuse in the private sector 
is characterized by complex interactions between states and non-state actors at the 
domestic, international and transnational levels.
And secondly, whereas the process whereby norms emerge, diffuse and get adopted 
by states is largely depicted as a one-way process that may or may not succeed,
184 Sending (2002), p.458.
185 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p.902. As they say, ‘up to the tipping point, little normative change 
occurs without significant domestic movements supporting change.’
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depending on the norm entrepreneur and the intrinsic characteristics o f the norm, the 
framework for norm evolution in markets is described as much more complex. In 
particular, state-based governance, such as government policy, multilateral 
agreements and international organizations, inform norm emergence in the private 
sector alongside transnational advocacy networks that actively promote particular 
norms. As such, the way in which norms have been institutionalized within states and 
international organizations has a bearing on how they are institutionalized in private 
governance initiatives. In fact, the standards and procedures that manifest 
institutionalized norms in international organizations do not only provide private 
actors with technical solutions to integrating the norms into existing practices, but in 
actuality constitute the problem itself.
Table 3.2 outlines the main phases o f the ‘spiral model’ that Risse and Sikkink (1999) 
used to explain the variations in the extent to which national governments move 
along the path towards improvement in human rights conditions.186 As such, it is an 
evolutionary framework that seeks to explain how norm entrepreneurs, notably 
transnational advocacy networks advocating human rights, gradually gain influence 
over national governments. Over the course o f the norm emergence, diffusion and 
adoption process, the dynamic between norm entrepreneurs and target states moves 
from being very confrontational to reconciliatory, and ultimately, mutually 
supportive. In this regard, it complements Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) nicely by 
identifying the dominant mode o f social interaction that characterizes different phases 
o f norm evolution, specifically, instrumental adaptation, arguing and 
institutionalization.
Table 3.2 Norm Evolution and State Behavior
1. Repression 2. Denial 3. Tactical 
Concession
4. Prescriptive 
Status
5. Rule-Co 
Behavior
Main Actors 
Moving 
Process to 
Next Stage
Transnational
Advocacy
Networks
Transnational
Advocacy
Networks
Transnational 
Advocacy 
Networks and 
Domestic 
Opposition
National
Governments and 
Domestic Society
National 
Govemmen 
Domestic S
Main Mode of 
Interaction
Instrumental
Rationality
Instrumental
Rationality
Instrumental 
Rationality / 
Argumentative 
Rationality
Argumentative 
Rationality and 
Institutionalization
Institutiona 
and Habitu;
M ain Target 
Actors
States and
International
Organizations
States and
International
Organizations
States and
International
Organizations
States and
International
Organizations
States and
Internation
Organizatk
Source: The table is featured in Risse and Sikkink (1999:32) as an illustration o f how human rights 
norms among states in the international system.
186 Risse and Sikkink (1999), p. 18.
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Table 3.3 outlines the hypothesis o f the thesis in the form o f an amended ‘spiral 
model’ aimed at explaining the emergence, diffusion and adoption o f environmental 
and social norms in transnational business. Whereas the former concerns the cases 
where states are target actors, the latter concerns the integration o f environmental and 
social norms in transnational business activities. By extension, it makes claims about 
how, why and under what conditions environmental and social norms emerge, diffuse 
and are adopted in transnational m arkets.187
The framework seeks to combine and build on two o f the most influential 
frameworks for understanding international norm dynamics presented in the 
scholarship on social movements in world politics. First, as discussed previously, the 
norm ‘life-cycle”  model by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) provides a useful way o f 
distinguishing between the separate stages that characterize how a norm may gain 
prominence and legitimacy in world politics, and become adopted by actors. It places 
norm entrepreneurs at the center o f international norm dynamics, and associates their 
initial instrumental actions with a clear cognitive transformation on the part o f states, 
in which norm diffusion and internalization are not the result o f tactical concessions, 
but rather, reconstituted state identities and interests. •
Table 3.3 Norm Evolution and Corporate Behavior
1. Repression 2. Denial 3. Tactical 
Concession
4. Prescriptive 
Status
5. Rule-Consistent 
Behavior
iMain Actors 
Moving 
Process to 
Next Stage
Transnational
Advocacy
Networks
Transnational
Advocacy
Networks
Transnational 
Advocacy 
Networks, Home 
Country 
Consumers, and 
Shareholders
TNCs and Home 
Country Society
TNCs and Home 
Country Society
Main Mode of 
Interaction
Instrumental
Rationality
Instrumental
Rationality
Instrumental 
Rationality / 
Argumentative 
Rationality
Argumentative 
Rationality and 
Institutionalization
Institutionalization 
and Habitualization
Source: This table is an amended version of Risse and Sikkink (1999:32), hypothesizing how norms 
emerge, diffuse and get adopted in transnational markets.
The framework assumes that international norms related to the prohibition of 
particular economic or political activities, such as logging in virgin forests, the use of 
child labor, or development in sensitive ecosystems, emerge on the international stage 
primarily because o f the activities o f norm entrepreneurs, notably transnational 
advocacy networks. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) note, norms are actively built 
by these agents who construct cognitive frames, which in cases where they are 
successful, resonate with broader public understandings and replace old ways o f 
understanding and talking about issues.188 As per Stone (1989), this entails
187 This section draws heavily from Risse and Sikkink (1999), pp.22-35.
188 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p.897, and Keck and Sikkink (1998), p.199.
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‘composing stories that describe harm and difficulties, attribute them to actions of 
other individuals or organizations, and thereby claim the right to invoke government 
power to stop the harm.’ 189
However, the existence o f norm entrepreneurs, and more specifically, actors who 
champion environmental and social causes, does not in itself guarantee that private 
actors adopt these norms and alter their behavior. What follows is a phase-by-phase 
description o f how a norm may emerge and diffuse among private actors. The 
framework builds on previous theoretical literature on norm emergence, diffusion and 
adoption, and seeks to explain the case o f environmental and social prohibition norms 
in transnational business. In this context, the assumption is that the target actors are 
TNCs that are based in OECD countries, yet active in non-OECD countries as 
financiers, producers or retailers. Indeed, because o f deomstic institutional pressures, 
this subset o f private actors are most likely to develop corporate responsibility 
policies, engage in transnational rule-making and join voluntary initiatives, including 
codes o f conduct. Therefore, understanding how environmental and social norms 
emerge and diffuse among market participants in these transnational markets is both 
topical and timely.
Repression
In many cases, norm entrepreneurs seek to enhance the governance o f collective 
goods in issue areas that most international relations scholars would not predict 
cooperation, because o f excessive political cost, collective action problems, or most 
often outright hostility. Thus, in the early phases o f the model, public information on 
norm violations is very scarce, as private actors ignore or deliberately suppress 
criticism. Therefore, as noted, the active promotion o f a prohibition norm is initially 
met with repression, as norm entrepreneurs are denied political space to make their 
moral claims, and receive scant attention in the media. Furthermore, the norm is 
delegitimized by both states and private actors because it does not affirm the 
legitimacy o f existing norms, understandings and linguistic practices that dominate 
transnational business. In turn, it is not simply a failure to integrate the norm into 
existing business activities, but private actors are unable to understand how and why 
the moral claims put forward by norm entrepreneurs is even relevant to their 
identities and roles in society.
Relative to private actors, norm entrepreneurs have several mechanisms available for 
promoting norms, which can be usefully categorized as either ‘liberal’ or ‘critical’ 
forms o f governance.190 In terms o f the former, it involves a strategy o f engagement, 
in which the constraints that the norm places on existing business practices is readily 
acknowledged and accepted. In this context, norm promotion becomes an exercise in 
problem-solving, or overcoming conflicts between norms or social purposes. For 
example, this may include educating the public on the environmental and social costs
189 Stone (1989), p.3
190 See Newell (2001a), pp.91-100.
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associated with producing or consuming certain products, and conversely, educating 
the targeted TNCs on the existence o f potential niche market in which consumers are 
willing to pay a premium for ‘ethical’ products. Another option is forging 
partnerships with TNCs at the project level, by for example finding ways to ensure 
that particular business transactions benefit a local community, to policy-level 
collaborations that may include the drafting o f industry guidelines or codes o f 
conduct based on a consensus among market participants in consultation with civil 
society groups.
Yet, given the resistance to prohibition norms that exist in transnational markets, 
norm entrepreneurs most often resort to more confrontational strategies, especially 
during the initial stages o f norm evolution. For example, they may organize consumer 
boycotts or demonstrations that are meant to stimulate adverse media publicity, and 
essentially shame targeted TNCs into responding to specific accusations o f wrong­
doing. In practical terms, it involves producing information on the environmental and 
social consequences o f different economic activities that attributes responsibility and 
blame to particular groups o f actors, and disseminating it to the public, the media and 
the target actor. Oftentimes, this means singling out events that can resonate with the 
public and trigger adverse reactions towards a target actor, such as egregious 
examples o f environmental destruction or human rights violations.19
In some cases, dramatic events, such as industrial accidents or oil spills, are given 
extensive media coverage and provide norm entrepreneurs with evidence that certain 
patterns of behavior are having immoral, unethical or unwanted outcomes. In other 
cases, such as gradual environmental degradation, both the choice o f event and which 
TNC to target can be strategically driven by what the public and the media might be 
interested in. In some cases, norm entrepreneurs eager to earn public attention may 
deliberately obstruct business activities by engaging in civil disobedience, or 
intentionally damaging corporate equipment or materials. By engaging in such 
activities and linking certain business activities to environmental or social harms, 
norm entrepreneurs in effect define problems by identifying an event or trend as 
morally undesirable and inappropriate, and associating it with actors and forms of 
behavior.192 As such, they help set the normative context within which policy agendas 
are formed.
Denials
If norm entrepreneurs are successful, the process moves to the next phase o f the 
‘norm emergence’ stage, in which the norm gains recognition in some circles and 
manifests itself in specific accusations o f wrongdoing against TNCs. Information
191 Nelson (1995), p.55.
192 This is significant, because as Underdal (1998) states, ‘the context into which a particular problem 
is framed can make a difference with regard to, inter alia, the (kinds of) perspectives and premises that 
are considered relevant or appropriate and which actors will have access to the policy-making 
process.’ ( p. 19)
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about TNCs that violate the norm is more readily available, and shared 
internationally. In such cases, the dynamic transnationalizes, as domestic pressure 
groups receive rhetorical and material support from allies in other states, whether 
they be NGOs or national governments. In turn, as the targeted TNCs are no longer 
able to simply repress these voices o f dissent, they instead resort to issuing public 
denials o f the accusations, rejecting the validity o f the norm and the assumption that 
they are responsible for what they stand accused of. Oftentimes, this involves making 
claims that adhering to the norm falls outside o f their mandates as profit-making 
organizations, and against the interests o f shareholders.
However, in contrast to the first phase in which criticisms did not even solicit 
responses, targeted TNCs now have to justify existing practices against the moral 
claims o f norm entrepreneurs. Therefore, they gradually enter into an argumentative 
dynamic with their adversaries, responding to specific accusations o f wrong-doing or 
irresponsibility with counter-evidence. In turn, norm entrepreneurs are required to de- 
legitimize existing norms governing the behavior o f target actors by arguing that 
compliance with them leads to immoral or unethical outcomes. They do so by 
creatively manipulating language, framing causal stories about the origins o f 
environmental and social harms, and attributing meaning to particular material 
events. In response, targeted actors may initially indirectly respond to the accusations 
by profiling themselves as responsible and reputable, or dismissing their adversaries 
as ill-intentioned and illegitimate. Yet, by publicly engaging in such exchanges, they 
do give recognition to the existence o f the norm, which is evidence that the norm is 
influencing interactions and the definition o f interests.
Tactical Concessions
In the subsequent phase, the increasing moral resonance o f the norm, and its growing 
appeal among a growing share o f the public and the media, severely undermines the 
credibility and persuasive strength o f repeated denials of wrongdoing. At this stage, 
norm entrepreneurs often attempt to mobilize other actors, by for example organizing 
consumer boycotts and running media campaigns aimed at triggering adverse market 
reactions against the targeted TNCs. In most cases though, the level o f public concern 
is low, and the degree to which product markets are affected is limited. Nevertheless, 
worried about their public image and the value o f their corporate brands, targeted 
TNCs decide to make tactical concessions, or instrumental acts meant to quell 
criticisms and deflect attention while not dramatically reforming their business 
practices to conform with the new norm. Oftentimes, these manifest themselves in 
declarations to comply with ‘indeterminate’, vague rules that are not conducive to 
enforcement.193 In turn, they enter the public discourse on the environmental and 
social impacts o f transnational business, and argue that responsibilities lie with 
governments or that their impact on the environment and local communities is overall 
positive. By extension, the social interactions between norm entrepreneurs and the 
targeted TNC shifts from tactical confrontations to strategic argumentation, aimed at
193 For the distinction between ‘indeterminate’ and ‘determinate’ rules, see Franck (1988), pp.713-725.
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advocating the legitimacy of norms through persuasion, rather than exposing norm 
violations by confrontational means.
In addition, TNCs may draft and implement internal codes o f conduct that identify 
and signal their commitment to broad values and principles that are meant to guide 
the professional behavior o f staff. Other initiatives may include giving charitable 
donations to popular moral causes, or joining roundtables, committees or industry 
groups that work towards convincing consumers and the public at large o f the public 
benefits that the industry provides. In undertaking such initiatives, targeted TNCs 
make rhetorical and largely symbolic statements that recognize the validity o f the 
norm and affirm its relevance to their practices, but do not follow them up by making 
substantive changes to existing policies and procedures or the introducing new ones. 
It also serves to mobilize additional pressure, as public expectations naturally grow 
alongside public declarations by targeted TNCs that the norm is both relevant and 
valid to their policies and strategies.
So despite the lack o f behavioral changes, the public recognition o f the legitimacy of 
the norm provides a critical window o f opportunity for norm entrepreneurs to 
continue the process o f conditioning target actors to the norm. As a result, it is at this 
stage that private governance emerges, in the sense that norm entrepreneurs have 
successfully been able to shift the standard o f good conduct, the economic incentives 
o f certain actions, or fundamental understandings that animate particular widespread 
activities.194 Despite not being embedded in guidelines or codes o f conduct, changing 
public expectations could nevertheless push targeted TNCs down different policy 
trajectories, in which they increasingly have to measure the adverse impacts they 
have on a wide variety o f  public interest concerns, and demonstrate how they are 
minimizing these. A notable trend in this regard is the proliferation o f corporate 
sustainability reports, and the general growth o f corporate publications on 
environmental and labor issues.
Prescriptive Status
But issuing verbal commitments without making behavioral changes also means there 
will be a contradiction between rhetoric and action. This discrepancy is often used by 
norm entrepreneurs to question the sincerity and commitment o f the targeted TNCs to 
causes that they themselves have endorsed. As such, if norm entrepreneurs are 
successful in associating this ‘implementation gap’ to material events that visually 
cause harm or injustices, targeted TNCs may be forced to go beyond tactical 
concessions and give norms prescriptive status. This may entail adding safeguard 
measures to existing business practices, such as adhering to and implementing ethical 
standards and codes o f conduct, or avoiding certain types o f business altogether. If 
the process reaches this stage, it means the tactical concessions made by individual 
TNCs have not been successful in satisfying the norm entrepreneurs’ demands for 
accountability and transparency. At this stage, targeted TNCs may recognize the
,94 Wapner (1997), p.81.
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adverse publicity affecting their entire industry, and seek collective solutions to 
containing and mitigating public criticisms, and ultimately, declining corporate 
reputations. This may include attempts to collaborate with, or in alternative language, 
co-opt norm entrepreneurs by inviting them to join public-private partnerships that 
give recognition to the norm and formalize a set o f policy prescriptions that speak 
directly to the business activities subjected to criticisms. 9 In many cases, these 
forms o f governance include the participation o f international organizations that have 
themselves institutionalized the norm and integrated it into knowledge and standard- 
setting activities.
The substantive change to business practices that may result from such efforts, even if 
only undertaken by a handful o f market participants, is perhaps the most critical point 
o f the norm evolution process. As the norms reconstitute the social purpose o f the 
targeted TNCs, by for example associating norm compliance with manifestations of 
‘corporate citizenship’, the pressure often increases on competitors that remain 
defiant in their opposition to the norm.196 As a result, the norm may diffuse across 
issues areas and institutional contexts by virtue o f the inter-linkages that exist 
between transnational markets. Over time, this may trigger a ‘norm cascade’, in 
which both material and discursive pressure on norm violators to become norm 
followers. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), this commonly occurs after 
the number o f norm-following target actors has reached a tipping point, or a critical 
mass sufficient to trigger a contagion effect that puts peer pressure on deviant target 
actors. Thus, the original norm entrepreneurs receive significant support from target 
actors that have adopted the new norm.
Whereas the previous tactical concessions can be explained as simple instrumental 
acts meant to deflect criticism from norm entrepreneurs that lack significant 
international support, the changes in corporate behavior that follow a norm cascade 
are commonly identity-related, as targeted TNCs become norm followers in order to 
preserve their membership in an imagined community o f actors. While TNCs may 
have economic incentives to follow the norms, or more likely, may have disincentives 
to violate it, it is nevertheless social sanctions that induce them to change their 
behavior. In particular, in cases where norm-following becomes synonymous with 
responsible corporate conduct within a defined group o f private actors, the norm is 
likely to diffuse rapidly. However, whereas some TNCs may have given the norm 
prescriptive status by integrating it into internal corporate policies and strategies, 
others make seek to counter public and peer pressure by making tactical concessions, 
or alternatively, engage in ‘green-washing’. In fact, it is common to observe large 
variations in compliance with environmental and social norms among private actors 
in the same industry. Thus, one o f the objectives with this analysis is to identify some 
private actors, but not others, choose to adopt a norm.
195 On public-private partnerships and transnational governance, see Borzel and Risse (2002). Newell 
(2001a) refers to these coalitions as ‘stewardship’ regimes, (p.94)
196 Examples may include the integration of norms related to environmental protection, indigenous 
people’s rights and gender equality within multilateral development banks.
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Rule-Consistent Behavior
In the final phase, patterns o f rule-consistent behavior spread across target TNCs, as 
norm-following becomes widespread and a central aspect o f corporate identities. Yet, 
relative to norm diffusion and states, Risse and Sikkink (1999) note that this does not 
mean external pressure is no longer needed to ensure norm compliance, as domestic 
political changes within states may alter the political commitment to the norm.197 
Similarly, in the context o f private actors, new market conditions or other 
circumstances may induce TNCs to change their business practices, and revert to 
norm-violating behavior. Nevertheless, at this phase o f the model, the norm has 
become widely accepted and has attained a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality.198 By 
extension, compliance is not questioned by most market participants, and a norm 
violation would not only be counter-intuitive, but go against the identities and social 
purposes o f TNCs. Furthermore, the validity o f the norm is no longer a significant 
source o f public debate, and norm-following is a matter o f habit, rather than a result 
o f deliberate, conscious actions.
Overall, the model proposes that norms emerging and diffusing in the private sector 
are more likely to succeed if  they have first been legitimized by states and state-based 
organizations and regimes.199 Norms that ‘socially fit’ existing norm structures are 
much more likely to be persuasive, given that they do not fundamentally conflict with 
the pre-existing institutionally-defined identities and interests o f most states.200 That 
is why norms that are institutionalized in the international system are almost by
“J 0 1 •definition more prominent, and more likely to diffuse further. The assumption that 
international legitimation matters is consistent with assumption made by Risse and 
Sikkink (1999) with regard to the diffusion o f human rights norms among states, 
namely that the starting point is the preexistence o f human rights norms that are 
firmly embedded in international treaties widely ratified by states.202 This does not 
only account for the often significant institutional and normative linkages between 
state-based and private forms o f governance, it also recognizes that private 
governance does not emerge from an institutional vacuum, but often builds on ideas 
and norms that have emerged and evolved in different institutional settings.
Yet, the centrality o f states as international legitimizing agents does not mean norm 
entrepreneurs depend on state support to successfully engage private actors.203
197 Risse and Sikkink (1999).
198 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p.904.
199 See Claude (1966) for her seminal work on the role of international organizations, notably the 
United Nations, in providing ‘collective legitimation’ of norms and forms of behavior.
200 Keck and sikkink (1998), p.201.
201 See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p.906. In addition, Florini (1996) notes that ‘international norm 
change depends on the percentage o f a population of states holding a given norm.’ (p.371)
202 Risse and Sikkink (1999), pp. 1-6.
203 For example, one o f the driving forces of private environmental governance in the last decade has 
been the emergence of a transnational corporate accountability movement, see for example Bendell 
(2004), DeWinter (2003), Newell (2001) and Wapner (1996).
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Indeed, one o f the notable observations made about private governance is how states 
and state-based organizations are often marginalized in transnational rule-making 
processes. However, this does not negate the fact that the norms and principles often 
advocated by norm entrepreneurs, such as transparency, environmental protection and 
human rights, are persuasive precisely because they have been firmly embedded in 
constitutive charters o f international organizations, such as the U.N Charter. By 
harnessing this ‘moral leverage’, norm entrepreneurs are able to overcome resource 
limitations, combining a strong ideational dedication with having ‘the better 
argument’ in confrontations with states or TNCs.204 As such, inter-state systems o f 
governance often set an important institutional precedent for private environmental 
governance, as norms that are aligned with those dominant in state structures are 
deemed more legitimate than those that are not.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion o f power-, interest, and knowledge-based perspectives on 
governance drew on the regime literature to illuminate how mainstream theories 
understand the role o f international norms in world politics.205 This chapter proposed 
to evaluate the explanatory power o f each in relation to this case, as a means to 
advance our understanding o f private governance formation. Subsequently, it 
proposed an analytical approach to understand the emergence, diffusion, and adoption 
o f norms in transnational markets based on the evolution o f interactions between 
norm entrepreneurs and target actors, as identified by Risse and Sikkink (1999). This 
model would be used to structure the empirical analysis and consider at what logics 
o f social action dominate different stages o f the norm evolution process.
More broadly, the chapter attempted to make the case that a synthesis approach is 
more suited for understanding why new forms o f private governance at the 
transnational level are emerging. The case for considering how norms influence 
corporate behavior recognizes that the legitimacy o f different corporate practices is in 
large part determined by the evolution o f public expectations. As Risse (2000) 
summarizes, debates in the international public sphere, what is referred to here as a 
transnational policy realm, have a stronger ideational dimension and are more likely 
to invoke identity-related issues than those that take place within conventional 
multilateral or bilateral diplomatic channels.206 First, such debates are less 
constrained by the bureaucratic machinery o f states and the legal norms and practices 
o f statecraft, and tend to be more open to a diverse range o f actors and voices. 
Secondly, those policy issues that gamer the most attention and that have a
204 Risse (2002). In making the case for understanding political change within a ‘logic o f arguing’, he 
makes two supporting claims; it advances understandings of how actors develop shared knowledge and 
understandings o f the underlying ‘rules o f the game, and it illuminates how norms constitute the 
identities and interests o f actors, which in turn allows them to mutually challenge and explore the 
validity claims of those norms and identities, (p.2)
205 Indeed, Robert Keohane, a proponent of rationalist regime theory, recognizes this limitation. 
(Keohane 1998, p.393)
206 See Risse (2000), p.22-23.
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transnational significance, such as questions about humanitarian interventions or 
development aid, directly concern the identity o f states and other non-state actors. As 
such, policy positions are commonly acts o f symbolism rather than means to a 
strategic end. And third, while open and inclusive, debates in the international public 
sphere nevertheless have a ‘civilizing’ effect by de-legitimizing policy positions that 
overtly favor self-interests over altruistic concerns.207
The subsequent empirical analysis will use this framework and trace the emergence 
o f the Equator Principles to the evolution o f particular environmental and social 
norms in the international system, first within multilateral development banks, and 
then subsequently, within commercial banks operating in the global project finance 
market. In doing so, it will refer to the five phases identified by Risse and Sikkink 
(1999) -  repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status and rule- 
consistent behavior -  and identify how and why norm entrepreneurs were able to 
achieve political victories and move the process to the next stage.
The next chapter will outline the existing understandings and practices in project 
finance that govern the behavior o f global banks relative to environmental and social 
issues, as this presented the material and discursive opportunity structure for new 
norms to enter project financing. Subsequent chapters will provide an historical 
overview o f how and why environmental and social norms emerge and diffused 
within the World Bank, and subsequently, the IFC and other multilateral development 
banks. In turn, the institutionalization o f these norms in the multilateral system did 
not only legitimize them, but also essentially created a policy problem that, in time, 
all financial institutions engaged in project finance had to respond to. In turn, the final 
chapter revisits the three sets o f hypothesis generated from the main theoretical 
perspectives on governance formation in international relations, summarizes the main 
findings o f the thesis and discusses its implications for further research.
207 As Newell (2001) notes in relation to TNCs, it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to argue 
for the pursuit of commercial self-interests at the expense of some recognized public goods, as they are 
forced to justify their business decisions in ways that give recognition to well-established 
environmental and social norms.
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4. Project Financing: The Art o f Managing Risk
Introduction
Private governance that addresses particular industries is often embedded in existing 
corporate practices, and draws on the understandings, norms and rules that govern 
decision-making in a particular market. By extension, to understand how and why 
particular norms emerge and diffuse in the corporate sector, it is instructive to 
consider the norms that preoccupy the policy space. For example, an analysis o f the 
FSC or the Responsible Care Program benefits from an understanding o f the 
institutional characteristics, market structures and production processes o f the global 
timber and chemicals markets, respectively. This includes an overview o f the major 
actors influencing the production, trade and consumption o f goods, their sources o f 
power and influence, and crucially, the conceptual lens through which environmental 
and social issues are understood, discussed and managed.
The Equator Principles is intended to provide a common framework for managing 
environmental and social issues in project finance transactions. This chapter will 
argue that, apart from the effects o f norm entrepreneurs, the emergence o f the 
Equator Principles is inextricably linked to the nature o f project financing and the 
growth o f commercial project lending in developing countries. In particular, the 
centrality o f risk management in project finance lending is firmly recognized in the 
Equator Principles, as its environmental and social standards are meant to supplement 
existing project risk management practices, rather than replace or fundamentally alter 
these. This provides the social context within which the legitimacy o f various 
demands placed on commercial lenders is determined, including the need to prevent 
or mitigate adverse environmental and social impacts. Therefore, the environmental 
governance o f large development projects cannot be understood without an 
appreciation for the nature and purpose o f risk management as a framework for 
investment decision-making.
This chapter has four sections. The first provides a brief survey o f the history of 
international project lending, identifying the extent to which the growth o f project 
finance market has been shaped by the internationalization o f banking and the 
liberalization and deregulation o f public services in developing countries. The second 
section describes the distinguishing features o f project finance relative to others 
forms o f corporate finance, and identifies project risk management as the decision­
making framework within which project finance transactions are negotiated and 
implemented, and environmental and social issues are identified and addressed. The 
third section discusses the legal origins o f environmental and social risk management 
practices in project finance, and considers the commercial rationale for considering 
environment and social issues in project finance transactions. And finally, the fourth 
section surveys the various actors and interests that influence the preparation and 
implementation o f  project finance transactions, focusing on the significant role of
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host governments and multilateral development banks in allocating and absorbing 
project risk.
4.1 Project Finance and Development
Project finance has been instrumental in capitalizing infrastructure development in 
countries that have lacked access to long-term financing because o f 
underdevelopment, weak regulatory and legal structures, unstable institutional 
environments, and poor corporate governance. Particularly during the past two 
decades, it has played a central role in increasing long-term private capital flows to 
developing countries, and enabling TNCs to enter domestic industries that were 
previously restricted to state-owned enterprises. As such, the global project finance 
market builds on the long history o f private financing o f major infrastructure projects 
in developing countries, dating back to the colonial trade in the nineteenth century. 
The concentration o f capital and technological resources that characterized 
international project lending during this time period laid the foundation for the 
modem project finance market, particularly the dominance o f commercial banks from 
former colonial powers, in addition to the United States.
A Short History o f  International Banking
As late as the 1950s and 60s, most infrastructure projects in industrialized countries 
were built under state supervision and funded by national reserves or sovereign debt. 
In many developing countries that gained independence from colonial powers, 
infrastructure was inadequate or in disrepair, and had in large part been developed to 
benefit commodities exports, with less emphasis on providing basic services for 
domestic populations. To redress this balance, many developing countries embraced 
infrastructure development strategies based on a policy o f economic nationalism, 
favoring domestic public financial institutions over private foreign banks. As a 
consequence, international financial flows from multilateral and bilateral sources far 
outweighed private capital flows, as a wave o f economic reform programs were 
enacted across the developing world aimed at redistributing national wealth to 
deprived regions and sectors long ignored by colonial powers. Local subsidiaries o f 
foreign banks were nationalized, and national development agencies were established 
to enable government to control the allocation o f capital and investment in the 
economy. And publicly owned and mandated development agencies flourished, as 
they became the primary vehicles for channeling World Bank loans to physical 
infrastructure projects.2 8
Over time, the post-1945 period proved to be a favorable environment for the 
expansion o f international trade and finance flows, initially due to the capital 
demands o f postwar reconstruction in Europe and Japan, and subsequently as a result 
o f the restoration o f external convertibility in Europe and the liberalization o f  capital
208 Wade (1997)
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markets. In the early 1970s, the breakdown o f the Bretton Woods system o f fixed 
exchange rates coincided with the liberalization and deregulation o f financial markets 
in industrialized- and some middle-income countries, which facilitated greater capital 
mobility.209 At the same time, the oil crisis and subsequent shortages also provided 
incentives to ease barriers to expanding energy production and produced large 
payment imbalances between the primary oil-producing and oil-consuming nations, 
increasing the overall demand for long-term debt and other financial services. Indeed, 
between 1972 and 1980, developing country sovereign debt held by private creditors 
increased almost twenty-fold.
The growth in international banking was driven by the development o f securities 
markets and the general shift in financial services provision towards underwriting 
debt and equity.210 The favorable conditions encouraged U.S and European banks to 
open representative offices in developing countries as part o f a diversification 
strategy aimed at establishing a banking presence in other financial markets outside 
o f North America and Western Europe.2 1 As an example o f the growing importance 
o f foreign sources o f income, the international earnings o f major U.S banks grew by 
nearly 25 percent from 1972 to 1977.212 At this stage, infrastructure services in 
virtually all developing countries, and in most developed ones, were controlled by the 
public sector in vertically integrated utilities.213 But significantly, the energy crisis 
and the associated growth in demand did prompt regulatory reforms in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, which provided the first opportunities for 
commercial bank lending to power and energy projects.214
In the early 1980s, the debt crisis significantly curtailed capital flows to developing 
countries and thereby reduced private investment in large infrastructure projects. 
Long-term private capital flows would not recover until reforms in previously state- 
dominated sectors were enacted in some developing countries, notably Chile, Turkey 
and the Philippines. The deregulation and privatization o f many domestic economic 
sectors increased their attractiveness to foreign investors, bringing about a dramatic 
increase in transnational capital flows. Alongside granting private entry into 
infrastructure projects, regulatory authorities overseeing financial markets were 
restructured so as to facilitate the expansion o f financial services, and the emergence 
o f non-bank financial institutions.21 Advances in information and communications 
technologies further reduced transaction costs, opened up new markets, and 
facilitated financial product innovation, particularly in the telecommunications
209 Das (2003).
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sector.216 In this context, project finance provided a useful vehicle for many heavily 
indebted developing countries to attract private infrastructure finance while retaining 
some level o f control o f individual projects, and restrictions on foreign investment 
and ownership.
Until the 1990s, long-term capital flows to developing countries mainly consisted of 
bank loans to governments and private companies. The period associated with 
financial globalization that followed triggered a substantial growth in foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investments, including bond and equity flows.217 During the 
1990s, all forms o f long-term financing to developing countries increased, with 
foreign direct investment representing the bulk o f growth.218 Between 1991 and 1997, 
private long-term capital flows roughly quintupled, with the volume o f project 
finance deals increasing six-fold to £26 billion.219 And although long-term official aid 
flows declined almost 40 percent during the same period, multilateral or bilateral 
financing to private entities nearly tripled, growing from £4.5 billion to £12 billion.220
In the financial sector, advances in information and communications technologies 
accelerated rates o f transactions and led to innovations in financial products to meet 
new demands. Financing structures and modalities that reduced the risk o f investment 
sprung up in response to the greater willingness o f financial institutions to enter 
developing countries. For example, financial institutions would syndicate loans, or 
sell a portion o f a loan to other financial institutions, in order to reduce the risk o f the 
investment. In other cases, loans would be packaged together in the form o f securities 
and sold as bonds on the open market.221 Thus, increasingly, financing o f projects 
was fragmented, and provided in a mix o f different modalities, including debt, equity 
and bonds.
During 1990s, foreign direct investment in financial services surged and broadened 
considerably. Whereas previous foreign bank expansions focused primarily on 
providing financial services to their international corporate clients, they were 
increasingly driven by profit opportunities in local markets.222 In relation to project 
finance loans, it was primarily a series o f regulatory reforms in several large 
developing country economies that triggered the surge in the number and volume of 
project finance transactions in the early 1990s.223 Privatization o f traditional public 
sector industries, harmonization o f tax regimes, and easing restrictions on foreign
216 World Bank (2004).
217 Long-term capital flows are generally assumed to encompass bonds, portfolio equity investment, 
foreign direct investment, and bank lending and other private credits with maturation periods that 
exceed one year.
218 As an additional indicator, the output o f the finance, insurance, and real estate sectors in the United 
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as 1985, their contribtion to US GDP was 15 percent less than manufacturing. (Henwood 1998)
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investment and ownership all enticed multinational corporations and commercial 
lenders to increase their participation in this form o f financing.
As a result, the sectoral diversity o f project financing increased significantly beyond 
energy and transport, to include manufacturing, tourism, chemicals, and 
telecommunications. Not surprisingly, many o f the countries that undertook the most 
extensive liberalization and deregulation programs became the primary benefactors o f 
long-term commercial bank lending. As a result, the geographical distribution o f 
private capital flows was heavily skewed, largely favoring those regions that already 
had experienced relatively high growth rates, such as East Asia and Latin America. 
Conversely, previously marginalized regions, notably Sub-Saharan Africa, largely 
remained unable to attract private capital flows during this period.224
Nevertheless, to hedge against the higher levels o f investment risk in developing 
countries, commercial banks continued to diversify the range o f financial products 
they offered. Project structures became increasingly complex, reflecting the risk- 
aversion o f participants and complicated governing structures o f projects financed as 
part o f privatization schemes. Whereas the success o f infrastructure projects in 
previous years was dependent on sound civil engineering, the growth o f the project 
finance market in the 1980s and beyond was based on advances in financial 
engineering in light o f  the higher levels o f investment risk in developing countries. In 
particular, a variety o f developments enabled major corporations and public-sector 
enterprises to access financing in equity markets, often at more favorable terms than 
bank loans.225
In 1997, the Asian crisis produced a remarkable downturn in long-term private capital 
flows, and illustrated the volatile nature o f this type o f financing. Between 1997 and 
2004, each significant measure o f  infrastructure finance to developing countries—  
total external finance, project finance, and investment with private participation—  
declined by at least 50 percent.226 While overall long- and medium term private debt 
flows decreased by less, commercial banks lending remained flat until 2004 before 
experiencing record-level annual growth rates. 227 During the same period, net official 
aid flows diminished substantially, in large part due to debt forgiveness, as well as the 
result o f large debt repayments by some middle-income countries.
Recent Trends in Project Financing
This brief history o f international banking and project lending reveals two distinct 
features that have a bearing on current global project finance market, and the 
environmental governance o f project finance transactions. First, the market was long 
dominated by European and North American banks that possess the vast financial and
224 Grieco and Ikenberry (2003), pp.259-266.
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226 World Bank (2004).
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technical resources necessary to arrange and finance complex infrastructure projects 
in difficult institutional contexts. Therefore, it is highly concentrated, characterized 
by long-term capital flows from commercial banks in OECD countries to capital- 
intensive, but lucrative, projects in developing countries. Furthermore, the legacy o f 
colonial trade can be seen in the regional characteristics o f the market, in which 
British banks are concentrated in East Africa, French banks in West Africa, and 
Spanish banks largely operating in Latin America.
Secondly, the nature and scale o f international project lending is significantly driven 
by the legal, regulatory and policy environment in developing countries. Specifically, 
international project lending curtailed during times o f economic nationalism or 
economic stagnation in developing countries, notably in the 1950s and 60s, and again 
during the debt crisis in the early 1980s, and in the aftermath o f financial crisis in the 
late 1990s. Conversely, it has surged during time periods in which commercial 
opportunities have presented themselves to foreign investors and companies, as was 
the case during the colonial era, and again in the early 1990s with the liberalization 
and deregulation o f previously restricted economic sectors.
And third, the management o f investment risk has been a significant determinant o f 
project success. Apart from greater access to markets, the recent growth o f the project 
finance market has also been driven by financial innovation, in which new ways o f 
structuring financial packages and allocating risk among public and private parties 
have enabled infrastructure projects in developing countries to access long-term 
priyate capital for the first time. It has manifested itself in increasingly complex 
financing structures, in which a growing array o f lenders, risk guarantee agencies and 
technical experts enter into contractual arrangements that enable investment risk to be 
sufficiently reduced at a satisfactory cost.
Yet, the nature o f project financing differentiates it from most other financial 
markets. Given the scale o f investment, both in terms o f financing volume and project 
size, project financing is time-intensive for all parties involved, requires considerable 
risk management expertise and involves significant involvement o f the public sector. 
And the financing modality is only used for large, complex projects likely to generate 
significant revenue streams, thus naturally constraining the size o f the market. In 
2004-05, only 216 projects were financed worldwide, totaling £38 billion, with 61 
percent o f projects in either power or infrastructure.228 However, this year was part of 
a longer recovery after the credit crisis of 2000. Current growth is primarily driven by 
continuing deregulation and privatization in the power, telecommunications, and 
transportation sectors, and by the globalization o f project financing products, 
particularly project bonds.
Furthermore, a fact that is often overlooked in more favorable accounts o f financial 
globalization is that the tremendous growth in long-term private capital flows was 
heavily skewed towards a handful o f large, middle-income countries. For example, 
between 1990 and 1996, roughly 44 percent o f infrastructure finance to developing
228 EIRIS (2006).
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countries went to East Asia alone, and within this region, predominately to China and 
Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.229 
Following the Asian crisis, flows shifted to other regions, notably Latin America, 
which experienced its own period o f dramatic reductions after the Argentinean crisis 
in 2001. Other regions, notably South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East and 
North Africa, did not benefit hugely from the growth in long-term capital flows in the 
1990s. These regional imbalances combined with the sudden downturn following 
economic crisis illustrates how long-term private capital flows are significantly 
driven by perceptions o f risk, particularly the uncertainty presented by the political, 
social and legal environment o f the host country.
The growth of the project finance market, particularly in developing countries, 
represents an important sub-theme to the emergence o f environmental and social 
norms. By virtue o f expanding in developing countries, commercial lenders have 
increasingly found themselves involved in large-scale development projects in 
ecologically-sensitive regions, often inhabited by indigenous people and local 
communities that have limited political rights domestically. As such, the management 
of so-called non-financial risks that may impact project profitability has arisen as a 
major concern for commercial project finance lenders.
The next section will describe the characteristics and purposes o f project risk 
management, as the conceptual lens through which commercial lenders engage with 
environmental and social issues, and formulate project-level responses to them.
4.2 The Financial and Legal Structure of Project Finance
Project finance is a specialized form o f financing that is predominately used to 
finance projects that require large amounts o f capital investments, and are expected to 
generate significant revenues over an extended period o f time once the project is in 
operation. A common characteristic o f project financing is a long initial ‘search’ 
phase, in which government and project sponsors explore a variety o f project 
proposals through extended negotiations. 31 While project finance is theoretically 
appropriate for financing any economic activity that can be legally separated from 
project sponsors, it is predominately used for projects in capital-intensive economic 
sectors, such as extractive industries, or energy, transportation, and communications 
infrastructure. And as these sectors are often heavily regulated due to their central 
role in national economic development, private companies often undertake projects in 
the context o f concession arrangements with governments, in which private 
ownership, investment and operation is predicated on a set o f limited financial, 
economic and legal conditions.
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In contrast to corporate finance, debt and equity in this form o f financing are 
provided to a self-liquidating single purpose company, commonly a joint venture 
between a domestic- and a foreign TNC. This project company owns and operates the 
project, and controls its physical assets and underlying contracts.232 The capitalization 
o f the project company is typically a lot less than the financial needs o f the project, 
and the difference is typically made up by debt or bonds.233 The assets o f the project, 
the contracts associated with its construction and operation, and the cash flow 
generated by it, are all legally separated from the balance sheets o f project sponsors.
34 As part of this legal arrangement, project sponsors are barred from redeploying 
any resources raised through the project for any other purposes.235
Debt financing is commonly provided by multiple lenders organized in loan 
syndications, often exceeding dozens o f commercial lenders. Such arrangements 
allow individual banks to provide debt to multiple projects in small amounts, rather 
than single projects in large amounts, thereby diversifying their financing and 
reducing their overall risk exposure.236 Financing projects through syndications also 
provides individual banks with greater access to collective information and expertise, 
and the ability to engage in loan trading and derivatives sales. 237 In addition, many 
syndicates include multilateral development banks and bilateral export credit 
agencies that bring significant risk management resources to bear and have close 
relationships with both project sponsors and host governments, which provides 
additional security to participating commercial lenders.
The exact financing structure o f individual projects varies, but a shared characteristic 
is a high debt-equity ratio, making them highly leveraged transactions.238 Typically, 
equity provided by project sponsors represents no more than 20 to 40 percent o f  total 
financing, with the remainder o f capital raised through a combination o f bank loans 
and bond issues.239 Once financing has been committed, creditors cannot seek 
compensation from the operators o f the project or the host government in the event 
that the project is unable to generate sufficient cash flow to service debt obligations. 
Therefore, project finance is commonly referred to as either non- or limited recourse, 
since creditors fully or mainly depend on future revenue streams for loan repayment. 
Non-recourse project finance refers to a financing structure in which lenders and 
creditors have no direct recourse to the sponsor beyond the assets being financed. In 
contrast, limited recourse project finance, which is common for projects in 
developing countries, does provide lenders and creditors with some limited security, 
usually in the form o f pre-completion guarantees during the construction phase.
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Project Finance as Risk Management
Project finance principally functions as a risk management structure chosen by 
lenders, sponsors and governments for its risk sharing attributes and associated 
financial advantages over other forms o f financing.24 Indeed, while project finance 
does remain the only source o f financing available for many poor countries wishing 
to undertake capital-intensive development schemes, most project finance 
transactions take place in countries where access to long-term private capital is not 
particularly constrained. The argument that the potential for managing risk, rather 
than the possibility o f accessing to capital, drives a borrower’s decision to opt for 
project financing is further supported by the fact that many energy and infrastructure 
projects are developed by major TNCs that possess significant financial resources and 
enjoy strong credit ratings.241
In managing risk, decision-makers choose one o f four possibilities depending on the 
significance o f the risk; prevention, mitigation, transfer, or acceptance. The choice o f 
strategy is primarily driven by the overarching objectives, namely the protection o f 
project revenue streams, and more broadly, shareholder value. But generally, 
decisions about the level o f risk mitigation are based on what is financially acceptable 
to those exposed to the risk, rather than an absolute concern for eliminating the risk 
entirely.242 As a result, the expectation is that a project proposal would only be 
rejected in the most extreme cases.243 The following passage illustrates the underlying 
legal rationale for addressing environmental issues.
‘A lawyer advising a financial institution in any type of financing does not and should not 
concern himself (unless the client asks him) with whether the activity being financed will 
have a beneficial or a deleterious effect on the environment, whether it will be good or bad for 
the indigenous population, or even whether it is ‘sustainable’ (at least beyond the terms of 
financing). Rather, the lawyer’s role, both in addressing environmental matters and in general, 
is to identify, assess and allocate risk.’
Frye (1998), p.481.
In fact, this rational and technical perspective does not only apply to legal advice, but 
reflects the broader normative context within which decisions on environmental and 
social issues are taken. As a decision on whether to devote time and resources to 
identify, assess and mitigate adverse impacts is taken within an overarching concern 
for expediency and cost-efficiency, those impacts that may represent a financial 
liability for the project are prioritized over those whose links to cost are less certain.
To understand the growth of project finance, it is therefore necessary to consider the 
wide range o f investment risk that can be associated with large-scale infrastructure 
projects, and how commercial lenders, project sponsors and governments are able to 
address these in a project finance structure.
240 See Hainz and Kleimeier (2003), and Pollio (1999).
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Types o f  Project Risk
The concept o f ‘project risk’ significantly informs how environmental and social 
issues are governed in project finance transactions. Project risk is crudely defined as 
the probability o f project failure, and ultimately, the aversion o f risk among lenders is 
driven by a desire to avoid financial misadventures. In the context o f project finance, 
project risk can be defined as ‘the possibility that the project will be unable to 
produce output in the quantity or quality or at a cost that ensures sufficient cash flow 
generation to repay the original indebtedness.’ 244 The nature o f risk associated with 
individual projects will in large part determine its exact financing structure.245 
Generally, the higher the level o f perceived project risk, the more risk mitigation 
measures are needed. For example, projects in countries with significant political and 
financial volatility would require more government assurances and support schemes 
to be able to attract risk-averse private creditors and investors.
The level o f risk that lenders are exposed to varies considerably between the pre- and 
post-completion stages. The process starts with the initial formulation o f a project 
proposal and associated preliminary discussions with public authorities regarding 
concessions and approvals. This phase is characterized by a high level o f risk, as a 
series o f critical decisions can make or break a project. Lenders would typically 
commission feasibility studies to determine the viability o f  any proposal. The study 
would assess the financial risk o f the project, manifested in the strength o f the 
financing plan and the size and certainty o f the project revenue stream. The plan 
would typically include a period schedule that sets out the various costs and receipts 
that constitute the projected cash flows and financial statements o f a project. This 
provides the basis for considering its financial viability by comparing expected 
project expenses and revenues according to different performance scenarios, with the 
aim o f ensuring that annual revenue streams are sufficiently large to cover debt 
repayments.246 This would provide the basis for establishing how much equity the 
project requires, and the capacity o f the project sponsor to cover any cost-overruns 
associated with construction. In addition, lenders would consider whether the 
proposed technology is suitable and cost-efficient for the project, and if  contractors 
and sub-contractors identified by the project sponsor possess the necessary 
experience and competence.
Alongside the analysis o f the financial plan, the commercial lender must identify and 
evaluate a variety o f project risks that could derail the revenue predictions presented 
by the project sponsor. The literature typically distinguishes between two types o f 
project-related risks.247 Commercial risks are those related to the development and 
construction o f the project, the maintenance o f assets and the identification o f a target
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market for the project output. This category also includes broader risks bearing on the 
project economics, such as interest rate changes, inflation, currency risk, and price 
fluctuations associated with raw materials and energy. Non-commercial risks relate to 
the policy environment o f  the project, and include unfavorable legislative and 
regulatory changes that adversely affectconstruction or operation, including 
expropriation o f assets and the failure o f the host government or public enterprises to 
meet contractual obligations. It also includes political and civil disturbances, 
including the likelihood o f armed conflict.
For projects generating an output for a particular market, such as energy, water or oil, 
the primary risk to project revenue streams is reduction or disruption o f supply or 
dem and.2 8 In terms of the production process, a variety o f problems can hamper the 
project in its operational phase, such as unexpected maintenance costs o f  project 
facilities, price increases on equipment and materials, or disruptions to project inputs 
and outputs. In many cases, projects generate only one product, and may rely heavily 
on particular raw materials or sources o f energy, and are therefore very vulnerable to 
price fluctuations. Therefore, lenders would seek assurances from project sponsors 
and the host government that the project can generate sufficient output and command 
a high enough price to adequately service debt payments. 249 If  the borrower is in 
material breach o f project management practices stipulated in the loan agreement, it 
would be liable, whereas if  the government arbitrarily revokes a critical operating 
license after the project is in operation, the lender has no recourse for financial losses 
incurred as a result. 50
In relation to policy or legal risks, the ease with which project sponsors are able to 
secure critical licenses to operate from public authorities is central to ensuring that 
the project progressing according to schedule, and is able to mobilize the necessary 
capital. This is a function o f the efficiency and fairness o f national or local planning 
processes, as well as the corporate management reputation and financial track record 
of the project sponsor. In many cases, favorable political connection and outright 
corruption plays a role in allocating concessions between bidding parties. 
Furthermore, as regulatory changes may affect project performance, lenders often 
seek assurances from government that unfavorable legislation will not be enacted 
during the lifetime o f the project. Even if construction does get underway, it is 
possible that unanticipated political or economic developments cause project 
sponsors or government to abandon the project prior to its completion.251 To facilitate 
these negotiations and obtaining the necessary assurances from relevant regulatory 
authorities, the participation o f a multilateral financial institution with established 
relationships with host governments can be instrumental.
Once the financial and technical aspects o f the project have been thoroughly 
appraised and the necessary regulatory approvals and capital has been obtained, the
248 Shaw (1999).
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project enters its construction phase. During this period, when enormous capital costs 
accumulate prior to any revenue being generated, equity investors bear most, if not all 
o f the risk.2 2 But as it requires large volumes o f capital, project construction is 
typically financed by a combination o f equity, subordinated debt and senior debt 
guarantees. Risks during the construction phase primarily relate to delays caused by 
labor strikes, late delivery o f equipment or material, or unanticipated weather 
events.253 To protect themselves against risk during this phase, lenders take out 
insurance and often use ‘turnkey’ construction contracts that condition incremental 
loan disbursements on the satisfactory completion o f particular tasks, providing a 
financial incentive to avoid delays and cost-overruns. 54 This would include 
provisions that define the penalties that will be incurred in case o f cost overruns or 
construction delays, and performance bonuses to reward completion ahead o f 
schedule or below cost.
Once construction is completed, the project transitions into its operational phase, 
upon which lenders would have ensured that all completion undertakings identified in 
the loan agreement would have met or exceeded the standards defined in the project 
feasibility report as minimum to ensuring the project’s financial viability. As the 
project produces output, it begins generating cash flow that is principally used to 
repay lenders. At this stage, project risk is in principle lower, as the project sponsors 
have been vetted, the necessary government approvals and concessions have been 
secured, and the project economics have been deemed satisfactory. And since the 
loan converts from being secured to a limited or non-recourse financing once the 
project is completed, lenders are forced to saddle any financial losses incurred during 
its operational phase, apart from those resulting from breaches that are deemed to be 
within the borrower’s control.255 But once the project sponsors have fully repaid 
outstanding debts, the commercial lenders no longer bear any obligation or 
responsibilities in relation to the project.
It becomes apparent from this analysis o f project financing that the transaction cannot 
be narrowly characterized as a transfer o f debt from a lender to a borrower. Instead, a 
wide variety of actors, interests and sources o f expertise converge in arranging 
project finance with the aim o f mitigating project risk to a level that allows it to raise 
the necessary equity and debt financing. The next section illustrates how and on what 
grounds adverse environmental and social impacts o f projects first gained interests 
among financial institutions, and subsequently, how they are commonly managed in 
project finance transactions.
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4.3 Environmental and Social Risk Management in Project Financing
Decisions regarding the construction and operation o f individual investment projects, 
and the formulation o f environmental management plans, can have significant 
environmental and social ramifications beyond the project itself. On the one hand, 
project financing can contribute to reducing pollution and waste by facilitating the 
transfer o f clean technologies to heavy industries, increase the availability o f 
electricity and water services by increasing energy production, and improve regional 
economic development and integration by developing transportation and 
communications infrastructure. As an example,a proportion o f the project financing 
provided by multilateral lenders to Eastern Europe and Russia after the fall o f 
communism upgraded heavily polluting industrial facilities, and improved the 
management o f toxic wastes that had by and large been neglected by government 
previously.
On the other hand, project finance can have a variety o f adverse consequences for 
local communities and the environment. As large infrastructure projects are often part 
o f national economic development programs, they may come at the expense o f local 
communities, particularly if their rights are poorly protected in the legal system. For 
example, hydropower development may submerge vast areas and force the 
resettlement o f  local communities, road projects in frontier regions may aid illegal 
loggers by providing them with access to previously isolated forest resources, and oil 
pipelines may harm fish stocks or increase the risks o f oil spills. As a result, the 
decision-making process by which environmental and social issues are considered in 
project finance can actually have a significant bearing on the development path of 
national economies, and the plight o f local communities and sensitive ecosystems in 
project-affected areas.
Yet, the fiduciary relationship that exists between commercial lenders and their 
borrowers typically prevents the former from exerting too much influence on the 
latter. While project finance does increase the leverage o f the lender compared to 
ordinary corporate loans by virtue o f relying on project revenues for repaying debts, 
the financing structure still limits the extent to which lenders can place conditions on 
the use o f funds. Therefore, fiduciary obligations require that lending conditions be 
justified within the parameters o f project risk, by only addressing possible threats to 
predicted project revenue streams. This limitation is at the heart o f debates regarding 
the legitimate roles and responsibilities o f commercial lenders in mitigating or 
preventing adverse environmental and social impacts in large-scale infrastructure 
projects.
The translation o f an adverse environmental impact into project risk is often 
convoluted. But the literature typically distinguishes between two types of 
environmental risk; direct risks, or those over which a bank may be held directly 
liable or responsible, and indirect risks, or those that may impact the borrower’s 
capacity to repay the loan.
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Direct Environmental Risks
The most direct environmental risk to the lender emerges in cases where collateral 
used to secure a project finance loan may be devalued by being associated with 
environmental liabilities, or when lenders assume direct liability for reversing or 
compensating for environmental damages, as in the case o f rehabilitating a 
contaminated facility or property. In addition, the lender may be held directly liable 
for environmental damages caused by the project.256 This would normally require that 
the lender exercises a greater level o f control and influence over the project than what 
is typical, either by commanding the environmental management policies and 
procedures o f the borrower, or by acquiring ownership of polluting assets as a result 
o f workout or recovery procedures.25 In either case, loan covenants often exempt 
creditors from such direct environmental risks by allocating these to project sponsors.
In fact, the earliest practices o f environmental risk management in commercial 
banking emerged among U.S banks in response to the prospect that they could be 
held liable for clean-up costs associated with environmental contamination. In 1980, 
the U.S Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liabilities Act (CERCLA), more commonly referred to as Superfund, which 
sought to define liabilities for environmental contamination associated with 
commercial properties. During the ensuing decade, a number o f legal cases favored 
secured lenders by maintaining that they could not be held responsible for the 
environmental pollution caused by borrowers and required to pay associated 
remediation costs.258 Liability would only be assumed in one o f two narrow 
circumstances; if the removal o f environmental contamination was so costly that it 
forced the borrower to foreclose on the loan, and thus transfer the ownership o f the 
facility, along with its liabilities, to the lender, or if the lender was actively involved 
in the ‘day-to-day’ operation o f a facility.259
However, the reassurances that secured lenders were given in relation to 
environmental liabilities soon ceased. A landmark ruling in 1990 provided a broader 
interpretation o f lender liability and thereby dissented from previous rulings, a 
reversal which reverberated among lenders around the world. The case, the United 
States vs. Fleet Factor, concerned the allocation o f responsibilities for environmental 
contamination discovered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at a cloth 
printing facility that had borrowed money from Fleet Factor Corporation.
256 For example, financial institutions that have provided project financing to the recently completed 
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline have been warned by NGOs and legal experts that they could face court 
action if the pipeline leaks. (EIRIS 2006)
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In a widely quoted excerpt o f the decision, the U.S Eleventh Circuit Court ruled that;
.a secured creditor may incur . . . liability, without being an operator, by participating in the 
financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the 
corporation's treatment o f hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor 
actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations o f the facility in order to be liable . . .  
Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to participate in management decisions related to 
hazardous wastes. Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the 
management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect 
hazardous waste disposal decisions.’ 260
Whilst only applicable to lenders with exposures in the U.S, the ruling was seen by 
many as a possible precedent for the development o f lender liability regulation 
elsewhere, and thus prompted many European banks to expand their environmental 
risk management practices. In 1992, an EPA ruling sought to remove uncertainty 
produced by the Fleet Factor ruling by allowing secured creditors to foreclose on 
contaminated property without incurring liability for clean-up costs, given that certain 
requirements are met. Subsequent federal and state-level legislation and a number o f 
legal cases brought additional clarity to this issue, and generally reduced the liability 
exposure o f lenders.
The Superfund legislation and the Fleet Factor case meant negative environmental 
impacts could in certain circumstances represent a direct risk to lenders, by allowing 
for the possibility that lenders could be held responsible for environmental clean-up 
costs. These legislative and legal developments established a relationship between 
commercial bank lending and adverse environmental impacts. The threat o f legal 
liabilities associated with environmental contamination meant that many lenders 
began integrating environmental risk management into relevant investment decisions. 
Particularly in the U.S, lenders would finance domestic brownfield development with 
extreme caution, knowing well that any financial liabilities associated with existing 
environmental contamination could far outweigh the commercial revenues generated 
by the financing. It led many to create environmental units staffed by lawyers charged 
with assessing whether the project sponsor could be subjected to legal claims 
associated with environmental contamination. In short, it gave credence to the notion 
that irresponsible or negligent behavior on the part o f the borrower could not be 
overlooked by lenders, which essentially prompted more comprehensive due 
diligence prior to issuing loans to commercial borrowers.
Meanwhile, the European Commission’s Green Paper on Remedying Environmental 
Damage, released in 1993, promoted the precautionary principles and prevention as 
the foundation for allocating responsibilities for environmental damages and 
choosing types o f interventions. 61 The British Bankers’ Association (BBA) strongly 
criticized the report for not exempting lenders from assuming responsibilities for
260 United States v. Fleet Factors Corporation, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
261 European Commission, Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final, 14 
May 1993.
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environmental liabilities associated with borrowers, acutely aware o f the legal risks
'j/L 'y
that American banks were facing. At the national level in the United Kingdom, 
similar legislation was underway in the form o f the Environment Bill, passed in 1995. 
The text led the BBA to seek clarification o f the terms ‘knowingly permit’, arguing 
that ‘lenders are not environmental experts and it is important that attempts to assess 
the quality o f a borrower's management ...should not make banks liable for the 
obligations o f their borrowers.’ 63 And as in the U.S case, the BBA noted that an 
exception to this position was one where ‘banks actually exercise effective control’ 
over a borrower's business.
Indirect Environmental Risks
The potential for a direct risk notwithstanding, environmental and social issues 
become relevant to commercial lenders primarily as potential project risks that may 
undermine future revenue streams. Since the collateral in project financing is lower 
than in ordinary credit transactions, credit risks are automatically higher, and there is 
a direct link between the social and environmental risks o f the project and the credit 
risks borne by the lenders.264 Such indirect risks emerge when adverse impact on the 
environment and local communities by way o f an intermediary mechanism are 
predicted to negatively affect project profitability. These indirect risks rest with the 
borrower, but nevertheless may impact its ability to repay loans to the lending bank 
or it may materially affect the value o f the collateral, and in the worst cases, fall 
within default risk.
The type and gravity o f  environmental and social issues vary between projects, and is 
to a large extent driven by the industry sector. In most cases, ecological- and socio­
economic impacts are often highly interdependent, since local communities often 
have a major stake in environmental resources in the project-affected area, and 
likewise, adverse environmental impacts may in fact materialize as project risks only 
because they harm the livelihoods o f people and induce local protests that disrupt the 
project. Such impacts translate into indirect risks when they require major changes to 
project design.26 For instance, banks acknowledge that any borrower penalty for 
non-compliance with environmental legislation, or subsequent loss o f market 
position, is a risk to repayment. Thus, an adverse environmental impact can represent 
a risk if it prevents the project sponsor from obtaining the necessary environmental 
operating licenses to dispose waste or discharge pollution. In such cases, regulatory 
authorities act as arbiters o f risk, capable o f deciding whether or not to impose 
significant financial costs onto the project. Therefore, as part o f their due diligence,
262 For an extensive discussion of the legal risks faced by British banks in relation to environmental 
contamination, and the policy positions of the BBA, see McKenzie and Wolfe (2004).
263 Quoted in ISIS (2002).
264 Amalric (2005).
265 Case (1999).
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creditors seek to ensure that contracts for project development and implementation 
conform to local or national environmental laws and regulations.266
And finally, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6, projects that generate 
significant adverse environmental and social impacts can attract negative media 
attention, and thereby harm the reputation o f financial institutions. Unlike other types 
o f risk, reputational risks are not necessarily related to mismanagement, negligence or 
incompetence, but can emerge in cases where projects for various other reasons 
simply generate significant adverse publicity. In contrast to legal risks, which emerge 
out o f violations o f laws and regulations, reputational risks are therefore much more 
intangible, as they are largely determined by the court o f public opinion, thus more 
difficult to identify, assess and mitigate.
The next section will define project financing as a transnational policy area, 
characterized by clashes between domestic, international and transnational policy 
imperatives, and the contestation o f norms defining what constitutes responsible and 
appropriate corporate conduct relative to the protection o f environmental resources 
and upholding the rights o f project-affected communities. It highlights the roles, 
responsibilities and motivations o f a variety o f public and private actors, and how 
these shape the management o f environmental and social issues in individual 
transactions, as well the evolution o f environmental lending policies.
4.4 A ctors, In terests and  the Allocation of Risk
Modem project finance transactions are often characterized by financially and legally 
complex operations with high financial risk, requiring the mobilization o f a wide 
variety o f public and private actors with development, construction, operation, 
financing and investment capacities and expertise.267 The project preparation phase 
can be characterized as a process through which the project concept, the sponsoring 
coalition, and the institutional framework co-evolve. 68 In the contractual structure 
that emerges out o f these negotiations, the project company retains a central position. 
The ownership o f the project company may be divided between a few large, active 
owners, commonly a combination o f foreign and domestic investors, as well as 
multilateral- or commercial lender in a minority position. It may also include 
contractors, who apart from holding equity, take part in the construction and 
operation o f the project.
Public authorities partake in a myriad o f ways, as regulators, licensing agencies, 
equity investors, and not least, as suppliers o f project inputs or purchasers o f project 
outputs. Financial institutions, including multilateral development banks, export 
credit agencies and commercial banks, provide debt and may also take on minority 
equity stakes. And whilst often lacking legal recourse, stakeholders affected by the
266 Hines (1997).
267 See Esty (2004).
268 Miller and Hobbs (2005).
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project can influence it by exerting political pressure on project sponsors and 
creditors to mitigate, prevent or provide compensation for certain adverse impacts.
As many projects lead to major transformations o f regions or industrial sectors, a 
large variety o f conflicting ideas and interests often surface during the preparation 
stages. The complexity o f  project preparation and contractual arrangements can often 
be overwhelming. A wide range o f problems can impede project preparation and 
operation, including a lack o f a shared agreement on and commitment to project 
objectives among parties, poorly designed or incomprehensive project plans, unclear 
lines o f authority and responsibility, resource constraints, poor risk analysis and 
inadequate control mechanisms, and inefficient bureaucracies.
The Role o f  Commercial Lenders and Project Sponsors
The boom in the global project finance market in the early 1990s can be traced to the 
deregulation and liberalization o f energy, water and extractive industries sectors in 
developing countries, and the commercial investment opportunities this provided to 
foreign investors. These reforms were driven by an infrastructure development 
strategy based primarily on private sector investment and operations, which provided 
TNCs and lenders with opportunities to expand into hitherto closed markets. To 
facilitate these transnational capital flows into large-scale development projects, 
project finance represented the financing structure o f choice among borrowers, 
lenders and host government alike, as it enabled lucrative projects to be pursued 
despite being operated by companies with insufficient creditworthiness, and located 
in countries with high levels o f investment risk.
For commercial lenders, the financing structure o f project finance has strong risk- 
sharing attributes that isolates and protects the substantial project revenue streams 
from the financial risks posed by the operational environment. First and foremost, 
project finance is conducive to creating loan syndicates, which provide commercial 
lenders with a mechanism to better manage and mitigate financial risks, facilitated in 
a variety o f contractual arrangements with different parties, including host country 
governments and development agencies. The complex web o f contractual 
arrangements that characterize this form o f financing contributes to safeguarding 
creditor interests. 269 Secondly, in comparison to conventional lending, project 
finance loans provide commercial lenders with potentially higher spreads and 
generate substantial fee revenues, especially if they act as both arrangers o f 
syndicates and funders o f the project.270 And thirdly, project finance is conducive to 
enabling the participation o f multilateral development banks in private sector 
projects, which reduces the political risks associated with a project. Therefore, 
commercial lenders often partner with multilateral developments banks, since the 
latter’s institutional relationship with public authorities can ensure that domestic 
policies and regulations impacting the revenue streams remain relatively stable
269 Pollio (1999).
270 Donaldson (1988) and Pollio (1999).
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throughout the lifetime o f the project. In most cases, infrastructure lending in 
developing countries is dependent on the participation o f a multilateral- or bilateral 
development agency to attract additional financing from commercial banks.
For project sponsors in developing countries, project finance provides them with a 
mechanism to maximize their financial leverage without solely relying on their own 
creditworthiness to access capital. First, by establishing a separate project company 
together with a reputable foreign TNC with a strong track record, they are able to 
access long-term capital from risk-averse investors beyond what their own balance 
sheet would normally allow.271 Secondly, as their own resources and operations 
encompass levels o f risk that they are unable to bear alone, project sponsors can 
through project finance reduce their own financial risks by insulating their core 
business from the costs o f project failure.272 And since project finance loans may in 
some cases be structured as off-balance sheet financing, it often comes with 
considerable tax advantages compared to corporate loans. And thirdly, the structuring 
o f debt in syndications facilitates the participation o f both multinational companies 
and lenders, which increases the flows o f capital, knowledge and information to 
borrowers. In the context o f complex infrastructure projects, this enables project 
sponsors to gain access to the latest technologies and project management 
practices.273 In terms o f access to financing, loan syndications often combine loans o f 
different types and maturities, which provide borrowers with flexibility in using loan 
funds during the construction period, and the ability to refinance debt once the project 
is operational.274
The Role o f Host Governments
As individual projects may significantly impact a country’s national economy and 
resources, it is not surprising that governments play a critical role in the development 
o f large projects.275 In many cases, project finance transactions are central to national 
development plans, and thus promoted aggressively by governments, sometimes as 
part o f broader economic reform programs financed by multilateral development 
banks. And even if  a project is solely financed and operated by the private sector, it is 
both undesirable and impractical for government not to be involved in the 
development o f the project.
Indeed, the sheer size and duration o f some undertakings suggest that public interests 
will be heavily implicated. While not representative o f a typical project, the Three 
Gorges Dam project under construction in China does illustrate the scale o f
271 IFC (1999).
272 Pollio (1999).
273 See Bond and Carter (1994).
274 World Bank (2004).
275 Miller and Hobbs (2005).
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transformational change that can result from a single project. When completed in 
2009, the enormous dam will create a 600 kilometer reservoir expected to submerge 
160 towns and cities, 770 villages, 800 ancient sites, 657 factory and mining sites,
139 power stations, 956 kilometers o f roads and 23,800 hectares o f crop land. 276 
Project cost may exceed £15 billion. On a lesser scale, but by no means trivial, other 
major undertakings with significant consequences for economic, political, social and 
environmental development have been financed through project finance in recent 
years, notably the Chad-Cameroon and Baku-Ceyhan-Tblisi, pipelines.
For a number o f reasons, host governments and public authorities overseeing the 
compliance with domestic laws and regulation can in principle exert significant 
influence over the project, although this is borne out in the context o f  negotiations 
with foreign operators and and lenders. Oftentimes, a large-scale development project 
begins when a government releases a policy statement that announces a set o f 
regulatory changes that provide incentives for certain undertakings.277 First, 
individual projects are most often undertaken in economic sectors that are heavily 
regulated or dominated by state-owned enterprises, such as energy, water and 
transportation infrastructure. In many cases, the acquisition o f ownership stakes by 
foreigners is severely restricted or even impossible, as governments are hesitant to 
relieve control o f strategically important industry sectors.278 Apart from the 
enactment o f favorable legislative changes that allow entry o f foreign investors and 
operators into domestic sectors, governments often retain some control in 
negotiations with project sponsors over concession agreements. These would specify 
the conditions for financing and operating a facility, and any arrangement that would 
transfer project assets to the government in the future.
As per Hines (1997), such concessions are often negotiated in the context o f one of 
four project structures. A turnkey arrangement is one in which a facility is returned to 
a public authority immediately after construction. Under a ‘build-own-transfer’
(BOT) scheme, the most favored by governments wishing to involve foreign investor 
in infrastructure development, developers and consortium partners would own and 
manage the project until the initial investment is recovered, upon which the project 
reverts to a state-owned entity without any continuing obligation to the project. 
Usually, it is based on a government granting a franchise to a project sponsor, either 
negotiated or as part o f a competitive bidding process, to design, construct, finance 
and operate the facility for a period o f years. When ownership and operational 
responsibilities rests with developers for an extensive period, the arrangement is 
referred to as ‘build-own-operate-transfer’ (BOOT), which is rare, but favored in 
cases where host governments wish to secure the long-term involvement o f foreign 
investors. And finally, under the seldom used ‘build-own-operate’ (BOO) scheme, 
ownership and control o f the project commonly lies with a foreign investor from the 
outset for an extended, often indefinite period
276 Case (1999).
277 Miller and Hobbs (2005).
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Secondly, apart from their role as owners and regulators, host governments often 
provide significant assurances and incentives for creditors and investors to partake in 
infrastructure development. At the most basic level is a well-functioning and 
comprehensively enforced legal system that provides the necessary assurances to 
creditors and investors that contractual agreements will be honored by all parties and 
enforced by the courts.279 For example, in the context o f financing a privately owned 
power plant, creditors would want to know whether legislation exists that would 
allow it to connect to the national grid, and whether public authorities involved in 
power regulation, transmission and distribution tend to honor their contractual 
obligations. As risk allocations are implemented through contractual arrangements 
between parties, the satisfactory mitigation o f legal risk is essential for any project.
Third, a mature legal structure is often complemented by a policy framework that is 
open to foreign investment and ownership in relevant economic sectors, and allows 
for easy conversion o f local currency into foreign exchange in order for project 
sponsors to service foreign debt obligations. In a study o f sixty large projects, Miller 
and Hobbs (2005) found that ‘important regulatory or institutional changes’ were 
critical to the development of nearly two-thirds o f the projects. Furthermore, in many 
cases, project sponsors were not simply passive beneficiaries o f favorable 
institutional changes, but ‘contributed to the creation or the modification of the 
institutional framework into which they became embedded, through a process o f co­
determination.’ 281
Such institutional change often takes place in the context o f partial or full 
privatization programs, in which governments may enact a series o f legal and 
regulatory changes facilitating greater private participation and ownership in 
economic sectors previously reserved for state-owned enterprises. In the power 
sector, this would include allowing private power plants to set prices on energy 
output according to their own profitability, rather than a tariff set by the government. 
Apart from scaling back government ownership and supervision in relevant economic 
sectors, such reforms may seek to encourage private creditors and investors by 
including favorable tax treatment of income or subjecting projects to minimal or no 
import duties on machinery and equipment associated with project construction and 
operation.282
And fourth, government participation in the risk management process is vital for a 
project to come to fruition. Indeed, in many countries, private investors are hesitant to 
invest unless direct government support to improve the project’s cash flow or reduce 
risk is provided. 283 Oftentimes, creditors and investors would analyze the 
institutional environment in the host country separately from the credentials o f
279 Bond and Carter (1994).
280 Hines (1997).
281 Miller and Hobbs (2005), p.43
282 Dailami and Leipziger (1997).
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9 fiiproject sponsors. In cases where a project generates a product, governments may 
respond to concerns over market risks identified in such analysis by granting a 
revenue guarantee, such as the right to sell project output at a fixed price over a 
certain time period regardless o f real price fluctuations in the market.
Similarly, governments can guarantee a fixed input price, for example on energy in 
the case o f aluminum production and manufacturing. Such hedging against market 
risk is especially important in volatile economies and commodity markets, where 
risk-averse lenders demand such assurances prior to making lending commitments for 
projects that may span decades. In the absence o f such measures, creditors that have 
committed funds in project finance structures may be vulnerable to market instability, 
as occurred during and after the Asian crisis. On that occasion, over-extended 
creditors suffered as numerous project sponsors cancelled or deferred major projects, 
and some in operation experienced financial difficulties because o f problems 
associated with reduced market demand for output.285
Government risk guarantees are most often issued in greenfield power projects, since 
project sponsors often rely heavily on debt for financing the initial construction of the 
project. In turn, creditors are eager for governments to absorb some o f the project risk 
associated with the large amounts o f financing placed in sunk assets, and the long 
duration o f the project. This is most commonly done in the context o f power 
purchasing agreements (PPAs) in energy projects, in which the project company is 
guaranteed a universal fixed tariff on power purchases for the life o f  a power p lant.286 
In cases where project revenue is generated in local currency, governments may also 
ensure convertibility and absorb the exchange rate risk by inserting an inflation-index 
clause in PPAs, thus protecting project lenders and sponsors from inflation in cases 
where project revenues are in local currency.287
The Role o f  Multilateral Development Banks
Individual projects that contribute to the privatization o f energy and water services 
cannot be understood without reference to the broader economic reforms programs 
initiated by many governments. And similarly, the wave o f infrastructure 
privatizations that have taken place in some middle- and low-income countries cannot 
be understood without alluding to the influence o f multilateral financial institutions, 
particularly the World Bank and the IMF, in pressing for such reforms by making 
infrastructure finance contingent on private sector participation. In particular, 
multilateral development banks targeting the private sector, notably the IFC, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the EBRD, have explicitly sought to 
expand private participation in infrastructure development by using multilateral 
financing to catalyze private ownership and investment.
284 Hines (1997).
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More generally, the role and influence o f multilateral development banks in the 
project finance market is complex and multi-faceted. First, as significant proponents 
o f private sector development, they have encouraged the deregulation o f economic 
sectors and the privatization o f infrastructure development and services, thereby 
providing market opportunities for foreign lenders and investors. While the pendulum 
is slowly swinging back to a more balanced view o f what constitutes the optimal role 
o f public and private actors in infrastructure, multilateral development banks have 
long been strong advocates o f privatization and deregulation o f infrastructure. As 
Buiter and Lankes (2003) o f the EBRD proposed, multilateral development banks 
should participate directly in the private investment process and aid governments in 
establishing an institutional environment that can best foster market-oriented 
economic growth. Similarly, the World Bank (2004) noted with a certain amount o f 
dismay that in many developing countries, ‘the agenda o f market liberalization, 
regulatory reform, and the restructuring o f state-owned monopoly utilities remains 
unfinished.’ 288 The policy conditionalities of structural adjustment programs, which 
pressured many developing countries to allow greater private investment and 
participation in domestic industries, embody this ideological preference.
Secondly, apart from their indirect influence through knowledge diffusion and policy- 
based lending, multilateral financial institutions often seek to directly encourage 
private investment by leveraging their financial and technical resources. Specifically, 
multilateral financing to the private sector is typically structured in the form o f seed 
financing that is intended to attract additional private investment. To facilitate 
commercial bank participation, multilateral lenders may use their extensive 
relationships with them to explore the prospects for commercial financing on behalf 
o f a borrower. As an illustration o f this practice, despite the growth in long-term 
commercial bank lending in the 1990s, a major share o f all project finance 
transactions involved at least one official aid agency.
Third, the participation o f multilateral development banks is critical to most large- 
scale development projects in developing countries, as it mitigates the level of 
political risk associated with the project. Specifically, it is essential for commercial 
banks to obtain assurances that the government will not enact any regulatory or 
legislative changes that would adversely impact the financial viability o f the project 
during its duration. Because o f their close relationship with host governments, 
multilateral financial institutions can be said to provide a ‘quasi-guarantee’ that such 
reforms would not happen.289 To a lesser extent, the participation o f multiple 
commercial lenders from countries o f strategic importance to the host government, 
such as significant trading partners or creditors, can provide a de facto guarantee 
against adverse political moves.290 But additionally, a project finance transaction 
often also includes political risk insurance provided by an export credit agency or the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). However, the risk o f parties
288 World Bank (2004), p. 154.
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backing out o f agreements still remains, as was most recently manifested in the 
Chadian government’s decision to violate key provisions in its financing agreement 
with the World Bank over the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline.
And fourth, multilateral development banks often bring significant technical 
knowledge and resources to project preparation.291 As lead arrangers o f loan 
syndications, the time and resources that they spend on project due diligence will in 
effect be shared by all participating banks. Therefore, their participation also enables 
commercial banks to participate in project finance transaction that would otherwise 
be too risky and complex to adequately assess on their own.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that an analysis o f the emergence o f the Equator Principles 
requires an appreciation for the significance o f project risk management as the 
framework within which commercial banks engage with environmental and social 
issues in project finance transactions. It briefly surveyed the history o f international 
project lending, emphasizing its association with export-oriented growth and a 
boarder neo-liberal policy agenda in developing countries. It outlined the 
distinguishing features o f  project finance as a financing structure, focusing on the 
centrality o f project risk management as the contextual basis for decision-making, 
and the influential role o f host governments and multilateral development banks.
Overall, it is in the context o f identifying, assessing and managing project risk, and 
by extension structuring the financial package, that commercial lenders interact with 
and influence the environment and local communities in their project financing. The 
identification and analysis o f environmental and social issues as ‘risk’ is based on a 
set o f assumptions about the nature o f environmental change that has a profound 
impact on governance outcomes. Chief among them is a strong profit motive 
dictating that adverse environmental and social consequences are only relevant to 
commercial lenders insofar as they pose a risk to project profitability, or the broader 
commercial interests o f the financial institution.
The emergence o f a significant reputational risk associated with large-scale project 
financing has indeed broadened the spectrum o f environmental and social issues that 
are deemed relevant project finance lenders. Since reputation is driven as much by 
public perceptions o f harm than actual material changes, those impacts that are likely 
to generate negative publicity by attracting the attention o f transnational advocacy 
groups or the media became much more significant. Nevertheless, employing risk 
management as the conceptual lens through which the significance o f environmental 
and social issues are understood, narrowly circumscribes the rationales and 
responsibilities o f both lenders and borrowers and provides the basis for lenders to 
rule out certain environmentally beneficial interventions on the grounds that they 
have little bearing on the risk o f the project financing.
291 Buiter and Lankes (2003).
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The analysis raises interesting questions with regard to private governance formation 
that will be discussed in later chapters. It identified the existence o f legal and 
regulatory requirements as a central motivation for commercial lenders to initially 
consider the adverse environmental and social impacts o f project financing in 
developed countries. The fact that previous environmental risk management practices 
had been driven by a requirement to comply with host country laws and regulations 
poses the question as to whether voluntary regulation can adequately compensate for 
poor legal and regulatory systems in developing countries.
Yet, as subsequent chapters will illustrate, the emergence o f environmental and social 
norms in commercial project financing posed a different threat to commercial project 
lenders. Whereas environmental and social risk management was long motivated by a 
need to comply with host country laws and regulations in order to secure much 
needed operating licenses, adhering to the demands o f transnational advocacy groups 
has little to do with project-level management. In fact, what is at stake for 
commercial banks is not only their corporate reputation as responsible project 
lenders, but their image and reputation in the financial sector at large.
The next chapter will outline how environmental and social concerns emerged and 
became institutionalized in multilateral development banks, and how this influenced 
the emergence o f the Equator Principles
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5. The World Bank Group and the Environment
Introduction
Multilateral development banks play a critical role in managing large resource- 
transfers between developed and developing countries. For example, as the world’s 
self-proclaimed depository o f development knowledge, the World Bank has become a 
powerful arbiter o f development norms, defining what constitutes legitimate policy 
interventions for developed and developing countries.292 In terms o f the Equator 
Principles, the emergence o f the framework cannot be examined in isolation o f 
broader currents in global environmental politics, particularly in relation to 
development financing. The practice o f  environmental review o f projects was first 
introduced at the World Bank in the early 1970s to ensure that its public sector 
projects did not harm the environment. Then, during the ensuing three decades, the 
practice expanded in complexity and scope in response to revelations that projects 
were causing ecological damages despite having been supposedly reviewed by 
environmental specialists
This chapter will provide a historical account o f the evolution o f environmental 
practices at the World Bank and the IFC, starting with the World Bank’s initial 
concession in the early 1970s that environmental problems should be regarded as a 
legitimate concern to multilateral development banks. The argument for historicizing 
a discussion o f the Equator Principles is that its emergence cannot be explained in 
isolation o f the way environmental and social concerns emerged and evolved in 
multilateral project financing. Specifically, the institutional context within which 
environmentalism first arose at the World Bank, and the nature o f how this additional 
organizational objective was integrated into its operations would later significantly 
shape the emergence o f environmental practice at the IFC, and subsequently, the 
diffusion o f these to commercial banks via the Equator Principles. The lasting 
impacts o f this process is two-fold, one linked to the legal and normative 
responsibilities o f project lenders, and the other being the range and type o f policy 
interventions that would be considered appropriate or legitimate to address 
environmental degradation and poverty alleviation.
The first section will illustrate how the environmental agenda first emerged within the 
World Bank, and identify the leadership o f the Bank, notably President McNamara, 
as central to this development. The second section will provide an overview o f how 
and why transnational advocacy groups first interacted with the World Bank, and 
how this changed its environmental and social mission, and more broadly, its 
organizational identity as a development institution. The third section surveys the 
environmental reforms at the IFC in the 1990s, and finds important parallels with the 
World Bank. And finally, the fourth section discussed why and how environmental
292 See Bods and McNeill (2004), Finnemore (1996), p.125, and Woods (2006).
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and social norms came to diffuse across these international organizations, and its 
broader implications for the environmental and social governance o f project finance 
transactions.
5.1 The Emergence of an Environmental Agenda at the World Bank
At its inception in 1944, the World Bank’s primary stated mission was to aid post­
war reconstruction in Europe, but following decolonization and the ‘emergence’ o f 
independent underdeveloped countries, it soon found itself immersed in its secondary 
purpose, providing aid for economic development. Its initial development rationale 
was to correct capital markets inefficiencies in its borrowing countries, produced by 
the lack o f long-term private funds at reasonable interest rates necessary to finance 
large-scale development projects.293 Until the late 1960s, its development strategy 
was largely based on export-led growth and large-scale energy, transportation and 
agricultural infrastructure development, whose benefits were expected to trickle- 
down to the poor. Its staff, which grew immensely during this period commensurate 
to the financing needs o f borrowers, was largely technically-trained professionals 
who had few incentives to or interests in addressing the environmental impacts o f 
their decisions. And international NGOs and other interest groups, who later were to 
have an enormous influence on the evolution o f environmental policies and 
procedures within the Bank, had yet to direct their attention towards the multilateral 
development banks.294
Upon assuming the Presidency o f the Bank in 1968, Robert McNamara rapidly 
expanded the Bank’s operations and gave it a broader development agenda, with 
poverty reduction as its central tenet. This redefinition was partially a response to 
emerging criticisms o f the Bank’s development orthodoxy, with claims that its focus 
on large-scale development projects failed to provide real direct benefits to the poor, 
and in fact exacerbated social inequalities in borrowing countries.295 It was during 
this time that the Bank became the first development institution to directly consider 
the relationship between environmental problems and economic development. Given 
the technocratic nature o f its professional staff and development practices, it was 
perhaps not surprising that its approach was based on developing appraisal 
methodologies and technical procedures for integrating environmental issues into its 
traditional economic cost-benefit analysis.
In 1970, as one o f his early initiatives, McNamara established an Office o f 
Environmental Affairs (OEA) reporting directly to him and staffed by a single 
environmental advisor, whose main task was to devise appraisal tools and provide 
advice on how to reduce the ‘environmental externalities’ o f projects. The following 
year, a suggestion to consider the environmental impacts o f projects in appraisal work
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appeared in the operational policies o f the Bank for the first time.296 As part o f the its 
work, the OEA also took on a broader educational responsibility to render 
environmental concerns more legitimate to operational staff, as well as the borrowing 
countries o f the Bank.
Following the establishment o f OEA, environmental review became the mechanism 
by which the Bank first addressed environmental issues in its operations.297 It entailed 
reviewing the environmental impacts o f project under preparation, and suggesting 
measures to mitigate or prevent them.298 By implication, the OEA’s role became 
largely advisory, entailing that operational staff were by no means bound by the 
results o f environmental reviews in the unlikely event that their projects were 
subjected to them. In other cases, the office was asked to work on residual matters 
that did not clearly fall within the remit o f other departments or divisions.299 
Crucially, this included an external public relations function aimed at ‘turning 
around’ external criticism, a role that would become increasingly significant.
This choice o f intervention ensured that the disruption to operations and strategies 
caused by the assumption o f an environmental commitment would be minimal, as it 
shifted the debate over environmental problems from principles to technical matters 
that could easily be managed internally.301 It also reflected M cNamara’s belief that by 
and large, Bank projects had negligible adverse environmental impacts. However, its 
introduction into the formal project cycle o f the Bank, which is the bureaucratic 
process that moves project proposals from the identification stage to Board approval, 
was still contentious and opened a rift between operational and environmental staff 
that would have a lasting influence on the Bank. 02 In fact, from the beginning, many 
operational staff had strong reservations with regard to the usefulness and feasibility 
o f identifying and assessing environmental impacts o f projects, as they were 
considered outside the realm o f the Bank’s work and could not be easily integrated 
into their quantitative analysis.303
296 OPM 2.20, see Wade (1997), p.616. Furthermore, the conceptual foundation o f environmental 
review can be found in the landmark National Environmental Protection Act o f 1969, which requires 
an environmental impact assessment to be conducted of all proposed major development projects in 
the United States as an element of the planning approval process.
297 The instrument was modeled after the U.S National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) o f 1969. 
It was first applied on an ad-hoc basis and would not become a requirement for all projects until 1987.
298 Le Prestre (1989), p.26
299 Le Prestre (1989).
300 Wade (1997).
301 Le Prestre (1989), p.27
302 Highlighting the conflicting interests faced by the OEA, according to Le Prestre (1989), it was 
generally not ‘judged against the soundness o f its environmental analysis and requirements, but 
according to the degree to which it hindered the pursuit o f the organization’s goals.’ (p.66)
303 Le Prestre (1989), p.23. They largely considered environmental protection to be the responsibility 
o f other international organizations, such as the newly established UNEP, and domestic governments.
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5.2 Transnational Advocacy Groups and the World Bank
By 1979, an institutionalized environmental assessment process that formally 
integrated environmental issues into project planning had become common practice 
amongst some bilateral aid agencies. In contrast, even though the Bank had issued 
various general and thematic guidelines on how environmental issues should be 
addressed in project design, operational staff at the Bank still enjoyed wide discretion 
and flexibility.3 4 During the ensuing decade, the growing gap between the Bank’s 
rhetorical statements about its environmental commitments and the extent o f 
substantive changes in its operational policies and procedures was being exposed and 
increasingly scrutinized.
The growth o f the environmental agenda at the World Bank is really a study of its 
evolving relationships with transnational advocacy groups.305 The effort was lead by 
U.S-based transnational advocacy groups, which argued that some development 
projects had caused significant environmental damage that had not been adequately 
considered in the Bank’s analysis.306 According to Wade (1997), the World Bank 
campaign launched by U.S advocacy groups was part o f a wider strategy to increase 
environmental protection and fight the causes o f poverty in developing countries. 
Their focus on the World Bank was driven by an understanding that it wielded 
considerable influence on industrial development in developing countries, and 
received significant U.S capital contributions to do so. As the U.S political system 
grants interest groups more influence over U.S government policy than other 
countries, they developed political alliances with key members o f the U.S Congress 
and sought to mobilize U.S support for their policy positions relative to the World 
Bank, thereby maximizing their own political leverage in affecting development 
policy in other countries.3 7 By directly confronting the World Bank on its claim that 
projects benefited the poor and did not significantly affect the environment, they 
hoped multilateral financing could be steered away from supporting large-scale, 
export-oriented development to more decentralized schemes that brought immediate 
benefits to the poor and protected environmental resources.
Given the technocratic nature o f the World Bank’s development bureaucracy, the 
advocacy groups were forced to express their demands in terms o f procedural 
amendments to existing financing practices to be deemed relevant. They called on the 
World Bank to employ more environment specialists, expand the range o f projects to 
be reviewed and the depth o f individual assessments. Furthermore, they also wanted 
an extension o f the time allotted to public consultations with local communities and
304 Wade (1997), p.611
305 For a brief history o f Bank-NGO relations, see O’Brien et.al (2000), pp. 18-23, pp. 28-32, and 
pp.l 15-134.
306 Wade (1997), p.614
307 See Bramble and Porter (1992), Keck and sikkink (1998), and Wade (1997). According to Bruce 
Rich, a lawyer at the Environmental Defense and a key figure in the NGO campaigns against the 
World Bank, it was led by a few motivated individuals at U.S-based NGOs that met at least bi-monthly 
in full, and more frequently in sub-groups, to form a common strategy and discuss the activities of 
each coalition member. (Rich 1993)
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increase public access to project documentation. In response, the Bank maintained 
that adding significant staff was not necessary, as a concern for environmental 
matters was already an integral part o f the professional practices o f its operational 
staff and already part o f existing risk management processes. Furthermore, it claimed 
that subjecting a wider range o f projects to environmental reviews and deepening 
investigations was unnecessary as only a small portion of them were likely to cause 
environmental damage.
Repressions and Denials: The Controversy over Polonoroeste
In 1981, the Bank implemented the North West Integrated Development Program 
(Polonoroeste) in Brazil, which primarily involved the construction o f  a 1500 km 
highway to facilitate the migration o f urban poor to Brazil’s less-populated regions. 
308 The project was introduced by the Bank as a poverty initiative and a model for 
comprehensive regional and development planning, as it included programs meant to 
set aside land for small farmers, protect forests, and manage the resettlement o f 
indigenous peoples.309 As it unfolded, federal and regional public agencies in Brazil 
responsible for implementing the protections and safeguards under the terms o f the 
financing agreement with the Bank failed to do so. In turn, it was to be depicted by 
critics as ‘the quintessential example o f the [the Bank’s] wider pursuit o f misguided 
development strategies’, and came symbolic of the Bank’s propensity to financially 
support ‘problem projects’ in developing countries.310
In 1984, three years after Polonoroeste had been implemented, a research 
collaboration between U.S advocacy groups and their Brazilian counterparts 
documented that the implementation o f Polonoroeste ran counter to almost all o f the 
Bank’s earlier forecasts and its ongoing external communications.311 For example, 
since road building preceded most adjacent projects, the highway facilitated the 
migration o f small farmers, as intended, but also failed to prevent the influx of 
loggers, miners and cattle ranchers into uncolonized and in some cases protected 
land, whose activities soon dwarfed agricultural production in the region.312 In order
308 Wade (1997), p.637
309 Wade (1997), p.637-8
310 Wade (1997), p.638
311 In 1991, an internal evaluation report produced by the Bank’s Operations Evaluations Department 
(OED) revealed that project proponents were primarily driven by the need to provide Brazil with credit 
to mitigate its balance-of-payments crisis, and actively marginalized operational staff that evaluated 
the project on its own merits. This meant crucial feasibility studies and consultations were either 
poorly executed or never conducted, in the interest o f saving costs, limiting time delays, and 
preventing the discovery o f problems that could jeopardize the project. As a result, the initial 
projections with regards to the migration patterns, agricultural production and impacts on forests were 
widely off the mark, (as cited in Rich 1993, p. 174; OED (1991), Approach Paper: The Bank’s Role in 
Environmental Issues in Brazil, produced jointly with the Brazilian Planning Ministry, Washington 
D.C: World Bank Joint Audit Committee). The OED has since been renamed twice, initially to the 
Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), and then more recently, to the Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG).
312 Wade (1997), p.648
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to build awareness o f these adverse impacts, the environmental advocacy groups in 
Washington D.C organized a major campaign to halt loan disbursements that 
included media stunts, petition letters, site visits to the region, and significantly, 
lobbying the U.S executive director at the Bank as well as key members o f the U.S 
Congress.
Initially the Bank refused to directly engage with the transnational advocacy network 
and defended its position by claiming its constitution barred Bank officials from 
engaging directly with citizens, interest groups or legislators, as these should only be 
communicated with indirectly through the appointed representatives o f member-states 
on the Bank’s Board. But this interpretation was successfully challenged by a 
prominent U.S congressman, who frustrated by the unwillingness o f the Bank to 
adequately respond to concerns over the controversy o f Polonoroeste, insisted on 
meeting the World Bank President in person. This proved significant, and provided a 
foundation for advocacy groups to increase their leverage by strategically aligning 
their demands with members o f congressional committees that had significant 
influence over the U.S capital contributions to the Bank’s funds. This collaboration 
resulted in multiple congressional hearings on Polonoroeste and the need for 
environmental reforms in the Bank, in which advocacy groups lambasted the OEA as 
a ‘public relations sham’, and documented numerous past projects with significant 
adverse environmental and social impacts that had been neither assessed nor
‘i l l
mitigated once known.
Suspicion, Skepticism and Mistrust: The Legacy o f  Polonoroeste
The public controversy over the Polonoroeste marked a turning point in the 
emergence and diffusion o f environmental and social norms in multilateral project 
financing. The norms promoted by the transnational advocacy network gained 
legitimacy precisely because o f the exposed environmental degradation and social 
injustices associated with Polonoroeste, and other projects as well. Even though many 
of the failures associated with the project was the result o f poor implementation by 
Brazilian public authorities, the World Bank as a lender o f capital was forced to take 
much o f the blame in the court o f public opinion. By extension, the project marked 
the first time lenders were held morally responsible for the adverse environmental 
and social impacts o f projects, raising public expectations considerably. The main 
legacy o f this controversy was that it was no longer legitimate to perceive the 
financing o f large-scale development projects as a purely technical intervention that 
should be prepared and implemented solely by professional experts, usually 
economists and engineers. Instead, the sheer scale o f the projects and their 
environmental, social and economic impacts on entire countries and regions meant
313 According to Rich (1993), these included, among others, ‘huge dams that displaced indigenous 
peoples, botched irrigation schemes that contributed to the spread of waterborne diseases such as 
malaria and schistosomiasis, cattle ranching schemes that destroyed tropical forests, massive 
resettlement projects.’ (p.l 13)
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the debate over planning and implementation moved into the public realm, by way of 
more information disclosure and opportunities for public consultation.
Apart from its symbolic impact on public perceptions o f large-scale project financing, 
Polonoroeste was significant for a number o f reasons. First, the project controversies 
and the aftermath signified the emergence o f an effectively organized and 
increasingly influential transnational advocacy network addressing the environmental 
and social policies and procedures o f multilateral development banks.314 According to 
Rich (1993), the success o f the coalition was not due to a centralized command, but a 
horizontally organized network that drew on all o f the resources and connections o f 
its members. Over time, large-scale development projects became a rallying point for 
environmental advocacy groups in many Western capitals, symbolizing the 
destructive potential o f  uninhibited export-led growth, and the social injustices 
caused by capital exporting countries to the world’s poor.
Secondly, while the Bank’s strategic vision o f development has always been 
contentious, the public nature o f the debate brought the divisions over multilateral 
financing to the fore and revealed the political dimensions o f the Bank’s appraisal 
methodologies. Project financing is political by nature, as it effects the distribution of 
economic resources and political influence between domestic interest groups. But the 
greater attention to the adverse environmental and social impacts o f projects proved 
controversial both within the Bank and with many o f its borrowers. Internally, it 
pitted environmental specialists against operational staff, who suspected the 
environmental agenda to be a Trojan horse for external interest groups that did not 
favor the World Bank’s broader development policies and strategies.315 Likewise, 
borrower governments often resented expensive compensation schemes and time­
intensive impact studies, and viewed these as unfairly imposed loan conditionalities 
that would do little to aid their development prospects.
Third, the experience with Polonoroeste solidified the view among advocacy groups 
that the Bank rarely communicated with the public in an objective or accurate 
fashion, which would come to characterize relations between them for years to come. 
In particular, environmental publications were received with increasing skepticism, 
assumed to deliberately present an issue in a way most favorable to the Bank. In this 
regard, the experience with Polonoroeste also provided evidence o f just how far 
project proponents are willing to go in order to further their own personal careers or 
avoid confronting governments. For example, this included withholding critical
314 See for example, Bramble and Porter (1992), Keck and Sikkink (1998), pp.135-160, Rich (1993) 
and Wade (1997).
315 Over time, the introduction of environmental review would result in much internal controversy, as 
operational staff either rejected or failed to understand the relevance of environmental problems to the 
Bank’s mandate. In addition, the specialization and separation o f environmental due diligence from 
operations gave the impression that environmental specialists were second-guessing the work of 
operational staff. As a result, a ‘syndrome of mistrust’ developed, Wade (1997) argues, because ‘the 
behavior of each side served to confirm the negative expectations of the other.’ This, he continues, 
‘eroded the effectiveness o f the environmental staff and discredited the idea o f ‘environment’ as a 
proper subject o f Bank concern.’ (p.632)
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project information from their superiors within the Bank, much less the general 
public, actively marginalizing skeptics in the project preparation work, and skipping 
the most elementary aspects o f environmental and social reviews. And even in the 
aftermath, advocacy groups witnessed that the careers o f project officers that had 
been indirectly criticized in both external and internal evaluation reports, barely 
suffered from their demonstrated failures.
Fourth, the project exposed how the nature o f the Bank’s operational mandate, as 
well as the career incentives o f project officers, could be at odds with the spirit o f its 
environmental review guidelines. The constraints imposed on the Bank by its peculiar 
mandate meant that its financial performance is heavily reliant on the number and 
size o f credit requests from a few large borrowers, which made a chronic shortage of
T 1A •viable projects a constant worry. The importance o f lending volumes increased 
significantly under President McNamara’s tenure, as he introduced annual lending 
targets for each sector. This produced an operational environment characterized by a 
‘pressure to lend’ on operational staff, exerted by creditors, borrowers and 
management, placing a premium on increasing the number, size and pace o f loan 
disbursements, and subordinating concerns for project quality .317
By extension, transnational advocacy groups understood these revelations as evidence 
that internal organizational objectives, and external pressures to promote export- 
oriented growth, often conflicted with the policy recommendations embedded in the 
environmental and social norms they were promoting, particularly forest conservation 
and upholding the rights o f  indigenous people. For example, the internal incentive 
structure within the Bank meant the career opportunities o f operational staff were less 
tied to the outcome o f individual projects they had managed than the size o f their 
lending portfolios. Not only did this favor larger projects over smaller ones, 
increasing the likelihood o f significant environmental impacts, but it also produced a 
disincentive for project officers to select projects that were difficult to appraise, or 
required borrowers to commission often costly and time-consuming environmental 
reviews, even in cases where they were obviously needed.318
Fifth, through its handling o f Polonoroeste, the extent o f the Bank’s immense faith 
and confidence in its ability to engineer economic and social change on a massive 
scale through centralized, vertical and expert-driven planning came to the fore and 
received serious public scrutiny for the first time.319 Generally, the Bank was
316 Rich (1993).
317 Le Prestre (1989), Rich (1993), and Woods (2006). For example, as Wade (1997) notes in relation 
to the Polonoroeste project in Brazil, ‘the road component was particularly attractive because it 
promised to disburse about $250 million quickly at a time when other ways to disburse to Brazil were 
limited.’ (p.640) Therefore, as Brazil was its largest and most important borrower, project officers 
became reluctant to confront federal and regional authorities responsible for implementation failures.
318 Rich (1993).
319 As Rich (1993) notes, ‘its vision o f global central planning was based on an extraordinary 
assumption; the staff o f the World Bank would, through visits (‘missions’) o f a few days or weeks, 
combined with desk research, take the lead in gathering data to prepare a development plan for ‘every 
relevant aspect’ o f a ‘nation’s social framework.’ (pp.85-86)
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convinced that by employing its appraisal methodologies and integrating appropriate 
safeguards into the financing arrangements, any potential danger, almost no matter 
how large or complex, could be identified and averted.320 This optimism prevented 
project officers from considering the damaging impact o f  vested interests or the 
eventuality o f other unanticipated developments during the implementation phase. It 
also reflected the ‘deal-making mentality’ that characterized the Bank, which 
emphasized project preparation and completion over supervision and monitoring.
The Bank repeatedly claimed its involvement in complex projects was absolutely 
critical to ensure that environmental and social issues would be addressed, since the 
development would have gone ahead regardless, with far worse consequences.322 The 
scrutiny o f its operations exposed how the Bank had exaggerated the extent and 
quality o f its environmental work and the influence o f the OEA within the Bank.323
And sixth, but not least, the effectiveness o f the advocacy campaigns in documenting 
the mismanagement o f projects and forming alliances with politicians with direct 
influence over U.S capital contributions to the Bank, put the World Bank on the 
defensive and triggered a significant transformation in the Bank’s rhetoric about its 
engagement with the outside world. In relation to transparency, requests made to the 
Bank for project-related documentation were often refused on the basis o f 
confidentiality considerations, as the Bank held that such actions was at the discretion 
o f the borrower. And mindful o f potential reputational damages, information that was 
cleared for release was carefully ‘sanitized’ to avoid the disclosure o f 
controversies.324 However, in light o f the implementation failures unearthed in 
relation to Polonoroeste, the judgement over confidentiality and the practice o f 
withholding critical information was increasingly the object o f sustained public 
criticism.
The Tactical Concession: The Environmental Reforms o f  1987
The controversy over the Polonoroeste project marked the beginning o f more 
formalized interactions between Bank officials and advocacy groups over 
environmental and social policies, and in some cases, the management of 
controversial projects. The emergence o f a coalition between U.S-based advocacy 
groups and selected members o f the U.S Congress would have a lasting impact on the 
World Bank’s environmental and social practices, and more broadly, the integration 
o f environmental and social norms into development finance. On the back o f
320 Wade (1997)
321 Wade (1997), p.649
322 Wade (1997), p.638
323 In one instance, the Bank continued to claim that all projects were reviewed for their environmental 
impacts during the early stages o f project preparation, even though this had been clearly contradicted 
by leaked internal hies. Specifically, a leaked internal file noted that, ‘as a matter o f routine, 
environmental issues are not considered, but that they are taken into account in specific instances 
where environmental consequences are pointed out by the Bank’s environmental advisor, the press, or 
special interest groups in host countries.’ (quoted in Rich 1993, p.l 18)
324 Rich (1993).
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campaign victories against the World Bank, the advocacy groups would later confront 
the IFC over its failure to follow the World Bank’s environmental and social policies 
in its private sector financing. Moreover, the campaigns against leading commercial 
banks would be staged by many o f the same groups, and in some cases, the same 
individual activists. As such, the networks that emerged and solidified during the 
World Bank campaigns in the 1980s would have a lasting impact on the 
environmental and social governance o f global project finance, across public and 
private financial institutions.
The turning point for the World Bank’s engagement with environmental and social 
issues occurred in 1986. In September that year, at the Annual Meeting o f the World 
Bank and IMF in Washington D.C, environmental activists mounted a huge banner 
on the side o f a World Bank, which read, ‘The World Bank Destroys Tropical 
Forests.’ Shortly thereafter, then President Barber Conable presented plans for a 
major reorganization o f the Bank at an event hosted by the World Resources Institute 
(WRI), the environmental research and advocacy organization. The reforms would 
involve a vast expansion o f its centralized environmental office, creating a new 
Environmental Department (ED) and four regional environmental divisions (REDs). 
As a result o f this expansion, the number o f staff engaged in environmental work 
would grow ten-fold. New environmental programs would be launched to secure the 
sustainability o f tropical forests, thereby specifically responding to the concerns of 
transnational advocacy groups raised by the Polonoroeste controversy. And lastly, the 
Bank was going to improve its communication and interaction with advocacy groups, 
and seek to involve them in all areas o f Bank operations.
The Norms Gain Prescriptive Status: The Narmada Dam Controversy
These initiatives paved the way for the defining policy development at the World 
Bank that would later come to influence the evolution o f practice at other project 
lenders, both public and commercial. In 1989, the World Bank approved Operational 
Directive 4.00 -  Annex A : Environmental Assessment, which would in 1999 be 
converted into a formal operational policy. Its intention was to help ‘to ensure that 
[projects] are environmentally sound and sustainable.’ 325 As with earlier policy 
developments in the mid-1980s, the revision was significantly driven by the 
implementation problems and ensuing public relations disasters o f a large-scale 
infrastructure project, the Narmada Valley Dam. It further provides evidence o f the 
significant role that ‘problem projects’ play in expanding the scale and scope o f 
environmental project review in project lending, by forcing lenders to mitigate 
downward spirals in organizational legitimacy by heeding to the demands o f critics.
The Narmada Valley projects involved a cluster o f dams envisioned along the 
Narmada River for hydropower and irrigation. The first dam would produce a 200 km 
long reservoir, Sardar Samovar, and an extensive canal network that combined would 
cause the forced displacement o f more than one hundred thousand households. The
325 World Bank (1999), p .l.
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Indian Government first approached the Bank for funds in 1979, and following 
reconnaissance missions and appraisals during the next four years, the Bank 
disbursed the first loan installments o f £225 million in March 1985. Following the 
disbursement o f loans, the lack o f coordination or oversight between and among 
federal and regional authorities led to implementation failures. An independent study 
commissioned by the Bank’s only expert in resettlement issues, discovered that 
villagers had not even been informed, much less consulted, o f the Indian 
government’s resettlement and rehabilitation plan, as agreed with the Bank.326 
Furthermore, as with Polonoroeste, it was revealed that neither the Bank nor the 
Indian government was committed to carry out environmental reviews o f the likely 
consequences o f the large-scale development. As a result, by the time the project was 
approved by the Board, there was virtually no knowledge o f the conditions o f forests 
or their future prospects, or the project’s consequences for ground water and other 
water resources used by downstream communities.327
A transnational advocacy campaign, coordinated with local protest groups, mobilized 
as early as 1982 and exerted significant pressure on the Bank throughout the decade. 
By 1989, U.S-based advocacy groups had gathered the strong support o f the U.S 
Executive Director, and were able to push through a congressional subcommittee 
hearing specifically on the Narmada project. Once again, the Bank was faced with 
sustained pressure from a transnational advocacy network that included local groups 
in the Narmada Valley, which enjoyed support from several executive directors. And 
in contrast to previous campaigns, the Narmada campaign was more directly focused 
on halting loan disbursements and stopping the project altogether, rather than 
improve its design.
Among its demands, the campaign urged the Bank to commission a review o f the 
project by an independent panel. In a tumultuous period, Medha Patkar, the leader o f 
the local Save the Narmada Movement, led a march to the dam site aimed at stopping 
construction. Following confrontations with police, some marchers began a hunger 
strike, and insisted that the Bank undertake a comprehensive review o f the project. 
While initially reluctant, Bank executives later agreed, hoping to settle the 
controversies delaying the project. The review, released in June 1992 and led by a 
former head o f the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), was highly 
favorable to the advocacy groups’ cause. It concluded that the project was unlikely 
to perform as planned with regard to hydrological predictions and resettlement. On 
the latter, it rather embarrassingly claimed extensive knowledge about the problem of 
resettlement actually existed and had been generated within the Bank, but never used 
to produce remedial action plans.
In response to the review, the Bank sent a mission to evaluate the project, which 
reported back and argued for a suspension o f loan disbursements until certain
326 Wade (1997), p.691.
327 Wade (1997), p.693.
328 Morse Commission (1992).
329 Wade (1997).
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conditions were met. However, senior managers o f the project instead suggested to 
give the borrower another six-month period to make amends, partly motivated by a 
desire not to hand advocacy groups another win. In March 1993, the Board weighed 
the progress made by the Government o f India towards the benchmarks set by the 
Bank, and again, implementation o f environmental obligations, particularly related to 
rehabilitation and resettlement, was unsatisfactory. The eventual decision was to 
cancel further loan disbursements altogether.
The project deepened the divisions between project proponents within the Bank and 
external critics, including U.S congressional members, advocacy groups and project- 
affected people, and heightened the urgency among the Bank’s senior executives to 
improve external communications and respond to criticisms. By placing the World 
Bank at the center o f a regional transformation that would displace local communities 
and cause widespread environmental damage, the development impact o f its 
operations were yet again questioned in the media. For the Bank, it further 
highlighted the extent to which ‘problem projects’ identified as rallying points for 
transnational advocacy groups could become sources o f considerable reputational 
damage, as they fomented adverse media coverage that provide ammunition to 
external critics on the left and the right. From then on, the fear o f negative publicity 
became a significant underlying motivation for the Bank, and project lenders more 
generally, to undertake environmental review o f projects and subject them to public 
consultation.
The next section describes how the World Bank emerged stronger from this 
legitimacy crisis and increasingly became regarded as an important environmental 
actor in world politics. On the back o f these negative experiences, it increasingly 
sought to find ways to integrate environmental and social concerns into public sector 
projects, and doing so became integral to its reputation as a champion o f sustainable 
development. With the release o f the seminal World Development Report in 1992, it 
became a significant advocate o f ecological modernization, promoting national 
policies and strategies that favored export-oriented growth, while focusing on 
reducing the emission-intensity o f development and redistributing revenue towards 
poverty reduction.
5.3 The World Bank as an Actor in Global Environmental Governance
The preceding sections have outlined how the practice o f systematically assessing 
environmental and social impacts was pioneered by the World Bank, and became 
institutionalized fully primarily as a result o f pressure from transnational advocacy 
groups and some powerful shareholders for more transparent, accountable and 
inclusive project lending. Yet, it is important to note that the World Bank’s entry into 
global environmental politics in the early 1970s was less a function o f external 
pressure, than a desire by its senior management to position the organization at the 
center o f a burgeoning policy area. During the few years preceding the UNCHE in 
Stockholm, it helped define the cognitive frame through which the environmental
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challenge would be conceptualized as an organizational objective for multilateral 
lenders, and now increasingly commercial banks. At a time when public debates over 
environmental issues focused on truly complex human-induced pressures on 
environmental resources, the Bank chose to approach this challenge by subjecting 
project proposals to an environmental review meant to identify and assess the adverse 
impacts o f large development projects. In this way, the World Bank played an 
instrumental role in formulating the legal and normative responsibilities o f financial 
institutions to mitigate adverse environmental and social impacts in project lending.
Yet, the controversy over Polonoroeste demonstrated the extent to which the World 
Bank’s commitment to environmental protection was substantially constrained by the 
lack o f staff and resources, resulting in a piecemeal approach in which projects were 
not systematically assessed for environmental damages. Thus, the demands made by 
transnational advocacy groups, embedded in the symbolism o f tropical rain forests, 
concerned a considerable expansion and formalization o f  existing review procedures 
and guidelines. The analysis demonstrated how the World Bank initially repressed 
criticisms, arguing that its identity as a multilateral institution barred it from 
interfering with ‘political’ issues such as environmental protection or upholding the 
rights o f indigenous people. This initial repression o f criticisms later gave way to 
public statements o f denial that the operational staff o f the World Bank were not fully 
committed to its environmental mission, and that they violated review procedures in 
cases where these conflicted with the commercial incentive to lend more money, 
quickly. Yet, failure to win the argument in the wake o f mounting evidence that the 
World Bank’s existing guidelines were not producing satisfactory outcomes, senior 
management were forced to make what amounted to tactical concessions that gave 
recognition to the moral claims of advocacy groups without significantly altering 
lending practices. Only when the environmental and social norms became formally 
institutionalized in the World Bank’s operational policies did they gain prescriptive 
status, which was further backed by the introduction o f the World Bank’s Inspection 
Panel in 1995.
At this stage, the World Bank began acting as a norm entrepreneur in its own right on 
the international stage, diffusing environmental knowledge, expertise and practices in 
its research and financial operations. Following the institutionalization o f the 
environmental and social norms in operational policies, these soon became 
recognized as the standard o f good conduct for development lenders, evidenced by a 
‘cascading effect’ across the aid industry. By the mid-1990s, all multilateral 
development banks, including the EBRD, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
the IDB, had developed environmental and social standards for project lending, 
intended to ensure that projects contribute to sustainable development in some 
form.330 Since then, many bilateral aid organizations have followed suit, and an EIA 
study and a subsequent EIA report has provided the basis for managing project- 
related environmental and social risks in development projects worldwide.
330 Kennedy (1999), Kjorven (1998), and Rees (2000).
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While in hindsight, environmental project review may come across as the most 
effective and only feasible intervention to ensure that project financing contributes to 
sustainable development, this rather limited approach represented one o f many 
plausible interventions. For example, even within the constraints posed by its project- 
based operations, it could have revised its broader operational strategies in 
environmentally-sensitive industry sectors, such as extractive industries or forestry, 
by either changing the composition o f its sectoral portfolios by including more 
environmentally-friendly projects, or placing explicit constraints on the types o f 
projects that would be eligible for financing. Furthermore, its direct relationships with 
national governments presumably gave it a unique opportunity to development 
national action plans on most critical environmental issues, a practice it did not 
pursue until the mid-1990s. It could have more actively encouraged the expansion of 
environmental laws and regulations, as a sound regulatory framework has been 
recognized as an important prerequisite for reducing urban air and water pollution in 
developed countries. It could have approximated the conceptualization o f the 
environmental challenge that came to inform the activities o f the newly established 
UNEP, which was mandated to look at the regional and global dimensions o f 
environmental problems.
Instead, the analysis identifies how new norms always confront existing normative 
structures when they enter organizations and become embedded in organizational 
practices. In this context, the World Bank’s own organizational structure and 
professional culture ensured that its conceptualization o f the environmental challenge 
would not conflict with the norms and principles o f development economics. Given 
the dichotomous view o f the environment-development debate at the time, 
characterized by a dominant understanding that the two policy objectives could not be 
fully reconciled, it was important for the World Bank that the global consensus would 
come down on the side o f economic growth as a solution to environmental 
degradation. Therefore, in terms o f defining an institutional response to the 
environmental challenge, the result was a set o f environmental and social lending 
procedures that conformed to widely-recognized environmental and social norms, 
such as environmental protection, public participation and transparency, whilst sitting 
comfortably within the existing commercial and political objectives o f multilateral 
financing. In turn, this ‘compromise o f liberal environmentalism’, to use Bernstein’s 
phrase, meant the emphasis from the beginning was on the mitigation o f adverse 
impacts, rather than prevention, as the environmental agenda did not significantly 
impact project selection or change the opinion of export-oriented growth as a model 
for development.331
The next section introduces the IFC as a multilateral institution, and identifies its 
distinct organizational characteristics as a lender mandated to supplement the World 
Bank by promoting private sector growth and investment.
331 Bernstein (2001).
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5.4 The International Finance Corporation: Its Origins and Evolution
Multilateral development banks that predominately finance private sector entities, 
notably the IFC and the EBRD, have a distinctly commercial orientation to their 
operational mandate and organizational structure. Whereas the World Bank offers 
project and programmatic loans to governments, their financing operations are 
overwhelmingly transaction-based and revolve around the identification, assessment 
and approval o f profitable investment projects in the private sector. While they do 
offer advisory services to government entities in support o f regulatory reforms that 
further private sector development, they do not provide policy- or sector loans that 
address the broader institutional basis for development. By implication, lending and 
equity financing is provided under a narrower mandate, carried out in sector-based 
banking divisions run by finance professionals that are trained in investment and risk 
management practices.
So while they do operate within a broader mission to promote sustainable 
development, commercial viability is the overarching criterion for selecting projects 
and negotiating financing terms, as projects do not benefit from host government 
guarantees. When financing development projects, they often take on the same 
commercial risks as private lenders do, and seek to operate within the constraints and 
opportunities o f the market place in order to demonstrate the commercial viability of 
developing country investments. Under these circumstances, managing and 
mitigating investment risk by carefully structuring the transaction and involving a 
multitude o f different financial institutions becomes central to realizing individual 
projects. By implication, they are therefore more ‘bank-like’ than public sector 
lenders, with an organizational culture, operational structure and professional staff 
more narrowly attuned to identifying and assessing commercial investment
• • 332opportunities.
Spanning more than a half-century, the IFC has a long history that predates all other 
multilateral development banks, and programs within them, that provide financing 
directly to the private sector. This underscores the fact that multilateral financing to 
the private sector at a significant scale is a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, the 
IFC’s annual commitments did not exceed £500 million until the mid-1980s, when 
there was a notable shift in multilateral financing towards private sector investments 
and economic reforms programs designed to encourage private sector growth. In 
1989, the IDB established the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) to 
primarily finance small business growth through financial intermediaries, and in 
1994, it created the Private Sector Development Department (PRI) to financially 
support the privatization o f large-scale infrastructure in Latin America. In 1991, the 
EBRD was established to promote market reforms and private sector growth in the 
former planned economies o f Eastern Europe and the republics o f the former Soviet
332 Gutner (2002).
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Union. During this time, the ADB and the African Development Bank (AfDB) also 
obtained authorization to lend for non-guaranteed private investments.
From the beginning, the IFC has been associated with a neo-liberal economic 
philosophy that placed the private sector at the center o f economic progress and 
human welfare, and considered the state ownership and regulation as an obstacle to 
fulfilling the potential of human ingenuity. Its origins are closely associated with big 
business and finance. In 1951, an U.S development policy advisory panel first 
endorsed the idea o f establishing a public financial institution affiliated with the 
World Bank, and mandated to support private sector development and encourage 
private investment in developing countries.333 The basic assumption held by the panel 
was that only by supporting private enterprise and investment and encouraging the 
emergence o f an independent private sector could developing country governments 
achieve economic development. Subsequently, Eugene Black, the World Bank 
president, worked with his assistant Richard Gamer, a banker and former executive of 
General Foods, to advance the idea to establish a lending institution that ‘would be 
owned by governments but act like a corporation’, promoting private enterprise.334 In
1955, separate Articles o f  Agreement were drafted to create the IFC, a financial 
institution that was to become the primary multilateral vehicle for pushing private 
sector growth in developing countries.
Established in 1956, the IFC operates independently o f the World Bank, managing its 
own funds. Its operations are meant to supplement the operations o f the World Bank, 
which lends exclusively to member state governments, by encouraging the growth o f 
productive private enterprise in member countries, particularly in the less developed 
areas. The Articles o f  Agreement of the IFC, largely unchanged since its inception in
1956, clearly identify it as a commercially-driven bank exclusively established to 
further private sector development. They explicitly state that its investments need to 
be productive, which means the selection and design o f projects is significantly 
driven by profitability. And since it was to encourage private ownership and the 
emergence o f liberal, competitive markets, it offers financing on terms and conditions 
that mirror those o f private investors.335 In addition, as with the World Bank, its 
purpose is not to compete with private investment in developing countries, but to 
complement it and encourage more o f it. This is referred to as its ‘catalytic role’, 
namely offering types o f financing and selecting the kinds o f investments that are 
most likely to encourage and expand private ownership, participation, and 
investments in its member developing countries. In combination, these provisions 
necessarily, and intentionally, restrict its investment opportunities.
Its commitment to increase the share o f private ownership and participation was 
especially strong in its engagement with domestic capital markets, which are 
traditionally among the most heavily regulated. As early as 1971, the IFC established 
a Capital Markets Department to conduct research evaluating financial markets in
333 This panel was led by Nelson Rockefeller, Governor o f the state of New York from 1958-1973.
334 From IFC’s website, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/50thanniversary.nsf/Content/IFCs_Origins
335 Rich (1993), p.77
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member countries, and provide technical advice and assistance to governments. 
Oftentimes, this amounted to encouraging deregulation and liberalization, 
establishing or strengthening market-enabling institutions, and assisting with the 
privatization of public financial institutions. In addition, since the early 1960s, it has 
syndicated loans for commercial banks as part o f its B-loan program, in which it 
combines its own funds with those o f commercial banks into one lending package, 
allowing the participating bank to benefit from the IFC’s superior credit standing, 
while the IFC can increase the leverage o f  its own project finance loans. And finally, 
in the 1990s, the IFC began to increasingly channeled funds through financial 
intermediaries, such as commercial banks and private equity funds, instead o f directly 
to project clients. By 2000, the financial sector had become IFC’s single largest 
recipient o f funds, amounting to 46 percent o f new approvals.336
The growth of the IFC had largely occurred in the shadow o f the more publicly 
visible World Bank. Yet, the substantial growth o f its lending portfolios meant that its 
influence on economic development in many developing countries was substantial. 
Furthermore, the growing global appetite for private capital meant the IFC was often 
brought in as a multilateral partner in large-scale infrastructure projects, such as oil 
and gas pipelines. As a result, the scope o f its lending policies increasingly affected 
how environmental and social issues were dealt with in development projects.
5.5 Transnational Advocacy Groups and the IFC
During the two decades from 1970 to 1990, the environmental and social impacts o f 
the World Bank’s public sector projects were increasingly scrutinized, yet the private 
sector operations o f the IFC were largely overlooked. In its early years, the IFC’s 
investments were largely sheltered from the scrutiny o f environmental advocacy 
groups, and by its own accord, it showed little interest in systematically considering 
environmental and social issues in its investments.337 As late as 1989, the IFC 
regarded its policy to only lend to projects with a ‘satisfactory ex-ante economic rate 
o f return’ to be its most fundamental development contribution. 338 It considered the 
financial profitability o f the companies it assisted as the ‘sine qua non’ o f its 
development impact.339 In many ways, the expansion o f  private ownership and 
investment was an end in itself, assumed to be a proxy for a positive development 
outcome, and it was the role o f the IFC to encourage private sector growth in 
developing countries.
In the early 1990s, it began to engage with the growing debate over the role o f the 
private sector in promoting sustainable development. In 1992, the IFC participated in 
the preparatory meetings for the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. The IFC had engaged with the Business
336 See IFC (2000) and Curmally, Sohn and Wright (2005).
337 IFC (2002b)
338 IFC (1989), p.2
339 IFC (1989), p.l
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Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD), which in large part coordinated the 
input from the business community to the conference.340 In turn, the BCSD produced 
a ringing endorsement o f the IFC as a force for good, arguing that multilateral 
financing to the public sector had long held back the more positive role that the IFC 
could play in building liberal capital markets in developing countries.341 It referred to 
state-owned enterprises in developing countries as ‘hidden reserves’, and lauded the 
IFC’s role in accelerating privatization by ‘reinforcing the regulatory structure and 
depth o f emerging markets.’ 342 The same year, the World Bank’s annual World 
Development Report focused on the relationship between economic development and 
the environment, and argued that solving the most pressing environmental was 
completely compatible with, and indeed necessitated, continued private sector 
development and economic growth.343
Thus, in the global debate over the role o f TNCs in reducing environmental 
degradation, the IFC sought to position itself as a source o f business expertise on 
environmental management in developing countries. As part of this new mission, it 
argued that its operational mandate to further private sector growth was fully 
compatible with environmental protection. In fact, the IFC increasingly framed an 
engagement with the environmental agenda as a commercial opportunity for business, 
a theme that would become its mantra for winning over skeptics in the business 
world. Instead o f highlighting the constraints placed on environmentally reckless 
corporate strategies by growing public concern for environmental issues, it claimed 
‘competitive advantage will increasingly be derived from superior environmental 
performance.’ 344 This view became increasingly influential in national policy circles, 
manifested in the politics o f ‘ecological modernization’.345 Within business, the 
growing influence o f this perspective manifested itself in the spread o f corporate 
social responsibility as a new paradigm for understanding the role of business in 
society, reflected in the growth o f environmental management and self-regulation as
340 The BCSD would later become the World BCSD, after it merged with the World Industry Council 
on the Environment (WICE), a creation of the International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC). See 
Vormedal (2006) for a historical overview of the organization and its influence on global governance.
341 Schmidheiny (1992).
342 Schmidheiny (1992), p.57
343 World Bank (1992). The report argued that ‘the view that greater economic activity inevitably hurts 
the environment is based on static assumptions about technology, tastes and environmental 
investments’ (p.38)
344 IFC (1992), p. V.
345 Mol and Sonnenfeld (2000) and Weale (1992). These ideas first gained mainstream attention with 
the publication o f The Competitive Advantage of Nations in 1990, by Harvard economist Michael 
Porter. He argued that tougher regulations are beneficial for both states and private companies. The 
assumption was based on a prediction that regulatory standards would inevitably be incrementally 
tightened across countries. In such a scenario, states should gradually adopt the highest standards so as 
to attract companies at the forefront o f research and innovation in environmental technology, and 
develop an industrial base that is not vulnerable to regulatory developments elsewhere. Similarly, 
firms should adhere to the highest standards irrespective of the regulation they are subjected to in their 
respective national jurisdictions, so best manage the adjustment costs they would inevitably face, and 
gain a competitive advantage over companies that use inefficient and irresponsible production 
methods.
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the most appropriate and effective institutional responses to environmental problems.
346
Yet, at this stage, policy pronouncements about promoting responsible corporate 
conduct were not followed up by an expansion o f formal requirements to undertake 
impact mitigation measures. In fact, until 1988, the IFC had no separate 
environmental and social policies and procedures designed to address the diverse, and 
often unique operational contexts o f private sector projects. Nor did it have 
environmental staff that would conduct environmental reviews o f  project proposals 
under consideration. Instead, the OEA at the World Bank was officially responsible 
for reviewing project proposals considered by the IFC, alongside those prepared by 
World Bank operational staff. In 1988, to relieve the World Bank o f its workload, the 
IFC commissioned a consultant to review its projects, and the following year, it hired 
its first environmental advisor to oversee project compliance with local 
environmental laws and regulations, as well as the World Bank’s guidelines and 
policies..347
As part o f adding environmental staff, the IFC also adopted a policy that required 
projects to be in compliance with the World Bank’s environmental guidelines to be 
eligible for financing.348 In 1990, a set o f environmental review procedures were 
formalized, and according to the IFC, its projects would thereafter be ‘consistent with 
the spirit and intent o f the appropriate World Bank guidelines and policies.’ 349 
Accordingly, it claimed its only environmental advisor reviewed approximately 100 
project proposals in that year alone.350 However, it would later admit that ‘one 
individual was simply not enough to address such a large number o f projects 
thoroughly.’351
The following year, one additional environmental position was added, and an 
Environmental Unit was established within the Engineering Department. The IFC 
stated the Unit would review all projects with a potential impact on the environment 
during the appraisal process, and subsequently monitor them to ensure conformity 
with World Bank and international guidelines and host-country regulations.352 This 
review o f projects was expanded from previous years; in addition to potential 
environmental impacts, the Environment Unit would also assess impacts on 
employees and the local population, resettlement and other socio-economic questions,
346 See Drahos and Braithwaite (2000), Falkner (2003), and Haufler (1999). On the role o f multilateral 
development banks in promoting CSR, see Vives (2004) and IFC (2002). Arguments in favor 
environmental management rest on a number of ideological assumptions; 1) that the environment can 
and should be rationally managed, that 2) corporate managers are the appropriate people to do this and 
have an appreciation o f the environment, that 3) business has the necessary technical resources, and 
that 4) traditional management tools, upon which new approaches will be based, are appropriate and 
adequate for protecting the environment. (Williams 2001)
347 IFC (1992).
348 IFC (1989a).
349 Quoted in IFC (2002b), p.31
350 IFC (1990).
351 IFC (2002b).
352 IFC (1991).
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occupational health and safety issues and risks to life and property. In 1992, the 
Environmental Unit was renamed the Environment Division, and integrated into a 
new Technical and Environment Department, and the IFC adopted the environmental 
screening categorization procedures already formalized within the World Bank.353 It 
added three high-level positions, and retained four environmental specialists as full­
time consultants. While not having formally adopted the environmental framework 
governing the execution o f  World Bank projects, the IFC claimed its environmental 
review procedures would ensure ‘consistency with the spirit and intent o f appropriate 
World Bank policies and guidelines.’354
As part o f this reorganization, the Environment Division became responsible for 
‘identifying environmental projects suitable for IFC financing, and working with 
project sponsors to develop bankable projects.’ 355 Furthermore, a newly created 
Infrastructure Department would be responsible for completing environmental 
projects developed by the Environmental Unit. Accordingly, the purpose o f many o f 
these environmental projects would be to transfer the ownership and operations of 
water infrastructure from national public monopolies to foreign companies. 
Operationally, investments in the ‘environmental’ sector largely came to mean 
involving both foreign and domestic private companies in infrastructure development 
in areas such as water supply, wastewater treatment, and waste management. Early 
accomplishments it chose to highlight include Aguas Argentina, a waste and 
wastewater services project in Buenos Aires that was the largest privatization of 
water services outside Western Europe, a Thai oil refinery, and a wastewater plant in 
Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.356 However, the IFC was also serving as a preparatory and 
executing agency for private sector projects funded by the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), which typically included more traditional conservation projects.
In many ways, the origins and nature o f these careful environmental reforms are 
similar to those undertaken by the World Bank in the early 1970s. Just as the World 
Bank sought to insert itself as a major actor at he Stockholm conference to influence 
the brewing global debate over environmental degradation, so did the IFC ally itself 
with the private sector and promote its cause at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1972. In 
both cases, the initial impetus for engaging with environmental issues did not 
primarily come from transnational advocacy groups or even board members, but 
rather, a desire to influence a growing policy agenda that would influence its future 
organizational roles and functions. As such, once transnational advocacy groups 
pressed for greater accountability and transparency, the IFC had already formulated a 
policy position on the environment that was significantly shaped by its mandate as a 
promoter o f private sector growth. In turn, this organizational environment, 
dominated by finance professionals, investment practices and analysis, served as a
353 IFC (1992a). The use of environmental screening categories -  A, B, C or FI -  to classify project 
proposals according to their potential environmental risks, was institutionalized in the World Bank’s 
investment cycle as part o f the Operational Directive on Environmental Assessment 4.00 (1989).
354 IFC (1992).
355 IFC (1993), p.88.
356 IFC (1994), p. 104
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filter through which environmental and social issues emerged and eventually became 
institutionalized in the IFC’s operational policies. In this regard, the socialization of 
the IFC also resulted in the commercialization o f the environmental and social 
lending practices o f  the World Bank, as the IFC, by mandate, was forced to create 
commercial justifications for undertaking such interventions.
In short, the IFC became a subject o f the growing norm cascade that followed the 
World Bank’s environmental reforms, which made it increasingly difficult for public 
lenders to claim that they operated responsibly if they did not formally comply with 
the World Bank’s environmental and social standards and procedures. In 1992, 
despite announcing new environmental guidelines and initiatives, including smaller 
projects with clear environmental benefits, the IFC’s environmental commitments 
were increasingly being compared and contrasted to those o f the World Bank. Most 
notably, the IFC came under increasing pressure to formally adopt the World Bank’s 
Operational Policy on Environmental Assessment, as well as other thematic polices 
that placed environmental and social conditions on project finance loans.
Given the preexistence o f the World Bank’s environmental and social policies, any 
announcements made by the IFC that it would more systematically manage the 
environmental and social impacts o f projects immediately raised expectations that it 
would align its due diligence procedures with those o f the World Bank and other 
multilateral lenders. In fact, the environmental and social norms advocated by the 
transnational advocacy network, particularly those pertaining to information 
disclosure, public participation and environmental impact studies, had become so 
recognized as the only legitimate standard among development institutions that 
compliance with them was perceived as a benchmark for responsible lending. Thus, 
given the widespread legitimacy o f their moral demands, the only challenge 
remaining for the transnational advocacy groups was to persuade the IFC, and 
perhaps more importantly, dominant board members, that the financing o f private 
sector projects should be governed by the same norms as those governing public 
sector lending.
As with the case o f the World Bank, it would be a project that generated considerable 
local controversy and subsequently became a rallying cry for activists that would turn 
the tide. Just as the exposed adverse impacts of Polonoroeste undermined the World 
Bank’s claim to have environmental and social guidelines in place, so did a large- 
scale infrastructure project place questions about the robustness o f  the IFC’s 
environmental and social procedures. In turn, the diffusion o f these norms from the 
institutional context o f the World Bank to that o f the IFC can be attributed to the 
political activities o f transnational advocacy groups, which did not differentiate the 
environmental responsibilities o f these institutions, despite the fact that they had 
widely different operational mandates.
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From Denials to Tactical Concessions: The Impact o f  the Pangue controversy
In 1992, the IFC became embroiled in a controversy over its financing o f a Chilean 
hydropower dam.357 During the course o f a few years, the growing social interactions 
between the IFC and transnational advocacy groups would eventually redefine IFC’s 
mission as a multilateral financial institution, ending in the formal adoption o f the 
World Bank’s environmental and social standards and procedures.358 In confronting 
the IFC, transnational advocacy groups drew on the same advocacy strategies they 
had used when they first pressed the World Bank to adhere to well-recognized 
environmental and social norms in the financing operations. In response, the IFC 
initially rejected accusations on the basis that its private sector projects could not be 
driven by political imperatives, yet gradually, it succumbed to pressures and made 
important concessions. In explaining this movement o f position, the main factor was 
the IFC membership o f the World Bank Group, which obliged it to follow the 
operational policies o f the World Bank, if not legally, at least ethically. As such, the 
moral claims o f  transnational advocacy groups became embedded in broader 
discussions about organizational coherence and policy development within the World 
Bank Group.
As with the World Bank and Polonoroeste, the IFC’s environmental and social record 
became closely associated with a particular problem project, in which a series o f 
implementation failures were exposed and made public by transnational advocacy 
groups. The Pangue project involved the construction o f a major hydroelectric dam 
on the Bio-Bio River, constructed by the Spanish energy company ENDESA, with an 
additional five dams slated for construction. The Bio-Bio watershed is home to 
indigenous communities, and the Pangue dam flooded 450 hectares o f land, 
displacing 53 people. However, given that the construction o f the dam would 
effectively open up the watershed for energy development, the overall impact o f the 
five additional hydropower projects on the river would likely be much more 
substantial. Therefore, in anticipation o f its significant impact on the environment, the 
project was assigned screening category ‘A ’, meaning the borrower would be require 
to undertake a broader range o f due diligence actions.
Alongside the ecological impacts, the greatest controversy centered on the impact on 
river communities, with allegations o f human rights violations and unfair 
compensation. With clear parallels to the still ongoing Narmada Dam controversy, 
the project generated the largest petition drive against the IFC in history, and 
mobilized local and transnational advocacy groups, as well as local communities, 
legal groups and even the American Anthropology Association. And significantly, as 
was the case when they contested the financing o f Polonoroeste, environmental 
advocacy groups based in Washington D.C took advantage o f their access to U.S 
policy-makers and found strategic allies in the U.S Congress to support their
357 See Hair et.al (1997) and Park (2006), pp. 174-176, for more on this controversy.
358 This contention finds support in existing research on the ‘greening’ of the IFC, notably Park (2006).
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arguments against the IFC.359 As a result, the U.S Treasury met with officials from 
the IFC in 1992 to discuss the environmental and social impacts of the proposed 
project. To mark its discontent, the U.S Executive Director on the IFC’s Board 
abstained from the project approval vote.
Alongside the brewing controversy, the IFC continued to expand its environmental 
management expertise, and increasingly reaffirmed a commitment to promote 
sustainable development in its project operations. In 1993, the IFC stated the 
environment had become ‘one o f its most urgent priorities.’360 As part o f  a bank-wide 
restructuring which divided Operational Directives into three new categories -  
Operational Policies (OPs), Bank Procedures (BPs), and Good Practices (GPs) -  the 
IFC undertook a revision o f its environmental review procedures to standardize its 
informal application o f  World Bank policies and guidelines, and more clearly allocate 
environmental responsibilities among internal staff, and between the IFC and project 
clients.361 Environmental procedures were further strengthened; for example, impact 
assessments o f individual projects would be conducted ‘at the earliest possible stage’ 
and updated ‘during each new phase o f  a project.’ 362 All projects would need to 
meet ‘stringent environmental standards’, and the purpose o f the review was to 
‘ensure that projects are environmentally sound and sustainable.’ 363
In 1994, a general disclosure policy was adopted, which according to the IFC, 
‘attempted to balance the private sector’s need for confidentiality with the public’s 
right to know about issues affecting it and involving the use o f public funds.’364 It 
formalized the disclosure o f key project-related environmental documents; the 
Summary Project Document (SPI) prepared for each project proposal under 
consideration, the Environmental Assessment o f category ‘A ’ projects, and the 
Environmental Review Summary o f all category ‘B ’ projects. All o f these were to be 
disclosed through a newly established World Bank Public Information Center.365 
Furthermore, following World Bank practice, IFC projects deemed to have significant 
adverse environmental impacts would be required to undergo public consultation 
during the environmental assessment stage, and make the ensuing report public. It 
strengthened monitoring and supervision procedures o f financed projects, requiring 
all borrowers to submit and annual report on implementation. According to the IFC, it 
would review them ‘thoroughly’, and recommend remedial measures to solve any 
problems.
By 1995, the Environment Division had eight higher-level staff and ten external 
consultants.366 In reference to these organizational changes, it stated a commitment 
to become more proactive in the environmental arena by ‘refining its project review
359 Park (2006), p. 175.
360 IFC (1993), p.87.
361 World Bank (1995).
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process to retain a high standard o f excellence while avoiding unnecessary 
bureaucracy.’ 367 To further integrate environmental concerns into Bank operations, 
the IFC conducted environmental management training for internal staff, educating 
them on the World Bank’s policies and guidelines, and the IFC’s environmental 
review procedures.
The same year, advocacy groups filed a complaint with the World Bank’s Inspection 
Panel over the Pangue project, alleging that the IFC had violated the World Bank’s 
operational policies. While the panel rejected the claim, arguing the IFC’s operations 
fell outside o f its jurisdiction, it provided support for the critics’ argument that the 
IFC was regarded as a member o f the World Bank Group, but not subject to all o f its 
operational policies. In 1996, during the midst o f the Pangue controversy, the IFC 
stated that projects would be required to meet the more stringent o f host country 
standards and World Bank guidelines. During the year, its Environmental Division 
had worked closely with World Bank to update its environmental guidelines. It had 
also hired its first social specialist, reflecting the growing stature o f the social 
dimensions o f sustainable development. This also signaled a closer alignment with 
the World Bank’s poverty alleviation mandate.
But the reforms did not signal a departure from its focus on promoting private sector 
development. On the contrary, according to the IFC, meeting the overriding objective 
o f the World Bank Group o f alleviating poverty ‘would directly depend on its success 
in supporting the momentum o f private sector development.’36 Symptomatically, on 
its 40 anniversary in 1996, the IFC proclaimed that its investments had collectively 
contributed to the widespread acceptance in the developing world of;
‘an economic model based on privatization, liberalization o f trade and investment regimes, 
establishment of domestic capital markets, and encouragement o f a dynamic, competitive 
local private sector with a growing export base.’ 369
However, in response to critics questioning the impacts o f its project operations, 
increased attention would be given to ex-post evaluations o f the actual development 
impact o f projects. The IFC’s Economics Department and Operations Evaluations 
Group jointly produced a set o f indicators to measure ‘a project’s contribution to the 
growth o f productive private enterprise and efficient capital markets, to sustainable 
economic growth, and to economic welfare, improved living standards and quality o f 
life.’ 370 While environmental protection or positive environmental change did not 
seem to feature prominently in this list o f ‘development impacts’, the IFC reiterated 
that it had ‘come to view environmental issues as an important part o f its 
development impact.’ 371
367 World Bank (1995), p.205.
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Norms Gain Prescriptive Status: The Reforms o f  1998
The controversy over the Pangue project had illustrated how giving tactical 
concessions had failed to reduce public criticisms, which were also coming from 
inside the U.S Congress. To address the Pangue controversy, World Bank President 
Wolfensohn commissioned an independent internal review o f the project, specifically 
considering allegations o f policy violations.372 The results o f the investigation 
confirmed that the IFC had failed to comply with the World Bank’s policies when 
financing the project, and had inadequately monitored project impacts. In turn, it 
recommended a series o f environmental and social reforms to remedy these problems. 
The same year, the World Bank reorganized existing thematic policies and developed 
new ones to form a set o f environmental and social Safeguard Policies that stipulated 
various assessment, consultation, disclosure, monitoring and reporting requirements 
placed on borrowers.
In 1998, on the back o f the Pangue review, the IFC formally adopted most of its 
recommendation, thus institutionalizing environmental assessment, as well as 
thematic policies covering impacts in a variety o f thematic areas.373 It also adopted a 
set o f Environmental and Social Review Procedures, which formalized the 
requirements placed on borrowers, and outlined the internal procedures by which the 
IFC assesses project proposals.374 Combined, these reforms produced a policy 
framework that would become the ‘foundation for IFC’s work in the environmental 
and social areas and for assessments o f IFC’s compliance and accountability’ until its 
revision in 2006.375 Furthermore, it hired its first NGO liaison officer, and introduced 
the Office o f the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) help the IFC and MIGA 
address the complaints o f people adversely affected by projects. Similar to the World 
Bank’s Inspection Panel, this office allowed project-affected communities to submit 
complaints in cases where an alleged failure by the IFC or MIGA to follow their own 
operational policies adversely affected them.
According to the IFC, the controversies surrounding the Pangue project were 
instrumental in the institutionalization o f environmental and social lending policies 
and the creation o f a formal accountability mechanism. In the words o f one former
372 The report was headed by Dr Jay Hair, a former president o f both the National Wildlife Federation 
(NWF) and the International Union for the Conservation o f Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), see 
Hair et.al (1997).
373 In 1998, these operational policies and directives, adopted at different times, became collectively 
known as the Safeguard Policies; Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01, Oct. 1998), Natural Habitat 
(OP 4.04, Nov. 1998), Pest Management (OP 4.09, Nov. 1998), Forestry (OP 4.36, Nov. 1998), Safety 
o f Dams (OP 4.37, Sept. 1996), International Waterways (OP 7.50, Nov. 1998), Indigenous Peoples 
(OD 4.20, Sept.1991), Involuntary Resettlement (OD 4.30, June 1990), Cultural Property (OPN 11.03, 
Sept. 1986). In addition, the IFC added a Child and Forced Labor Policy Statement.
374 IFC (1998).
375 IFC (2002a), p.33
376 IFC (undated) ‘The Pangue Hydroelectric Project -  Lessons Learned’, Date o f Access: February 7, 
2007, see http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf7AttachmentsByTitle/ 
p_pangue_summary/$FILE/pangue_summary.pdf
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official, while the project demonstrated that environmental and social issues could 
pose real risks, senior management reacted defensively by suggesting a wide range o f 
reforms to make sure that the IFC would not be criticized again.377 Specifically, its 
assumption that minimal direct environmental impacts would ensure that external 
criticisms would not materialize proved wrong. For the IFC, the Pangue project 
demonstrated how ‘indirect impacts can pose equal, if not greater, reputational risk to 
the IFC and the sponsor than direct project impacts.’ 378 By extension, it created a 
direct link between the process o f environmental and social risk management and the 
reputation o f the IFC as development institution.
The significance o f reputational risk as a motivation for institutionalizing 
environmental and social policies and procedures would again manifest itself when 
transnational advocacy groups began to pressure commercial banks. Before reviewing 
the growing pressures on the commercial banking industry in detail, the next section 
will briefly discuss how advocacy campaigns against the IFC contributed to its 
transformation into a leading proponent o f corporate social responsibility and 
voluntary business regulation, thereby emerging as an intellectual and operational 
partner for the commercial banks. Crucially, for the first time, the IFC formulated and 
increasingly promoted commercial justifications for complying with the operational 
policies o f the World Bank, thereby strengthening their legitimacy among 
commercial project lenders and borrowers.
5.6 The IFC as an Actor in Global Environmental Governance
As with the World Bank, the IFC emerged out of its environmental reforms in 1998 
as a new actor in global environmental governance, recognizing the need to protect 
the environment and local communities, whilst integrating this agenda into its 
commercial objectives as a financial institution. Alongside expanding environmental 
and social review, it also completed its first comprehensive client survey in order to 
identify its competitive strengths and weaknesses as a financial institution in an 
increasingly crowded market place. According to the IFC, it revealed that while 
clients valued its membership in the World Bank Group, the expertise o f its staff, and 
the environmental and social guidance it provided, they also felt that the IFC was ‘too 
slow to respond, shunned risk, and had a culture which had become bureaucratic and 
inward looking’.379 In response to these findings, the IFC’s senior management 
became increasingly focused on understanding the financial and technical needs o f its 
clients, and finding ways to improve the development impacts o f its projects.
377 EPFI-08.
378 IFC (undated) ‘The Pangue Hydroelectric Project -  Lessons Learned’, p.3. Date o f Access: 
February 7, 2007, see
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_pangue_summary/$FILE/pangue_summar 
y.pdf
378 EPFI-08.
379 IFC (1998), p.2
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This marked the beginning o f an internal process whereby an Operational Strategy 
Group, together with a number o f environmental specialists in its Environment 
Department, collaborated to better integrate the IFC’s environmental and social 
mission with its commercial objectives as a financial institution.380 Known as the 
‘Sustainability Initiative’, this strategy included efforts to raise the awareness o f the 
benefits o f environmental risk management, both internally and externally, through 
research dissemination, training programs, and the establishment o f partnership with 
a number o f environmental business networks.381 It received critical support from 
Peter Woicke, a career investment banker who became the IFC’s Executive Vice 
President in 1999, and saw it as a way for the IFC to increase the value o f its 
environmental and social expertise and positively differentiate itself from other 
financial institutions servicing the private sector in developing countries.382
Significantly, while it sought to expand the IFC’s environmental and social mission, 
it was forcefully launched as a business-driven initiative aimed at improving 
relationships with clients and enhancing their competitiveness. As such, the approach 
conformed to the ‘client-driven’ agenda that was increasingly influencing policies 
and strategies within the World Bank Group more broadly.383 It also stated it would 
place a greater emphasis on achieving positive development outcomes, in line with 
growing skepticism in some policy circles that multilateral financing to the private 
sector was still necessary, given the tremendous growth in private capital flows to 
developing countries in the 1990s. According to IFC officials, this pressure provided 
an additional rationale for reforming its approach to environmental and social risk 
management, away from a focus on process compliance to a greater emphasis on 
achieving development outcomes.38
Within this new discursive context, the IFC’s institutional role was to supplement its 
due diligence framework with a focus on identifying, enhancing and realizing the
380 According to the Director o f the Operational Strategy Group, moving beyond the narrow 
conception of environmental and social issues as risks to the status quo was instrumental to making its 
environmental and social mission consistent with its mandate to foster social change in developing 
countries in the form of private sector development (IFC-02)
381 The IFC’s initial definition o f ‘sustainability’, which would evolve overtime, referred to 
‘development which is viable over the long-term— in its financial, economic, environmental and social 
dimensions- and not development achieved in the short-term at the expense o f longer-term 
prosperity.’ (p.14) By emphasizing the synergies between economic, social and environmental 
objectives, it cast the consideration o f environmental and social issues as a central component of 
profitability, thereby reinforcing the notion that they were compatible with its mandate to catalyze 
private sector growth and development.
382 IFC (2000). According to Armstrong, Woicke expressed a desire to introduce an initiative that 
would ‘change the face of the organization by placing sustainable development central to its 
organization, management and values’ (IFC-04).
383 In terms of the environmental agenda, this most forcefully manifested itself in June 2006, when the 
World Bank announced it would disband the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
(ESSD) network and merge it with the Bank's infrastructure department, and create a new Sustainable 
Development Department It was meant to streamline management and enhance coordination between 
operational and support staff, ultimately increasing its efficiency in meeting the demands o f borrowers 
during the preparation o f projects.
384 IFC-01.
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‘business case’ for its clients to voluntarily adopt environmental and social 
practices.385 By taking on an advisory role relative to borrowers, rather than a role as 
a regulator, it placed less emphasis on broadening and enforcing rules and 
requirements, and more on appealing ‘to firms’ self-interest as a means o f enhancing 
the sustainability o f economic activity.’386 The premise was that ‘many opportunities 
exist for businesses in emerging markets to benefit from actions that advance 
sustainable development’, and it became the role o f the IFC to convince private 
clients o f the financial benefits o f considering environmental and social issues.387 In 
doing so, it sought to assert itself as ‘a partner o f choice’, and claimed it possessed 
‘an expertise in sustainability that is second to none among financial institutions and 
multilateral development banks.388
In September 2002, the IFC co-hosted a side event with the WBCSD at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg.389 At the event, the 
IFC launched Developing Value, a report that presented a series o f carefully chosen 
case studies identifying ways in which private companies had benefited from 
implementing a ‘sustainability action.’ 90 In expanding the awareness o f the 
‘sustainability’ concept, the IFC identified itself as a resource for ‘business people in 
emerging markets who are struggling to find the right balance between financial 
pressures on the one hand, and sustainability challenges on the other.’ 391 It was 
thought that harmonizing its environmental and social practices with those favored by 
many TNCs, some o f  which were receiving financing from the IFC, would enhance 
its legitimacy in the private sector.392
The IFC’s participation at the WSSD alongside the WBCSD essentially replicated its 
involvement in the Rio Summit ten years before. Yet, while its policy 
recommendations were broadly similar, the IFC had during the interim period hired 
environmental and social specialists, established an Environmental Department, and 
provided environmental risk management training to hundreds o f financial 
institutions. On this basis, it had acquired superior expertise in managing 
environmental and social issues in private sector projects in developing countries that 
was widely recognized among commercial banks, and proved conducive to 
facilitating discussions about developing common environmental and social standards 
to be used by commercial banks in project financing. Reflecting this expertise, the 
IFC expanded its environmental and social risk management training in the
385 IFC (2002).
386 IFC (2003), p.20.
387 IFC (2002), p.6.
388 IFC (2003), p.2.
389 For an assessment o f the role and influence of the WBCSD in global governance, see Vormedal 
(2005).
390 These case studies were organized across seven categories; governance and engagement, 
stakeholder engagement, environmental process improvement, environmental products and services, 
local economic growth, community development and human resource management. (IFC 2002)
391 IFC (2002) p.7.
392 As one senior IFC official noted, understanding environmental and social issues as potential ‘value 
added activities’ for private investors and companies more accurately reflected what the market was 
increasingly looking for. (IFC-01)
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commercial banking industry, influencing the evolution o f lending policies and 
practices.
In fact, the emergence o f the IFC as a promoter o f corporate social responsibility as 
the most appropriate institutional response to integrating environmental and social 
concerns into investment practices increased its legitimacy among TNCs and laid the 
foundation for its role and influence in the drafting and launch of the Equator 
Principles. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
Conclusion
The chapter has chronologically documented the emergence and evolution of 
environmental review as an institutional mechanism to govern the environmental and 
social impacts o f project finance loans. It has traced the practice o f environmental 
review to the early 1970s, when the World Bank first became engaged in global 
environmental debates and articulated how it would address environmental pollution 
in its development projects. At that time, its mandate was narrowly defined as 
promoting economic development, assumed to be a public good in itself, regardless 
of its environmental and social impact on society. In this context, addressing the 
adverse environmental and social impacts o f projects by placing conditions on loans 
was regarded as a political act, and thereby in violation o f the World Bank’s 
‘apolitical’ mandate.
Yet, over time, economic development was no longer understood in isolation o f the 
rapid environmental degradation that was occurring in many developing countries, 
particularly the degradation o f tropical forests. Furthermore, in cases where projects 
involved the forced resettlement o f people, the World Bank was forced to address the 
negative impacts on their livelihoods, beyond getting assurances from borrower 
governments that compensation would be provided. Overall, project financing was 
transformed in the public mind from a financial transaction driven by a single 
requirement to attain a satisfactory rate o f financial return, to a development 
intervention meant to generate a wide variety o f development benefits.
The analysis has demonstrated that contestation, both internal and external, has been 
central to the evolution o f environmental and social lending policies at the World 
Bank, and subsequently the IFC. Specifically, ideologically rooted differences over 
what constitutes the appropriate roles and responsibilities o f multilateral development 
banks significantly shaped debates over the purpose and scope environmental and 
social lending policies. In turn, the legitimacy and popular strength o f transnational 
advocacy groups has increased amidst revelations that both the World Bank and the 
IFC have supported projects that were not in compliance with their operational 
policies. Thus, tactical concessions were no longer tenable responses amidst evidence 
o f significant implementation gaps. Therefore, both the World Bank and the IFC gave 
the norms prescriptive status by embedding them into operational policies, and 
making norm compliance obligatory for internal staff. And in turn, both organizations
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transformed themselves into self-proclaimed sources of knowledge and expertise in 
environmental and social risk management, promoting themselves as significant 
actors in global environmental governance.
As a result o f being institutionalized in multilateral lending policies, the 
environmental and social norms advocated by transnational advocacy groups came to 
define what constituted appropriate and legitimate lending. The next chapter will 
illustrate how the norm cascade eventually came to include commercial project 
lenders as well. In remarkably similar ways, transnational advocacy groups were 
successful in directing public attention towards the lending practices o f commercial 
banks, and identifying a gap between their lending policies and practices and well- 
recognized norms in the multilateral system. Just as the IFC had initially argued its 
private sector mandate exempted it from complying with these norms, so did 
commercial banks. But, in the face o f a norm cascade caused by the growing 
influence o f transnational advocacy groups and the emergence o f corporate social 
responsibility I the corporate sectore more generally, the defense eventually 
succumbed to external pressures, and several industry leaders transformed themselves 
from denying the legitimacy o f the norm to promoting it as a central aspect o f risk 
management processes.
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6. Commercial Banks and Sustainable Development
In troduction
The last chapter documented how the World Bank Group’s growing influence on 
economic development in developing countries caused transnational advocacy groups 
to promote environmental reforms in its lending policies as a way to increase 
environmental protection and improve the conditions o f project-affected 
communities. Over time, external pressure induced both the World Bank and the IFC 
to formally integrate environmental and social concerns into their lending policies 
and practices. While these developments, and the norm cascade they triggered, are 
important factors in explaining the emergence o f the Equator Principles, this chapter 
will also seek to place the framework within the broader historical context o f an 
emerging environmental agenda in the commercial banking industry. Specifically, the 
rise o f corporate environmental policies among commercial banks coincided with 
growing public attention in developed countries towards the role o f TNCs in fostering 
sustainable development in developing countries, as manifested at the Earth Summit 
in Rio.
In the 1990s, alongside the campaigns against the IFC, transnational advocacy groups 
increasingly brought attention to how private investors in the West were bankrolling 
large projects in developing countries that were causing widespread environmental 
damages. The analysis will highlight how the proliferation o f transnational advocacy 
campaigns against controversial development projects not only undermined the 
corporate reputation o f the private companies in charge, but also their private 
financial backers. On numerous occasions, advocacy groups alleged that commercial 
banks were financing profitable projects at the expense of the environment and local 
communities, and feeding narratives to the press that were reminiscent o f those that 
had been written in connection with World Bank and IFC projects. In turn, it was the 
cumulative public pressure that was building on the project finance industry that gave 
rise to a collective will among commercial banks to explore a common industry 
framework.
The chapter will be structured as follows. The first section will survey the literature 
on the influence o f  transnational advocacy groups on the emergence and diffusion of 
environmental and social norms in TNCs. Subsequently, the second section will 
review the ‘greening’ o f the commercial banking industry, as a subtext to 
understanding how and why the Equator Principles emerged. The third section 
identifies how transnational advocacy groups began to focus on the involvement o f 
commercial banks in large-scale infrastructure projects in developing countries, and 
how this triggered social interactions reminiscent o f those between the World Bank, 
the IFC and their critics in civil society. And finally, the fourth section provides a 
review o f how commercial banks responded to these advocacy campaigns, illustrating 
how the existence o f the World Bank’s environmental and social standards in many
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ways constituted not only how their roles were understood, but the way in which their 
lending could be made more responsible and accountable.
6.1 Transnational Advocacy Networks and Transnational Business
Whereas TNCs are the primary driving force behind the transformation o f the global 
economy, transnational advocacy networks have become central to the emergence o f 
a transnational public policy realm confronting TNCs, multilateral development 
banks and international economic regimes.393 In fact, the parallel growth o f TNCs and 
transnational advocacy groups, and the evolution o f interactions and confrontations 
between them, has become one o f the hallmarks of world politics in an age o f 
globalization.394 Just as TNCs have grown tremendously in scale and numbers, so 
have advocacy groups. While their growth has been steady for a number o f decades, 
the 1990s saw a particularly dramatic proliferation in areas like the environment, 
human rights and poverty, evident in statistics on organizational membership, growth 
of voluntary sectors in the economy, and accreditation to U.N conferences.3 5 Aided 
by advances in internet and communications technologies, they have been able to 
build broad-based networks across national borders, held together by a shared 
commitment to common causes, the constant exchange o f ideas and information, and 
collective advocacy in the form o f petitions, press releases and policy reports.
As such, transnational advocacy groups have been critical to the emergence o f a 
counter-discourse on globalization, highlighting the adverse impacts o f transnational 
economic activity on the environmental and local communities in developing 
countries, and more generally, confronting corporate power. The rise o f voluntary 
self-regulation has been widely challenged by the contestation o f the notion that 
market-driven solutions can deliver the structural transformation o f the global 
economy that is required to reverse current trends o f  environmental degradation 
associated with corporate activities. In doing so, they have depended on various 
sources o f authority and influence.
First, on the back o f popular support and increasingly targeted media campaigns, 
transnational advocacy groups have become a constant source o f pressure on the 
centers o f power in the international system, affecting governments, transnational 
corporations and international financial institutions alike. Since ‘the Battle o f Seattle’, 
large-scale public demonstrations have become a hallmark o f international 
conferences on trade, finance or development, prompting event organizers to select 
increasingly remote places as conference venues. And by mobilizing public opinion
393 As with transnational corporations, transnational NGOs are by no means a recent phenomenon, but 
have a long historical record o f significant accomplishments, from abolishing slavery to 
institutionalizing universal suffrage. See Drahos and Braithwaite (2000), pp.497-501, for a brief 
discussion.
394 See Borzel and Risse (2002) for a discussion of public-private partnerships as an emerging feature 
of global governance.
395 Bendell (2004), pp.12-13.
396 Drahos and Braithwaite (2000), Keay (2002), and Willets (2005).
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in host countries, and in many cases, the developing country in which corporate 
practices are undertaken, they can directly confront and engage with TNCs.397 
Therefore, they no longer depend on domestic political channels to influence 
corporate behavior, but exert influence internationally as political actors in their own 
right, able to bypass conventional inter-state relations to shape transnational policy­
making processes.398 By coordinating their efforts, appealing to moral principles, and 
exploiting tensions among states and industry sectors with divergent interests, 
advocacy groups have been able to achieve political success with relatively marginal 
financial resources.399
Secondly, transnational advocacy groups have become recognized as the standard 
bearers o f social justice and environmental protection, and more importantly, as 
sources o f knowledge and expertise in areas o f development policy.400 In fact, 
progressive foreign policy on environmental matters is often a result o f domestic 
pressure from advocacy groups.401 By virtue o f their expertise, they have acted as 
policy advisors for national governments and their delegations to environmental 
conferences, and in some cases, been included in the monitoring arrangements o f 
international environmental regimes, such as Greenpeace in the Arctic Whaling 
regime.402 And they have helped form political coalitions among states vulnerable to 
environmental change, as in the efforts of the Center for International Environmental 
Law (CIEL) in establishing the Association o f Small Island States as an ally in global 
climate politics.403
Third, in relation to TNCs, there has been a growth in the number o f advocacy groups 
exclusively devoted to surveying and comparing corporate practices, based on the 
premise that corporate information cannot be trusted and needs to be verified 
independently.4 4 By exposing violations o f laws and regulation, or even standards 
recognized as ‘international best practices’, advocacy groups have popularized the 
contention that the activities o f TNCs often conflict with the interests o f people and 
the environment. In turn, this has increased the pressure on private actors to transform
397 Haufler (1999), Wapner (1997). In terms of business-NGO relations, the literature typically 
distinguishes between ‘rejecitonist’ strategies, which aim to induce changes to corporate practices by 
‘naming and shaming’ corporate malfeasance, and ‘accomodationist’ strategies, which place faith in 
promoting corporate environmentalism by injecting knowledge and information about environmental 
problems and opportunities into corporate management practices. (Williams 2001)
598 Williams (2001).
399 For example, in relation to the first public campaigns against the World Bank in the 1980s, the 
success of the coalition was not due to a centralized command, but a horizontally organized network 
that drew on all o f the resources and connections of its members. (Rich 1993)
400 Keck and sikkink (1998) argue that the success of transnational NGOs can partly be attributed to 
the strategic framing o f environmental degredation around two types of issues, ‘bodily harm to 
vulnerable individuals and legal equality of opportunity, which ‘speak to aspects o f belief systems or 
life experiences that transcend a specific cultural or political context, (p.204) For a discussion of 
framing, see also Payne (2001 and Stone (1989).
401 Drahos and Braithwaite (2000).
402 Vogler (2003).
403 Drahos and Braithwaite (2000).
404 See for example, Falkner (2003), Haufler (1999), Newell (2001), and Wapner (1995).
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voluntary guidelines on responsible corporate practices into legally binding standards, 
especially those that apply to developing countries with weak environmental 
regulations.405 As an element o f this trend, transnational advocacy groups are 
increasingly targeting transnational investors as a means to discipline TNCs operating 
in developing countries.406 Following the same logic as the World Bank campaigns, 
they pressure financial institutions to only finance the foreign expansion o f TNCs on 
certain environmental and social conditions, thereby attempting to use the financial 
leverage o f private investors to diffuse environmental and social norms in 
transnational markets.
And fourth, by virtue o f their public advocacy campaigns and expertise, transnational 
advocacy groups have amassed considerable legitimating power in the international 
system. As public awareness about environmental degradation, the effects o f free 
trade on the poor, and the health risks o f  genetically-modified crops have increased, 
transnational advocacy groups with large professional staff have become a major 
influence on public policy, shaping national and international policy agendas. In 
identifying the adverse impacts o f markets on people and the environment, their 
campaigns have put governments, international organizations and TNCs on the 
defensive, forced to demonstrate how their policies and practices conform to 
increasingly well-recognized norms and values, such as the precautionary principle, 
transparent decision-making and a concern for the poor.407
In sum, advocacy groups, organized in transnational networks, wield considerable 
influence in the international system, from being formal participants in inter-state 
negotiations to directly lobbying government and TNCs by staging advocacy 
campaigns and engaging in direct consultations. But more significantly, they 
participate in transnational institution-building and the emergence o f voluntary forms 
of governance by waging advocacy campaigns and engaging in policy deliberations 
with business, international organizations and states to define environmental 
standards for particular industries.408 In doing so, they have played an important role 
in developing the norms and principles that form the basis for inter-state agreements 
and transnational rules emerging out o f public-private partnerships.
405 Clapp (2005).
406 According to Emel (2002), transnational advocacy groups primarily draw on four strategies for 
using transnational capital to spread environmental and social norms; 1) leveraging international 
financial institutions, that is, putting pressure on or negotiating with the US Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) and other lending agencies such as the World Bank, etc; (2) 
shareholder activism; (3) fostering socially responsible investment (including approaching fund 
managers); and (4) efforts to increase environmental and social disclosure as part o f the reporting 
requirements to regulatory agencies like the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), (p.830)
407 Newell (2001), refers to this as ‘civic regulation’, or the continuous process whereby NGOs 
encourage private actors to justify their actions to broader public constituencies of shareholders, 
consumers, and civil society.
408 Falkner (2003), pp.79-80.
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6.2 Commercial Banking and Environmental and Social Risks
Relative to other industries, the financial sector has been slow in engaging itself with 
broader development questions, as financial institutions, governments and even civil 
society long considered financial markets to be only indirectly responsible for 
environmental degradation and social injustices. Yet, a surge in public interest in the 
financial sector’s impacts on the environment and local communities over the last 
decade has prompted a broadening and a deepening o f environmental risk 
management approaches, reflected in the emergence o f the Equator Principles and 
other voluntary business regulation at the transnational level. But whereas the original 
environmental risk management practices developed in response to the risks related 
to environmental liabilities, the policies introduced during the last decade were 
prompted by a need to demonstrate how their activities benefited the environment and 
local communities.
As with other economic sectors, the financial industry was first put in this public 
spotlight following the Earth Summit in Rio, which formally recognized the role that 
the private sector played in causing environmental degradation and providing 
solutions to it. In 1991, Mustafa Tolba, then UNEP’s Executive Director, invited a 
group o f five financial institutions to form an advisory group to discuss 
environmental sustainability in the financial sector.40 At that stage, UNEP had not 
considered the role o f the financial sector in sustainable development, and the 
creation o f an advisory group was driven by a desire to facilitate a collective 
discussion on common goals and how to achieve them.410 A year later, twenty-six 
financial institutions pledged to incorporate environmental considerations into all 
internal operations and business decisions by signing a statement o f intent.411
The event was a milestone, but the vagueness o f the statement reflected the generally 
defensive attitude o f commercial banks towards environmental issues, a legacy o f the 
landmark U.S versus Fleet Factor decision two years prior.412 The cautious approach 
was driven by the assumption that making lofty commitments could represent a risk if  
the bank was found in violation o f these. Instead, the UNEP statement was intended 
to provide a forum for discussion, encourage policy innovation, and provide 
environmental specialists within financial institutions with some leverage in their 
internal discussions with senior management. During this time, many commercial 
banks started their engagement with environmental agenda by issuing corporate 
environmental policies that laid out some broad principles o f corporate conduct. In 
the next stage, the policies would provide the basis for setting internal targets for 
increasing the efficiency o f resources and reducing waste. They put in place internal 
environmental management systems that calculated and monitored resource use with 
an eye on achieving performance targets and cutting operating costs. In terms o f
409 These were Barclays, NatWest Bank (now part p f RBS), Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank o f Canada, 
HSBC and Westpac.
410 OTH-02.
411 According to ERM (2006), none o f these original signatory banks were American.
412 See chapter 4, section 4.3.
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external activities, some introduced green products on a limited scale, engaged in 
philanthropic activities, such as sponsoring green initiatives and participation in 
community Local Agenda 21 processes, and implementation o f the European Eco 
Management & Audit Scheme regulation.413 In some cases, these internal and 
external initiatives were made public in corporate environmental reports.
In general terms, the primary motivation to engage with environmental issues at that 
stage came from corporate guidelines and principles and the personal beliefs and 
commitments o f key executives within financial institutions. In contrast, economic 
factors and external pressures from government or advocacy groups mattered less.414 
In addition, the focus on managing internal resources, rather than the impacts o f 
investment decisions, was based on two prevailing assumptions. First, banks were, 
and remain, extremely reluctant to intervene into the management decisions o f 
borrowers. As per the ethos o f risk management, a lender should not constrain the 
decision-making autonomy o f the borrower by applying loan conditions unless they 
can demonstrate that these financially secure the loan. The fiduciary relationship that 
characterizes the interactions between lenders and borrowers, and the confidentiality 
agreements that govern information sharing and disclosure, means commercial banks 
refrain from placing conditions on financing that lack a clear association with risk.
Secondly, in most financial transactions, including bonds, equity and corporate loans, 
the exact use o f proceeds is not pre-established, which makes it difficult to assess, let 
alone manage, the environmental impacts o f financing. As a result, the growing 
integration o f financial markets, and the innovation o f new financial products to more 
effectively allocate risk between financial institutions, means it can be nearly 
impossible to ascertain responsibilities for certain adverse impacts, as financing is 
provided by multiple sources. And third, even in project financing, where the use o f 
proceeds is known, commercial banks were reluctant to confront borrowers in an 
increasingly competitive marketplace. The expectation was that if  a particular 
commercial bank opted to place environmental conditions on project finance loan 
beyond those required to manage risk, it would possibly lose business to other 
financial institutions prepared to lend money with less strings attached.
Yet, it was not until commercial project financing was scrutinized by transnational 
advocacy campaigns that the development o f systematic and comprehensive 
environmental and social risk management policies within commercial banks gained 
some momentum. The next section documents the growing public scrutiny o f 
commercial project lending in developing countries, and the ensuing evolution o f 
environmental and social lending guidelines in the commercial banking industry, as a 
precursor to the Equator Principles.
4,3 BMU (2002).
414 These observations were made by a study o f German financial institutions conducted by the 
German government (BMU 2002).
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6.3 Transnational Advocacy Groups and Commercial Banks
Until the mid-1990s, most o f the public scrutiny o f the environmental and social 
impacts of project finance deals was directed towards multilateral development 
banks, and to a lesser extent bilateral export-drecti agenices, which not only held 
strong positions in the market, but were also publicly institutions accountable for 
their impacts on local populations and the environment. While public development 
institutions still play a dominant role in large-scale infrastructure projects, 
commercial banks have in recent years become more visible as lead arrangers or co­
financiers o f major project finance deals, making them both legitimate and easy 
targets for transnational advocacy groups.415 As a result, the environmental and social 
impacts o f their investments have been increasingly exposed and scrutinized in the 
media, increasing the awareness among consumers about their impact on 
development.
As noted in chapter 4, most project finance deals in developing countries rely on 
large amounts o f foreign capital, and by extension, facilitate foreign direct investment 
and ownership in critical industrial sectors in developing countries, such as energy 
production, water service provision and transportation infrastructure. Foreign debt- 
financing, including commercial bank loans through loan syndications and individual 
loans provided by multilateral development banks and export credit agencies, 
typically account for two-thirds o f overall financing in a private infrastructure 
project.416 As a result, the high levels o f foreign involvement contribute to raising the 
profile o f many project finance transactions in the international media, and effectively 
draw projects into broader political debates concerning energy and infrastructure 
development.
While the activities o f financial TNCs are global, their corporate identities and 
practices are often tied to particular states, perhaps more so than corporations in any 
other sector. Even as transnational conglomerates with offices globally, it is striking 
how strongly their environmental and social practices are driven by the institutional 
environment in their home countries. This has a number o f explanations. First, in 
many cases, dominant shareholders are from their home countries, as are Board 
members and senior management. This affects the organizational culture and 
professional norms o f the commercial bank. By extension, in countries with a strong 
environmental commitment and awareness in the public sector and the business 
community, decision-makers within financial institutions and stakeholders will more 
likely advocate environmental practices. As an example, there is an increasing focus 
on environmental and social issues in institutional investment, and a growing demand 
for socially responsible investment products, particularly in the British, Dutch and 
German markets.417
415 Case (1999) and Newton (2006).
416 Dailami and Leipziger (1997).
417 ISIS (2002).
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Secondly, for deposit-taking financial institutions, the retail business in their home 
countries can be a significant source o f revenue, indeed in most cases far outweighing 
their project finance business. By extension, a much-criticized environmental impact 
associated with a project finance loan will not only add risk to the project in question, 
but also represent a ‘franchise risk’ to the financial institution, as the adversity may 
affect other lines o f business that are not associated with the project.418 In most cases, 
these consumer-banking operations were significantly larger in volume and revenue 
than project financing.4 9 Realizing the strategic importance o f this business, 
advocacy groups organized demonstrations and petition drives outside retail branches 
in a number o f occasions, using the consumer-facing business o f financial institutions 
as a leverage to demand change in project financing practices. By extension, this 
kind o f pressure necessarily directs their corporate strategies towards their home 
countries, and makes them attentive to changes in the domestic business environment.
Public Denials o f  Responsibility
Throughout the early 1990s, multilateral financing to public infrastructure projects, 
particularly hydropower dams, had declined dramatically as a result o f the 
controversies surrounding the Narmada Dam in India. In its wake, the IFC, the EBRD 
and commercial project lenders had stepped in to fill the financing gap, benefiting 
from a wave o f privatizations and liberalization reforms that provided favorable 
conditions for private capital and TNCs to participate in infrastructure development 
in developing countries. In addition, commercial banks based in OECD countries 
emerged as a significant providers o f long-term capital in rapidly growing developing 
countries, becoming associated with high-profile projects in a wide range o f 
environmentally-sensitive sectors, including extractives industries, hydropower, and 
roads. As a result, it became apparent to a few transnational activists that simply 
focusing on integrating safeguards into multilateral lending was not enough to ensure 
that the environment and local communities would not suffer from large project 
investments.
During the mid-1990s, the reluctance o f the World Bank and other public lenders to 
get involved in complex hydropower projects because o f the controversy over the 
Narmada Dam created an opening for private investors. In 1995, FOE and the 
International Rivers Network (IRN) launched a campaign against Merrill Lynch and 
Morgan Stanley over their alleged financial links to the Three Gorges dam project in 
China, the first o f its kind. Two years later, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 
Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., Salomon Smith Barney (later part o f Citigroup), and 
BancAmerica Securities (now part o f Bank o f America Corp.) underwrote a bond 
worth £165 million issued by the state-owned Chinese Development Bank.420 The
418 EPFI-06.
419 For example, in the case of RBS, currently the largest project finance bank in the world by lending 
volume, the ratio o f project financing / consumer banking for 2006 was roughly 1 / 37. (EPFI-06).
420 ‘Pay Attention to Activists or Pay in Money and G rief, by Ricardo Bayon, American Banker, June
15,2001.
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project proposal would entail the construction o f the world's largest hydropower 
development, erecting a dam 175 meters tall on the Yangtze River in China, 
producing a 600-kilometer-long reservoir, and slated to displace more than one 
million people and cause untold environmental damage. In parallel with RAN’s 
campaign, the IRN persuaded Domini Social Investments to file a shareholder 
resolution with Merrill Lynch, and another socially responsible fund, Trillium Asset 
Management Corporation, to file one with Citigroup, asking them to review the 
environmental and social impacts o f their business activities.421
The China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank had issued bonds 
through major investment banks, which raised concerns among environmental groups 
that some or all o f the proceeds would be used to finance the Three Gorges Dam 
project. FOE accused Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley o f disguising their support 
for the project by providing bond financing through the Chinese banks rather than 
direct debt-financing to the project.422 In response, the investment banks either denied 
financing the projects, or argued that they had received assurances from the Chinese 
banks that the proceeds would not be used to finance the Three Gorges Dam project.
The campaign came at the heels o f board-level decisions at the World Bank, the ADB 
and the U.S Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to disengage from the 
project.423 The decision made by these financial institutions was primarily driven by 
their own concerns with the project, such as an unacceptable level o f environmental 
risk, or because the Chinese government declined to provide sufficient environmental 
information. Yet, the public scrutiny o f the project put pressure on financial 
institutions to publicly address the environmental and social impacts that might be 
generated by the project, and how they would be mitigated or prevented.
For FOE, the Three Gorges Dam project highlighted the extent to which private 
investors were playing a growing role in financing development projects. In addition, 
it illustrated how commercial project lenders, as well as bilateral export credit- 
agencies, were increasingly prepared to finance projects rejected by public lenders 
due to environmental concerns. 424 As such, it revealed how the environmental 
reforms that had ushered in environmental and social safeguard policies at the World 
Bank would have little impact in cases where World Bank participation was not 
required for a project borrower to access long-term financing.
In 1997, to address this gap, the FOE and National Wildlife Federation (NWF) 
launched the Quantum Leap project, a training and capacity building workshops that 
provided financial and technical support for NGOs wanting to meet with individual 
commercial banks. It helped spread awareness of the role o f commercial banks in
421 ‘The New Financial Activists’, by Deepak Gopinath, Institutional Investor, June 1,2000.
422 ‘Report Slams Three Gorges Resettlement’, Asia Times Online, January 24, 2003; The Value o f an 
Investment in Human Rights’, The Financial Times, October 28, 2004.
423 In contrast, the bilateral export-credit agencies o f Canada, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Brazil provided more than £700 billion in direct financing for the project, mostly for the purchase of 
equipment produced by their own big construction and hydroelectric firms.
424 NGO-01.
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financing controversial projects, and understand how their operations differed from 
multilateral lenders. Led by Michelle Chan-Fishel, the coordinator o f FOE’s Green 
Investment Campaign, the objective was to target major commercial lenders that had 
already issued environmental policies and created internal environmental divisions, 
and pressure them to address the adverse environmental and social impacts o f their 
investments, not just the resource use and waste associated with their facilities.425 The 
same year, the UNEP Banking Initiative issued a revised statement for the banking 
industry, and also merged with a similar initiative launched for the insurance 
industry, creating the UNEP Finance Initiative as it is known today.
For many commercial banks, in particularly those based in Western Europe and 
North America, the late 1990s marked the gradual replacement o f a purely legalistic 
approach to environmental risk management in favor o f a more systematic and 
holistic management system.426 The former approach reflected an expectation among 
lenders that the need to mitigate environmental risk to an acceptable level would not 
substantially affect the financing structure or project design, and could be 
successfully done by having the borrower absorb the financial costs associated with 
existing environmental liabilities, or soliciting assurances from public authorities that 
the project would not be subjected to new laws or regulations that adversely affected 
its profitability.
More broadly, commercial banks were noticing that TNCs in other industries were 
increasingly paying attention to risk management in their business, often in the 
context o f corporate social responsibility programs.427 In terms o f project financing, 
many commercial banks recognized that the environmental impacts o f individual 
projects, often caused by management lapses on the part o f borrowers, could attract 
significant public scrutiny and generate unfavorable media coverage. Given that the 
broader reputation o f financial institutions were at stake, it marked the growing 
influence o f senior banking executives in the development o f corporate 
environmental policies and procedures, including direct oversight o f project approval 
processes. Overall, the growing media visibility o f project financing elevated 
environmental risk management to a long-term strategic concern in which factors 
beyond those o f the project influenced approval decisions.
The Campaign Against ABN Amro: The 'Wake-Up C all’
In 1995, Milieudefensie, the Dutch chapter o f FOE International, together with its 
Indonesian counterpart, launched a campaign against Dutch bank ABN Amro over its 
financing o f a copper and gold mine in Papua New Guinea operated by Freeport- 
McMoRan. By then, the World Bank Group (through MIGA) and U.S Overseas
425 NGO-01.
426 As Case (1999) notes, commercial lenders often treated the environmental risk management process 
simply as a tick-box exercise that needed to be completed in order to secure a variety of permissions 
from planning authorities.
427 EPFI-14.
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Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) had provided insurance for the mine, amidst 
considerable pressure from transnational advocacy groups, who had arranged 
meetings between local community groups and the senior management o f these 
financial institutions. At the time, the operation was dumping thousands o f tons of 
tailings directly into a river o f vital importance to local communities living 
downstream from the mine.
In 1996, the mining company cancelled the risk insurance policies, due to reasons 
which activists believed were tied to the World Bank’s intention to imminently 
investigate the environmental and social impacts o f the mine. As a result, FOE, under 
the direction o f Chan-Fishel, identified Freeport shareholders that could be 
approached and persuaded to submit shareholder resolutions opposing the practices o f 
the mine, and began sending quarterly reports on the company’s political risk to all 
buy-and-sell side gold-mining analysts, contributing to a more than 50 percent fall in 
its share price.428 These groundbreaking initiatives reflected the extent to which the 
globalization o f finance, combined with a growing concern in the corporate sector for 
brand value and reputation, provided opportunities for advocacy groups to leverage 
finance in their push for more responsible corporate practices.
In 1997, in a letter to ABN Amro, Milieudefensie requested an interview with its 
CEO to discuss the project. In his place, ABN Amro was represented by Herman 
Mulder, a career banker who had just become Senior Vice President for Group Risk 
Management. The meeting represented the first time in history that ABN Amro had 
invited an environmental advocacy group to its offices. Following the exchange of 
views, Mulder assured FOE that his bank did not want to invest in ‘controversial 
projects’, and promised to investigate the case and provide a management response 
within three weeks.429 ABN Amro took the unprecedented step o f asking Freeport- 
McMoRan to allow an independent environmental and social audit o f the mine. FOE 
questioned its independence, and criticized the failure to consider the linkages 
between environmental degradation and the livelihoods o f local communities, and the 
influence o f the Indonesian military in the region. The response from ABN Amro to 
Milieudefensie was delayed by one month, and in the interim, Milieudefensie sought 
to mobilize ABN Amro’s retail customers in a public campaign that asked: ‘Do you 
know what ABN Amro is doing with your money?’
In parallel, social unrest had broken out among indigenous peoples most affected by 
the mining operations, after it was revealed that they had not been included in a 
compensation scheme developed by the mine operators. The campaign against ABN 
Amro broadened to a coalition consisting o f FOE, local community groups and 
church leaders demanding that the bank clarify its position relative to the 
compensation scheme, and the project more generally. To ABN Amro’s surprise, the 
ultimate demand was not to divest from the project, but to stay engaged in order to
428 Emel (2002), p.839.
429 Information in this section is based on interviews with key participants in the exchanges between 
ABN AMRO and FOE. (EPFI-02 and NGO-04).
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ensure that the demands o f  the downstream communities affected by the pollution 
would be met.430
A second meeting with Milieudefensie eventually took place, in which Mulder openly 
admitted that ABN Amro should have been aware o f the adverse impacts o f the 
mining operations.431 Given the circumstances, he offered on behalf o f the bank to 
disengage from the project by selling its share. In response, Milieudefensie reiterated 
their position that ABN Amro should stay involved and use its leverage to exert 
maximum pressure on mine operators, based on the fear that a withdrawal could 
invite another lender with lower standards. The result o f the World Bank withdrawing 
from the project had proven to activists that having a bank engaged provided them 
with a channel o f influence.
The campaign marked the turning point for ABN Amro’s approach to environmental 
risk management. By its own admission, it represented a ‘wake-up call’ that it has 
since publicly given Milieudefensie significant credit for.432 Following the meetings 
with FOE and a series o f internal management discussions, ABN Amro published its 
first environmental policy, and announced it would adopt environmental and social 
guidelines for its project financing in the mining sector, in direct response to the 
Freeport controversy.
At this stage, public campaigns against commercial project lending broadened and 
deepened. In the United States, the participation of major investment banks in the 
initial public offering o f PetroChina, China’s restructured state oil company, became 
politicized by the U.S Congress, since it coincided with the hotly contested debate 
over whether the United States should resume normal trading relations with China. In 
2000, Goldman Sachs was chosen to help underwrite the sale o f American depositary 
receipts in PetroChina, and in the aftermath, FOE accused Goldman Sachs o f 
ignoring the environmental impacts o f the company.433 As a first, it filed a brief with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) arguing that PetroChina failed to 
disclose required information regarding non-quantifiable business risks, demanding 
the deal to be delayed.
Over time, a coalition o f more than 200 NGOs, including FOE, the American 
Federation o f Labor and Congress o f Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the Casey 
Institute, and the Center for Religious Freedom, and a number o f pro-Tibetan- 
independence groups, conducted a collective advocacy campaign against the 
PetroChina IPO, targeting investment banks, members o f Congress and pension fund 
managers. In the end, the IPO raised about 40 percent less funds than expected, 
leading transnational advocacy groups to declare victory. While the SEC filing was 
ultimately unsuccessful, Chan-Fishel argued the financial losses caused by external
430 EPFI-02
431 EPFI-02.
432 EPFI-02
433 ‘Pay Attention to Activists or Pay in Money and G rief, by Ricardo Bayon, American Banker, June
15,2001.
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pressures marked an important milestone for public interest campaigns against 
financial institutions, and also reflected how policy makers were increasingly 
interested in the public policy impacts o f Wall Street.434
The campaign against ABN Amro marked the first time a European bank would be 
asked to publicly address the environmental and social impacts o f its investments 
overseas. The next large advocacy campaign took place in the United States, and 
involved the largest project finance bank in the world, Citigroup.
The Campaign Against Citigroup: Taking on the Giant
In 2000, San Francisco-based Rainforest Action Network (RAN) announced it was 
going to launch a Global Finance Campaign to pressure commercial banks to 
consider the adverse environmental impacts o f their projects. According to Ilyse 
Hogue, the campaign director, RAN had conducted research on what it considered 
some o f the most destructive development projects, and discovered that Citigroup 
was financing many o f them.435 In April 2000 at Citigroup’s annual shareholder 
meeting, RAN publicly announced their concerns and plans to launch a campaign 
against the bank. The following day, RAN was invited to meet with Citigroup 
officials to discuss their concerns, and in return, RAN invited Citigroup to attend a 
forum with environmental and labor groups to discuss the way forward. The latter 
offer was declined, and what followed was perhaps the most targeted and aggressive 
public advocacy campaigned ever lodged against a financial institution.
The campaign, which lasted four years, deliberately targeted Citigroup because o f its 
dominant position in the global project finance market, and because o f a marketing 
campaign it was conducting at the time projecting itself as the best consumer bank in 
the world. The campaign centered on mobilizing Citibank customers against the 
bank, and cause an adverse market reaction in its domestic consumer banking 
business because o f  its project finance investments overseas. According to one 
account, ‘campaign workers distributed thousands o f anti-Citi stickers and fact sheets 
to protesters in Washington, D.C., and organized demonstration outside Citibank 
branches in San Francisco.’ 436 Its Chief Executive, Sandy Weill, was deliberately 
targeted, approached at lectures and labeled an ‘environmental villain’ in a full-page 
newspaper ad in the International Herald Tribune. 437 RAN bought television ads in
434 ‘The New Financial Activists’, by Deepak Gopinath, Institutional Investor, June 1, 2000. In 
response to the campaign, a Goldman Sachs executive declared: ‘For special interests to pursue their 
agenda through capital markets is inherently dangerous. It will result in capital markets that are less 
deep and less liquid.’
435 EPFI-02.
436 In addition, Wired magazine donated half a page to the campaign in its June issue for an ad that 
asked, ‘It's 10:00 p.m. Do you know where your money is?’ accompanied by photos of the 
environmental and social destruction allegedly caused by Citigroup lending. (The New Financial 
Activists’, by Deepak Gopinath, Institutional Investor, June 1, 2000; NGO-02)
437 ‘The Mosquito In The Tent: A Pesky Environmental Group Called Rainforest Action Network is 
Getting Under the Skin o f Corporate America’, by Marc Gunther, Fortune Magazine, May 31, 2004,
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which film celebrities were seen cutting up their Citibank credit cards, inducing a 
reported 20,000 customers to do the same. 438 The campaign was sustained, calculated 
and aggressive, and placed other large financial institutions active in the global 
project finance market on high alert.
Given the common practice o f financing projects through loan syndications, it was 
common for campaigns against individual projects to target multiple banks. As a 
result, regardless o f the amount or length o f investment, the mere financial 
association with a project could cause a commercial bank to become a target. Thus, as 
transnational advocacy campaigns proliferated, so did the number o f projects and 
bank under public scrutiny.
The Campaigns Against the Financing o f  Indonesian Deforestation
Perhaps no other environmental issues resonate with citizens in Western countries 
than tropical deforestation. In the 1990s, the expansion o f commercial logging and 
timber product manufacturing in South-East Asia attracted significant attention from 
commercial lenders, many o f which were confronted with the devastating ecological 
impacts caused by their corporate borrowers. In the early 1990s, the Indonesia 
government under Suharto instigated a national program to significantly expand palm 
oil plantations through the privatization o f plantation companies and the liberalization 
o f foreign investment. Between 1995 and 1999, the Indonesian government approved 
expansion o f crude palm oil plantations worth more than £10 billion, and began 
issuing land-clearing permits to plantation companies, including in the less developed 
forest-rich regions o f Irian Jaya, East Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The government- 
backed program provided incentives for rapid, systematic deforestation, causing 
widespread social conflict, illegal land clearing practices, and a devastating forest fire 
that affected the health o f 70 million people across South-East Asia, with estimated 
economic damages in excess o f £4 billion.
Following the economic crisis in 1997, the plantation companies were in need o f 
external financing to reinvigorate the industry. Several Dutch banks stepped forward, 
under heavy criticism from advocacy groups. In 2000, Milieudefensie and 
Greenpeace in the Netherlands, with input from an Indonesian network of advocacy 
groups working against palm oil plantations, released a report, Funding Forest 
Destruction, which catalogued the impacts of the government program on Indonesia’s 
forests and the people that depended on them.439 In parallel, RAN had pressured 
Citigroup to explain its role in arranging a syndicated loan to the Indonesia company 
PT Pan London Sumatra Plantation to allow it to purchase London Sumatra, a
Date o f Access: January 12, 2006,
http://money.cnn.eom/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/05/31/370717/index.htm
438 ‘The Mosquito In The Tent: A Pesky Environmental Group Called Rainforest Action Network is 
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company involved in the clearing and planting o f significant palm oil plantations. The 
Dutch report recommended that Dutch banks refrain from financing plantations 
unless guarantees were given that the borrower would not clear more land to make 
way for new plantations, or violate the rights o f local people and Indonesian law. By 
then, the controversy had generated a mass petition and spilled into Dutch politics, 
prompting policy-makers to address them in parliamentary questions.
In January 2001, the two advocacy groups entered into dialogues with the Dutch 
banks ABN Amro, Fortis, and FMO, who all acknowledged the plantations may have 
caused the adverse impacts identified by advocacy groups. In contrast, ING and 
Rabobank denied the accusations, arguing that they could not be substantiated. But all 
o f them stated that their leverage with the borrower was limited since their financing 
only represented a marginal share o f the overall project costs. Subsequently, the 
advocacy groups were asked to provide a report that documented the specific 
environmental allegations against the projects, which claimed financing from Dutch 
banks was contributing to primary forest conversion, forest fires, illegal logging and 
social conflict with local people. In the end, three o f the banks introduced new 
environmental lending requirements for forestry and plantation projects that 
conformed closely to the recommendations made in the report.
Alongside the controversy over the expansion o f palm oil plantations, a not entirely 
separate set o f projects was also being heavily scrutinized. In December 2000, the 
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) released a report -  Profits and Paper - that documented how up to £7.5 
billion in foreign investment into the Indonesian pulp and paper industry was 
significantly contributing to deforestation. A transnational NGO campaign against a 
host o f commercial banks sought to exploit the leverage they had to induce the 
logging industry to source more o f its timber from sustainable plantations. The 
publicity peaked in March 2001, when the largest beneficiary o f this financing, Asia 
Pulp and Paper (APP), announced a standstill on all debt repayments, causing the 
New York stock exchange to suspend trading on its shares. 40 The financial collapse 
o f APP affected numerous financial institutions, and for advocacy groups, was used 
to illustrate how commercial banks had failed to adequately identify and assess all the 
risks associated with the investm ents.441
In May 2001, FOE in the United Kingdom and Profundo o f the Netherlands released 
a scathing report that demanded a moratorium on the financing o f all pulp and paper 
processing capacity in Indonesia and Malaysia, and asked financial institutions to 
subject APP’s supply chain to independent review and verification.442 In the United 
Kingdom, Barclays Bank, Royal Bank o f Scotland (RBS) and HSBC became targets
440 In a glaring cover story, Business Week labeled the company ‘Asia’s Worst Deal’ , describing its 
financial implosion as ‘a cautionary tale of greed and blind optimism.’ (‘Asia’s Worst Deal’, Asia 
Cover Story, Business Week, August 13, 2001)
441 According to FOE, Barclays Bank, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Credit Suisse First Boston, 
Goldman Sachs, Franklin Templeton, Merrill Lynch, Bank o f America, Deutsche Bank, ABN Amro 
and Bank o f China were all involved in providing financing for APP. (FOE 2001)
442 FOE (2001).
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of a domestic campaign that appealed to the environmental consciousness o f bank 
customers. Among them, Barclays had perhaps the strongest financial links to the 
struggling company, having helped to arrange loans o f over £200 million to APP and 
its subsidiaries. In February 2002, FOE organized nation-wide demonstrations against 
Barclays’ retail branches, alleging that the bank was using customer deposits to 
knowingly facilitate deforestation and social conflict in Indonesia. In April that year, 
protesters targeted Barclays’ annual shareholders meeting, pressuring the bank to 
introduce a forestry policy that ensured that investments in the sector would be 
sustainable and respectful of indigenous people’s rights.
The Campaign Expands: Oil and Gas Pipelines in Tropical Forests
Several large-scale projects involving oil and gas pipelines and associated production 
facilities had attracted attention from North American and German advocacy groups 
campaigning against commercial banks in their home countries. The significant 
involvement o f multilateral lenders, alongside bilateral export-credit agencies and 
commercial banks, also allowed a direct comparison o f their lending policies and how 
they decided to implement them in a controversial project. In Peru, numerous 
financial institutions were debating whether to finance the Camisea natural gas 
development project encompassing four drilling platforms, two pipelines and 
distribution systems in Lima and Callao, some o f which are situated in either 
protected lands or fragile eco-systems. Following public pressure, concerns about 
unacceptable risk eventually prompted Citigroup, OPIC and the Export-Import Bank 
o f the U.S to decline financing for the Camisea project. Yet, the negative assessment 
made by these three financial institutions was not shared by others, most notably the 
IDB, which decided to finance the development project despite these risks. 443
In 2000, West Deutsche Landesbank (WestLB), the quasi-public German bank, was 
heavily criticized by Urgewald and Greenpeace Germany for arranging a 17-year 
syndicated bank loan o f £450million to finance the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados 
(OCP) pipeline, operated by a multinational consortium and involving the 
construction o f a 500 kilometer-long heavy crude pipeline cutting protected 
ecological areas, meant to facilitate the transport o f heavy crude oil from hitherto 
inaccessible areas o f the Ecuadorian Amazon over the Andean mountains to a coastal 
port facility. The additional involvement o f Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase and 
Deutsche Bank in the project ensured that the advocacy coalition campaigning 
against would be transatlantic, in addition to the significant local resistance.
WestLB had made compliance with World Bank standards a condition for the loan, 
and insisted the operators had met it, whereas advocacy groups in Germany and 
North America argued to the contrary. And for a significant period, WestLB refused
443 The project has received financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Andean 
Economic Development Corporation, the Brazilian Development Bank, as well as the Italian, 
Argentinian and Belgian export credit agencies. In an irony o f sorts, IDB’s involvement was awarded 
the ‘Latin American Project Finance Deal o f the Year’ Award by Project Finance Magazine in 2004.
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to comment on the mounting criticism, standing by its own assessment, despite 
: having also been rebuked by the World Bank. 44 Meanwhile, in the German state o f 
North Rhine Westphalia, which held a 43 percent stake in WestLB, concerned policy­
makers from a red-green coalition were holding parliamentary hearings on the 
project, and several delegations were sent to Ecuador to assess the pipeline 
construction, confirming the views o f critics. The German press covered the 
controversy extensively.
Amidst the environmental controversy, WestLB also experienced its first financial 
losses in part due to a bad loan provided to Boxclever, the UK-based TV-leasing 
company. The financial crisis sparked criticism over its corporate governance, which 
was an element in a decision to create a separate commercial division within the 
bank. At the same time, the controversy over the OCP pipeline had peaked, inducing 
WestLB to climb down from its previous position not to engage with critics. In 
August 2002, the OCP president was forced to resign. A month later, Dr. Robert 
Goodland, a tropical ecologist and former World Bank environmental specialist, 
released an assessment report o f the project, uncovering ‘substantial violations’ o f the 
four World Bank Safeguard Policies that were relevant to the project.445 In the end, 
the project was completed despite costly delays caused by local protests, and leaving 
| WestLB and other financiers with damaged reputations.
I
i But the biggest controversy erupted over two significantly larger pipeline projects 
that mobilized a broad international coalition o f civil society groups, and prompted 
financial institutions to undertake unprecedented environmental and social studies to 
document the impacts on local communities and the environment. The most notable 
was the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, the first large-scale infrastructure project 
spearheaded by the World Bank since the Narmada Dam. The main operator, Exxon 
Mobile, received financing predominately from multilateral and bilateral agencies for 
operating thelOOO-kilomter pipeline and three oil fields in Chad, and the World Bank 
provided political cover for them by gaining the necessary assurances o f stability 
from the Chadian government. In addition, two commercial banks participated as 
arranger banks for export credit agency facilities; ABN Amro for the US-Exim Bank 
and Credit Agricole Indosuez (now Calyon) for COFACE, the French agency.
For the World Bank, the pipeline provided an opportunity for Chadians to escape 
| poverty by extracting and exporting their only source o f wealth to global markets, and 
they applied unprecedented safeguards, including a revenue management plan, to 
ensure that the original objectives would be fulfilled.446 Similarly, the IFC viewed the 
project as an opportunity to demonstrate how private sector financing could promote
I ___________________________
‘ 444 ‘Sustainability Management at the WestLB’, by Anke Hassel and Ulrike Lexis and commissioned 
by the Bertelsmann Foundation, at http://www.hertie-
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445 ‘Ecuadorian Pipeline Fails to Meet Bank Standards’, Environmental News Services, September 13, 
2002 .
446 For a discussion o f these institutional measures and a critique o f them, see ‘Chad’s Oil: Miracle or 
Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State’, by Ian Gary (Catholic Relief Services) 
and Nikki Reisch (Bank Information Center), February 2005.
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economic growth while providing direct benefits to the p oo r.447 Meanwhile, critics 
argued the project would ultimately benefit the elites and solidify their positions o f 
power, exacerbate climate change, and harm local communities that inhabited areas 
along the pipeline course. For both, it represented a test case as to whether oil 
exports could help reduce poverty in a developing country context.
In 1999, a group o f U.S-based NGOs, including the Bank Information Center, the 
Environmental Defense Fund and RAN, criticized the World Bank’s faith in the 
Chadian government, given its record o f corruption and human rights abuses. They 
focused their allegations on the pipeline’s destructive impact on rain forests and the 
indigenous people that depended on them. Shortly thereafter, Shell and E lf withdrew 
from the consortium, but Exxon swiftly replaced them with Malaysia’s Petronas and 
Chevron. The controversy peaked just before the World Bank’s board was to vote for 
its £95 million financing package, which included an oil revenue fund that would be 
independently managed to ensure that a share o f  the oil wealth would benefit projects 
aimed at reducing poverty.448 But the project was approved amidst external criticism, 
and oil started flowing through the pipeline in 2003.
6.4 The Industry Response: Business Principles and Environmental Guidelines
The previous section focused on the process by which the adverse environmental and 
social impacts o f development financed by major commercial banks received public 
attention in Western Europe and North America. It illustrated how transnational 
advocacy groups were able to put the environmental and social impacts o f 
commercial project lending in the public eye by networking with local community 
groups, exploiting the interest in environmental issues among bank customers, and 
releasing research and advocacy reports that were widely referenced in the media. 
Overall, the growing role o f transnational private capital in financing large-scale 
development projects in environmentally-sensitive sectors, combined with a growing 
concern for reputational risks, provided transnational advocacy groups with a channel 
o f influence over corporate practices.
Yet, in parallel with these developments, and indeed often in response to them, 
financial institutions were increasingly seeking to demonstrate their commitment to 
corporate responsibility. In the past decade, corporate responsibility has become an 
industry in itself, with a vibrant business press validating the environmental and 
social activities o f TNCs, a booming environmental consulting industry, the birth o f 
environmental management and reporting tools, and the near universal corporate
447 IFC-04. The project also received financing from ABN AMRO and Credit Agricole Indosuez (now 
Calyon), as well as COFACE, the European Investment Bank, and the U.S and African Ex-Im Banks.
448 In Decmber 2005, the Chadian government passed legislation to abolish the fund, prompting the 
World Bank to suspend loan payments. In April 2006, the World Bank and the Chadian government 
reached an agreement whereby loan disbursements would continue provided they benefited projects in 
education, health, community development, HIV/AIDs, agriculture, electricity, water and 
infrastructure. In return, the Chadian government promised to pass a budget law that required 70 
percent o f oil revenues in the 2006 budget to be used for poverty reduction projects.
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practice o f annual sustainability reporting. It has coincided with a steady stream of 
corporate environmental commitments, ranging from philanthropic donations to 
internal waste reduction and resource efficiency targets.
In terms o f environmental and social risk management, most large commercial banks 
had developed internal environmental credit risk policies in the early to mid-1990s, in 
response to concerns about environmental liabilities, particularly in OECD 
countries.449 The policies were meant to identify and manage credit and security risks, 
or those directly related to the financial viability o f the investment. Yet, with regards 
to developing countries, commercial project financing prior to the Equator Principles 
was often provided to project clients without a formal requirement to comply with the 
Safeguard Policies or the World Bank’s environmental standards.450 While many 
commercial banks state that these standards were often used as a reference, and 
compliance was formally required in some instances, by their own admission the 
practice was largely piecemeal and not embedded in specific policies.451
In this context, according to one senior project finance executive, a decision to 
finance a questionable project was based on subjective judgement by risk officers as 
to whether it was ‘ethically acceptable’ to them.452 In many cases, this would be made 
solely on the basis o f information provided by the client or a consultant working on 
its behalf, which by virtue o f the apparent conflict o f interest was a practice 
susceptible to failure. Indeed, in the case o f WestLB and the OCP pipeline, it was its 
trust and faith in environmental consultants hired by the client that triggered the 
bank’s downfall, as its contention that the project was in compliance with the 
Safeguard Policies was rejected by the public, and later proven false by an 
independent expert.
In most cases, project financing represents a marginal share o f overall business for 
the vast majority o f commercial banks. Yet, the fact that stakeholders can easily 
connect investment decisions to particular projects effectively made project financing 
the Trojan horse o f corporate environmentalism in commercial banking, in the sense 
that it represented the channel through which stakeholders placed demands on them 
to tackle the adverse impacts o f investments.453 In fact, media coverage o f  large 
project finance investments has become the primary basis upon which the public 
forms impressions about the ethical dimensions o f the international financing 
practices o f commercial banks. To manage such public impressions, it is therefore not 
surprising that it was in the area o f project finance that commercial banks first 
released policy guidelines aimed to reduce the risk o f financing harmful projects.454
449 ISIS (2002), pp.8-10.
450 In contrast, under the Equator Principles, commercial banks are required to integrate any 
environmental and social conditionalities into the loan agreement with the borrower.
451 EPFI-06; EPFI-01; EPFI-03; EPFI-08; EPFI-14.
452 EPFI-03.
453 IFC-04.
454 According to ABN Amro, its approach has been to try and develop policies in response to 
developments in sensitive industry sector, such as a forestry policy in response to the palm oil issue in 
Indonesia’, (EPFI-01).
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For most commercial banks, responding to growing reputational pressures meant 
expanding existing environmental and social risk management policies so as to 
include a wider scope o f non-financial impacts in developing country investments.455 
In October 2001, in the aftermath o f the controversy over the Indonesian palm oil 
plantations, ABN Amro released a Forestry Policy that is widely perceived as a 
milestone within the industry. To prepare the policy, ABN Amro hired a forestry 
specialist, and consulted corporate clients in the sector that would be subjected to the 
policy. While ABN Amro also solicited input from a technical specialist at the IFC, 
its aim was to formulate a policy that addressed the concerns o f advocacy groups 
while being accepted by its regular clients in the sector. 456 It was released for public 
consultation, and the input from advocacy groups significantly informed the eventual 
outcome. The policy would govern its investments in forestry and tree plantations, 
and restricted ABN Amro from financing activities related to illegal or unsustainable 
resource extraction from primary or high- conservation value forests, and required 
borrowers to have an explicit policy o f respecting human or indigenous rights. It also 
declared it would require borrowers to produce environmental management plans, 
and use monitoring and certification schemes to ensure compliance.
In 2001, following the release o f its Forestry Policy, ABN Amro published a set o f 
Business Principles that mixed promises to conduct business in an accountable and 
transparency manner and protect the environment and human rights, with a continued 
commitment to confidentiality and shareholder value. It introduced a Mining Policy 
and an Oil and Gas Policy that stated it would not finance projects located in World 
Heritage Sites. In addition, the former included a commitment to prevent tailings 
from being directly released into riverine environments, which can be read as a direct 
response to the public criticisms o f the Freeport mining operations in Papua New 
Guinea. And in 2002, it developed a Client Assessment Tool for oil, gas and mining 
projects, aimed at screening the capacity and commitment o f borrowers to manage 
environmental and social risks, and providing the basis for adjusting due diligence to 
the level o f project risk identified.
Other commercial banks followed the same path, first developing existing internal 
environmental risk policies, and gradually expanding internal capacity. More broadly, 
these policies reflected a broader attention to the role o f financial institutions in 
causing and helping to solve a wide variety o f environmental and social problems. 
Numerous financial institutions sponsored studies, organized conference or joined 
public-private partnerships, sustainable business networks and industry working 
groups that aimed to define the appropriate role o f financial institutions in sustainable 
development. In 2001, eleven financial institutions, under the auspices o f the 
WBCSD, issued a statement committing them to integrate sustainable development 
into decisions about client selection and relationship management, whilst stressing 
the need to define the boundaries o f responsibilities between financial institutions and 
their clients. In the United Kingdom, the asset management firm ISIS (now F&C)
455 ISIS (2002), p.8.
456 IFC-04 and EPFI-02
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released a survey o f British banks that considered if and how human rights were 
addressed in project financing.457
National governments also entered the debate over the role o f financial institutions in 
sustainable development, particularly in the period leading up to the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development. 458 In 2000, OPIC published a report on its investments 
in fossil fuels, marking the first public acknowledgment by a financial institution of 
the potential climate impacts o f project financing. The same year, the FORGE group 
comprised o f British financial institutions, issued the first industry-led guidelines for 
environmental management and reporting, supported by the Association o f British 
Insurers (ABI), the British Bankers Association and three government ministries 459 
In April 2002, the group began drafting Guidance on Corporate Social Responsibility 
Management and Reporting for the Financial Sector, in consultation with 
Government, socially responsible investment funds and advocacy groups. In South 
Africa, the Government-commissioned report recommended a set o f corporate 
governance and reporting guidelines that would include a requirement for financial 
institutions to implement so-called triple bottom line reporting in line with the 
standards laid out in the Global Reporting Initiative 460
International organizations also contributed to the growth o f voluntary guidelines, by 
increasingly partnering with the private sector to produce institutional responses to 
environmental and social problems. The U.N Global Compact and the UNEP Finance 
Initiative were growing in membership, and the OECD revised its Guidelines fo r  
Multinational Enterprises. Public financial institutions supprting private sector 
projects in developing countries were expanding their engagement with 
environmental and social issues. The same year as the IFC adopted the World Bank’s 
Safeguard Policies, it began advocating the commercial benefits o f applying them in 
private sector projects, official export-credit agencies in OECD countries committed 
to develop environmental and social standards for export credit support to projects in 
developing countries. A working group o f export-credit agencies was formed, and 
two years later, the OECD issued a voluntary framework o f environmental standards 
aimed at facilitating a convergence among export-credit agencies.461
457 ISIS (2002).
458 In 2002, a report by the German Federal Ministry for Environmental Protection, Conservation and 
Nuclear Reactor Safety (BMU) surveyed the environmental practices of German banks, (see BMU 
2002) The same year, the City o f London commissioned Forum for the Future to partner with financial 
institutions to create the London Principles, a framework with aspirational statements about how the 
financial sector should respond to sustainable development challenges. It was launched at the WSSD.
459 The group consisted o f Abbey National AVIVA (Chair), Barclays Bank, Lloyds TSB Legal & 
General, Royal & Sun Alliance, Royal Bank o f Scotland, and Zurich Re. (see, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Guidance for the Financial Services Sector’, the FORGE Group, November 15, 2001).
460 The King Committee on Corporate Governance was formed in 1992 to consider corporate 
governance in the context o f South Africa. It has issued two reports with recommendations, in 1994, 
and again in 2002.
461 ‘Draft Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export 
Credits’, drafted by the Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, OECD Trade 
Committee, TD/ECG(2000)11/REV6, December 17,2001. The document was formally released and 
adopted in December, 2003, and then revised in November, 2005.
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And last but not least, several international commissions on sustainable development 
issued policy recommendations relevant to project financing. In 2000, the World 
Commission on Dams released a set o f  recommendations on planning and building 
large-scale hydropower dams in developing countries.462 It concluded that the 
ecological and social considerations had been marginalized in the vast majority o f 
dams built in developing countries, and urged financial institutions and project 
operators to improve the accountability and transparency o f decision-making when 
considering such projects. The same year, James Wolfensohn, the World Bank 
president, commissioned the Extractive Industries Review , which was mandated to 
consider whether it should continue to invest in oil, gas and mining projects in 
developing countries. Both processes promoted the integration o f environmental and 
social issues with commercial objectives as central to increasing the development 
impact o f projects.
Collectively, these national and transnational initiatives contributed to increasing the 
public awareness o f the role o f financial institutions in promoting sustainable 
development. In particular, they helped define the environment as perhaps the most 
effective arena o f public debate for financial institutions to positively differentiate 
themselves from their competitors. A regard for protecting the environment, and 
support for renewable energy and energy efficiency, became almost synonymous 
with ethical banking, creating a corporate race to the top in environmental 
commitments. In turn, this broader institutional environment proved favorable for 
inducing commercial banks under growing reputational pressures to coalesce around 
a set o f progressive lending standards that were recognized as an important element 
o f responsible project finance.
Conclusion
The chapter has illustrated how transnational advocacy groups have significantly 
influenced the ‘greening’ o f commercial project finance, and more generally, the 
emergence o f corporate environmental policies and strategies in the financial sector. 
By collecting information from project-affected people and sharing their grievances 
with bank customers in developed countries, transnational advocacy groups both 
facilitate exchanges in ideas and knowledge across national boundaries, empower 
local communities, and put pressure on transnational commercial banks to ensure that 
financing does not adversely affect the environment and the poor. The sources of 
their power stem from the advancements in information and communications 
technologies that have enabled transnational networking and information-sharing at 
minimal cost, combined with a growing public concern in developed countries o f the 
adverse impacts o f globalization. The confluence o f these two developments has 
increased the legitimacy and effectiveness o f their political messages, and by 
extension, their power and leverage in world politics.
462 See Dingwerth (2005).
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The now familiar dynamic between financial institutions and transnational advocacy 
groups triggered the emergence o f the Equator Principles. Just as public campaigns 
had induced both the World Bank and the IFC to institutionalize these norms in 
operational policies, so did commercial banks seek to accommodate the political 
demands o f advocacy groups. And just as the former were concerned with 
maintaining their reputations as responsible development institutions, so were 
commercial banks concerned that adverse media publicity could harm their 
reputations as responsible lender, and thereby indirectly impact the profitability o f 
their project finance business. Thus, closing the gap between public expectations and 
actual lending practices became a key objective, alongside the importance o f 
remaining competitive by not alienating clients in the most important industries.
The next section presents original research on the actual drafting process that 
preceded the launch o f the Equator Principles, highlighting how the most targeted 
commercial banks eventually came together to discuss and create a common industry 
framework for managing environmental and social risks in project finance 
transactions. In explaining how and why this occurred, the dual role o f the IFC as a 
neutral convener, discussion facilitator, and perhaps most importantly, provider o f 
international legitimation, is an important finding. In addition, as with the World 
Bank and the IFC, quelling public criticisms was an important objective throughout, 
as commercial banks were eager to produce a framework that allowed them to 
continue financing large-scale development projects in developing countries, yet 
avoid the public controversies over adverse environmental and social impacts.
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7. The Equator Principles
Introduction
This chapter will explain how the increasingly contentious politics over the 
management o f environmental and social risks in project financing induced 
cooperation between commercial banks. The public scrutiny o f large-scale project 
financing surpassed the attention given to investors in any other financial market, and 
to the detriment o f commercial lenders, it was largely negative. By implication, the 
adverse media publicity not only undermined the projects in questions, but also the 
broader corporate reputations o f the financial institutions involved. Therefore, the 
ability to better predict, manage and mitigate the likelihood o f project controversies 
became an important imperative for project finance executives, and more broadly, 
executive management within leading commercial banks. This commonality in 
purpose provided the foundation for exploring the formulation o f a common industry 
standard.
The institutionalization o f environmental and social norms in the commercial project 
financing has important parallels with the previous socialization o f both the World 
Bank and the IFC. Just as these public lenders were forced to eventually make tactical 
concession as a means to restore their legitimacy as responsible development 
organizations, so did ABN Amro and other commercial banks seek to appease 
advocacy groups in an attempt to reduce negative media publicity and declining 
corporate reputations. However, whereas transnational advocacy groups turned to 
governments for leverage against the World Bank and the IFC, they sought to 
mobilize market participants, such as consumers, investors and shareholders, to 
increase their political influence over commercial banks. And as the final analysis 
will hold, norm diffusion through markets, rather through states and international 
relations, proved in many cases to be just as effective in soliciting concessions from 
target actors.
This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section identifies the 
institutional context which gave rise to the first discussions about a potential common 
industry framework, and follows the evolution o f this idea until the launch o f the 
Equator Principles in June 2003. It provides a detailed account o f a series o f meetings 
that took place between the IFC and leading commercial banks in the project finance 
market, and the responses to this process among transnational advocacy groups. The 
second section briefly describes the aftermath o f the Equator Principles, notably how 
it changed relations between transnational advocacy groups and commercial banks, 
and which issues remain contentious. The final section provides a detailed overview 
o f the content o f the framework, and how the standards and procedures would be 
integrated into a typical project cycle in the commercial banking industry.
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7.1 An Industry under Siege and the Making of a Common Framework
During the 1990s, the growth o f commercial project financing meant commercial 
banks were increasingly financing projects in developing countries with significant 
environmental and social dimensions. The negative media coverage that could be 
generated by a controversial project meant project financing emerged as a potential 
source o f reputational risk for commercial lenders. It became particularly apparent in 
the context o f project financing o f large-scale development projects in ecologically- 
sensitive areas, which by virtue o f their sheer size and significance solicited 
considerable public scrutiny.463 The growing perception that commercial banks were 
failing to lend responsibly was fiieled by transnational advocacy groups, who directed 
public advocacy campaigns against domestically-based financial institutions, holding 
them responsible for the adverse environmental and social impacts o f projects they 
had financed.
This was the context within which the earliest discussions between leading 
commercial banks over developing a set o f common environmental and social 
standards for project financing emerged. In mid-2002, commercial banks with 
significant project finance portfolios in developing countries were almost uniformly 
under pressure to demonstrate that their investment did not harm the environment or 
local communities. At the same time, international organizations, transnational 
business networks and several advocacy groups offered a way for many o f  them to 
positively differentiate themselves in the marketplace o f corporate reputation, by 
inviting them to join public-private partnerships that worked towards enhancing 
corporate responsibility in the financial sector.
In 2001, ABN Amro was still under considerable pressure from advocacy groups, 
consumers and shareholder activists for its continuous involvement in several 
controversial projects. Mulder invited two environmental specialists from the IFC to 
meet with ABN Amro executives in a two-day workshop to present the IFC’s 
environmental and social policies and practices, and its experience with applying 
standards to project finance investments.464 They were Glen Armstrong, a senior 
environmental consultant who had been hired by the IFC in 1997 to help strengthen 
environmental and social risk management in project operations, and Leo Johnson, a 
consultant in charge o f IFC’s environmental and social risk management training for 
financial institutions. According to Armstrong, Mulder had already demonstrated a 
strong interest in environmental and social Fisk management, given ABN Amro’s 
Forestry Policy and his role in the group-wide risk committee that was governed the 
centralized project approval process.46
Shortly thereafter, ABN Amro was bidding to be the lead arranger for an oil project 
in Venezuela. At the time, it claimed to have an internal policy o f applying the World 
Bank’s standards to extractive industries projects in developing countries. According
463 Miller and Hobbs (2005).
464 IFC-04.
465 IFC-04.
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to Mulder, a U.S bank had approached the Venezuelan project operator and offered to 
provide project financing without a requirement to comply with these standards, and 
ended up getting the deal.466 By coincidence, Mulder had scheduled a breakfast 
meeting the next day in Amsterdam with Peter Woicke, the Executive Vice President 
o f the IFC. In the meeting, Mulder spoke about the incidence where ABN Amro’s 
desire to apply World Bank standards had proven detrimental to securing a lucrative 
project finance deal, since a competing bank was willing to finance the project 
without applying the relevant standards. He also expressed his concern that project 
finance investments in sensitive industries were being increasingly affected by 
advocacy campaigns and negative media publicity. In response to this concern, 
Woicke suggested they organize a workshop o f commercial banks in the project 
finance market to share experiences about managing environmental and social risks 
in project financing.
In the spring o f 2002, Mulder and Woicke decided to co-chair a workshop at ABN 
Amro’s offices in London later that year. The decision was to persuade as many 
project finance executives o f major project finance banks as possible to discuss the 
significance o f environmental and social issues in project financing.467 According to 
Mulder, the invitation list was produced by identifying the top dozen project finance 
banks in the world by lending volume, reflecting a desire to include industry leaders 
in all regions and sector. In the summer o f 2002, Mulder and Woicke decided to 
jointly approach the banks, a deliberate strategy to maximize their leverage and give 
the impression that neither the IFC nor ABN Amro was solely behind the initiative. 
Given the sensitivity that commercial banks attached to discussing the terms and 
conditions o f individual project finance transactions, providing the necessary 
reassurances proved critical to soliciting interest from the industry.
The timing o f the invitation proved conducive to securing a high response rate. 
According to Armstrong, numerous projects at the time ‘were coming off the rails 
because o f environmental and social issues’, and ‘banks were feeling the pressure and 
did not know quite what to do.’ Most prominently perhaps, WestLB was in the midst 
o f a financial and public relations crisis, and it was awaiting the independent 
assessment report on the OCP pipeline commissioned by several advocacy groups, 
and widely anticipated by its shareholders. Meanwhile, Barclays and RBS were 
targets o f consumer boycotts and public advocacy campaigns and negative press 
reports following the financial collapse o f APP, linking them to deforestation in 
Indonesia.468 In the United States, RAN’s campaign against Citigroup was escalating, 
manifesting itself in organized consumer demonstrations and full-page 
advertisements in national newspapers. In the summer o f 2002, public relations 
battles intensified as the bank became embroiled in the corporate scandals involving 
Enron and WorldCom, and the target o f a public investigation.469 Yet, these 
commercial banks were not alone. Given the fact that project financing is commonly
466 EPFI-02.
467 IFC-04.
468 ‘Indonesian rainforests pulped to extinction’, The Guardian, February 11, 2002.
469 See, ‘Crisis at Citi’, Special Report, Business Week, September 9, 2002.
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organized in loan syndications, the reputation o f virtually every major project finance 
bank had become tarred by being linked to a controversial project.
The First London Workshop
At the outset, the objective was to get a critical mass o f commercial banks together to 
share experiences with projects in which environmental and social issues had 
emerged as significant project risks. In all other contexts, these banks were fierce 
competitors, reluctant to share information with each other about particular projects, 
much less admit that some had been poorly managed and proved to be more costly 
than predicted.470 Woicke and Bemie Sheahan, IFC’s Director o f Operational 
Strategy, had asked Armstrong to produce an agenda for the workshop. They had 
chosen to approach four specific banks - ABN Amro, Barclays, Citigroup and 
WestLB - to present experiences with particular projects that had been problematic 
early in the meeting, meant to ensure that substantive discussions would emerge by 
lunchtime, when Woicke was scheduled to leave.
Nine commercial banks attended the meeting. During the morning session, ABN 
Amro, Barclays, WestLB and the IFC presented case studies on past projects which 
had attracted controversy because o f local community protests amplified by 
transnational advocacy campaigns. Subsequently, Citigroup proposed that the banks 
try to develop a common framework to deal with these issues. Early on, according to 
Armstrong, ‘the common understanding was that this is bigger than any one bank’, 
and by the end o f the morning session, the overarching question had moved from 
whether environmental and social issues were relevant to project financing, to 
discussing what the banks could do about it together 471 During the afternoon, 
discussions ensued about formulating a collective solution to the problem. While the 
project finance portfolios o f the banks varied widely in size and sectoral composition, 
they shared a desire to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental and social risk 
management standards. The assumption was that allowing environmental and social 
issues to remain a competitive issue would not only undermine the reputation o f the 
commercial banks that failed to lend responsibly, but the industry as a whole.
At the end o f the meeting, it was decided that four banks -  ABN Amro, Barclays, 
Citigroup and WestLB -  would form an informal working group to explore a 
common set o f standards could agreed upon that catered to commercial project 
lending, particularly in high-risk sectors. Armstrong o f the IFC served as a facilitator 
and technical advisor to the working group. During the next four months, it met once 
in London, and working group members held various telephone conferences to 
discuss broad questions about the scope o f the standards, including the types of
470 As one bank official close to drafting process noted, ‘it was not common practice to have joint 
initiatives among competitive banks. We were not used to sit in a room with each other. We only 
interacted on the project-level in the context o f loan syndications, not over internal policy matters.’ 
(EPFI-14)
471 IFC-04.
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financing and industrial sectors that should be covered. While not a participant in all 
o f the interactions, Armstrong presented to the working group how the IFC applied its 
Safeguard Policies to high-risk projects.
At the outset, the banks considered adopting their own standards on the assumption 
that they needed to produce something uniquely tailored to the needs o f commercial 
lenders.472 In addition, the working group considered focusing on developing 
standards for the extractive industries sector only, given that oil pipeline and mining 
projects had attracted the most scrutiny and criticism. Yet, the recognition that 
drafting a set o f global standards from scratch would be time-consuming and be 
susceptible to considerable disagreement over individual provisions eventually led 
them to consider basing a voluntary framework on the IFC’s Safeguard Policies and 
the World Bank’s environmental standards.473 The former was seen as especially 
strong on social issues, such as managing relations with indigenous people and 
handling resettlement disputes, whereas the latter were the most well-recognized 
environmental standards for industry.474 According to Armstrong, the IFC did not 
force this decision, saying his view at the time was that ‘it had to be their decision, 
something that they wanted to do.’ Yet, given the common objective o f producing 
standards that could applied to all projects, globally, and that would be perceived as 
legitimate by advocacy groups and TNCs alike, the IFC’s policies were not only a 
logical choice, but perhaps the only one.
The Second London Workshop
In February 2003, a second workshop was hosted by Citigroup to discuss a set o f 
draft standards named the ‘Greenwich Principles’, in reference to the meeting 
location’s proximity to Greenwich, near Central London.475 The objective was to 
present the standards to commercial banks and discuss how it would impact their 
project financing business, identify and discuss particular pressure points, and 
convince a critical mass to commit to applying them to project financing. According 
one bank official in attendance, most o f the key protagonists were commercial banks 
that had been the most strongly impacted by a number advocacy campaigns, which 
gave them a more pressing need to take action to mitigate reputational pressures.476 
By extension, the challenge was to create a sense o f urgency that something needed 
to be done, particularly for those financial institutions where this was very much a 
latent risk.
Reportedly, discussions during the meeting were quite heated, with several 
participants expressing concerns about the legal implications they would have for
472 Lazarus (2004).
473 IFC-04.
474 EPFI-12.
475 Lazarus (2004).
476 The bank official noted that many commercial banks that had not been heavily impacted by NGO 
campaigns would ask, in reference to their internal credit risk procedures, ‘if  it is not broken, why fix 
it?’ (EPFI-06)
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their project finance business. At that stage, some observers predicted it would be 
difficult for commercial banks to reach a consensus on the choice o f  using the 
Safeguard Policies as a starting point, as it was unclear whether a framework that has 
been used within the ‘government structure’ o f the IFC was suited for commercial 
project lending.477 During the meeting, it was decided that the IFC’s annual Bankers 
Meeting in June 2003, in which it invites hundreds o f financial institutions to discuss 
its Loan Syndications Program and topical financing issues in developing countries, 
would be the deadline for individual banks to decide whether or not to voluntarily 
commit to adopting a new framework
In the ensuing three months, discussions were held within financial institutions 
between project finance units, risk management committee, legal departments and 
corporate boards over whether to adopt the framework. Many also consulted with 
their most regular corporate clients in high-risk sectors that would be subjected to the 
standards, to ensure that the adoption o f the framework would not alienate them. As 
one project finance executive at a large British bank noted;
‘There were good reasons for why the launch of the framework could be misunderstood 
among financial institutions. So we had to start thinking quite strategically in terms of 
communicating this, how to reach out to other institutions, bringing them on board, and get 
them to understand that it is not an anti-business charter.’ 478
Alongside these consultations, the draft standards were circulated to a group o f 
advocacy groups that had spearheaded the advocacy campaigns against many o f the 
commercial banks. During these consultations, NGO were reportedly told by 
commercial bank officials that the launch o f the framework would be the first step in 
a process, and that the pace and nature o f implementation would vary from bank to 
bank depending on their existing capacity and resources, as well as the characteristics 
o f their project finance portfolios.47 Overall, they were told, the intent o f the 
framework was to define a common framework and vocabulary in managing 
environmental and social issues in project financing. In response, they highlighted 
several shortcomings, including the lack o f a reporting requirement or compliance 
mechanism to ensure transparency and accountability, and the absence o f a secretariat 
to facilitate communication between the banks and stakeholders.
These concerns were also articulated in the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial 
Institutions and Sustainability, a policy statement issued jointly by over 100 civil 
society groups in January 2003 4 0 Broadly, the declaration reflected the deep 
skepticism among advocacy groups that export-oriented private sector development 
and growth can help mitigate or prevent degradation o f environmental resources and 
improve the economic welfare o f local communities, particularly indigenous people, 
(see Box 7.1) Reflecting the moral claims and political demands levied at the World 
Bank and the IFC previously, the declaration emphasizes the need for corporate
477 EPFI-06.
478 EPFI-06.
479 Focus on Finance (2003), p.l
480 Missbach (2004).
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accountability, or transparent and inclusive decision-making that provides local 
communities with legal rights to approve projects that may affect them. In terms o f 
integrating environmental and social concerns into investment decisions, the 
declaration emphasizes that a holistic approach is necessary, which not only focuses 
on impact mitigation, but also allows for particular projects likely to cause significant 
harm to be rejected in the project approval stage.
Box 7.1 The CoIIevecchio D eclaration
1. Commitment to Sustainability
Financial institutions must expand their missions from ones that prioritize profit maximization to a vision o f social and 
environmental sustainability. A commitment to sustainability would require financial institutions to fully integrate the 
consideration o f ecological limits, social equity and economic justice into corporate strategies and core business areas 
(including credit, investing, underwriting, advising), to put sustainability objectives on an equal footing to shareholder 
maximization and client satisfaction, and to actively strive to finance transactions that promote sustainability.
2. Commitment to 'Do No H arm '
Financial institutions should commit to do no harm by preventing and minimizing the environmentally and/or socially 
detrimental impacts o f  their portfolios and their operations. Financial institutions should create policies, procedures and 
standards based on the Precautionary Principle to minimize environmental and social harm, improve social and environmental 
conditions where they and their clients operate, and avoid involvement in transactions that undermine sustainability.
3. Commitment to Responsibility
Financial institutions should bear full responsibility for the environmental and social impacts o f  their transactions. Financial 
institutions must also pay their full and fair share o f  the risks they accept and create. This includes financial risks, as well as 
social and environmental costs that are borne by communities.
4. Commitment to Accountability
Financial institutions must be accountable to their stakeholders, particularly those that are affected by the activities and side 
effects o f companies they finance. Accountability means that stakeholders must have an influential voice in financial decisions 
that affect the quality o f  their environments and their lives — both through ensuring that stakeholders rights are protected by 
law, and through practices and procedures voluntarily adopted by the financial institution.
5. Commitment to T ransparency
Financial institutions must be transparent to stakeholders, not only through robust, regular and standardized disclosure, but also 
through being responsive to stakeholder needs for specialized information on financial institutions' policies, procedures and 
transactions. Commercial confidentiality should not be used as an excuse to deny stakeholders information.
6. Commitment to sustainable m arkets and governance
Financial institutions should ensure that markets are more capable o f fostering sustainability by actively supporting public 
policy, regulatory and/or market mechanisms which facilitate sustainability and that foster the full cost accounting o f  social 
and environmental externalities.
Source: www.banktrack.ore. see also Missbach (2004)
Yet, the desire among commercial banks for a framework that did not have any major 
legal implications, and that did not significantly undermine their decision-making 
autonomy, led these recommendations to be largely ignored. In particular, their 
argument that client confidentiality could not be infringed upon severely limited the 
scope for including the transparency and disclosure provisions that governed 
multilateral lenders. In April 2003, the four commercial banks that made up the
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working group formally announced that they would adopt the framework ahead o f a 
consultation meeting with other financial institutions, the IFC and several NGOs.481 
According to one official working at a bank that did not adopt the Equator Principles 
at its launch, Citigroup had taken a leading role in advancing the framework at that 
stage, and was largely ‘running the process’, with speculation that it wanted to 
demonstrate its ethical credentials at a time when it was increasingly confronted with 
allegations o f improper business conduct in the aftermath of the Enron scandal482 
Among the remaining commercial banks mulling over the decision to adopt the 
framework, one o f the points o f contention was whether adopting the Equator 
Principles would potentially put them at a competitive disadvantage in the market 
place. For advocacy groups, most were cautiously saluting the initiative, although 
many questions regarding transparency, accountability and governance were raised, 
most o f which have persisted to this day.483
The Dusseldorf Meeting and the Launch
In May 2003, a fourth meeting was held in Dusseldorf, Germany at the headquarters 
o f WestLB. At this stage, the number o f financial institutions in attendance had 
increased, primarily as a result o f the outreach efforts o f the IFC and the four leading 
commercial banks. Citigroup chaired the meeting, and the IFC gave a series of 
presentations on the process o f environmental screening and the application o f its 
environmental and social policies and procedures to particular projects.484 The IFC 
also affirmed its interest in providing environmental management training to adopting 
banks, in order to help them gain internal capacity to implement their new 
commitments, which was important for many o f the commercial banks lacking 
internal expertise in assessing compliance with the Safeguard Policies 485
In the meeting, there was a general consensus that producing a ‘level-playing field’ in 
which environmental and social issues would no longer be an element o f competition 
between commercial banks was the overarching goal. In addition, several banks, 
including Citigroup and Barclays, stressed the importance o f inducing as many 
commercial banks as possible to join the initiative for it to be successful. Several 
bank officials noted that the critical mass that the four leading banks aimed for was
481 ‘Four Bank Adopt IFC Agreement’, by Demetri Sevastopulos, Financial Times, April 9, 2003.
482 EPFI-17.
483 See Missbach (2004) and WWF (2005) for a summary of criticisms of the Equator Principles 
among transnational advocacy groups tracking the project finance investments o f commercial lenders.
484 EPFI-12. Chris Beale, Managing Director and Global Head o f Project Finance, was Citigroup’s 
representative at the meeting. Leo Johnson, a consultant that had long held the IFC’s Environmental 
Advantage Workshops for financial institutions in developing countries, gave the presentation on 
environmental risk management. He had also co-authored the report, Beyond Risk, together with other 
IFC environmental staff, which provided survey data on environmental risk management practices of 
the participants of the IFC workshops. The report was to be released a month after the Dusseldorf 
Meeting. (See IFC 2003c)
485 IFC-04.
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ten banks or more. Given these objectives, the meeting was characterized by 
finding compromises that were acceptable to largest number o f participants, and 
forging consensus around definitions o f particular issues.487 A discussion erupted 
over, on the one hand, making the standards less specific and thereby giving adopting 
banks more discretion in applying them to their project financing, and on the other 
hand, being more precise and strict and thereby ensuring that adopting banks would 
interpret and apply the framework in similar ways. 488 A specific point o f contention 
was whether the framework should not apply to projects with total project costs that 
were less than US$50 million, with some banks claiming this would simply add 
complications, while others stated it was necessary condition for them to join.489
By then, the standards had been renamed the Equator Principles so as to reflect the 
joint intention among adopting banks to produce a global framework applicable to all 
industry sectors.490 Less than a month later, the Equator Principles were launched, 
fittingly, at the IFC’s annual Bankers Meeting, in a panel session scheduled on the 
second day o f the two-day conference. Peter Woicke o f IFC was joined on the panel 
by senior project finance executives o f ten commercial banks to make the 
announcement.491 It was the first financial sector initiative o f its kind, attempting to 
harmonize environmental and social risk management practices o f  commercial banks 
within a specific financial market, and getting a strong endorsement from a majority 
o f industry leaders.
7.2 The Aftermath: The Battle over Implementation
In an interesting parallel to the emergence o f institutionalized cooperation between 
commercial banks, many o f the advocacy groups behind the Collevecchio 
Declaration decided to create and join a formal advocacy network, Banktrack, in 
November 2003. The network would spearhead and coordinate a transnational 
campaign to pressure commercial banks to integrate environment and social concerns 
into their project finance activities, as well as other kinds o f  transnational 
investments. It would facilitate information sharing, coordinate campaigns and handle 
press inquires, all in an effort to amplify the influence o f individual advocacy groups. 
Whereas the emergence o f the Equator Principles was widely seen as a watershed 
event, Banktrack’s response was notably cautious, praising the intention yet pointing 
out the discrepancies between the framework and the practices o f other project
486 IFC-04; EPFI-08. As late as a month before the launch, reaching double-digits was merely a ‘hope’ 
for the main advocates o f the framework, and not an expectation. (EPFI-06)
487 EPFI-06.
488 EPFI-12.
489 EPFI-12. The main argument in favor of the US$ 50 million threshold, which was eliminated when 
the Equator Principles were revised in July 2006, was that the administrative costs associated with 
assessing and verifying compliance small projects was unjustifiably high relative to cost o f the project.
490 According to numerous sources, there were also some concerns among the banks that ‘Greenwich 
Principles’ could be too easily misread or deliberately referred to as the ‘Greenwash Principles.’
491 Citigroup, as the only commercial bank participating in the launch, was represented by its Chief 
Executive Officer, Chuck Prince.
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finance lenders, notably the World Bank and the IFC. It has been Banktrack’s view 
from the beginning that the act o f adopting the code of conduct is inconsequential 
unless Equator banks are ‘transparent and accountable in their implementation o f and 
compliance with the Equator Principles.’ 492 In the absence o f this information, they 
argue, it is difficult (for them) to assess whether the Equator Principles are actually 
changing the way individual projects are prepared and implemented.
Yet, for the first time, commercial banks had agreed to apply environmental and 
social standards to project finance investments, a decision that only a few years 
earlier would have seemed unthinkable. This provided an institutional context for 
Banktrack to engage with commercial banks and discuss their environmental and 
social risk management practices. It certainly increased its leverage, as those 
commercial banks that declined to adopt the framework could be more effectively 
scrutinized than was the case before it existed. And for those commercial banks that 
declared an intention to apply the IFC’s Safeguard Policies and the World Bank’s 
environmental and social standards to their project finance activities, as part o f 
adopting the Equator Principles, they paradoxically became more vulnerable to 
scrutiny, as advocacy groups were eager to assess whether they had acted on these 
commitments.
Therefore, following the initial euphoria in the media o f this event, controversy 
reemerged over the management o f environmental and social impacts in conjunction 
with the proposed Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which Banktrack claimed was in 
violation of the Equator Principles. The project, which included an oil field and a 
pipeline stretching 1760 km from Azerbaijan to Turkey, had a total project cost o f 
£1.8 billion and was financed by syndications which included the IFC and the EBRD, 
seven export credit agencies, and fifteen commercial banks, many o f which had 
adopted the Equator Principles. Thus, the project marked the first test o f the voluntary 
framework, and predictably, Banktrack and the Equator banks disagreed on whether 
it passed it. The project marked the first o f a string o f projects in which compliance 
with the Equator Principles was central to disagreements between transnational 
advocacy groups and various Equator banks. Some o f these projects, such as the 
development o f the Sakhalin II oil fields in the Russian Far East, had been planned 
and partly constructed prior to 2003, prompting the question as to whether the 
framework would apply retroactively in cases where projects were already under 
way.
Alongside continued campaigns against individual projects, the evolution o f 
environmental and social standards in project financing during the next three years 
would be driven by three developments; the IFC’s revision o f its Safeguard Policies 
in 2006, the growing number o f commercial banks that decided to adopt the Equator 
Principles in their project financing, exceeding sixty by 2008, and the continued 
public pressure on commercial banks for providing project financing to development 
projects allegedly in violation o f the Equator Principles.
492 Banktrack (2005), p.l
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Already prior to the launch o f the Equator Principles, the IFC had announced it was 
going to revise and update the Safeguard Policies and replace them with a new set o f 
standards. Therefore, there was an acknowledgement among commercial banks that 
the Equator Principles would have to be revised in the future in line with changes to 
IFC’s policies. In January 2003, IFC’s Office o f the Compliance Advisor/ 
Ombudsman (CAO) released a report that reviewed the implementation and impact o f 
the IFC’s Safeguard Policies since their formal adoption in 1998.493 It observed that 
many clients found them difficult to interpret and implement, and many o f its own 
staff did not even regard them as part o f the IFC’s core business.494 In cases where 
potential clients lacked the capacity or commitment to address environmental and 
social concerns and had access to multiple sources o f finance on reasonable terms, 
there was some concern among internal staff that the IFC was losing business 
because other banks were more ‘pragmatic’ in addressing environmental and social 
issues. 495 This could potentially mean that placing environmental and social 
requirements on clients that regarded these as administrative or political burdens 
would induce them to pursue other sources o f finance.
The recommendations made in the CAO’s report informed a comprehensive revision 
o f three policy frameworks; the Safeguard Policies, the Policy on Disclosure o f  
Information, and the Environment, Health and Safety Guidelines. Launched in 
October 2004, the stated objective o f the policy revision process was to produce a due 
diligence framework better suited for the private sector context. And wanting to break 
with the past, it was perhaps no coincidence that the concept o f ‘safeguards’ was not 
retained. After a tumultuous and delayed policy revision process, in which both civil 
society groups and a selection o f multinational commercial banks voiced their 
dissatisfaction with the consultation process, the IFC released its new Policy and 
Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability in March 2006.
Equator Bank-Banktrack Consultations
Meanwhile, a series o f semi-annual dialogue meetings between Equator banks and 
Banktrack members have been held since the launch o f the Equator Principles, 
mainly to discuss issues o f implementation. One o f their main expectations was that 
communication with commercial banks would be simplified with the emergence o f 
the framework, as bilateral talks and discussions could be replaced by a multilateral 
setting. At the first meeting in London on the one-year anniversary o f the Equator 
Principles, there was a discussion about the purpose and functions o f the official 
website o f the framework.496 Banktrack noted that while the established website 
allowed the Equator banks to collectively share information with the public through a 
shared email address, it did not facilitate two-way communication that would allow 
advocacy groups to contact all the Equator banks simultaneously. Overall, they hoped
493 IFC (2003a).
494 IFC (2003a), p.7 and p.39, respectively.
495 IFC (2003a), p.38.
496 www.equator-principles.com. See also Appendix 1.
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Equator banks would use the website as a vehicle to improve internal governance by 
facilitating information sharing amongst themselves, and with the public. Ultimately, 
it was hoped that better governance would increase coordination and compliance, and 
by extension, reduce the free-riding problem.
A second meeting was held in February 2005, hosted by Credit Suisse First Boston 
near Zurich, Switzerland. Compared to the first meeting, both the participation o f 
Equator banks and advocacy groups increased, with the latter also including two non- 
Banktrack members. The discussions with the banks centered on three issues, the 
implications o f the IFC’s policy revisions for the Equator Principles, the expansion of 
NGO-Equator bank consultations, and the disclosure o f information on 
implementation. As the IFC was in the midst o f replacing the Safeguard Policies with 
a new set o f Performance Standards, there were discussions about what implications 
it would have for the Equator Principles. Specifically, the question was whether the 
framework be automatically updated in accordance with the IFC, or would the 
Equator banks remained wedded to the Safeguard Policies.
First, with regards to the new IFC standards, Banktrack argued the consultation drafts 
released by the IFC indicated that the new standards would be weaker than the 
original Safeguard Policies, and the network was able to press a few Equator banks 
into making a commitment not to revise the Equator Principles if it meant adopting a 
weaker set o f standards. However, against this aim, a vast majority o f Equator banks 
stated that ensuring a ‘level-playing field’ by coordinating standards across all 
institutions was the ultimate goal.
Secondly, Banktrack continued to press for more consultation with Equator banks and 
specific implementation issues. They called for continuing the semi-annual meetings, 
but also creating working groups with a selection of banks on particular topics that 
would make consultation more continuous. In response, several banks expressed 
resistance to the idea o f formalizing the framework and organizing the Equator banks 
into a collective, arguing that each bank should retain discretion in deciding how to 
implement the standards in their project financing.
And third, Banktrack reiterated their desire for more transparency, particularly with 
regards to how individual banks applied the standards to particular transactions. The 
background was their contention that several projects approved by Equator banks 
since the launch o f  the framework were in violation o f it. In return, many Equator 
banks argued that stricter confidentiality obligations in commercial banking relative 
to multilateral lending would place considerable constraints on transparency, 
particularly with regards to project-level disclosure.
In March 2006, the IFC released its new Policy and Performance Standards on Social 
and Environmental Sustainability to replace the Safeguard Policies, upon which the 
original Equator Principles were based. Later that month, a selection o f Equator 
banks met in Vienna to discuss a corresponding revision o f the Equator Principles. In 
the press release announcing the meeting and the draft version o f the new framework,
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the signatory banks identified themselves as the Equator Principles Financial 
Institutions (EPFIs), the first instance where signatory banks publicly declared a 
collective identity that set them apart from non-signatory banks.
For the commercial banks, there was hope that the release o f the IFC’s policy 
revisions would trigger some additional commercial banks to join the framework, as a 
major uncertainty about the future content o f the Equator Principles had been 
removed.497 In particular, there was a desire to bolster the regional representation 
beyond Western Europe and North America. According to one bank official, the 
Equator banks needed to have an open dialogue with major project lenders based in 
emerging markets, and discuss whether the evolution o f environmental laws and 
regulations in those countries provided an incentive for them to sign the Equator 
Principles.498
Following the meeting, a public consultation period was announced, during which 
external stakeholders and EPFIs could provide comments on the revised draft. In 
April 2006, a consultation meeting between the EPFIs and a group o f Banktrack 
members was hosted by HSBC in London. And in July 2006, the new Equator 
Principles (EP2 hereafter,) replaced the old (EP1 hereafter), and were adopted by the 
vast majority o f the commercial banks that had pledged their commitment to the 
original framework.
7.3 The Equator Principles: A Framework for Managing Non-Financial Risks
As noted in chapter 4, commercial banks consider environmental and social issues in 
project finance transactions in the context o f ‘risk’. While commercial banks engaged 
in project financing in developing countries had long assessed the environmental 
risks o f project finance transactions, it had largely been limited to those adverse 
environmental impacts that may have directly undermined debt-servicing or devalued 
securitized assets. But the growing public scrutiny o f transnational economic and 
financial activity has made environmental risk management an element o f corporate- 
wide risk strategies, driven by a desire to identify and manage public impressions and 
expectations o f corporate behavior. As mentioned in chapter 6, commercial banks 
targeted by public campaigns principally viewed them as a potential source of 
reputational risk, as transnational advocacy groups demonstrated their capabilities to 
mobilize banking customers, shareholders and in some cases, government officials.
To address this risk to their brand value and overall reputation in the market, 
commercial banks expanded their risk assessment practices to include project-related 
impacts that could generate adverse reactions in their home countries, and negatively 
influence their retail banking operations. In addition, as an element o f ensuring that 
projects would not be subject to criticism, commercial banks increased their 
interactions with key advocacy groups in order to learn about the moral and political
4y/ EPFI-07; EPFI-08.
498 EPFI-07.
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concerns. In turn, this allowed them to retain or regain some control o f the public 
discourse on project financing by influencing the terms upon which debate took 
place.
Thus, initially, the Equator Principles can be viewed as a framework for managing 
stakeholder expectations, and reducing the reputational risk o f project financing. By 
adopting the Equator Principles, many commercial banks assumed they could no 
longer be accused o f not adhering to standards o f good corporate conduct, as the 
standards and procedures embedded in the framework were widely recognized as 
such. Yet, notwithstanding public declarations in support o f the World Bank and IFC 
frameworks, the Equator Principles does not embed commercial banks into a legal 
structure that gives rights and entitlements to project-affected communities. In fact, 
the formal existence o f the framework is limited to a publicly available document that 
spells out the normative and business rationale for undertaking environmental and 
social risk management (the Preamble), and the specific provisions that would define 
the common approach among signatory banks, (the Principles)
Yet, despite being non-binding, and the lack o f public information about how the 
Equator Principles are implemented in the context o f individual projects, the 
specificity o f the individual provisions do allow external observers to consider 
whether particular projects are in compliance, by for example monitoring public 
consultation process, environmental impact studies, and mitigation and prevention 
measures. Thus, it is the content o f the framework - short on aspirational statements 
and long on specific standards o f conduct - which sets it apart from most other 
voluntary initiatives in the private sector, and invites public scrutiny on 
implementation. As illustrated in the preceding two chapters, the standards originated 
within the World Bank, with the introduction o f environmental review guidelines in 
the early 1970s. Since then, they have evolved in scope and specificity, becoming 
institutionalized in the formal project cycles o f multilateral development banks, and 
many bilateral development and export credit agencies. As such, they are uniquely 
tailored to the nature o f project financing, and the process by which a project is 
identified, assessed, negotiated and eventually approved. In turn, while the credit risk 
processes o f commercial banks can vary greatly depending on the size o f their 
business, organizational culture, level o f centralization and environmental 
management capacity, compliance with the Equator Principles affects every stage o f 
the project cycle, as schematically outlined in figure 7.1.
Project Identification
At the stage when a project finance investment is identified, the first step is to 
determine whether it falls within the qualification parameters o f the Equator 
Principles. EP1 applied to all projects with total project cost above US$50 million. In 
EP2, these parameters were widened as the threshold was lowered to US$10 million, 
and also covering expansions or upgrades o f existing facilities that may create
Christopher Wright 182
significant environmental and/or social impacts or significantly change an existing 
impact.
Figure 7.1 The Project Cycle and Environmental Risk Management
PROJECT
IDENTIFICATION
REVIEW
CLASSIFICATION
I
ASSESSMENT
▼
ACTION PLAN AND 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
GRIEVANCE AND 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW
PUBLIC CONSULTATION
DOCUMENTATION
INDEPENDENT
MONITORING
MONITORING AND 
COMPLIANCE
Source: Adopted from Arthur Allen Robinson (2006), p.3.
Initial Project Review
During the review process, project proposals are classified in two ways. First, 
according to the magnitude o f potential social and environmental impacts and risks.
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The purpose is to separate relatively benign projects not likely to produce adverse 
environmental and social impacts. And secondly, as part o f EP2, they are also 
classified according to the location o f the project. In particular, projects in high- 
income OECD countries are accorded different treatment than those in developing 
countries. The additional provision was meant to appeal to commercial banks whose 
project finance portfolios are concentrated in high-income OECD countries.
Assigning Environmental Screening Categories
The categorization o f project proposals is the basis for a tiered assessment process 
following project screening, in which the specific category assigned to a project 
proposal determines the scope and scale o f the ensuing assessment process. This 
means a project proposal expected to generate significant adverse environmental and 
social impacts triggers a more comprehensive and rigorous review process than one 
expected to have negligible impacts.
To implement this differentiated review process, EP 1 adopted the IFC’s 
environmental screening procedures that assigns an environmental screening 
category, ‘A ’, ‘B ’ and ‘C ’, to each project proposal under consideration, based on the 
significance and sensitivity o f their projected adverse environmental impacts.
In EP1, projects are classified as category ‘A ’ if they are ‘likely to have significant 
adverse environmental impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented.’ In this 
context, ‘sensitive’ refers to irreversible impacts, as in significant the loss o f natural 
habitat, and often affecting the environment beyond the narrow confines o f  the 
project area. Category ‘B ’ is assigned to project proposals if their ‘potential adverse 
environmental impacts on human populations or environmentally important areas—  
including wetlands, forests, grasslands, and other natural habitats— are less adverse 
than those o f Category A projects.’ Typically, these are site-specific and 
predominately reversible impacts that can be mitigated by environmental 
management interventions. Projects expected to have no, or minimal adverse impacts, 
are assigned category ‘C’.
The Assessment Process
For all projects classified as ‘Category A ’ or ‘Category B ’, the signatory bank must 
require the borrower to conduct an environmental assessment (an assessment 
hereafter) that addresses relevant impacts and risks, including proposals for 
mitigation and management.499 Commonly, this includes establishing baseline 
conditions, identifying relevant host country laws and regulations and applicable 
international agreements and treaties, and evaluating project design in a number o f 
areas, including resource efficiency, environmental health and safety, biodiversity
499 In the March 2006 draft version of EP2, this statement had been slightly amended. Specifically, 
borrowers were required to ‘complete and disclose’ the assessment, rather than simply ‘conduct it’. In 
the final version, the requirement to ‘disclose’ was removed.
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protection, and involuntary settlement. And significantly, the assessment needs to 
consider the industry-specific standards o f  the World Bank and IFC Pollution 
Prevention Handbook, and for projects located in low- and low-middle-income 
countries, the applicable IFC Safeguard Policies.500 In EP2, this requirement was 
slightly relaxed, by the stating that ‘the project's overall compliance with, or justified 
deviation from, the IFC and World Bank policies’, should be done at ‘the 
satisfaction’ o f the signatory bank.
For a ‘Category A ’ project, a more comprehensive assessment is required that 
examines the project's potential negative and positive environmental impacts, 
compares them with those o f feasible alternatives (including, the ‘without project’ 
scenario), and recommends any measures needed to prevent, minimize, mitigate, or 
compensate for adverse impacts and improve environmental performance. For 
‘Category B ’ project, the assessment is broadly similar, except that its scope is 
commonly narrower. And for projects assigned a ‘Category C ’, no further EA is 
required beyond the initial screening process.
Action Plan and Management System
On the basis o f the conclusions o f the assessment, the borrower or a commissioned 
third party has to prepare an Action Plan that addressed mitigation, action plans, 
monitoring, management o f risk and schedules. For EP1, the Action Plan was a 
requirement for all ‘Category A ’ projects, and at the discretion o f the signatory bank, 
for ‘Category B ’ projects as well. 01 For EP2, this discretion was removed, meaning 
the requirement covered all ‘Category B ’ projects. In addition, EP2 clarifies that in 
cases where the borrower already has an internal Social and Environmental 
Management System in place, they were required to use the assessment to ‘build on 
or maintain’ it.
Prior to completing an Environmental Management Plan (EMP), the borrower or 
commissioned third party has to provide a summary o f the assessment ‘for a 
reasonable minimum period in the local language and in a culturally appropriate
500 Country categories by income as defined by the World Bank Development Indicators Database. The 
methodology classifies categories as belonging to either low-income economies, lower-middle-income 
economies, upper-middle-income economies, high-income economies or high-income OECD 
members.
501 In EP1, the Action Plan refers to an Environmental Management Plan (EMP), whereas in EP2, the 
EMP is renamed the Action Plan and Management System, in conformance with the new IFC 
Performance Standards. In this context, the Action Plan refers to a plan for addressing project-specific 
impacts, and is defined much broader than previously, and may include, as applicable, a resettlement 
action plan, an indigenous peoples plan, an emergency preparedness and response plan, and a 
decommissioning plan. The Management System refers to a Social and Environmental Management 
System that incorporates the following elements: (i) Social and Environmental Assessment; (ii) 
management program; (iii) organisational capacity; (iv) training; (v) community engagement; (vi) 
monitoring; and (vii) reporting.
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manner.’ 502 In EP2, the borrower is required to disclose the entire assessment or a 
non-technical summary o f it. Furthermore, it has to consult with project-affected 
groups, including indigenous people and local NGOs, ‘in a structured and culturally 
appropriate way’, to the satisfaction o f the signatory bank. In EP2, an additional 
clause was added, declaring that the consultation process was meant to ensure ‘ their 
[affected communities] free, prior and informed consultation and facilitate their 
informed participation as a means to establish, to the satisfaction o f the [signatory 
bank], whether a project has adequately incorporated affected communities’ 
concerns.’ EP2 also clarified that for adverse impacts, disclosure should occur ‘early 
in the assessment process and in any event before the project construction 
commences, and on an ongoing basis.’
The Action Plan would document and take account o f the outcomes o f these 
consultations. In EP1, the EA and Action Plan of all ‘Category A ’ projects would be 
subject to independent expert review, whereas EP2 extended this to ‘Category B ’ 
projects as well, if deemed appropriate by the signatory bank. In addition, EP2 added 
a requirement to establish a ‘grievance mechanism... scaled to the risks and adverse 
impacts o f the project’, meant ‘to ensure that consultation, disclosure and community 
engagement continues throughout construction and operation o f the project.’ 503 The 
mechanism allows ‘the borrower to receive and facilitate resolution o f  concerns and 
grievances about the project’s social and environmental performance raised by 
individuals or groups from among project-affected communities’, and information 
about it should be publicly disclosed during the consultation process.
Under EP2, projects in high-income OECD countries are not required to adhere to the 
IFC and World Bank policies and guidelines, as compliance with host country laws 
and regulation on environmental assessment, information disclosure and public 
consultation is deemed sufficient.
Documentation and Reporting
Perhaps the most significant aspect o f both EP1 and EP2 is that the Action Plan is 
covenanted in loan agreements with borrowers. In EP2, this was clarified to only 
apply to ‘Category A ’ and Category B ’ projects, as ‘Category C ’ do not require an 
Action Plan anyway. But making the Action Plan binding, means that, in principle, 
signatory banks can hold back or cancel loan tranches in cases where the borrower 
fails to comply with the Action Plan.
502 In EP2, this public disclosure had to be done in a ‘relevant local language’ (emphasis added), an 
amendment that made in response to comments received during the public comment peiod between 
March and May o f 2006.
503 The ‘grievance mechanism’ clause was lengthened and clarified after the public consultation 
perdion in 2006. However, the clause ‘scaled to the risks and adverse impacts o f the project’ was 
added, thereby providing the signatory bank with more discretion in how this requirement would be 
implemented in the context o f particular projects.
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As a result o f these legal obligations, both EP1 and EP2 requires borrowers to 
provide regular reports to signatory banks on compliance with the EMP during the 
construction, operation and decommissioning o f the project facility. In EP2, the 
reporting clause was further tightened, stating that the reports have to be provided 
frequently, at a minimum annually, based on the ‘the severity o f impacts, or as 
required by law.’ In terms o f content, the reports have to ‘provide representation of 
compliance with relevant local, state and host country social and environmental laws, 
regulations and permits.’
At the discretion o f signatory banks, EP1 states that the borrower ‘may be required to 
appoint an independent environmental expert to provide additional monitoring and 
reporting services’ (emphasis added). In EP2, this was made an explicit requirement, 
but it was also noted that these external experts should simply be ‘qualified’ and 
‘experienced’, presumably allowing for non-independent experts to be used.504
Neither EP1 nor EP2 adopted the IFC’s Policy on Disclosure o f  Information, which 
governs the public release o f policy and project information by banks. Instead, public 
disclosure o f information is done at the discretion o f third parties, in accordance with 
what is legally required by host country laws and regulations. However, EP2 added 
an annual public disclosure requirement in response to pressure from NGOs, in which 
each signatory bank is obliged to ‘report publicly at least annually about its Equator 
Principles implementation processes and experience, taking into account appropriate 
confidentiality considerations.’ 505 (emphasis added)
Managing Cases o f  Non-Compliance
In both EP1 and EP2, if incidences o f non-compliance with the EMP are uncovered, 
the debt financing would technically be in default. In such cases, EP1 states ‘we 
[signatory banks] will engage the borrower in its efforts to seek solutions to bring it 
back into compliance with its covenants.’ In EP2, this obligation to remedy cases o f 
non-compliance was ostensibly relaxed. It stated that in cases o f non-compliance, the 
signatory banks would work with the borrower ‘to bring it back into compliance to 
the extent feasible , and if  the borrower fails to re-establish compliance within an 
agreed grace period, [signatory banks] reserve the right to exercise remedies, as they 
consider appropriate.’ 06 (emphasis added) As such, the amended statement in EP2 
inserted a condition o f ‘feasibility’ and provided signatory banks with more 
discretion in addressing cases o f non-compliance.
504 This discretionary language was removed in response to comments made by NGOs during the 
public comment period in 2006.
505 The clauses ‘at least annually’ was added in response to comments made by NGOs during the 
public comment period in 2006. They were concerned that a failure to specify the frequency of 
reporting would be exploited by signatory banks.
506 The clause ‘within an agreed grace period’ was added in response to comments made by NGOs 
during the public comment period in 2006. They were concerned that cases of non-compliance would 
persist indefinitely, and not be subjected to a timetable.
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Some Comments on the Governance Structure
Because it was based on the binding operational policies, the Equator Principles are 
much more ‘operational’ than other voluntary codes o f conduct for the financial 
sector, in the sense that the framework is designed to inform decision-making in a 
particular financial market, project financing, with unique and distinct characteristics. 
In fact, the nature o f the rules means the framework is more or less meaningless to 
financial institutions that are not engaged in project financing, as risk management in 
other financial markets does not focus on project risks, but rather investment risk 
associated with the balance sheet o f a particular company. The extent to which it is 
tailored to project finance manifests itself in specific rules about screening project 
proposals, undertaking environmental impact studies (of the project), consulting 
project-affected communities, and embedding environmental action plans into loan 
agreements. Thus, in addition to giving recognition to broader norms concerning the 
need to identify and mitigate the environmental and social impacts o f investment 
decisions, as most voluntary codes o f conduct do, the Equator Principles also contain 
specific rules for how this should be done in the context o f specific kinds o f 
investments
Yet, a tension built into the framework is that it seeks to induce convergence in 
environmental and social risk management in project financing while providing 
Equator banks with significant discretion and flexibility in deciding how to 
implement the framework into their project financing activities. As stated in the 
preamble, ‘we [Equator banks] recognize that our role as financiers affords us 
significant opportunities to promote responsible environmental stewardship and 
socially responsible development’, and furthermore, commit themselves ‘to ensure 
that financed projects are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and 
reflect sound environmental management practices.’ The stated intention is for the 
individual management standards to ‘serve as a common baseline and framework for 
the implementation o f our [the Equator banks’] individual, internal environmental 
and social procedures and standards for our [the Equator banks’] project financing 
activities across all industry sectors globally.’ And to ensure that they are given teeth 
in the internal credit risk processes o f individual banks, each Equator banks declares 
it ‘will not provide loans directly to projects where the borrower will not or is unable 
to comply with [its] environmental and social policies and processes.’507
Such language is balanced by several provisions that protect the decision-making 
autonomy o f individual Equator banks. Specifically, while the framework contains 
specific procedures for how Equator banks should identify, assess and manage the 
environmental and social impacts o f projects, Equator banks are only required to 
introduce internal policies and processes that are ‘consistent’ with the Equator 
Principles, and as is clarified, that ‘this can be done at any time.’508 Furthermore, both
507 See Appendix 1.
508 see, http://www.equator-principles.com/join.shtml.
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EP1 and EP2 end with a legal disclaimer that explicitly disassociates individual banks 
from each other and the framework, securing their legal independence.
‘The adopting institutions view these principles as a framework for developing individual, 
internal practices and policies. As with all internal policies, these principles do not create any 
rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private. Banks are adopting and implementing 
these principles voluntarily and independently, without reliance on or recourse to IFC or the 
World Bank.’
- EP1, p.4
In addition, whereas the specificity o f rules suggest that the code may have some 
teeth, as it allows observers to clearly ascertain levels o f compliance, the voluntary 
nature o f the framework potentially negates this feature. More specifically, whereas 
the rules embedded in the Equator Principles are both mandatory and enforceable in 
the context o f World Bank and IFC financing, they become entirely voluntary and 
unenforceable when applied to projects by commercial banks. For example, in the 
context o f EP2, language in the Performance Standard on Labor and Working 
Conditions makes strong references to various ILO Conventions, yet under the 
framework, the requirement to adhere to these basic labor rights is not enforceable.509 
Therefore, while the Equator Principles reaffirms the legitimacy o f well-recognized 
international environmental and social norms, the framework does not recognize the 
how these norms need to be embedded in a legal, enforceable framework to retain 
their original meaning and purpose.
Thus, the institutional design o f the Equator Principles, and how it differs from the 
operational policy frameworks o f multilateral, perhaps reflects an important 
distinction between public and private forms o f governance. This will be an issue for 
discussion in the final chapter.
Conclusion
Industry leaders often dominate standard-setting exercises in the private sector, as 
they stand to gain the most from standards that serve their commercial interest in the 
market, and can effectively veto any standard they disagree with through their market 
power and behaviour.510 In the case o f  the Equator Principles, the analysis found its 
main proponents in the market place were commercial banks with the largest project 
finance portfolios in developing countries, and in many cases, heavily invested in 
environmentallv-sensitive sectors, such as the extractive industries and 
infrastructure.5 1 These industry leaders, notably Citigroup, ABN Amro, Barclays and
509 See IFC’s Performance Standard 2: Labor and Working Conditions. Date o f Access: July 2, 2007, 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf AttachmentsByTitle/pol_PerformanceStandards2006_PS2/$FILE/ 
PS_2_LaborWorkingConditions.pdf
510 Drahos and Braithwaite (2000) and Muchlinski (1997).
511 Indeed, the four commercial banks that comprised the working group were among the largest 
commercial project finance lenders in developing countries. In 2001, ABN Amro, Barclays, Citigroup 
and WestLB arranged more than £7 billion in project financing, or 17.5 percent o f the market occupied
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West LB, often arranged loan syndications, and thereby determined the risk 
management framework to be used in individual project finance transactions. Given 
their public visibility, they were also the most frequently targeted by transnational 
advocacy groups, and therefore had perhaps the largest stake in the outcome o f the 
standard-setting process. As a result, they were instrumental in forming the working 
group and played a role in recruiting other market participants to adopt the 
framework.
The IFC’s involvement as a technical advisor in the drafting stages o f the Equator 
Principles reflects the extent to which leading commercial banks identified with its 
operational experiences as a project lender in developing countries, and considered it 
as a valuable source o f expertise for managing environmental and social risks in 
developing country projects.512 Combined with the legitimacy o f  its operational 
policies, particularly with transnational advocacy groups, the IFC possessed and 
exerted significant moral, convening and technical authority during the drafting 
stages o f the Equator Principles, legitimating corporate environmentalism, facilitating 
information-sharing among commercial banks, and providing technical expertise in 
environmental and social risk management. In performing these roles, the IFC also 
drew on the trust it enjoyed as a result o f its long-standing operational relationships 
with private financial institutions, as a provider o f debt or equity financing, and as a 
lead arranger o f loan syndications in support o f large development projects. Thus, the 
authority o f the IFC as an international organization in the emergence o f the Equator 
Principles stems from its reputation as a neutral facilitator o f cooperation and 
coordination, and as a market actor mandated to identify and finance profitable 
investment projects.
In terms o f transnational advocacy groups, the last set o f actors identified as critical 
to the emergence and diffusion o f environmental and social norms, they played a 
relatively minor role in the drafting process. Once their advocacy campaigns had 
induced commercial banks to collectively discuss their environmental and social 
practices and ways to harmonize them as to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’, transnational 
advocacy groups did not significantly influence the governance formation process. 
Most o f the crucial decisions, such as the scope o f the standards, the choice of 
standards, the institutional design o f the framework, and the nature o f the governance 
structures, were decided upon with very little direct input from transnational 
advocacy groups. In fact, apart from the technical advisory role performed by the 
IFC, the framework was by and large created by commercial banks, for commercial 
banks. Moreover, the negotiators representing the various commercial banks were not 
principally corporate communications or environmental officials, as is common with
by the 20 largest arrangers. See ‘Four Bank Adopt IFC Agreement’, by Demetri Sevastopulos, 
Financial Times, April 9, 2003.
5,2 The gradual addition of environment specialists in the 1990s, the establishment of an environmental 
unit, the formal adoption of the Safeguard Policies, and the hiring o f social specialists all contributed 
to building the IFC’s organizational expertise in managing environmental and social issues in projects, 
including public consultations. Overall, the IFC brought its expertise, experience and resources to bear, 
all o f which proved important to advancing policy discussions and quelling some o f the skepticism that 
existed among project finance executives in some commercial banks.( EPFI-06; IFC-04 )
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aspirational voluntary codes o f conduct. Instead, they were project finance executives 
that were closely tied to the identification, preparation and implementation o f project 
finance loans. As such, the framework had both an operational focus and a clear 
commercial purpose; to allow project finance lenders in environmentally-sensitive 
industries to continue financing projects in a political and social atmosphere 
characterized by growing public scrutiny and assessment o f investment practices in 
developing countries.
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8. Understanding Private Governance Formation: Main Findings
Introduction
The preceding three chapters identified how the issue o f  environmental and social 
loan conditionalities in project financing has moved from being an internal matter at 
the World Bank, closely associated with its public sector operations and mandate, to 
an imperative viewed as an element o f prudent risk management in commercial 
project financing. In terms o f the World Bank and the IFC, the debate over their 
respective environmental and social agendas is no longer simply a matter discussed 
between them and their principal shareholders. Instead, it is mediated within a 
process o f ‘complex multilateralism’, in which non-state actors are influencing policy 
development in the multilateral system.513 By extension, multilateral governance in 
this area is moving away from both state-based forms o f authority and nationally- 
driven policy initiatives, to being increasingly shaped by transnational non-state 
actors and sources of authority.
Two trends are underlining this transformation. First, structural changes in the global 
economy, notably the growth o f private capital flows to developing countries, has 
placed commercial bank lending at the center o f debates over sustainable 
development. By arranging loan syndications and financing projects without the 
support o f multilateral lenders, commercial banks are in position to determine the 
environmental and social lending conditions o f project finance investments.
Secondly, these developments, alongside the growth o f  official assistance from large 
developing countries, have not only changed the competitive environment of 
multilateral lending, but also attracted attention from an increasingly well-organized 
transnational network o f advocacy groups. Helped by advances in communications 
technologies and a greater awareness o f the impacts o f TNCs in developing countries, 
these groups staged consumer boycotts, organized petitions and lobbied shareholders 
as a means to pressure the commercial banking industry to integrate environmental 
and social norms in project finance lending.
This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings o f thesis, and makes some 
general remarks on its implications for understanding private governance formation.
It attribues the emergence and adoption o f the Equator Principles to a growing level 
o f reputational risk among leading commercial banks active in the global project 
finance market. The threats to their individual and collective reputation caused by the 
adverse media publicity that followed the growth o f transnational advocacy 
campaigns provided the impetus for leading commercial banks to discuss a 
collaborative framework. In this context, the preexistence o f the IFC’s policy 
framework essentially constituted the governance problem, as the legitimacy o f 
environmental and social norms related to environmental impact assessment, public
513 For this argument, see O’Brien et.al (2000), pp.206-234.
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consultation and transparency highlighted the extent to which commercial banks were 
not engaging in responsible financing practices. In turn, the eventual selection o f the 
IFC’s policy framework as a blueprint for the Equator Principles reflects both the 
extent to which reputational risk was the central motivation o f commercial banks for 
creating a common industry framework, and the constitutive role of these norms in 
the global project finance market.
The first section will revisit the ‘spiral model’ introduced in chapter three, and 
summarize the main arguments made in the thesis regarding how norm entrepreneurs 
pressured commercial project lenders into committing to complying with the IFC’s 
environmental and social policy framework by virtue o f adopting the Equator 
Principles. The subsequent six sections will revisit the six aspects o f private 
governance formation identified in chapter three, and summarize the empirical 
findings o f the research. The concluding section will consider the explanatory power 
o f realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism relative to this case, and 
the implications that these findings have on our understanding o f how and why 
private governance emerges.
8.1 Revisiting the ‘Spiral Model’ -  Main Findings
Chapter three presented the thesis’ two primary objectives: to evaluate the 
explanatory power o f the three dominant perspectives on institutional change in 
international relations theory against this case study, and to consider whether the 
norm evolution framework presented by Risse and Sikkink (1999) could be usefully 
applied to studying the diffusion o f environmental and social norms among private 
actors in transnational markets. The amended ‘spiral model’ is a hypothesis for how 
norm entrepreneurs influence corporate behavior through the diffusion o f norms.
Over the course o f the process, the dynamic between norm entrepreneurs and target 
actors moves from being very confrontational to reconciliatory, and ultimately, 
mutually supportive. As per Risse and Sikkink (1998), each phase o f the ‘spiral 
model’ -  repression, denial, tactical concession, prescriptive status and rule- 
consistent behavior - is associated with a particular mode o f  interaction that 
characterizes interactions between actors, as either instrumental adaptation, arguing 
or institutionalization.
Table 8.1 identifies the main findings o f the thesis relative to this hypothesis. It 
outlines the amended ‘spiral model’ introduced in chapter three, and supplements this 
with additional observations made in the case study. In addition to identifying the 
main actors and the mode o f interaction that characterizes relations between them, it 
also identifies the main sources o f power and authority available to the actors 
engaged in the norm contests at each stage o f the model. And finally, it identifies 
which institutional conditions that need to be present at each stage in order for norm 
entrepreneurs to be successful. This underscores the point that norm entrepreneurs are 
not always successful, and that the diffusion o f environmental and social norms may 
therefore succeed in some industries and markets, but not in others.
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Table 8.1 Norm Evolution and C orporate Behavior -  Main Findings
1. Repression 2. Denial 3. Tactical 
Concession
4. Prescriptive 
Status
5. Rule-Consistent 
Behavior
Main Actors 
Moving 
Process to 
Next Stage
Transnational
Advocacy
Networks
Transnational
Advocacy
Networks
Transnational 
Advocacy 
Networks, Home 
Country 
Consumers, and 
Shareholders
TNCs and Home 
Country Society, and 
international 
organizations
TNCs and Home 
Country Society, and 
international 
organizations
Main Mode of 
Interaction
Instrumental
Rationality
Instrumental
Rationality
Instrumental 
Rationality / 
Argumentative 
Rationality
Argumentative 
Rationality and 
Institutionalization
Institutionalization 
and Habitualization
Main Sources 
of Influence
Moral authority 
and corporate 
power
Moral
authority and
corporate
power
Moral authority 
and technical 
authority
Moral authority and 
technical authority, 
and state power
Moral authority and 
technical authority, 
and state power
Favorable 
Conditions for 
Norm 
Diffusion
Evidence o f  
environmental 
and social harm
Evidence o f
corporate
wrong-doing
Private actors 
fear reputational 
damages
No collective action 
problems among 
private actors
Organizational 
culture and structure 
not resilient to new 
norms
Source: The table is an amended version o f Risse and Sikkink (1999), p.32, hypothesizing how norms 
emerge, diffuse and are adopted by private actors in transnational markets. The main findings in the 
thesis relevant to this table are in italics.
In terms o f applying the emergence o f the Equator Principles to this model, the 
research suggests that the decision to adopt should be considered a tactical concession 
on the part o f most banks, and a reaffirmation o f their commitment to the World 
Bank’s standards and procedures on the part o f a small minority. As such, the 
research did not find evidence that the environmental and social norms have been 
internalized by the adopting banks in the way that constructivists would expect as a 
precondition for governance.
For the most part, this case study confirmed observations made in previous studies o f 
international norm diffusion. First, advocacy groups operating in transnational 
networks, significantly aided by recent advances in internet and communications 
technologies, are instrumental to diffusing norms across institutional contexts. In this 
aspect, the emergence of the Equator Principles has strong parallels to the origins o f 
environmental reforms at both the World Bank and the IFC. Secondly, in terms o f 
modes o f interaction, it confirmed the assumptions made by Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998) about the strategic nature o f  norm entrepreneurship, particularly how 
transnational advocacy groups seek to maximize their impact by deliberately 
selecting vulnerable target actors and framing causal stories in ways that could 
capture the public’s attention. And third, target actors, in this case commercial banks, 
behaved predictably, first repressing and denying accusations, and later defending
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their behavior in the public domain, increasingly seeking to demonstrate that they 
complied with the emerging norms.
Yet, compared to how norms emerge and diffuse among states, the research found 
two important differences when TNCs are target actors. First, while human rights 
activists could build their case on the need for states to honor the U.N Charter and 
comply with a variety o f international human rights laws, no such international legal 
structure exists to regulate TNCs. In the case o f project finance, while multilateral 
development banks have indeed institutionalized norms that have come to define 
‘international best practices’, these policies emerged and evolved in the context o f 
fulfilling their public mandates as international organizations. In turn, these policies 
were in part created to differentiate public lenders from private investors, and ensure 
that the former went beyond the latter in terms o f financing projects with clear, direct 
development benefits. Therefore, as part o f advocating these norms in the private 
sector, transnational advocacy groups had to persuade commercial banks that these 
concerns were indeed relevant to their commercially-driven lending strategies. In 
doing so, the advocacy groups drew on their moral authority as perceived 
representatives o f the poor and the environment to challenge the corporate power of 
commercial banks, reflected in the autonomy they enjoyed as foreign investors in 
countries with weak and poorly enforced regulations.
Secondly, while transnational advocacy groups significantly drew on the political 
leverage o f allied governments in diffusing human rights norms, they sought to 
mobilize market actors in the case o f TNCs. Recognizing the transnational 
characteristics o f these banking conglomerates, advocacy groups made statements o f 
disapproval against their project finance business in developing countries by staging 
protests against their consumer banking branches in Western capitols. As a result, 
they sought to mobilize regular bank customers against their banks, and participate in 
demonstrations against their project financing in developing countries. In addition, 
they often contacted institutional investors and shareholders, or in some cases 
purchased shares themselves, in order to influence (or disrupt) annual shareholder 
meetings and impact the stock market valuation o f the banks they were targeting. 
More broadly, they took advantage o f how sensitive commercial banks are to their 
reputation in the marketplace by seeking to induce a negative market reaction against 
the development impact o f the project financing in developing countries.
And third, with regards to the stages o f norm evolution, material events and 
conditions played a central role in determining the success o f environmental 
advocacy groups. Initially, producing credible information about environmental and 
social harms generated by projects was a prerequisite for the success o f  norm 
entrepreneurs. Subsequently, they had to be able to demonstrate an operational 
connection between the (non)-decisions of commercial banks and the particular 
environmental or social harm. And even if  successful, inducing changes to corporate 
practice was predicated on commercial banks being sufficiently concerned about 
damages to their corporate reputations. In combination, the analysis suggests that the 
ability o f norm entrepreneurs to successfully persuade target actors does not simply
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depend on the communication and argumentation skills, but also the extent to which 
their empirical evidence o f wrongdoing provide support for their moral claims and 
make their discursive strategies persuasive.
The next six sections will revisit the areas o f comparison chosen to evaluate the 
explanatory power o f the three competing theoretical perspectives on governance 
formation -  realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism -  and consider 
the extent to which this case affirmed or discredited their respective hypothesis. By 
reviewing what the case study tells us about the reasons norms emerge in the 
international system, the timing o f private governance formation, the main initiators, 
their sources o f influence, the governance structure, and why norms are adopted, this 
concluding analysis attempts to make concrete theoretical contributions to some of 
the most common research questions discussed in the literature on private governance 
formation in world politics.
8.2 Why Norms Emerge: The Power and Legitimacy of Multilateral Institutions
The most recent decade has seen the birth o f a number o f  governance initiatives 
between international organizations and TNCs, often taking the form public-private 
partnerships. As en element o f this trend, multilateral development banks that operate 
through the private sector have become leading proponents o f  voluntary business 
regulation and private sector growth and investment as the most appropriate and 
effective solution to a wide variety o f public policy objectives. As a result, there has 
been a gradual convergence between development policies in the multilateral system 
and the norms and practices o f transnational business, evident in multilateral support 
for the privatization o f many public sector services, the promotion o f carbon finance 
as a climate mitigation instrument, and the advocacy o f corporate social responsibility 
as the policy paradigm within which the environmental and social costs o f business 
should be dealt with.
Within multilateral development banks, and in particular those that serve the private 
sector, the dominance o f neo-liberal norms creates a strong cognitive bias against 
norms and principles that do not conform to the commercial imperatives and the logic 
o f markets.514 By contributing to the institutionalization o f norms in the multilateral 
system, the IFC not only encourages the harmonization o f practices across national 
jurisdictions, but also act as a norm entrepreneur in its own right, favoring 
technocratic solutions to environmental and social problems that give the private 
sector a central role in implementation. The World Bank has formally recognized and 
embraced this discursive role by seeking to project itself as a ‘knowledge bank’, 
whereas the IFC is increasingly promoting itself as a depository o f knowledge and 
technical expertise in environmental and social risk management, producing research
514 For example, the World Bank has largely ignored the policy recommendation made by the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) and the Extractive Industries Review (EIR), two recent multi­
stakeholder processes that assessed the development impact and effectiveness o f the World Bank’s 
infrastructure lending, (see Dingwerth 2005)
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reports, surveys and guidelines, in addition to providing training for financial 
institutions.515 As a result, the IFC has become a significant discursive force in 
financial markets in developing countries, articulating ideas and norms that define 
how and why financial institutions should further sustainable development in their 
investment practices.516
Notwithstanding its mission to define and diffuse ‘international best practices’, the 
IFC does not have any formal powers over private companies, apart from the leverage 
it enjoys over corporate borrowers. Therefore, its effectiveness at inducing behavioral 
changes rests primarily on its organizational legitimacy, and the legitimacy o f the 
rules it advocates.517 Over time, the environmental and social standards and 
procedures o f the World Bank and the IFC have acquired a status as a ‘discursive 
frame o f reference’ against which the legitimacy o f both multilateral and commercial 
project financing is assessed and judged.518 Moreover, these standards and procedures 
do not only delineate between responsible and irresponsible lending. By providing the 
foundation for the Equator Principles, they in effect give commercial lenders a 
number o f mandates and responsibilities previously restricted to public agencies, 
thereby contributing to constituting the issue area o f environmental governance in 
international banking. In other words, these standards and procedures did only 
provide a powerful benchmark for commercial banks involved in the drafting process, 
they also constituted the link between finance and sustainable development that 
enabled a public discourse on responsible project financing to emerge.
The standards and procedures upon which the Equator Principles are based have 
attained this legitimacy in three principle ways. First, from a Weberian perspective, 
the World Bank and the IFC have formulated rules that serve to promote sustainable 
development that can be explained and justified using rational-legal reasoning.519 As 
outlined in chapter 6, the process o f environmental review was designed to ensure 
that environmental (and later social) considerations could be seamlessly integrated 
into project preparation processes without undermining the existing operational 
objectives. More broadly, the ideas and norms furthered by technocratic decision­
making tend to carry a legitimacy o f their own by virtue o f being grounded in 
scientific methodologies and rationalizations. As such, the research and expertise 
accumulated within the World Bank and the IFC, and their adherence to rational 
decision-making processes enhances the legitimacy o f the rules they promote.
Secondly, the standards and procedures have not been created in a closed and 
exclusive decision-making process. Instead, drafts had been widely circulated to a 
range o f actors as part o f formal consultations, thus giving each a sense o f  ownership. 
As a result, the standards and procedures enjoy ‘input legitimacy’ because they
515 See World Bank (1999) and Stone and Wright (2006), pp.9-16.
516 SeeWright (2006), pp.70-76. For similar arguments about the World Bank and the IMF, see Woods 
(2006).
517 Dingwerth (2005).
518 This mirrors they way in which the World Commission on Dams changed the public discourse on 
hydropower development, (see Dingwerth 2005, p.77)
519 Steffek (2003).
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appear transparent, inclusive and accountable in the eyes o f many external observers.
5 0 This legitimacy did not derive primarily from the normative content o f the 
policies, but rather from the governments that had endorsed them. In addition, the fact 
the environmental advocacy groups referred to them as benchmarks for responsible 
lending reflects the legitimacy these norms enjoyed in development finance. As such, 
commercial banks could not produce standards on their own that would attain the 
same level of legitimacy.
And thirdly, apart from ‘input legitimacy,’ legitimacy also depends on the extent to 
which rules are effective in achieving pre-stated objectives, so-called ‘output 
legitimacy’. For commercial banks, the IFC’s policy framework was legitimate in 
part because it was ‘tried and tested’, as it had a positive track record in reducing the 
non-financial risks o f controversial projects by reassuring a wide range o f  actors that 
broader environmental, social and political risks had been identified and effectively 
managed. In this context, commercial banks valued the operational characteristics of 
the standards and procedures, and how they were meant to be applied to the most 
difficult projects in developing countries. Overall, commercial banks expected that 
adopting the IFC’s policy framework would relieve them o f some o f the public 
pressure and ensure that the environment and local communities were not harmed by 
their project finance investments.
Having been entrusted with creating and diffusing rules in the international system, 
international organizations such as the IFC have a significant discursive influence on 
world politics. The legitimacy they enjoy as international organizations often makes 
them arbiters o f norm contests, implicitly judging the appropriateness o f normative 
claims made by external observers, and creating rules that attain an ‘official’ and 
‘legitimate’ status among a wide range of external observers for the reasons outlined 
above. As a result, in the words of Claude (1966), they provide ‘collective 
legitimation’, by explicitly or implicitly, ‘dispensing politically significant approval 
or disapproval o f the claims, policies and actions o f states, including, but going far 
beyond, their status as independent members o f the international system.5 1 In turn, 
private actors that align their behavior with rules created by international 
organizations enjoy a level o f immediate positive recognition, as they become 
associated with norms that define appropriateness for a wider range o f actors within 
given policy areas
Since the emergence o f the Equator Principles, the IFC has more forcefully embraced 
its role as a producer o f knowledge and information on sustainable business. It is 
increasingly publishing ‘good practice’ handbooks and guidelines on how private 
investors and companies should conduct themselves when operating in developing
520 Borzel and Risse (2004). For example, as Dingwerth (2005) notes in relation to the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD), whereas inter-governmental rule-making derives its legitimacy from 
being legally binding on individuals, states, or other collective actors as such, the WCD’s guidelines 
(and similar public-private rules) rely on an aura of legitimacy to have an effect on actual 
decisionmaking, (p.77).
521 Claude (1966), p.367.
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countries. In doing so, it is contributing to defining standards o f responsible 
corporate behavior, thereby creating and popularizing particular distinctions between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms o f conduct and providing justifications for private companies 
to engage in certain activities. As part o f its growing agenda to define and diffuse 
‘best practice’ standards and procedures in the private sector, the IFC frequently puts 
forward the Equator Principles as its greatest achievement.523 In promoting 
responsible corporate conduct in developing countries, it almost exclusively focuses 
on the commercial benefits that private companies may derive from it, with little 
attention given to the role o f government in designing rules or enforcing existing 
ones. According to the IFC, a central premise underlying this voluntary regulation 
agenda is that, as laws and regulation in the conventional sense do not exist at the 
global level, ‘the reputational process o f developing voluntary standards for corporate 
responsibility will continue to play an important role.’ 524 This is particularly the case 
for environmental considerations, as these are not governed by a recognized 
collection o f international legal requirements as in the ILO Conventions.525 In turn, 
the promotion o f  voluntary forms o f governance as supplements to existing laws and 
regulations ascribes particular institutional roles to actors that affect corporate 
decision-making, and in general terms, legitimizes partnerships and new forms o f 
governance between civil society, government and business that focus on areas o f 
convergence and collaboration, rather than ideological differences.
The influence o f the World Bank and the IFC, and the emergence and 
institutionalization o f these norms in the multilateral system notwithstanding, it was 
not inevitable that these norms would diffuse to the private sector and become 
commonly accepted criteria for evaluating whether commercial banks are lending 
responsibly. As part o f explaining the timing o f the Equator Principles, the next 
section summarizes the main findings about the significance o f public advocacy 
campaigns against project finance banks.
8.3 Timing: Norm Entrepreneurs Target the Commercial Banking Sector
Chapter 6 demonstrated that the most critical factor in determining the timing o f the 
Equator Principles was the rise o f  a corporate accountability movement that 
systematically scrutinized and publicly reported on the project finance loans of 
market leaders in commercial project financing. While some commercial banks had
522 For some recent examples, see “ Creating Business Opportunity through Improved Animal Welfare’ 
(April 2006), ‘ILO Convention 169 and the Private Sector: Questions and Answers for IFC Clients’ 
(March 2007), and ‘Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing 
Business in Emerging Markets’ (May 2007). Date o f Access: July 2, 2007. 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsI7Content/Publications_GoodPractice
523 For example, following its launch in June 2003, the IFC expressed ‘pride’ in its role, and 
proclaimed that their emergence exemplifies the potential for [its] leadership on issues of 
sustainability, by helping businesses recognize the ways their interests align with those of people in 
developing countries and with the well-being o f the global environment.’ (IFC 2003, p.3)
524 Klein and Harford (2004), p.4.
525 Ward (2004).
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fairly well-developed environmental credit risk procedures prior to the Equator 
Principles, the timing o f the framework can be directly traced back to a collective 
desire among leading commercial banks to stage an effective response to the growing 
criticism o f their project finance activities. In this regard, it is no coincidence that the 
commercial banks that took the greatest interest in negotiating an industry standard 
for managing environmental and social risks and sought to convince others were 
those that were heavily involved in large-scale infrastructure projects in developing 
countries, and were therefore most susceptible to being targets o f environmental 
advocacy campaigns.
Given their role in diffusing environmental and social norms between two 
institutional contexts (public and private project financing), environmental advocacy 
groups can be usefully referred to as norm entrepreneurs in this contex. In the 1990s, 
the emergence o f information and communications technologies that allowed instant 
and rapid diffusion o f information across national boundaries and organizational 
contexts empowered social movements against various corporate sectors in a number 
o f ways. First, it allowed geographically disparate groups to form networks, share 
information and build political alliances, which produced a convergence around 
particular norms and ideas, and increased the mobilization o f  resources. Secondly, it 
has increased the availability o f independent information (and disinformation) about 
corporate practices, as the internet has allowed media outlets and ‘watchdog’ groups 
to effortlessly disseminate viewpoints and assessments. And third, alongside the 
transnational mobilization o f  civil society and the greater access to information, 
public awareness o f the development impact o f corporate practices has increased 
considerably.
More broadly, the empirical analysis provides support for the argument that ‘naming 
and shaming’, which imposes a reputational cost on laggards relative to a publicly 
recognized standard, has become central to the enforcement o f  environmental norms 
in the private sector. By gathering, organizing and diffusing information about 
development projects, transnational advocacy groups were absolutely central to the 
growing reputational risk associated with large-scale projects in developing countries, 
and its effect on the environmental and social risk management policies among 
commercial banks.527 Prior to these campaigns, commercial bank financing in 
developing countries still generated adverse environmental and social impacts, but 
information about these was not widely circulated until transnational advocacy 
groups brought attention to it.
526 Haufler (1999). See Newell (2001), pp.97-100, for a discussion o f how NGOs generate 
counterinformation as part of monitoring the activities of TNCs.
527 As one senior sustainability officer at a German bank noted; ‘the NGOs made the final push to 
bring issues to the forefront. The campaigns elevated the issue to a higher plain once banks realized 
that their reputation and brand were endangered. That caught the attention of senior management 
executives.’ (EPFI-07) As an example, in explaining gradual cascade in the U.S banking sector, UNEP 
(2006) attributed the environmental policy development at Citigroup, Bank of America and JP Morgan 
Chase to RAN’s long-standing Global Finance Campaign. (UNEP 2006, p. 17)
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In promoting the ‘greening’ o f commercial project financing, transnational advocacy 
groups engaged in three types o f  mutually-supportive advocacy activities. First, at ai 
initial stage, they have been very prolific in generating research on the environmen&l 
and social costs o f  commercial project financing in developing countries, and 
blending this in with specific policy recommendations. Oftentimes, the World Ban! 
standards and procedures were held up as a benchmark for responsible project 
financing. In most cases, reports have singled out specific projects or industries and 
brought to light examples o f environmental and social injustices in remote areas thd: 
have not generated any media attention in the home countries o f the respective 
commercial banks. As an example, in 2000, Milieudefensie and Greenpeace in tie 
Netherlands, with input from an Indonesian network o f local NGOs working against 
palm oil plantations, released a report, Funding Forest Destruction, which cataloged 
the impacts o f the government program on Indonesia’s forests and the people that 
depended on them.529 The same year, the CIFOR and WWF released a report -  
Profits and Paper - that documented how up to £7.5 billion in foreign investment iito 
the Indonesian pulp and paper industry was significantly contributing to 
deforestation.
There is a strong recognition among leading commercial banks that published 
research by Banktrack members was important in raising awareness about the 
negative impacts that project financing could have on local communities and the 
environment. In cases where commercial banks were unaware o f these impacts, such 
reports have been used by commercial banks as additional sources o f information.
For example, project finance executives at ABN Amro have openly admitted that 
Milieudefensie’s campaign against mining operations in Papua New Guinea was a 
real ‘wake-up call’ for its risk management committee. In other cases, such researck 
reports have directly conflicted with information released by the commercial banks or 
their borrowers, thereby forcing them to provide additional documentation to back jp  
their assessments. Yet, in both cases, whether NGO-generated research unearthed 
new information or challenged corporate reporting, it discursively influenced pubic 
understandings o f the impact o f transnational business on the environment and local 
communities in developing countries.
Secondly, advocacy groups integrated this research into specific advocacy campaigns 
directed at commercial banks and their stakeholders, which became central to 
broadening public expectations about the roles and responsibilities o f commercial 
banks in promoting sustainable development.530 Many o f the advocacy groups that 
would later form Banktrack, including FOE (numerous chapters), WWF, and 
Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale (CRBM), had experience staging
528 In a survey of commercial banks, events such as ‘polluting incidences’ that generate significant 
media coverage were associated with a considerable risk to corporate reputation. (ISIS 2002, p. 10)
529 Milieudefensie (2000). The report recommended that Dutch banks refrain from financing 
plantations unless guarantees were given that the borrower would not clear more land to make way for 
new plantations, or violate the rights o f local people and Indonesian law.
530 For the role o f NGOs in the ‘greening’ o f the World Bank, see Bramble and Porter (1992), pp.325- 
336), Keck and Sikkink (1998), O’Brien et.al (2000), pp.l 15-134, Park (2006), Rich (1993), and Wade 
(1997).
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campaigns against multilateral lenders, and drew lessons from those successes when 
confronting the commercial banking industry. Therefore, it was not surprising that the 
campaigns emulated those previously launched against the World Bank and the IFC. 
As described in greater detail in chapter 6, it began in the mid-1990s when advocacy 
groups realized that despite having been successful in persuading multilateral lenders 
to shun the Three Gorges Dam project because o f the likely ecological damages it 
would cause, the development was still being bankrolled by foreign lenders. 
Specifically, a number o f commercial banks and investment houses were indirectly 
financing the project as purchasers o f Chinese bonds, prompting advocacy groups to 
criticize them publicly. In this and other projects, the initial step was to thoroughly 
document environmental and social harms associated with a project, and persuasively 
try and tie these to the negligence or wrong-doing o f commercial banks.
Yet, in order to generate adverse media publicity, it was also necessary for 
transnational advocacy groups to demonstrate that commercial banks could have 
intervened to prevent the damages, or alternatively, should have avoided financing 
the project in the first place. Commonly, advocacy groups would present evidence o f 
environmental and social harm and attribute blame to commercial banks, which in 
response countered such claims with statements o f  innocence. To build pressure, 
advocacy groups would creatively mobilize market actors, including consumers and 
shareholders, that for either financial or ethical reasons objected to the actions o f 
financial institutions. In some cases, campaigns directly targeted senior bank 
executives, by for example disrupting public appearances or even picketing their 
homes, whereas more commonly, they staged small demonstrations outside of 
corporate offices, handing out flyers to passers-by to great effect. As one senior bank 
official noted, ‘there is nothing that concentrates your mind more than having people 
outside o f your building, sending in complaint letters, and threats going into your 
CEO’s office’ 531
And third, advocacy groups also influenced the development o f environmental and 
social risk management policies by directly engaging with commercial banks in 
bilateral discussions. Oftentimes, advocacy groups were invited to speak with bank 
executives following sustained campaigns in which adverse media coverage o f the 
involvement o f banks in particular ‘problem projects’ was getting continuously 
worse. For example, on the back o f the public campaign against ABN Amro over its 
financing o f a copper and gold mine in Papua New Guinea, Milieudefensie was 
eventually invited by the bank to discuss a resolution o f the matter. Similarly, after its 
sustained advocacy campaign against Citigroup, RAN was invited to meet its senior 
management to discuss ways in which the bank could operate more responsibly. In 
both cases, heated confrontations in the press over the responsibilities o f financial 
institutions for the adverse environmental and social impacts o f project financing 
were replaced with direct dialogue because the respective commercial banks wanted 
to end a wave o f adverse media coverage.
531 EPFI-06.
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In turn, once channels o f dialogue had opened up, the dynamic between them 
gradually evolved into a process o f argumentation, in which each side sought to 
convince the other, and the general public, about the validity and legitimacy o f 
conflicting truth claims. To come across as more persuasive, advocacy groups 
cushioned their moral claims within well-recognized international norms, such as the 
precautionary principles, human rights, and transparency, whereas commercial banks 
stressed the limited responsibility, leverage and opportunity they had for addressing 
these concerns, given the financial and legal structure o f project financing. They also 
initially claimed that their mandates as fiduciaries barred them from imposing 
particular environmental and social conditions on loans and disclosing information on 
the specifics o f financial transactions.
Yet, despite the proliferation o f advocacy campaigns against commercial banks, it 
was not inevitable that the growing reputational risk o f project financing would 
translate into a common industry standard eventually backed by a majority o f 
commercial banks active in the global project finance market. For that to happen, 
both the IFC’s role in convening industry leaders and legitimating the framework, 
and the willingness o f commercial banks to engage in cooperation, was instrumental. 
The next section will identify the main initiators o f the Equator Principles by 
reviewing the significance o f  the IFC’s role in the Equator Principles in the context of 
the evolving institutional relationship between international organizations and 
transnational business.
8.4 The Main Initiators: Commercial Banks and the IFC
The growing scrutiny o f commercial banks on the one hand, and the emergence o f the 
IFC as a significant actor in global environmental governance on the other, provided 
a foundation for the initial interactions that led to the Equator Principles. While 
advocacy groups produced the institutional context in which commercial banks 
increasingly felt under pressure to mitigate the adverse development impacts o f their 
projects, it was not a given that this pressure would lead to a common industry 
standard. Notably, as much as advocacy groups wanted commercial banks to formally 
adopt the IFC’s operational policies, they did not have the power or capability to 
either force them to do so individually or create a collective framework o f this nature. 
Instead, the initiative to produce a collective industry response to the growing public 
scrutiny o f project investments originated from within the industry, driven by leading 
commercial banks and the IFC, an increasingly influential multilateral lender to 
private sector projects in developing countries.
Commercial Banks as Global Standard-Setters
Since the early 1990s, market reforms in developing countries have resulted in the 
widespread privatization o f traditional public sector industries, harmonization o f tax 
regimes, and lower restrictions on foreign capital. These favorable investment
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conditions prompted TNCs based in OECD countries to expand internationally to the 
fastest growing developing countries, contributing to a tremendous growth in long­
term private capital flows to infrastructure projects, including power plants, roads, 
ports and telecommunication.532 In turn, commercial banks eagerly followed their 
corporate clients abroad, bankrolling large-scale investment projects at a rapid pace, 
surpassing multilateral financing in volume in many countries.5 Given the growing 
competition between investors in developing countries, project finance lenders have 
been forced to sharpen their competitiveness by improving the terms o f financing, 
expanding advisory work and streamlining loan consideration and approval 
processes.
Hence, improving credit risk processes was very much on the minds o f banking 
executives at the time they were invited by the IFC and ABN Amro to participate in a 
workshop on environmental and social risk management practices in project finance. 
Many commercial banks suffered heavy financial losses in their developing country 
portfolios in the late 1990s, as a result o f economic crisis in Asia and Russia. 
Therefore, during this period, commercial banks paid more attention to developing 
effective and prudent risk management practices, particularly for large-scale 
investments in developing countries. In terms o f environmental risk management, 
commercial banks were at this stage predominately focused on mitigating credit risk, 
or the possibility that adverse environmental impacts could undermine the ability of 
the borrower to repay the loan, and security risk, or the possibility that environmental 
contamination would devalue assets used as collateral. Thus, the practice among 
some leading commercial banks o f referring to the Safeguard Policies in an ad-hoc 
fashion when financing complex projects was in part an aspect o f prudent risk 
management but also reflected a recognition that a failure to do so could generate a 
reputational risk.
Yet, whereas project-specific risks could be mitigated by commercial banks in an 
individual fashion, reputational risks were o f a different nature, requiring a broad 
industry response to be effectively managed. As an element o f this greater visibility, 
commercial project lenders became increasingly subjected to the same levels o f 
public scrutiny as multilateral development banks, since they were increasingly 
associated with controversial projects that entailed the disruption o f ecosystems and 
local communities. These developments made commercial banks more receptive to 
arguments that neglecting to manage environmental and social risks could adversely 
affect business by resulting in costly delays and a damaged reputation in the 
marketplace.
What induced cooperation between them to create industry standards for commercial 
project finance banks was the realization that they confronted similar reputational 
threats in their project finance business. As a result o f this convergence in interests, a
532 Esty (2004).
533 According to the World Bank (2004), commercial bank financing for infrastructure in developing 
countries increased nine-fold between 1990 and 1997, and the annual volume o f project finance deals 
exploded from less than £2.5 billion to over £25 billion.
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concentrated industry, and a high degree o f cooperation on financial transactions, 
commercial banks were able to collectively negotiate standards for environmental and 
social risk management that would not undermine their competitiveness. As 
documented in chapter seven, through a series o f workshops commercial banks 
presented their experiences with project finance transactions in developing countries 
and share ideas on how to mitigate risk. A core group o f commercial banks 
volunteered to forma working group that together with the IFC would devote time 
and resources to formulate a set o f standards that could be appealing to a critical mass 
o f commercial banks. Subsequently, these commercial banks consulted their clients 
and some o f the environmental advocacy groups that had been there most frequent 
critics, in an effort to design a framework that was both acceptable from a 
commercial point o f  view, and legitimate from the perspective o f the public. All in 
all, the framework was driven by the interests o f the commercial banks, as they 
recognized that gaining the support o f a critical mass o f commercial banks in the 
marketplace was always what separated success from failure.
The IFC as an Advocate fo r  Voluntary Business Regulation
Right about the same time as commercial banks were increasingly targeted by 
advocacy groups, the IFC was positioning itself as a depository o f knowledge and 
expertise on environmental and social risk management in developing countries. 
Throughout the 1990s, it gradually expanded its policy framework and added 
environmental and social specialists to its staff, in part as a response to campaigns by 
the same environmental advocacy groups. In 2000, the IFC launched the 
‘Sustainability Initiative’, a strategic framework with a number o f new metrics that 
embedded its environmental and social mission within its overarching aim of 
promoting private sector growth and investment. The initiative reflected the client- 
driven agenda that was increasingly influencing policies and strategies within the 
World Bank Group more broadly.534 By applying the framework, the IFC also 
intended to demonstrate that multilateral financing to the private sector was still 
necessary, despite the tremendous growth in private capital flows to developing 
countries in the 1990s.
As part o f this effort, the IFC’s new institutional role was to supplement its due 
diligence framework with a focus on identifying, enhancing and realizing the 
‘business case’ for its clients to voluntarily adopt environmental and social 
practices.535 By taking on an advisory role relative to borrowers, rather than a role as 
a regulator, it placed less emphasis on broadening and enforcing rules and 
requirements, and more on appealing ‘to firms’ self-interest as a means o f enhancing
534 In terms o f the environmental agenda, this most forcefully manifested itself in June 2006, when the 
World Bank announced it would disband the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
(ESSD) network and merge it with the Bank's infrastructure department, and create a new Sustainable 
Development Department It was meant to streamline management and enhance coordination between 
operational and support staff, ultimately increasing its efficiency in meeting the demands of borrowers 
during the preparation o f projects.
535 IFC (2002).
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the sustainability o f economic activity.’536 Relative to other financial institutions, it 
sought to assert itself as ‘a partner of choice’ by offering environmental and social 
risk management training, producing research on managing development impacts o f 
projects, and promoting voluntary business regulation as the institutional mechanism 
o f choice for increasing corporate environmental performance and accountability.
This strategic initiative, combined with personal relationships between IFC staff and 
project finance executives o f other banks, made the IFC well placed to assist 
commercial banks in designing the Equator Principles. Its role in convening the first 
workshop alongside ABN Amro in 2002 was essential, as the latter did not have the 
legitimacy to do so on its own. Since the workshop would require competitors to 
share sensitive information about their internal credit risk procedures, the 
participation o f the IFC was critical to giving the project finance executives o f 
commercial banks enough comfort that the exercise was worthwhile, and that the 
information would not be misused. During the working group’s deliberations and in 
subsequent workshops, the IFC participated by providing technical advice on 
formulating standards, and informing banks how they would be implemented in 
projects. All in all, the involvement o f an ‘honest broker’ that enjoyed legitimacy and 
trust within the industry was critical in order for commercial banks to cooperate on 
matters that had long been determined by market competition.
In initiating the deliberations that led to the launch o f the Equator Principles, 
commercial banks and the IFC drew on various sources o f influence and power, 
unavailable to other actors. The next section briefly discusses them.
8.5 Sources of Influence: Corporate Power, Technical Expertise and Legitimacy
Both commercial banks and the IFC have been beneficiaries o f the gradual 
liberalization o f global capital markets and the growth in investment opportunities in 
developing countries. IFC’s total committed portfolio increased six-fold between the 
mid-1980s to 2000, from less than $1 billion in annual commitments to over $6 
billion. During this time, its engagement with the financial sector deepened, reflected 
in a growing portfolio o f debt and equity investments to financial institutions, as well 
as risk management training to financial executives in developing countries. 
Alongside a growing perception in the development community that economic 
development could only be achieved through private sector growth, the IFC raised its 
stature within the World Bank Group because o f its distinctly commercial orientation. 
Moreover, during the 1990s, a number o f commercial banks gradually increased their 
project portfolios and market share, becoming important sources o f capital for 
developing countries wishing to build ports, oil and gas pipelines, hydropower dams, 
palm oil plantations, and transport infrastructure. Their growing influence on the flow 
o f long-term private capital to developing country projects, and the terms upon which 
financing was provided, is part o f the explanation for how and why they were able to
536 IFC (2003), p.20.
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devise an industry standard for managing environmental and social risks with limited 
public interference.
Commercial Banks: Market Power and Technical Expertise
Although the timing o f the Equator Principles can be traced back to the rise o f 
environmental advocacy campaigns in the late 1990s, the commercial banks that hold 
a dominate position in the project finance market have from the beginning been the 
most prominent advocates o f the framework, and have played a leading role in 
persuading competitor banks to endorse it. As one bank official noted;
‘The IFC was interested in getting this initiative up and running. After all, the Equator 
Principles are based on the IFC’s standards. But after things started to move, it was primarily 
driven by the banks. O f course they talked with the IFC, but the whole thing was bank-driven. 
In the end, it is the banks that have to implement it, and it is their reputation that is at stake. 
IFC was there to provide input, but banks were chairing sessions and creating the framework.’
- EPFI-12.
The Equator Principles did not emerge from within a government or international 
organization, and was not directly prompted by regulation. In fact, an important 
backdrop to its emergence was that developing countries did not have regulations that 
forced project developers or banks to follow ‘international best practice’ standards in 
the construction and operation of projects. As a result, commercial banks enjoyed 
significant discretion in tailoring the framework to their commercial imperatives with 
limited public interference, on the basis o f their powerful position in the marketplace. 
Given that inducing a critical mass o f commercial banks to adopt the standards was 
the most important objective, the leverage o f individual banks in the negotiations was 
somewhat commensurate with their market share. Indeed, the four commercial banks 
that comprised the working group were among the largest commercial project finance 
lenders in developing countries. 7
In each o f  these banks, there were banking executives that showed a particular 
interest in addressing environmental and social risk management in project financing, 
and given that a direct relationship had emerged between the adverse environmental 
and social impacts o f selected projects and the corporate reputation o f commercial 
banks, senior management executives happily gave space for them to explore the 
development o f common standards for the industry.5 8 Interviews revealed that many 
of these individuals had personal ideational commitments to environmental and social 
issues, and wanted their respective organizations to reflect that. But in promoting 
these standards and procedures internally and externally, they relied heavily on 
developing commercial justifications for doing so. According to one bank official, 
while the mandates o f the project finance executives in the policy discussions were
537 In 2001, ABN Amro, Barclays, Citigroup and WestLB arranged more than £7.5 billion in project 
financing, or 17.5 percent o f the market occupied by the 20 largest arrangers (‘Four Bank Adopt IFC 
Agreement’, by Demetri Sevastopulos, Financial Times, April 9,2003)
538 EPFI-07.
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not open-ended, senior management at the respective banks wanted ‘a framework that 
could guarantee that risks associated with individual projects would be addressed 
across the board.’ 539
Throughout the drafting process, commercial banks as a group unilaterally made 
decisions with regard to the scope and content o f the framework, with little 
interference from the IFC or transnational advocacy groups.540 In fact, the working 
group, in consultation with other commercial banks, was deciding upon which 
elements o f the IFC framework was applicable to commercial project lending, and 
which were not. While it was acknowledged that the framework had to be perceived 
as legitimate by the public in order to be effective in rebuilding their damaged 
reputations, the overarching goal was to find a common standard that would generate 
as much interest as possible within the commercial banking industry. To this end, the 
initial proposal from the working group was adjusted many times during the 
consultation phase, in response to objections from commercial banks whose 
participation was deemed to be o f critical importance. For example, whereas the draft 
presented by the working group in February 2003 covered all financing for limited or 
non-recourse transactions, the final version limited the scope o f the framework to 
‘direct lending’, thereby excluding equity and bond financing. Furthermore, the $50 
million lower threshold (reduced to $10 million in EP2) was added because o f 
concerns raised by some banks that the administrative costs associated with applying 
the framework to small projects would be excessive. And finally, interviews revealed 
that the concern for anti-trust accusations among commercial banks from the United 
States was one o f the primary reasons that the commercial banks did not establish a 
secretariat with its own mandate and resources.
Apart from the market share o f commercial banks in the project finance market, the 
operational experience and technical expertise of the project finance executives 
themselves was an important source o f influence. The operational focus o f the 
negotiations ensured that technical and commercial feasibility was the most important 
factor in determining the value o f any proposition about a particular standard. O f the 
four individuals that participated in the working group, three had been recognized as 
among the foremost experts in the project finance industry on environmental and 
social risk management. While the banks they represented enjoyed significant market 
shares, the personal experience and expertise o f these executives was also an 
important consideration for being selected.
By way o f the Equator Principles, these banking executives placed themselves in a 
position o f power to make crucial decisions about whether and how to apply 
standards and procedures that were originally created to safeguard public interests. As 
a result of the growing acceptance o f voluntary business regulation o f this kind, 
commercial banks became increasingly viewed by many as legitimate decision­
539 EPFI-07.
540 For example, a joint NGO declaration on after the launch of the Equator Principles clearly reflected 
how transnational advocacy groups were overall disappointed in how little their demands had been 
heard, particularly with regards to transparency and accountability. (Focus on Finance 2003)
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makers on matters that have historically been seen as antithetical to their commercial 
objectives, and been the responsibilities o f public sector organizations. The 
implication has been that the commercial imperatives that underlie risk management 
are increasingly seen as complementary to the need to protect the environment and 
project-affected communities from harm. In fact, commercial justifications, 
embedded in the language o f ‘sustainability’ and the ‘triple bottom line’, are 
gradually taking over the public discourse, replacing earlier mentions o f regulatory 
standards and extending right and entitlements to local communities.
The IFC: Market Power, Convening Power, and Technical Expertise
The IFC’s power in shaping the Equator Principles drew on three primary sources of 
influence that in many ways makes it unique among international organizations. 
Central to its influence on setting standards for responsible lending was the power it 
had in the global project finance market, as a lender, a source o f technical expertise, 
and its convening power as a legitimate ‘third-party’ broker.
First, the similarities between its financing operations, policies and procedures and 
professional culture and those o f commercial banks provided a basis for forging close 
relationships with them. The IFC’s mandate and organizational structure centre on 
identifying, evaluating, negotiating and closing financially viable investment projects. 
Its financing operations are organized in nine industry departments, each charged 
with identifying and completing investment projects in particular industries, such as 
agribusiness, infrastructure and global financial markets. Tasks associated with 
identifying and mitigating the environmental and social impacts o f project proposals 
are primarily handled by environmental specialists embedded in investment or 
country teams, or working in a separate support department. As a result o f this 
transactional orientation, the IFC’s operational staff primarily consists o f business 
professionals with advanced degrees in corporate finance or business management 
that would otherwise seek employment in the commercial banking industry
Secondly, apart from an organizational structure that focuses on project transactions, 
the IFC remains firmly wedded to its original purpose of mobilizing financial 
resources in support o f financially viable private sector projects in developing 
countries. In fact, during the 1990s, the environmental reforms at the IFC were driven 
by external pressures to better account for the development impacts o f its project 
investments. The IFC’s emphasis o f commercial viability effectively meant that IFC 
financing and commercial bank lending was broadly driven by the same organizing 
principle, which in turn guaranteed that the IFC’s technical advice to commercial 
banks would not directly conflict with their profit motive. On both an ideological and 
practical level, this confluence o f interests provided a basis for an exchange o f ideas 
and knowledge, in which the IFC’s technical advice was perceived as directly 
relevant, and neutral, to the current predicament o f commercial banks, namely 
mitigating the non-financial risks o f commercial investments.
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Third, given its focus on identifying financially viable transactions, the IFC engages 
with the environmental and social dimension o f private sector development on a 
project-by-project basis, and with business profitability in mind. While a significant 
purpose o f its environmental and social policy framework is to increase the 
development impact and accountability o f its financing operations, the IFC frequently 
argues for the existence o f a ‘business case’ for managing environmental and social 
issues in project investments.541 By having adopted this distinctly corporate 
perspective on environmental and social issues, the IFC had not only aligned its 
environmental and social mission with the concept o f corporate social responsibility, 
but also reinforced the notion that private sector growth and investment was a 
prerequisite for reversing environmental degradation and reducing poverty.
And finally, the IFC had during the last decade amassed considerable expertise in 
environmental and social risk management by increasing the number o f in-house 
environmental specialists from under 10 to over 100.542 In doing so, it frequently 
promoted its specialized expertise in environmental and social risk management, and 
positioned itself as ‘a partner o f choice’ for private borrowers in developing 
countries.543 And in the context o f its financial sector investments, it had provided 
environmental risk management training to financial institutions, produced guidance 
material diffusing its own operational experiences and made the case for considering 
environmental and social issues in investments.544 Many commercial banks benefited 
from this knowledge during the consultation process, and solicitied IFC’s advice on a 
bilateral basis after they adopted the framework.
In combination, its organizational structure, commercial orientation and technical 
expertise gave it considerable legitimacy in the global project finance market, and by 
extension, influence in the negotiations that preceded the launch o f the Equator 
Principles. It guaranteed that most commercial banks did not consider IFC’s interests 
in the negotiation process to conflict with their own, which allowed the IFC to 
operate as an ‘honest broker’ in the negotiations while clearly having an interest in 
establishing its environmental and social policy framework as the industry standard.
Given that commercial banks and the IFC were the main initiators o f the Equator 
Principles, and focused on devising a standard that was acceptable to the largest 
number o f  commercial banks, it is no surprise that the governance structure was 
uniquely transnational and market-based, as part o f ensuring the harmonization of 
policy commitments across countries and industries. The next section will briefly
541 IFC (2002a), Wright (2006), pp.71-76. Such cognitive frameworks are also prevalent at the World 
Bank. According to O’Brien et.al (2000), the World Bank’s gender agenda has focused on identifying 
and promoting a ‘business case’ for gender equity, based on an ‘economic rationale for investing in 
gender.’ (pp.47-49)
542 IFC (2002) and Park (2006).
543 IFC (2003), p.2, and Wright (2006).
544 After the launch o f the Equator Principles, the IFC exploited its enhanced leverage and expertise to 
form a partnership with the U.N Global Compact and the UNEP FI to further the integration of 
environmental and social issues in financial markets.
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review how and why the governance structure o f the Equator Principles took this 
form.
8.6 Governance Structure: Transnational, Market-Based Regulation
Notwithstanding the conformance with existing international institutions, the 
governance structure o f the Equator Principles reflects the interests o f commercial 
banks and manifests their growing power in global governance. Given their discretion 
in devising the framework, and the importance o f  mobilizing a critical mass of 
commercial banks to adopt it, negotiating parties were primarily interested in 
designing standards that could be applied globally across projects in all industry 
sectors, and be integrated into the commercial banks with often very different 
organizational structures and credit risk procedures. The resulting governance 
structure was therefore uniquely tailored to the strategic interests o f  the commercial 
banks involved in the negotiations.
First, while the content o f the Equator Principles is strongly associated with norms 
promoted by powerful states and implemented by international organizations , its 
institutional design is uniquely tailored to the strategic interests o f commercial banks. 
It is voluntary for commercial banks to adopt the framework, and once adopted, there 
is no independent enforcement mechanism that monitors compliance or sanctions 
implementation lapses. As is stated, compliance with host country laws and 
regulations and relevant World Bank and IFC guidelines will be addressed to the 
satisfaction o f the financier. So whereas World Bank and IFC compliance with 
operational policies can be enforced by project-affected communities by submitting 
claims to the World Bank Inspection Panel and the CAO, respectively, no such 
accountability mechanism exists for the Equator Principles.5 5 Instead, as stated, 
‘each institution adopting the Equator Principles individually declares that it has or 
will put in place internal policies and processes that are consistent with the Equator 
Principles’, and as is clarified, ‘this can be done at any time.’ 546 Moreover, since the 
launch o f  the Equator Principles, transnational advocacy groups have almost in vain 
called for greater accountability and transparency that allows for independent 
auditing o f compliance.547 While a reporting provision was inserted into the revised 
framework in July 2006, it does not require commercial lenders to disclose project- 
level information beyond an environmental assessment report for the largest 
projects.
545 Not only is an accountability mechanism missing, but the document explicitly states that ‘the 
adopting EPFIs view these Principles as a financial industry benchmark for developing individual, 
internal social and environmental policies, procedures and practices. As with all internal policies, these 
Principles do not create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private. Institutions are 
adopting and implementing these Principles voluntarily and independently, without reliance on or 
recourse to IFC or the World Bank.’ (Equator Principles (2006), p.5)
546 See www.equator-principles.com. See also Appendix 1.
547 See Banktrack (2006) and Missbach (2004)
548 See ‘Guidance to EPFIs on Equator Principles Implementation Reporting’, Date o f Access: July 2, 
2007. www.equator-principles.eom/documents/EPReporting_2007-06-12.pdf
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Second, in addition to its voluntary nature and discretionary language, the Equator 
Principles outright lack many elements o f the IFC’s policy framework which 
commercial banks deemed to be inappropriate or inapplicable to commercial project 
lending. Most notably, the IFC’s Exclusion List, which identifies certain economic 
activities that are not eligible for financing, does not figure in the Equator 
Principles.549 Nor does it include the IFC’s disclosure policy, which is an important 
element o f its engagement with civil society, yet deemed incompatible with the need 
for commercial banks to maintain client confidentiality. These policies are central to 
the IFC’s accountability framework, and its relationships with stakeholders.
Third, as a result o f the preferences o f commercial banks, the framework was not 
initially embedded in any kind o f formal structure. It has no formal organization or 
secretariat, and communication with stakeholders is done through a website hosted by 
one o f the Equator banks on a rotating basis. Communication between adopting banks 
is not systematic, but takes place informally in ad-hoc workshops organized by one o f 
them. Environmental advocacy groups have lamented the fact that communicating 
with adopting banks requires them to send individual e-mails to an increasing number 
o f banks, given that there is no system for managing communication with external 
observers. To address this, a formal structure with working groups was introduced in 
2007, but it lacks mec hanisms for self-policing, let alone independent auditing o f 
compliance.
And fourth, and more broadly, just as the integration o f the World Bank’s standards 
and procedures into the IFC’s financing operations meant they would be promoted in 
the multilateral system as an aspect o f responsible private sector financing, so did 
their adoption by commercial banks mean that they were increasingly justified as a 
central element o f prudent risk management. The professional training and 
responsibilities o f the banking executives that determined the direction and pace of 
negotiations ensured that commercial and operational imperatives took center stage. 
Whereas TNCs participating in consultations on voluntary guidelines are often 
represented by executives from public relations or corporate sustainable development 
units, policy discussions associated with the Equator Principles were dominated by 
risk management professionals from project finance units that worked directly with 
transactions on a daily basis.550 From their perspective, applying environmental and 
social standards to projects was not principally understood as a moral or ethical 
imperative, but represented a way to address an emerging and compelling risk that 
was increasingly affecting their project finance business in developing countries.
Overall, the content and institutional design o f the Equator Principles ensure that the 
framework conformed with the theory and practice o f project risk management, as 
outlined in chapter four. This placed the consideration o f environmental and social
549 For example, as a result of applying the exclusion list, the IFC is barred from financing projects that 
include the production of weapons, tobacco, pesticides or radioactive materials. See IFC (1998), 
p.19.
550 IFC-04.
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issues solidly within a commercial imperative to enhance the financial viability o f a 
project, and a legal requirement not to influence the project beyond what is permitted 
in fiduciary relationships. In general terms, such risk management involves making 
judgements about the significance o f project-related inputs and impacts, including the 
identification o f risks to the project, and choosing which risks to ignore, mitigate or 
prevent, including by what means, and formulating operational plans and establishing 
procedures to monitor them. Therefore, the commercial justification for these 
standards and procedures is that they enable a financial institution to finance lucrative 
projects that are associated with high levels o f environmental, social and reputational 
risks. In short, they are designed to enable an expansion o f business, not force a 
constriction.
For environmental advocacy groups, this is a grand paradox o f the Equator Principles. 
As the voluntary framework allows commercial banks to manage risks better, it 
enables them to increase the volume o f bankable projects by financing those that 
would previously be deemed too risky. As a means to efficiently manage and allocate 
risk, project financing relies upon the capacity o f lenders to identify, assess and 
mitigate all project-related issues that could impinge on the future revenue streams o f 
projects. Those commercial banks that are strategically pursuing projects in 
environmentally-sensitive industries are therefore significantly exposed to 
reputational pressures, and institutionalizing a comprehensive risk management 
process can ensure that they are made aware o f potential project ‘controversies’, and 
stand prepared to respond to any external criticisms.551 For these commercial banks, 
including ABN Amro, Citigroup and WestLB, there is an expectation that many of 
the largest and most lucrative projects in the future will be in remote areas in states 
with weak governance, conditions that typically invite significant external scrutiny. In 
this context, developing risk management practices commensurate to the likely levels 
o f future risk exposure makes business sense.
8.7 W hy N orm s A re A dopted: The M itigation o f R eputational R isk
Based on the empirical analysis, the thesis does not find support for the constructivist 
argument that the widespread adoption o f a norm among a group o f actors is 
preconditioned by a reconstitution o f their identities and interests. The primary 
research did not find evidence that banks had internalized the norms to the extent that 
failing to comply with them would be seen as antithetical to their corporate identities. 
Instead, it argues that a commercial bank’s decision to adopt the Equator Principles 
was largely strategic and primarily based on the level o f reputational risk it was 
exposed to through its project finance business. In the context o f investments in
551 As a environmental risk officer at one of the four commercial banks in the working group noted, 
‘the original four banks had been involved with difficult transactions during which they had received 
questions and queries about how environmental and social issues were managed in projects. Prior to 
implementing systematic risk processes, it was very difficult for the banks to answer those questions, 
and by and large, they could not confidently say whether standards had been met, as this was not part 
o f their formal credit policies.’ (EPFI-08)
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developing countries, a commercial banks’ reputational risk can be defined as ‘the 
probability o f being a target o f a public campaign multiplied by the cost for the bank 
of such a campaign.’ 552 Given that international banking is increasingly based on 
building client relationships, commercial banks are extremely sensitive to their 
reputation in the market place, and this fact is reflected in adoption patterns.
It is possible to identify a number of factors that explain why commercial banks face 
different levels o f exposure to reputational risk. Drawing on research presented in 
chapters 6 and 7, figure 8.1 summarizes findings o f the three most significant factors 
for determining the extent to which a financial institution’s project finance 
investments in developing countries are likely to lead to reputational damages.
First, the level o f home country pressure on the financial institution to consider 
environmental and social issues in investments is important in determining the 
likelihood that a controversial project in a developing country will translate into a 
reputational liability. Exposure increases significantly if  the financial institution has a 
large consumer banking network, as banking customers are in position to directly 
punish its commercial standing by withdrawing funds and moving accounts to a 
competitor. As a result, the fact that a commercial bank is a deposit-taking financial 
institution that allow consumers to make their preferences known in the marketplace 
enhances the leverage o f  advocacy groups, and makes it much more likely that public 
revelations o f irresponsible financing practices will result in financial costs.553 Apart 
from advocacy groups and ‘ethical’ bank customers, there is now a wide variety of 
public and private actors that put pressure on financial institutions to adopt more 
responsible investment practices, including socially responsible investment funds and 
environmental technology firms, pension funds and a wide range o f financial services 
clients. In addition, formal regulations or government-issued guidelines can call 
attention to the negative consequences that can be generated by the activities o f TNCs 
in developing countries, and force financial institutions to publicly disclose their 
corporate practices.
Secondly, the level o f host country pressure, or civic pressure against a development 
project in the country in which the project takes place, significantly determines the 
extent of negative local and international media coverage that is produced. In many 
cases, a controversy erupts when a local community organizes a protest or court 
action against a project operator over negligence or deliberate injustices, generating 
publicity around the adverse environmental and social impacts generated by a project. 
While the severity of ecological damages and social injustices is a factor in 
determining the level o f local opposition, the political rights and capacity o f  local 
community groups to organize a response and be heard is also crucial. In addition, in 
cases where local authorities bearing the costs o f a project are pitted against a 
national government that favors an export-oriented growth strategy, the extent to
552 EIRIS (2006), p.7
553 See Newell (2001) for a similar discussion. The importance of the institutional environment in the 
home country explains why two financial institutions involved in the same controversial development 
project may not be exposed to the same level o f reputational risk.
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which their claims o f injustices can be pursued in the national legal system or stir 
public debate is also an important factor.
More broadly, the level o f environmental laws and regulations and the extent to 
which they are comprehensively enforced contributes to the level o f pressure in host 
countries. For example, requirements associated with the provision o f operating 
permits and licenses can put pressure on financial institutions to undertake more 
rigorous environmental and social risk studies. Similarly, if a project is found in 
violation of environmental laws and regulations, or the rights o f local communities, 
this would put project operators and lenders on the defensive in need o f recognizing 
failures and rectifying them. This explains why the most controversy has arisen in 
connection with large-scale development projects that require widespread 
government approvals, and undertaken in developed countries with generally mature 
democratic institutions and we 11-organized civil society groups, that collectively are 
able to mobilize political support behind the concerns o f project-affected
• • 554communities.
Figure 8.1 Project Financing in Developing Countries and Reputational Risk
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554 Exam ples include large-scale colon ization  projects in Brazil and Indonesia, and several hydropower 
projects in India, w hich have involved large-scale land conversion, infrastructure developm ent and the 
resettlem ent o f  local com m unities. M any o f  these are referenced in earlier chapters.
C hristopher W right 215
And third, the vulnerability o f a financial institution to a public backlash also depends 
on its overall role and market position in the project finance market, and the 
environmental risk profile o f  the projects it finances. In general terms, mandated 
arrangers, or those commercial banks nominated by the borrower to take the lead in 
negotiating contracts and conducting risk management, are commonly more exposed 
to reputational risk as an aspect o f their greater public visibility.555 In terms o f their 
individual project finance portfolios, both the geographical and sectoral distribution 
has an impact on the overall level o f environmental risk commercial banks are 
exposed to. For example, since systems o f governance and environmental 
management differ widely between developed and developing countries, an industrial 
accident is much less likely to happen in developed countries, and if  it does happen, 
will have much greater adverse impact on the environment or local people in 
developing countries.556 In terms o f sectors, projects in industries associated with 
significant adverse environmental impacts, such as oil, gas, mining and hydropower, 
are more likely to generate adverse environmental and social impacts than those in 
more service-oriented industries, such as health, education and telecommunications.
In the latter case, larger projects are also more likely to attract public attention than 
smaller projects.557
The regional representation o f financial institutions that have adopted the Equator 
Principles underscores the extent to which reputational risk is a primary driver in the 
decision to adopt a code o f conduct. Among the ten initial adopters, all were from 
Western Europe or North America, and many had significant project finance 
portfolios in high-risk sectors in developing countries. O f the thirty-two financial 
institutions that had adopted the framework a year after its launch, 53 percent 
(nineteen banks) were located in Europe, 25 percent (nine banks) in North America, 
with no representation in South Asia or South-East Asia. The remaining 23 percent is 
made up o f financial institutions headquartered in Brazil (14 percent, five banks), 
Japan (3 percent, one bank) and Australia (3 percent, one bank), and South Africa (3 
percent, one bank). Five years after its launch, the geographical distribution o f the 
signatory banks is less skewed, but still heavily weighted towards commercial banks 
in the OECD.
This skewed regional distribution towards OECD countries mirrors that o f other 
voluntary codes o f conduct targeting TNCs. For example, o f the current financial 
institutions that have signed the UNEP’s Statement by Financial Institutions on the 
Environment and Sustainable Development, 72 percent are from Europe, twelve 
percent from Asia and seven percent from North America, with only marginal 
representation from Africa (three percent), South America (two percent) and the 
Middle East (one percent).558 Regional figures for commitments to the GRI are
555 EIRIS (2006), p.9.
556 EPFI-06.
557 On this point, see Esty (2004).
558 See www.unepfi.org.
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Europe (48 percent), Asia (22 percent), Oceania (7 percent), Africa (5 percent) and 
Latin America (4 percent). And finally, corresponding figures for the United Nation’s 
Global Compact are Europe (46 percent), Asia (25 percent, North America (eight 
percent), with the remainder distributed across other regions.559
The overall conclusion about the significance o f reputational risk associated with 
project financing in developing countries finds support in numerous business surveys 
and reports. In a survey o f European and North American commercial banks 
conducted prior to the Equator Principles, reputational risk to be a ‘key policy driver’ 
in the development and expansion o f environmental credit risk assessment policies.560 
Freshfield Bruckhaus Deringer, the international law firm, conducted a much larger 
survey in which respondents repeatedly spoke o f ‘the value and importance o f 
reputation, the need to protect a good reputation and the difficulty in regaining a good 
reputation, if tarnished.’ 561 Similarly, in a more recent IFC survey o f financial 
institutions that have attended its Competitive Business Advantage Workshops, the 
most cited reason among respondents (66 percent) for considering environmental and 
social issues in investments was ‘increased credibility and gain in reputation.’ 562 
Similarly, when asked to identify key environmental and social risks, again the most 
cited reason given by financial institutions (76 percent) was ‘reputational risk / 
negative publicity with customers, shareholders and the general public’. 563 Indeed, as 
an example o f how adopting the Equator Principles benefits corporate reputation, 
Unibanco’s brand recognition as a socially responsible bank reportedly improved 
seven fold within the first three months o f adopting the framework.564
What does this empirical case tell us about the explanatory power o f the three 
beforementioned theoretical perspectives on private governance formation? As 
identified in chapter 3, the thesis adopted a synthesis approach for understanding 
private governance formation which carefully considered the validity o f power, 
interest, and knowledge-based approaches to understanding why private governance
559 These figures refer to all ‘participants’ o f the UN Global Compact, which includes companies (82 
percent), NGOs (seven percent), Labor (one percent), and cities, universities, associations and 
foundations (a combined ten percent), see McKinsey & Co.,’Assessing the Global Compact’s Impact’, 
May 11, 2004. Date o f Access: November 18,2005. 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/content/NewsDocs/Summit/imp_ass.pdf
560 ISIS (2002), p.9. In this survey o f commercial banks, it features a story of a Senior Director, who 
also held a board seat in another major industrial company. This company was the subject o f a high- 
profile environmental pollution incident. The industrial company suffered huge adverse publicity and a 
downturn in public sentiment which all board directors, including Non-Executives witnessed, up front. 
As a result, the senior director determined that the Bank should not allow itself to fall victim to such 
reputational damage, even if only indirectly through its client relationships. This event triggered the 
development of the bank’s environmental credit risk assessment policy. (ISIS 2002, p. 12).
561 FBD (2005), p.52. According to the report, banks used ‘reputation’ in two different senses. First, 
the need to protect the public image o f the institution regarding internal decisions such as what 
projects to finance and, second, the vulnerability of the reputation o f the bank to what the bank’s 
customers or clients do, such as what project sponsors do in areas which are out o f the control o f the 
bank.
562 See IFC (2007), p.5.
563 See IFC (2007), p.6.
564 UNEP (2006), p. 15.
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emerges. Having reviewed the emergence o f the Equator Principles in detail, the final 
section will draw some conclusions about the validity o f these perspectives relative to 
the six dimensions o f private governance formation that were considered.
8.8 Sum m ary: Revisiting the T hree Theoretical Perspectives
Overall, the empirical analysis provides support for a theoretical approach that 
resembles what Hurrell (1993) refers to as ‘weak cognitivism’. The study o f private 
environmental governance entails explaining why TNCs include environmental and 
social considerations, many commonly regarded as public interest concerns, into their 
business practices in developing countries. It is difficult to explain the growth o f 
corporate environmental practices, and private environmental governance more 
broadly, without reference to the changing public expectations o f corporate 
performance. The commercial rationale for integrating environmental and social 
considerations into business practices rests in part on the need to enhance corporate 
reputation and defend corporate brands against reputational damages. As a result, 
there is often direct link between the pursuit o f commercial objectives in the private 
sector and the evolution o f public expectations and judgements about the legitimacy 
o f different forms o f corporate behavior. While the former can be understood within a 
rational-materialist logic, the latter is subject to the meanings and understandings 
external observers attach to different corporate practices. As such, understanding how 
and why norms emerge in the private sector is critical to explain variations in 
corporate environmental practices.
Chapter 3 identified three competing hypothesis for how and why private governance 
emerges, and table 8.2 summarizes the main findings. The theoretical perspective that 
was found to have the most explanatory power for each o f the different aspects o f 
private governance formation is shaded in grey. While the analysis found support for 
elements o f all three theoretical perspectives, a neo-liberal institutionalist approach 
had the most explanatory power among the three. Not surprisingly, its explanatory 
power proved to be particularly strong relative to the other approaches in explaining 
those aspects o f private governance formation that sough to explain behavior, and 
less useful in explaining why norms emerge and diffuse. Conversely, neither one of 
the three theoretical perspectives were found to have most explanatory power across 
all six dimensions o f governance formation.
W hy Norm s Em erge: On the question as to why the Equator Principles became 
based on a particular set o f environmental and social norms that had been 
institutionalized in the multilateral system, as opposed to norms that had emerged 
from within the private sector, the thesis finds support for a realist argument that 
powerful states, directly or idirectly through international organizations, in large part 
determine why particular norms emerge. In other words, having been institutionalized 
in the multilateral system seems to be a prerequisite for a norm to be influential, and 
by extension, for environmental advocacy group promoting it to be successful.
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Table 8.2 Three Perspectives on Private Governance Form ation -  Main Findings
Realism Neo- Liberal 
Institutionalism
Constructivism
Why norms emerge Hegemony Efficiency Legitimacy
Timing Shift in balance of 
power between states
Change in institutional 
conditions and interest 
structure
Rise and fall of 
international norms
Main initiators States (and 
interna tional 
orgamza tions)
States, international 
organizations and 
transnational actors
Nonn entrepeneuis 
(both states and non­
state actors)
Sources of influence Economic resources Economic resources / 
technical expertise
Knowledge / 
legitimate moral 
claims
Governance
structure
(Inter )na tional, 
state-based
Transnational,
market-based
Global,
society-based
Why norms are 
adopted
Response to coercion Convergence in 
interests and 
response to incentives
Effect of persuasion
Thus, while environmental advocacy groups were instrumental in diffusing norms 
between the institutional contexts o f public- and private project finance, their success 
in large part depended on the legitimacy that these norms already enjoyed among 
states in the international system. For example, their success in pressing for 
environmental reforms at the World Bank in the 1980s depended heavily on 
mobilizing the support o f key members o f the U.S Congress, which used the United 
States’ veto power on the Bank’s board to establish an Environment Department and 
institutionalize environmental and social policies, particularly the public disclosure o f 
environmental impact assessments. (the Pelosi Amendment, 1990) Therefore, this 
meant that when commercial banks initially rejected the norms and claimed they were 
irrelevant to their commercial project financing, they implicitly challenged the 
legitimacy o f the World Bank, and by extension its government shareholders, in 
setting standards in transnational markets.
However, the alternative theoretical explanations o f norm emergence were not 
entirely without merit. Neo-liberal institutionalists would argue that norms which 
most effectively solve conflicts and coordination problems between market 
participants and increase the efficiency o f  interactions are more likely to emerge and 
become institutionalized. An important objective for commercial banks leading the 
negotiations was to produce a framework that would prevent a divergence in 
environmental and social risk management practices, so as to avoid a race-to-the-
C hristopher W right 219
bottom in which competitive pressures would induce some banks to bypass the 
standards in exchange for more business. As a result, harmonizing practices was in 
many ways more important than which sets o f standards that would be adopted. 
Choosing the IFC’s policy framework as a blueprint for the Equator Principles was 
based in part on the fact that commercial banks, their clients, and public agencies 
involved with issuing operating permits and licenses were very familiar with them.
As such, linking the Equator Principles with the IFC’s policy framework ensured 
continued harmonization in the practices o f public and private lenders, which clearly 
has its efficiency benefits when they co-finance projects. Yet, the reason that the 
these norms had become influential was precisely because they enjoyed a multilateral 
endorsement for addressing a variety o f public interest concerns.
Timing: In terms o f explaining the timing o f the Equator Principles, the thesis finds 
considerable support for the constructivist hypothesis that governance emerges as a 
consequence o f norms shifts, which are triggered by the actions o f norm 
entrepreneurs. The emergence and diffusion o f environmental and social norms in the 
project finance market cannot be understood without reference to the growing 
influence o f environmental advocacy groups. While their success rested on a strong 
moral case, which the existence o f the World Bank’s policy framework provided, the 
staging o f advocacy campaigns was nevertheless a precondition for commercial 
banks to consider adopting them. Without them, the adverse environmental and social 
impacts o f projects would not have been identified to the media, shareholders, 
consumers and indeed the banks themselves. These groups successfully argued that 
commercial banks should be held equally accountable for projects as public lenders, 
which meant abiding by the standards and procedures o f the World Bank. As the 
empirical chapters demonstrated, the negotiations that led to the launch o f the 
Equator Principles started at a time when the public scrutiny o f projects peaked, as 
industry leaders all faced considerable pressure to mitigate the adverse development 
impacts o f their projects. Therefore, as confirmed by interviews with bank executives, 
the efforts o f these norm entrepreneurs was the single most important factor in 
determining the timing o f the Equator Principles.
With regards to competing explanations, the realist hypothesis was not validated 
given that the timing o f the Equator Principles cannot be directly traced back to the 
actions o f any government. However, it is easy to identify a variety o f 
complementary institutional developments that set the stage for the framework to 
emerge, and that could provide support for a neo-liberal institutionalist argument that 
a focus on changing interest structures best explains the timing o f the framework. The 
Rio Summit in 1992 and the establishment o f the UNEP FI in its aftermath led to a 
growing consciousness in the banking sector o f both the risk that could materialize 
from being associated with controversial projects and the commercial opportunities 
presented by the growing public interest in sustainable development. In addition, 
numerous national-level policies alerted banks to the prospect that environmental 
damages associated with projects could result in legal liabilities, and shareholders 
began to put pressure on banks to strengthen internal control systems. As a result of 
both national and international developments, new environmental risk management
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units and business divisions developing green financial products began to emerge in 
the banking sector, increasingly as part o f an overall strategy to build a positive 
reputation in an increasingly competitive marketplace.
Yet, these developments do not explain the emergence o f cooperation between 
commercial banks engaged in project financing, and why such initiatives did not arise 
between investors in other financial markets. In this regard, the emergence o f the 
Equator Principles was a direct consequence o f the higher level o f public scrutiny 
against project finance loans in comparison to other forms o f financing, and the 
demands put forth by environmental advocacy groups that commercial banks abide 
the World Bank’s standards and procedures as a proxy for lending responsibly.
M ain In itiators: Notwithstanding the significance o f environmental advocacy 
groups, they lacked the authority to compel commercial banks to formally adopt the 
World Bank’s standards and procedures. While there would be no collective interest 
among commercial banks to pursue cooperation without them, the main initiators of 
the Equator Principles were the handful o f commercial banks that were under the 
most pressure to strengthen their environmental and social risk policies, and the IFC 
which was instrumental in convening them and providing technical expertise in the 
negotiations. The cooperation between commercial banks and the IFC built on 
relationships developed through their respective project finance operations. In 
particular, through its syndicated loan program, the IFC regularly partnered with 
commercial banks from the US, UK, the Netherlands and Germany, which resulted in 
personal relationships and informal ties between banking executives. These facilitated 
the organization o f the first workshop and were critical to attracting the interest o f a 
critical mass o f banks.
On the basis o f this observation, the thesis finds support for the neo-liberal 
institutionalist hypothesis that global financial and economic integration has 
expanded the influence o f transnational actors in world politics by increasing the 
value o f their resources and expertise. While commercial banks have taken 
advantages o f the opportunities that liberalization and privatization reforms provided 
them in developing countries, multilateral development banks are both products and 
drivers o f this development. For example, as a frequent promoter o f private sector 
growth and investment as the most viable development strategy, the IFC has put 
pressure on developing countries to accommodate foreign investment and facilitate 
the privatization o f industries. To this end, IFC financing is deliberately structured so 
as to stimulate additional private investment, thereby encouraging foreign investment, 
and more broadly, the globalization o f finance.
A notable observation about the emergence o f the Equator Principles is the complete 
absence o f direct state involvement in the negotiations. Governments were not 
represented at meetings, and on the basis o f primary data collected for this research, 
they were not consulted by either the IFC or the commercial banks in the consultation 
period that preceded the launch. While the praise that the framework has since 
received from governments, especially those o f capital-exporting countries, suggests
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that states may have endorsed the initiative and given it their tacit consent, it is 
nevertheless striking that a framework that would influence the way large public 
sector infrastructure projects would be governed was not subject to government 
consultation.
Sources of Influence: Leading commercial banks and the IFC, the main initiators of 
the Equator Principles, exerted influence primarily by virtue o f possessing economic 
resources and technical expertise in project management, credit risk processes, and 
financial analysis, and being recognized as a legitimate ‘honest broker’ in convening 
negotiations and leading discussions, respectively. By extension, the thesis finds 
support for a neo-liberal institutionalist interpretation that the transnationalization o f 
finance has created new policy spaces in which actors that operate transnationally and 
possess technical expertise that is seen to be globally applicable hold privileged 
positions over those whose objectives and interests are oriented towards particular 
states. Unlike other transnational governance processes based on an inclusive 
negotiating model that prioritized input legitimacy over expediency (such as the 
World Commission on Dams or the Extractive Industries Review), the Equator 
Principles were created by banking executives focused on improving environmental 
and social risk management processes as a means to reduce the reputational risk of 
project finance loans. In this context, the power o f actors in the drafting process was 
primarily based on their significance in the market as well as their experience with 
project finance, and their technical expertise in environmental and social risk 
management. This point is supported by the fact that commercial banks have 
continued to dominate the negotiating process in the aftermath o f the framework 
being launched. Since 2003, a network o f project finance executives at leading 
commercial banks have met regularly to discuss revisions to the framework and 
issues related to implementation, often alongside members o f Banktrack, the network 
o f environmental advocacy groups.
G overnance S tructure: The thesis finds support for a neo-liberal institutionalist 
hypothesis that the governance structure o f private governance would be driven by a 
concern for efficiency and generally conform to the logic o f transnational markets by 
encouraging harmonization and globally applicable standards. Its institutional design 
reflects how cooperation emerged because o f a collective interest among private 
actors to create or clarify legal liabilities, improve information quality and flows, and 
increase the efficiency o f interactions by reducing transactions costs.565
First, in terms clarifying legal liabilities, the Safeguard Policies had a long track 
record in development finance, and broadly conformed to national laws and 
regulations in many countries.566 As a result, applying them to project finance
565 Keohane (1982), p.338.
566 Several bank officials that took part in the negotiations noted that although the working group could 
have formulated a new set o f standards for commercially-oriented lenders, the pre-existence of global 
standards developed by a third party, such as the IFC’s Safeguard Policies, meant they were able to 
produce and agree upon a new industry standard for the global project finance market within seven 
months. ( EPFI-03; EPFI-06; EPFI-07; EPFI-08)
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transactions could absolve commercial banks from bearing moral and ethical, if  not 
legal, responsibilities towards local communities and the environment.
Secondly, in terms o f reducing information imperfections, aligning the Equator 
Principles with the dominant standard that existed in the market would reduce 
uncertainty among lenders and borrowers, and encourage the removal o f 
environmental and social risk management practices from the realm o f competition.
And third, in terms o f reducing transaction costs, the IFC’s framework was well 
suited for an increasingly globally integrated industry, in which the project finance 
portfolios o f commercial banks differed widely in their geographic and sectoral 
concentrations. 567 In addition, as most commercial project lenders had participated in 
IFC loan syndications, they had referred to its standards in their past practices, as had 
many o f their corporate clients in environmentally-sensitive sectors such as oil, gas 
and mining.
So while the content o f the framework was based on international norms, the 
governance structure was designed according to the strategic interests o f commercial 
banks negotiating the framework. Overall, the legitimacy o f the standards ensured 
that adopting them would mitigate the reputational risk in project financing, whereas 
creating a discretionary and informal governance structure allowed commercial banks 
to retain flexibility in integrating the standards into their own credit risk processes 
and apply them to their project financing.
W hy Norm s A re A dopted: In terms o f understanding why commercial banks 
adopted the norms (e.g. the Equator Principles), the analysis finds considerable 
support for a neo-liberal institutionalist argument which explains corporate behavior 
in the context o f the costs and benefits associated with different strategic choices. 
Returning to the ‘spiral model’ identified by Risse and Sikkink (1999), the adoption 
o f the Equator Principles was a tactical concession in the case o f  most banks, and an 
affirmation o f practice for a few others that consider compliance with the World 
Bank’s standards and procedures to be an aspect o f prudent risk management when 
financing particularly large projects in developing countries. Therefore, the thesis 
does not find support for the constructivist argument that a reconstitution o f identities 
and interests explains new rule+following behavior.
The level o f exposure to reputational risk explains which commercial banks showed 
the greatest interest in establishing an industry standard, and in the aftermath, which 
banks have been most aggressive in upgrading environmental and social risk 
management processes, consulting with environmental advocacy groups on issues 
related to reporting and implementation, and demonstrating compliance with the 
Equator Principles.
Indeed, the argument that the level o f reputational risk determine the level o f interest 
that different commercial banks had in creating the framework is supported by the
567 Lazarus (2004); EPFI-08.
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observation that leading commercial banks that were faced with significant 
reputational pressures had difficulties in inducing other less scrutinized banks that did 
not see a commercial justification for adopting the framework and investing in 
additional staff and risk management training to implement it. While the emergence 
and growing legitimacy of the norms in the multilateral system, and later in global 
finance, cannot be explained without reference to the interests o f powerful states and 
the actions o f environmental advocacy groups, the adoption o f the norms should be 
viewed in the context o f the corporate strategies and market positions o f commercial 
banks. This provides a basis for understanding why there are considerable disparities 
in environmental and social risk management practices between commercial banks 
operating in the same market.
The empirical analysis provides very little support for alternative explanations for 
why the ten commercial banks that initially adopted the framework did so. The 
validity o f  a realist explanation would depend on identifying some form o f state 
coercion as the impetus for commercial banks to adopt the norms. But complying 
with these norms is not formally required in most developing countries, and the IFC 
does not have any formal powers over commercial banks. In fact, the pace and 
direction o f negotiations was determined by the interests o f commercial banks during 
the process, and promoters o f the framework faced difficulties in convincing skeptical 
banks o f the need to adopt the norms despite the lack o f a regulatory obligation to do 
so. The fact that commercial banks were in a position to deselect aspects o f the IFC’s 
policy framework that they found objectionable, and their decision to build a 
significant level o f discretion and flexibility into the framework, supports the notion 
that negotiations were driven by the banks own interests, and not an external threat o f 
regulation.
Similarly, a constructivist approach which associates norm adoption with a 
reconstitution o f identities and interests overstates the extent to which commercial 
banks have internalized the norms. Revisiting the Risse and Sikkink (1999) ‘spiral 
model’, the adoption o f the Equator Principles amounted to a tactical concession for 
most banks, and should be viewed as an attempt to mitigate the reputational risk of 
financing. For others that already had fairly well-developed environmental and social 
risk management processes, adoption was both a tactical concession and a 
reaffirmation o f the legitimacy o f these norms. Therefore, a reconstitution o f 
identities and interests was not a precondition for adopting the norms, as doing so 
was fully compatible with their preexisting commercial interests in the global project 
finance market.
Instead o f manifesting a deeper transformation o f corporate identities, the Equator 
Principles reflected a broader trend among commercial banks to pay greater attention 
to risk management in their international operations in response to financial losses 
resulted from some private financing in developing countries in the 1990s.568 Thus,
568 For example, the financial support for APP in many ways epitomized how the absence of external 
pressure and long-term financial risk management led investors to absolve themselves of 
environmental and social responsibilities in favor of short-term profitability. According to one bank
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the Equator Principles can be seen in the broader context o f a continued improvement 
o f credit risk processes as an aspect o f enabling international diversification in project 
finance portfolios. As part o f  this, the management o f reputational risks became an 
important imperative for those commercial banks that positioned themselves in the 
market as financiers o f large-scale project transactions in developing countries. 
Whereas the potential financial losses o f project risks were commonly confined to a 
single project, reputational risks associated with a specific project could adversely 
affect every division o f the bank. Therefore, reputational risk management associated 
with project financing was much more o f a corporate-wide concern than other 
product-specific risk policies In turn, adopting the Equator Principles was not only a 
decision that affected project finance units within banks, but concerned the identity o f 
the bank as a whole, and in particular, the reputation o f their global corporate 
brand.569
Conclusion
This thesis has considered the emergence o f the Equator Principles in order to 
advance our understanding o f  how and why private actors are increasingly creating 
new forms o f transnational institutions to govern corporate environmental and social 
practices. Given the growing prevalence o f such institutions in global environmental 
governance, the thesis hopes to make a timely and constructive contribution to the 
study o f international relations.
In concluding this thesis, two points should be made in relation to its broader 
contribution to further research on private governance formation; its implications for 
understanding norm emergence and diffusion in transnational markets, and its 
implications for the ongoing debate about the relative power o f states and markets in 
an increasingly integrated global economy.
This case study illustrates the importance o f considering the institutional features o f 
markets in order to explain why institutionalized cooperation between private actors 
emerges.
First, an important observation made in this thesis is that the success o f norm 
entrepreneurs targeting private actors is in large part determined by the characteristics 
o f market transactions. Environmental advocacy groups have struggled to establish
official close to the project, investors were drawn to the political connections of the company and the 
security it could provide, not foreseeing the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998; ‘When we 
approved the credit for millions o f US dollars, we just signed and never asked in detail about the risks 
o f the business.’ (Anonymous, quoted in Pirard, R and Rokhim, R (2006), Asia Pulp and Paper 
Indonesia: The business rationale that led to forest degradation andfinancial collapse, Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Working Paper No. 33,2006, p.4.
569 As Paul Clements-Hunt, the Head o f UNEP’s Finance Initiative, noted, ‘adopting voluntary codes 
o f conduct should be seen as an initial defensive reaction that creates a positive fa?ade for a collective 
group o f corporations in relation to issues raised in the public space.’ (Paul Clements-Hunt, personal 
interview, January 25, 2006)
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with absolute certainty what the proceeds o f bond purchases or corporate loans will 
be used for, as evidenced by the failure to stem the flow o f bond financing to the 
Three Gorges Dam project. As a result, they have been less effective in inducing 
changes in investment practices in these financial markets. In contrast, when financial 
institutions provide financing directly to projects, environmental advocacy groups are 
better able to clearly establish funding relationships and allocate blame for negative 
development impacts. As a result, even though corporate lending and bond financing 
dwarfs project financing in volume, it is less scrutinized by environmental advocacy 
groups, simply because the structure o f these markets makes it difficult to ‘frame’ a 
convincing story that implicates financial institutions into particular environmental 
and social harms. This in large parts explains why a framework like to Equator 
Principles has not emerged in other financial markets.
Secondly, the case o f the Equator Principles reveals how collective action problems 
among private actors are reduced in concentrated markets with a high degree o f 
interaction between participants. While competitive, the project finance market is 
quite unique in that market participants frequently collaborate and therefore have a 
strategic interest in retaining good relationships with each other. The fact that co­
financing through syndications, often involving both public and private lender, is the 
most common mechanism to capitalize large-scale infrastructure projects means that 
project finance executives had developed strong professional relationships with each 
other and established a basic level o f trust that was essential for forging the kind o f 
cooperation that arose in conjunction with the Equator Principles. Given that private 
governance is typically much more informally initiated and negotiated, the strength of 
relationships between key executives in the industry can become an important 
determinant as to whether cooperation materializes.
And third, although a reputational risk did emerge because o f the activities of 
transnational advocacy groups, and indirectly, because o f the preexistence o f a 
multilateral policy framework that clearly de-legitimated project financing that did 
not comply with environmental and social norms, commercial banks had the power to 
decide how and when to act. While societal expectations have indeed risen with the 
emergence o f the Equator Principles, potentially increasing the reputational (and by 
extension commercial) cost of norm violations, commercial banks still retain the 
flexibility to integrate these normative obligations as they see fit, and are not 
externally accountable to those affected by their decisions. Therefore, as predicted by 
the IFC itself, the threat o f a damaged reputation remains the primary enforcement 
mechanism for voluntary business regulation o f this kind.570 While voluntary 
regulation has been successful in inducing corporate behavioral changes in some 
circumstances, it is not effective in inducing changes to corporate behavior in cases 
where markets suffer from imperfect information, or consumers and shareholders do 
not call for more responsible corporate conduct.
In this context, the emergence o f the Equator Principles only represents a success 
story for transnational advocacy groups promoting greater accountability and
570 See Klein and Harford (2004).
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transparency in global finance against the backdrop o f the growing power o f financial 
institutions in an increasingly global financial marketplace. The voluntary framework 
is indeed unique in financial markets, and only came about because o f a set o f very 
favorable circumstances, notably the market structure o f project finance, the rise o f 
public pressure, the preexistence o f a feasible industry standard, and the leadership of 
a small group o f commercial banks. Given these observations, it is hard to see how a 
similarly specific and operational framework for environmental and social risk 
management could emerge in other areas o f finance in the near future, including 
corporate lending, bonds or private equity, where its impact may be much greater.
The best hope is for the Equator Principles to be a normative reference framework to 
inform policy development in other areas o f finance.
What this tells us is that in terms o f ‘greening’ those transnational markets that states 
are unwilling or incapable o f regulating, the obstacles and opportunities for voluntary 
regulation, never mind externally accountable rules, are primarily presented by the 
structure o f the market and the institutional environment o f market participants. As an 
example, the institutionalized norms and rules regarding client confidentiality 
significantly constrain the opportunities for making project finance transactions more 
transparent. Similarly, the growing tendency to syndicate and securitize investments 
in developing countries makes it increasingly difficult for external observers to 
‘follow the money’ and associate environmental and social harms with particular 
investors. In this context, the reputational mechanism will fall short, as its 
effectiveness depends on the ability o f norm entrepreneurs to clearly demonstrate that 
actors are engaging in illegitimate and inappropriate behavior, and be able to 
sufficiently sanction those that fail to comply. 1
Yet, the framework is unlikely to be embedded in structures that enable independent 
monitoring and ensure public accountability. This leads us to the second point. Given 
resilience o f voluntary regulation to external pressures from advocacy groups, what 
does the emergence o f private governance tell us about the evolving relationship 
between public and private actors in international relations? An increasingly 
observable pattern is that international organizations are putting their legitimacy and 
political weight behind voluntary market-based regulation that largely depends on 
reputational mechanisms. Public authority is increasingly converging with new forms 
o f private authority to promote non-hierarchical forms o f regulation that address 
governance gaps produced by processes o f transnationalization. Realizing that 
adopting a code o f conduct marks the beginning o f sustainable business, and not and 
end in itself, international organizations are trying to facilitate ‘social learning’ in the 
corporate sector by organizing business networks that encourage the sharing o f 
knowledge and information about responsible corporate conduct. In doing so, they 
encourage the integration o f national and international laws and regulations into 
voluntary frameworks that consist o f largely aspirational principles around which 
private actors are expected to converge.
571 See Newell (2001a), pp.101-105, for a discussion on how environmental NGOs depend on broader 
support from consumers and shareholders to effectively pressure TNCs.
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As such, the emergence o f the Equator Principles is less about the decline o f state 
authority in IPE, as perhaps a transformation o f its social purpose.572 In fact, 
international organizations have a long history o f drafting voluntary codes for TNCs 
that draw on institutionalized norms in the international system. As early as 1977, the 
U.N established the Centre on TNCs (UNCTC), which coordinated the negotiation of 
a Draft Code o f  Conduct on TNCs that affirmed their obligation to respect national 
laws and legislation, and respect a variety o f environmental and social norms and 
principles.5 3 To counter the threat posed by this code, the OECD member states 
began the drafting o f the precursor to the Guidelines fo r  Multinational Enterprises, 
which initially stressed the obligation o f countries to offer better national treatment to 
TNCs in accordance with international law.574 Another example is the ILO’s 
Tripartite Declaration o f  Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy, which contained principles related to environmental protection, workers’ 
rights and the denouncement o f bribery.
More recently, the Global Compact, launched by the U.N Secretary General at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 1999, has become the 
overarching framework for corporate social responsibility, tying in companies across 
countries and sectors. Its stated objective is to integrate environmental and social 
concerns into corporate practices, and encourage business to make investments in 
support o f the development goals o f the U.N. Furthermore, it acts as social arena 
for a wide variety o f  international organizations to interact and form partnerships with 
private actors.576 It is comprised o f nested networks o f private corporations 
administered by a small, formal secretariat, which are meant to diffuse into markets a 
set o f  ten principles based on norms and values embedded in four international 
agreements; the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, the Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work o f the ILO, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, and the U.N Convention Against Corruption. The more than 2,400 
companies that have thus far adopted the framework are expected to become 
advocates o f the principles in their respective markets, and report annually on lessons 
they have derived from applying them in their business operations.577
In the financial sector, a variety o f guidelines and voluntary codes o f conduct have 
recently emerged, most o f them products o f public-private partnerships between 
international organizations and private financial institutions. Among them, the
572 For a discussion, see Falkner (2003), pp.75-78, and Lipschutz and Fogel (2002). As Higgott et.al 
(2000) suggest, the central question in contemporary IPE is to better understand how relations between 
non-state actors and states is changing and affected by transnationalism and an evolving global order. 
(P-6)
573 Bendell (2004), p.l 1, and Muchlinski (1997).
574 According to Muchlinski (1997), the use o f international law as the benchmark for national 
obligations meant the OECD Guidelines were at odds with the Draft UN Code, as the latter 
emphasized national policy autonomy in devising laws and regulations for foreign enterprises and 
investors.
575 Clapp (2005).
576 Therien and Pouilot (2006), p.60.
577 Ruggie (2002).
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UNEP’s Finance Initiative is the most widely adopted voluntary framework, with 
over 160 signatories. It was bom shortly before the Rio Summit in 1992, when UNEP 
initiated a partnership with a selected group o f commercial banks, which led them to 
formulate and adopt a Statement by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable 
Development. In 1995, the UNEP Insurance Industry Initiative (UNEP III) was 
launched for the insurance industry, and following a merger in 2003, these two policy 
initiatives formed UNEP FI.578 In contrast to the Global Compact and the OECD 
Guidelines, the statements do not make explicit references to any U.N treaties or 
conventions, instead listing a series o f voluntary commitments to integrate norms and 
values into investment practices, such as applying the precautionary principle to 
environmental risk management.
Thus, the collective legitimation o f voluntary business regulation by international 
organizations is not an entirely recent phenomenon, yet is becoming an increasingly 
important aspect o f global environmental governance, and is placing private 
governance within a broader ‘shadow o f hierarchy’. But significantly, despite 
material and discursive ties to international organizations and institutions, private 
governance o f this kind largely remains externally unaccountable, and therefore 
provides limited policy space for norm entrepreneurs that wish to challenge voluntary 
institutional forms. Whereas transnational advocacy groups will remain influential in 
triggering reactive policy development in transnational markets, the structure o f 
markets and the growing need to provide commercial justifications for environmental 
policy severely limits their leverage. As such, norm contests that pit concerns about 
environmental protection and social justice up against the institutionalized norms and 
practices o f transnational business will continue to be a dominant feature o f global 
environmental governance. This underscores the point that governance at the 
transnational level should be conceptualized as a continuous and deeply contested 
process, and not as a consensual outcome o f bargaining processes between different 
classes o f actors.
578 Following revisions in 2004, these statements are now formally referred to as the UNEP Statement 
by Financial Institutions on the Environment and Sustainable Development and the UNEP Statement 
o f Environmental Commitment for the Insurance Industry.
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APPENDIX 1 -  THE EQUA TOR PRINCIPLES
4 June 2003
THE ‘EQUATOR PRINCIPLES’ AN INDUSTRY APPROACH FOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN DETERMINING, ASSESSING AND MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL & 
SOCIAL RISK IN PROJECT FINANCING
PREAM BLE
Project financing plays an important role in financing development throughout the world. In providing 
financing, particularly in emerging markets, project financiers often encounter environmental and 
social policy issues. We recognize that our role as financiers affords us significant opportunities to 
promote responsible environmental stewardship and socially responsible development. In adopting 
these principles, we seek to ensure that the projects we finance are developed in a manner that is 
socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices. We believe that adoption 
o f and adherence to these principles offers significant benefits to ourselves, our customers and other 
stakeholders. These principles will foster our ability to document and manage our risk exposures to 
environmental and social matters associated with the projects we finance, thereby allowing us to 
engage proactively with our stakeholders on environmental and social policy issues. Adherence to 
these principles will allow us to work with our customers in their management o f environmental and 
social policy issues relating to their investments in the emerging markets. These principles are 
intended to serve as a common baseline and framework for the implementation of our individual, 
internal environmental and social procedures and standards for our project financing activities across 
all industry sectors globally. In adopting these principles, we undertake to review carefully all 
proposals for which our customers request project financing. We will not provide loans directly to 
projects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply with our environmental and social policies 
and processes.
S T  A  TEM EN T O F PRINCIPLES
We will only provide loans directly to projects in the following circumstances:
1. We have categorised the risk o f a project in accordance with internal guidelines based upon the 
environmental and social screening criteria o f the IFC as described in the attachment to these 
Principles (Exhibit I).
2. For all Category A and Category B projects, the borrower has completed an Environmental 
Assessment (EA), the preparation of which is consistent with the outcome of our categorisation 
process and addresses to our satisfaction key environmental and social issues identified during the 
categorisation process.
3. In the context o f the business of the project, as applicable, the EA report has addressed:
a) assessment o f the baseline environmental and social conditions
b) requirements under host country laws and regulations, applicable international treaties and 
agreements.
c) sustainable development and use of renewable natural resources
d) protection of human health, cultural properties, and biodiversity, including endangered species and 
sensitive ecosystems
e) use of dangerous substances
f) major hazards
g) occupational health and safety
h) fire prevention and life safety
i) socioeconomic impacts
j)  land acquisition and land use 
k) involuntary resettlement
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1) impacts on indigenous peoples and communities
m) cumulative impacts of existing projects, the proposed project, and anticipated future projects 
n) participation o f affected parties in the design, review and implementation of the project 
o) consideration o f feasible environmentally and socially preferable alternatives 
p) efficient production, delivery and use o f energy
q) pollution prevention and waste minimization, pollution controls (liquid effluents and air emissions) 
and solid and chemical waste management
Note: In each case, the EA will have addressed compliance with applicable host country laws, 
regulations and permits required by the project. Also, reference will have been made to the minimum 
standards applicable under the World Bank and IFC Pollution Prevention and Abatement Guidelines 
(Exhibit III) and, for projects located in low and middle income countries as defined by the World 
Bank Development Indicators Database
(http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm), the EA will have further taken into 
account the then applicable IFC Safeguard Policies (Exhibit II). In each case, the EA will have 
addressed, to our satisfaction, the project’s overall compliance with (or justified deviations from) the 
respective above-referenced Guidelines and Safeguard Policies.
4. For all Category A projects, and as considered appropriate for Category B projects, the borrower or 
third party expert has prepared an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) which draws on the 
conclusions of the EA. The EMP has addressed mitigation, action plans, monitoring, management of 
risk and schedules.
5. For all Category A projects and, as considered appropriate for Category B projects, we are satisfied 
that the borrower or third party expert has consulted, in a structured and culturally appropriate way, 
with project affected groups, including indigenous peoples and local NGOs. The EA, or a summary 
thereof, has been made available to the public for a reasonable minimum period in local language and 
in a culturally appropriate manner. The EA and the EMP will take account o f such consultations, and 
for Category A Projects, will be subject to independent expert review.
6. The borrower has covenanted to:
a) comply with the EMP in the construction and operation of the project
b) provide regular reports, prepared by in-house staff or third party experts, on compliance with the 
EMP and,
c) where applicable, decommission the facilities in accordance with an agreed Decommissioning Plan.
7. As necessary, lenders have appointed an independent environmental expert to provide additional 
monitoring and reporting services.
8. In circumstances where a borrower is not in compliance with its environmental and social 
covenants, such that any debt financing would be in default, we will engage the borrower in its efforts 
to seek solutions to bring it back into compliance with its covenants.
9. These principles apply to projects with a total capital cost o f $50 million or more. The adopting 
institutions view these principles as a framework for developing individual, internal practices and 
policies. As with all internal policies, these principles do not create any rights in, or liability to, any 
person, public or private. Banks are adopting and implementing these principles voluntarily and 
independently, without reliance on or recourse to IFC or the World Bank.
EXHIBIT I: ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SCREENING PROCESS 
Environmental screening of each proposed project shall be undertaken to determine the appropriate 
extent and type of EA. Proposed projects will be classified into one of three categories, depending on 
the type, location, sensitivity, and scale o f the project and the nature and magnitude o f its potential 
environmental and social impacts.
Category A: A proposed project is classified as Category A if it is likely to have
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significant adverse environmental impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented. A 
potential impact is considered ‘sensitive’ if it may be irreversible (e.g., lead to loss o f a major natural 
habitat) or affect vulnerable groups or ethnic minorities, involve involuntary displacement or 
resettlement, or affect significant cultural heritage sites. These impacts may affect an area broader than 
the sites or facilities subject to physical works. EA for a Category A project examines the project's 
potential negative and positive environmental impacts, compares them with those o f feasible 
alternatives (including, the ‘without project’ situation), and recommends any measures needed to 
prevent, minimize, mitigate, or compensate for adverse impacts and improve environmental 
performance. A full environmental assessment is required which is normally an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA).
Category B: A proposed project is classified as Category B if  its potential adverse environmental 
impacts on human populations or environmentally important areas—  including wetlands, forests, 
grasslands, and other natural habitats— are less adverse than those o f Category A projects. These 
impacts are site-specific; few if  any of them are irreversible; and in most cases mitigatory measures 
can be designed more readily than for Category A projects. The scope of EA for a Category B project 
may vary from project to project, but it is narrower than that o f Category A EA. Like Category A EA, 
it examines the project's potential negative and positive environmental impacts and recommends any 
measures needed to prevent, minimize, mitigate, or compensate for adverse impacts and 
improve environmental performance.
Category C: A proposed project is classified as Category C if  it is likely to have minimal 
or no adverse environmental impacts. Beyond screening, no further EA action is required 
for a Category C project.
EXHIBIT II: IFC SAFEGUARD PO LICIES
As of 4 June 2003, the following is a list o f IFC Safeguard Policies:
Environmental Assessment, OP 4.01 (October 1998)
Natural Habitats, OP 4.04 (November 1998)
Pest Management, OP 4.09 (November 1998)
Forestry, OP 4.36 (November 1998)
Safety o f Dams, OP 4.37 (September 1996)
Indigenous Peoples, OD 4.20 (September 1991)
Involuntary Resettlement, OP 4.30 (June 1990)
Cultural Property, OPN 11.03 (September 1986)
Child and Forced Labor, Policy Statement (March 1998)
International Waterways, OP 7.50 (November 1998)*
*Note: The principal requirements relate to the role o f IFC as a multi-lateral agency and notification 
requirements between riparian states which are generally outside the remit o f private sector operators 
or funders. It is referenced for the sake o f completeness. The substantive elements of good practice 
with respect to environmental and social aspects therein are fully covered by OP 4.01.
EXHIBIT III: W ORLD BANK AND IFC SPECIFIC GUIDELINES
As of 4 June 2003, IFC is using two sets o f guidelines for its projects.
1. IFC is using all the environmental guidelines contained in the World Bank Pollution Prevention and 
Abatement Handbook (PPAH). This Handbook went into official use on July 1, 1998.
2. IFC is also using a series o f environmental, health and safety guidelines that were written by IFC 
staff in 1991-1993 and for which there are no parallel guidelines in the Pollution Prevention and 
Abatement Handbook. Ultimately new guidelines, incorporating the concepts o f cleaner production 
and environmental management systems, will be written to replace this series o f IFC guidelines. When 
completed these new guidelines will also be included in the Pollution Prevention and Abatement
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Handbook. Where no sector specific guideline exists for a particular project then the World Bank 
General Environmental Guidelines and the IFC General Health and Safety Guideline will be applied, 
with modifications as necessary to suit the project.*
The table below lists both the World Bank Guidelines and the IFC Guidelines.
World Bank Guidelines (PPAH)
1. Aluminum Manufacturing
2. Base Metal and Iron Ore Mining
3. Breweries
4. Cement Manufacturing
5. Chlor-Alkali Plants
6. Coal Mining and Production
7. Coke Manufacturing
8. Copper Smelting
9. Dairy Industry
10. Dye Manufacturing
11. Electronics Manufacturing
12. Electroplating Industry
13. Foundries
14. Fruit and Vegetable Processing
15. General Environmental Guidelines
16. Glass Manufacturing
17. Industrial Estates
18. Iron and Steel Manufacturing
19. Lead and Zinc Smelting
20. Meat Processing and Rendering
21. Mini Steel Mills
22. Mixed Fertilizer Plants
23. Monitoring
24. Nickel Smelting and Refining
25. Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plants
26. Oil and Gas Development (Onshore)
27. Pesticides Formulation
28. Pesticides Manufacturing
29. Petrochemicals Manufacturing
30. Petroleum Refining
31. Pharmaceutical Manufacturing
32. Phosphate Fertilizer Plants
33. Printing Industry
34. Pulp and Paper Mills
35. Sugar Manufacturing
36. Tanning and Leather Finishing
37. Textiles Industry
38. Thermal Power Guidelines for New Plants
39. Thermal Power Rehabilitation of Existing Plants
40. Vegetable Oil Processing
41. Wood Preserving Industry
IFC Guidelines
1. Airports
2. Ceramic Tile Manufacturing
3. Construction Materials Plants
4. Electric Power Transmission and Distribution
5. Fish Processing
6. Food and Beverage Processing
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7. Forestry Operations: Logging
8. Gas Terminal Systems
9. General Health and Safety
10. Health Care
11. Geothermal Projects
12. Hazardous Materials Management
13. Hospitals
14. Office Buildings
15. Offshore Oil & Gas
16. Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)
17. Pesticide Handling and Application
18. Plantations
19. Port and Harbor Facilities
20. Rail Transit Systems
21. Roads and Highways
22. Telecommunications
23. Tourism and Hospitality Development
24. Wildland Manage
25. Wind Energy Conversion Systems
26. Wood Products Industries
27. Waste Management Facilities
28. Wastewater Reuse
* Exception (the following are World Bank Guidelines not contained in the PPAH and 
currently in use)
Mining and Milling - Underground 
Mining and Milling - Open Pit
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APPENDIX 2 -  RESEARCH INTERVIEWS
LAST NAME FIRST
NAME
TITLE EMPLOY
ER
DATE CODE
1 Burrett Richard Managing Director o f Sustainable Development ABN Amro 03/05/06 redacted
2 Mulder Herman Former Vice-President for Group Risk Management ABN Amro 22/11/06 redacted
3 Cochard Eric Head, Project Finance and Sustainable Development Calyon 24/11/06 redacted
4 Smith Justin Senior Manager, Governance and Sustainability and 
Nedbank Enterprise Governance and Compliance
Nedbank 09/05/06 redacted
5 Hancock Martin Chief Operating Officer Westpac 15/05/06 redacted
6 Abu Baba Director o f Sustainable Banking RBS 20/11/06 redacted
7 Diebert Foster Head of Sustainability M anagem ent1 West LB 11/05/06 redacted
8 Miller Shawn Director, Environmental and Social Risk Management, 
Global Corporate and Investment Bank. Former NGO 
Liason Officer, IFC.
CitiGroup,
Ex-IFC
20/12/05
and
09/03/06
redacted
9 Flaherty Pam Senior Vice President for Global Community Relations Citigroup 08/03/06 redacted
10 Sullivan Francis Deputy Head, Group Sustainable Development HSBC 19/07/06 redacted
11 Rico Stephanie Spokeswoman Wells Fargo 26/04/06 redacted
12 Kubusch Jens Credit Analyst in Sustainability Management HVB redacted
13 Evans James Senior Manager, Environmental Risk Management RBC 08/11/06 redacted
14 Schreve Leonie Adviser, Corporate Social Responsibility ING 04/05/06
and
11/04/07
redacted
15 Williams Jon Head o f Group Sustainable Development HSBC 27/04/06 redacted
16 Bray Chris Head o f Environmental Risk Policy Management Barclays 13/04/06 redacted
17 Murray Gavin Director Institutional and Corporate Sustainability at 
ANZ. Former Director, Environment and Social 
Development Department, IFC.
ANZ, Ex-IFC 20/12/05 redacted
18 Kyte Rachel Director o f the Environment and Social Development 
Department
IFC 03/06/05 redacted
19 Sheahan Bemie Director o f the Advisory Services Department IFC 03/06/05 redacted
20 Lazarus Suellen Senior Advisor, ABN AMRO Bank, former Director of 
Loan Syndications, IFC.
ABN Amro, 
Ex-IFC
19/05/05 redacted
21 Armstrong Glen Co-Founder, Sustainable Finance Ltd., Former Senior 
Adviser on Sustainable Development, IFC.
Sustainable 
Finance Ltd., 
Ex-IFC
11/01/06
and
20/11/06
redacted
22 Chan-Fishel Michelle Manager, Green Investments Program FOE-US 23/01/06 redacted
23 Hogue Ilyse Director, Global Finance Campaign RAN 26/01/06 redacted
24 Frijns Johan Coordinator Banktrack 03/05/06 redacted
25 Pols Donald Leader, Climate and Energy Campaign FOE-NL 11/05/06 redacted
26 Chappie Alice Director, Centre for Sustainable Investment Forum for the 
Future
20/11/06 redacted
27 Sohn Jon Senior Associate on the International Financial Flows 
and the Environment Project
WRI 02/03/06 redacted
28 Clements-Hunt Paul Head, UNEP Finance Initiative UNEP 25/01/06 redacted
29 Robins Nick Head of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Funds Henderson
Global
Investors
06/07/06
and
20/04/07
redacted
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